

Outlaws and Barbarians: The Bush Administration's Revolution in Sovereignty

by Eric Patterson and Kendra Puryear

State sovereignty is the foundation of international relations. It defines the primary actors of international life, is the basis for international law and organizations, and has been the central organizing principle of global affairs for 350 years. However, in recent years there have been schemes, some visionary and others harebrained, to reframe the axiom of sovereignty because it can lead to repressive regimes types.

The US has generally supported the principle of sovereignty, even in cases of governments it has found repugnant. This is no longer the case. Since September 11, the Bush administration has clearly articulated a revised conception of sovereignty, one that is conditionally based on international security, domestic political legitimacy, and democracy. Moreover, President Bush has backed words with deeds in the global War on Terror. The Bush administration is calling for substantive changes to the concept of sovereignty in international relations by discriminating against “outlaws” and this has profound consequences for US foreign policy and international politics in the twenty-first century.

REVOLUTIONS IN SOVEREIGNTY

State sovereignty is a relatively new historical concept. For millennia, other political units, from tribes to empires, were “sovereign.” However, since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the notion of sovereign states has slowly spread around the globe. One way of understanding the omnipresence of the statist model of international relations is that it constitutes and structures the world system. Daniel Philpott argues that international society has an unwritten constitution made up of the norms and mores practiced by states. Philpott argues that such a constitution of international society answers three questions: Who are the legitimate polities? What are the rules of becoming a polity? What are the basic prerogatives of the polities? He calls these the “three faces of authority” and argues that, in the past 400 years, there have been two macro-level “revolutions in sovereignty.” The first was the seventeenth-century institution of the sovereignty principle following a century of bloody religious warfare in the wake of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation

Eric Patterson is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Vanguard University. He was awarded a William C. Foster Fellowship in the Bureau of Political and Military Affairs, US Department of State (2005–2006). He is the author/editor of two books, a book-length manuscript on revising just war theory in light of the War on Terror, and numerous journal articles. **Kendra Puryear** is a research assistant in the Department of History and Political Science at Vanguard University. The authors thank Dennis McNutt for valuable comments on the original manuscript.

(Westphalia). The second occurred in the twentieth century with the post-war breakdown of empires and the globalization of the principles of sovereignty and representative government.¹

The Bush administration is attempting to redefine the “faces of authority” and advance a twenty-first century, liberal vision of sovereignty.

Philpott’s analysis is important because he recognizes that “it takes a revolution in ideas to bring a revolution in sovereignty.”² Some would argue that globalization is causing such a revolution. However, there is no true “revolution in sovereignty” unless a major state or states go beyond rhetoric to act in a way that inaugurates a new paradigm. This paper argues that the Bush administration is advancing such a revolution in sovereignty. In the aftermath of September 11, the Bush administration is attempting to redefine the “faces of authority” and advance a twenty-first century, liberal vision of sovereignty. Thus, the questions before political scientists are threefold. First, what is the traditional sovereignty paradigm? Second, how has the Bush administration reconceptualized sovereignty after September 11? Finally, how likely is the administration’s view of sovereignty to take hold in the twenty-first century?

THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF SOVEREIGNTY

The traditional view of sovereignty is rooted in the Westphalian understanding that the state of international affairs is anarchic. Such anarchy does not necessarily mean chaos or continuous violent warfare; rather, it means the nonexistence of a supranational government. Scholars such as Kenneth Waltz have characterized this anarchy as an ordered self-help system, populated by actors (states) with similar interests, playing balance-of-power politics.³ In short, the Westphalian system is structured around autonomous sovereign states with no temporal governing authority above them.

The consequence of this was the notion that states were constituted by their monopoly of force within a given territory. The intent of international jurists was that force would be limited and centralized as a function of the effective state. The reality was twofold: Westphalia delegitimized intervention of any kind across borders and essentially gave regimes a free hand to do as they wished within their realm.

In practice, the traditional view of sovereignty is based on the mutual recognition of states by other states. Such recognition entitles one to privileged status in world affairs—a status enjoyed by the likes of Togo and Estonia but not California or even Taiwan. International recognition brought with it the cardinal rights of statehood: domestic autonomy and, in theory, security from external intervention.

Notice that the traditional discourse of sovereignty is one of rights, not responsibility; entitlement, not morality. Sovereignty was a heuristic notion that

became the cornerstone of the international order, and has been immensely useful in defining roles and relationships in international life. As one scholar puts it, “For many purposes, sovereignty rules have been attractive and stabilizing. They have established the political equivalent of property rights. They have facilitated the conclusion of treaties—contracts among states. They have made it easier to define transgressions.”⁴

Of course, anarchy could be dangerous, but the Westphalian system was an improvement over the less stable century and a half of violence and confusion that prevailed prior to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.⁵ Moreover, the destructiveness of two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century led to innovations in the Westphalian model. Most importantly, the UN Charter and other post-war treaties reestablished the illegitimacy of military intervention (conquest), reinforced the primacy of the state in international relations, and developed international organizations and treaties designed to protect the sovereignty and security of states. A further evolution of Westphalia was the globalization of liberal principles designed to protect human life in situations of war or state collapse. Of course, the primary purpose of these international organizations and treaties was international security, but a secondary mandate, particularly in recent decades, was the alleviation of human suffering.

Over time, such institutions as the UN and its associates developed supranational characteristics. Indeed, since the 1970s, a growing chorus of scholars and activists has urged that the world community move beyond state sovereignty to a world government. Doing so would dispose of such arcane notions as international anarchy and sovereignty.⁶

In short, the old model of sovereignty viewed international life as characterized by independent states operating in an evolving environment of anarchy that was increasingly interconnected by international organizations and treaties. Nevertheless, the first principles of state independence, sovereignty, and nonintervention persist as the foundational principles of international affairs.

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S VIEW OF SOVEREIGNTY

The Bush administration has consistently argued that September 11 transformed the international system. Yet, from the pronouncements of the administration, it is somewhat unclear if the president believes that September 11 itself changed the world, or if the world was already changing during the 1990s and it took the airliner attacks on New York and Washington, DC, to call the world to action.

In any event, the public statements of the administration advance, in numerous ways, a different conception of sovereignty from the understanding previously advocated by US government officials. In short, President Bush’s view of international life discriminates between a civilized society of states and a lawless periphery, and his notion of sovereignty is based on domestic security and political freedom rather than recognition by other states and the principle of nonintervention.

Most scholars and government officials in the 1990s viewed international affairs as characterized by an evolving Westphalian model with an increasing respect for the rule of international law, including the principle of nonintervention, and an increasingly complex interdependence among societies. Such scholarship suggests the rise of international ethics based on international law and practice. Since September 11, the Bush administration flatly disagrees that law characterizes global affairs. Before diverse audiences, the president and his advisors have distinguished between two zones of international life. The first is the “community of nations.” The administration calls this group “civilized,” meaning that it is characterized by representative domestic government, adherence to international treaties, and is bound by various normative and institutionalized relationships. As President Bush says, “once again, this nation and all our friends are all that stand between a world at peace, and a world of chaos and constant alarm.”⁷⁷ President Bush views the Western hemisphere, Europe, Australia, and parts of East Asia as falling within this category.

In contrast, President Bush sees entire regions as “uncivilized” and barbaric. The president called the Taliban a “barbaric regime” and trumpeted, “the United States is an enemy of those who aid terrorists and of the barbaric criminals who profane a great religion by committing murder in its name.”⁷⁸ The borders of civilization are populated with failed states, rogue and outlaw regimes, and areas beyond the control of domestic authorities, as, for example, Western Pakistan. President Bush also points to the existence of transnational “stateless networks” and terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda who reject the Westphalian system of states and the norms of the civilized world: “They [terrorists] hide and they plot in over sixty different countries...This enemy lives like a parasite. They plot in the shadows. They prey on failed states. And they ally themselves with outlawed regimes...”⁷⁹ In sum, the administration holds a view of international anarchy that is less like that of Kenneth Waltz and more like that of Thomas Hobbes, who wrote,

During the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition called war, and such a war, as if of every man, against every man...To this war this also is consequent, that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law, where no law, no injustice.¹⁰

The Bush administration’s dualistic view of the world is the basis for a conditional view of sovereignty: civilized states are sovereign; uncivilized ones are not. This has ramifications for state recognition. The conventional view of sovereignty was that states were sovereign when they were recognized by other states. Such recognition had little or nothing to do with domestic legitimacy, regime type, or the quality of human rights within their borders. The old view of sovereignty was that governments would “live and let live” other states that exercised control over a given territory. This external view of sovereignty presupposed that states monopolized destructive force within their borders.¹¹

The Bush administration does not entirely discount the value of the traditional

view of sovereignty based on the recognition of states. On the one hand, the administration agrees that international legitimacy is important for sovereignty. However, the Bush administration argues that states should only recognize as legitimate other states that guarantee regional security as well as individual freedoms to their citizens. President Bush asserts, “our aim is to build and preserve a community of free and independent nations, with governments that answer to their citizens and reflect their own cultures. And because democracies respect their own people and their neighbors, the advance of freedom will lead to peace.”¹²

On the other hand, in some cases, existing international recognition is not a sufficient criterion for sovereignty. Instead, the administration borrows directly from Woodrow Wilson in asserting that sovereignty is based on domestic political legitimacy. Indeed, the administration routinely asserts an “internal” view of sovereignty—sovereignty which rests in the “nation” or “the people,” not the government. President Bush argues, “[all] people have a right to choose their own government and determine their own destiny—and the United States supports their aspirations to live in freedom.”¹³ In short, regime type, not a UN delegation, determines sovereignty. Regimes that are representative in nature are legitimate due to the liberal principles of individual liberty and “consent of the governed.” In contrast, regimes that abdicate their responsibilities by repressing segments of their population are not legitimate and do not represent the sovereignty inherent in the population. As President Bush states, “the only force powerful enough to stop the rise of tyranny and terror, and replace hatred with hope, is the force of human freedom.”¹⁴

As hinted above, a corollary to the internal sovereignty principle is the Bush administration’s view that numerous states, or actors within those states, are threats to international security. Therefore, the administration argues that states or regions that represent a threat to international security are not sovereign. Another way of saying this is that sovereignty is conditionally based on domestic legitimacy as well as international security concerns. Failed states such as Somalia and Afghanistan that not only had repressive warlords who terrorized their populace, but that also created regional instability due to refugee flows and lack of domestic security, are not sovereign. They have no sovereign rights because they failed to live up to the responsibilities of sovereignty. Interestingly, Kofi Annan has recently made a similar point,

*We must also remember that state sovereignty carries responsibilities as well as rights, including the responsibility to protect citizens from genocide or other mass atrocities. When states fail to live up to this responsibility, it passes to the international community...*¹⁵

In short, the geographical centers of activity by non-state actors such as international criminal cartels or terrorist networks—“stateless” spaces—are not protected by the old doctrine of sovereignty from preventive and punitive action by the US. President Bush and then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice have both said that this is “a new type of war” and that they “are going to take this fight

to the enemy.”¹⁶

The impetus for this conditional view of sovereignty is partly based on the destructive potential of some non-state actors. Traditional sovereignty was based not only on the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force, but also on the practical reality of the past four centuries that only states held the most destructive engines of war. Terrorist acts of the past decade, such as the Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack in Japan, the 2001 anthrax attacks in the US, and the bombing of the USS Cole, demonstrate the globalization of destructive technologies. The president responds thus, “it doesn’t matter where they—where they hide, we’re after them, one by one. We follow them wherever they run.”¹⁷

This Texas Ranger-style challenge is a declaration of a new type of war: the deliberate targeting of stateless actors in their geographical concentrations. The reality is that those geographical hubs are within the boundaries of states, but in the administration’s view, those states do not exercise sovereignty in those areas and therefore the US can act. As Rice said, “we live in an age of terror, in which ruthless enemies seek to destroy not only our nation and not only to destroy all free nations but to destroy freedom as a way of life...America will defend the peace by opposing and preventing violence by terrorists and outlaw regimes.”¹⁸

In short, the Bush administration responded to the destruction of September 11 with a revised view of the international order and state sovereignty. The administration no longer accepts the passive view of sovereignty as protecting the rights of states. Instead, the administration asserts that sovereignty entails responsibilities to domestic and international security. Thus, as Americans in the realist tradition, the administration believes that the priority of security makes the existence of terrorists, in any location, an international rather than intranational issue. Furthermore, as Americans in the liberal tradition, the administration also argues that international norms of human rights and political freedom are fundamental natural rights. President Bush says, “the American flag stands for more than our power and our interests. Our founders dedicated this country to the cause of human dignity, the rights of every person, and the possibilities of every life. This conviction leads us into the world to help the afflicted and defend the peace, and confound the designs of evil men.”¹⁹ Thus, the Bush administration believes that regimes that violate the rights of their citizens do not represent the sovereignty which is inherent in the people and that, on occasion, neighbors should participate with oppressed people to emancipate them and provide an opportunity for a new establishment of popular sovereignty.²⁰

Finally, the Bush administration’s view of sovereignty does take into consideration the role of international organizations and institutions. President Bush’s view of the so-called “international community” is that it has frequently failed. International organizations, such as the UN, are delegated authority by states to promote international security and preserve human life around the globe. The Bush administration rightly points out that in numerous cases in the past decade, from Rwanda to Congo to Bosnia, the international community did not take action

against major violations of human rights, even genocide. In the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, the international community refused to coerce outlaw regimes to comply with international standards of behavior. Furthermore, the Bush administration looks at the UN as a seriously flawed and corrupt organ, as recently characterized by the massive corruption in the Oil-for-Food program and the involvement of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s son in the morass.

Consequently, in light of the failure of international organizations to live up to the responsibilities adumbrated in their founding documents, many in the administration believe that the US, by default, must work to promote its own interests and security. This is not a violation of the UN Charter; rather, it is the recognition that states delegate authority to the UN and when it avoids acting on that authority, responsibility falls back to the constituent members to uphold security and international order.

In summary, since September 11, the Bush administration has introduced a blueprint for a revised understanding of international politics. The key to understanding the administration’s worldview is their reconceptualization of sovereignty. As Table 1 demonstrates, the administration’s view of international life is a struggle for order and security between the civilized world and barbarians on the frontier. The administration is chary of outlaw regimes that violate international law, skeptical of the will of existing law enforcement agencies to punish criminal behavior, and deeply troubled by lawless regions in failed or failing states from the jungles of Colombia to the mountains of Afghanistan. The administration has redefined sovereignty primarily in terms of democracy and human rights and is overtly hostile to some regimes that violate the freedoms of their populace.

Table 1: The Bush Administration's Revised View of Sovereignty

	Traditional View	Bush View
Status	Unconditional	Conditional
Obligation	Rights	Responsibilities
Authority	Territory/Force	Domestic Legitimacy
Recognition	International Recognition	International and Domestic Legitimacy
Agents	States	Regimes
Norms	Amoral	Civilized vs. Uncivilized
Milieu	Waltzian Anarchy	Hobbesian Anarchy

THE DISCOURSE OF SOVEREIGNTY: OUTLAW REGIMES

One interesting dichotomy in the public discourse regarding international relations is the use of the terms “rogue” and “outlaw” in application to regimes that either repress their own populace or violate certain norms of international life. For

instance, the US has made the case that Sudan represses its population through genocidal policies in the Darfur region. Similarly, North Korea's violation of the principle of nuclear nonproliferation exemplifies a violation of an international norm.

It is interesting to note that the term commonly used to describe outliers in international life is "rogue state." By "commonly used" we mean the usual way that political figures, journalists, and academics refer to regimes that challenge the rules of international affairs is by calling them "rogues." The definition of "rogue" is not one of complete illegitimacy. Instead, the idea of the rogue state is one that has bad character, a regime that is a scoundrel, a rascal, wayward, defiant, and unruly. In this way, rogues such as Burma and Cuba are viewed as contrary, naughty, and disruptive of the international order. However, the common view is that most rogues are rational, can be bargained with, are interest-seekers, and will not push the status quo so much as to invite military intervention in their affairs.

Like Woodrow Wilson before him, President Bush is attempting to reframe the international consensus with regards to issues of security, democracy, and sovereignty.

Interestingly, the Bush administration rarely uses the term "rogue" to describe the states it has targeted since September 11. A content analysis of major policy speeches by President Bush and then National Security Advisor Rice suggests that three-quarters of the time the administration used the word "outlaw" instead of "rogue" when referring to regimes like Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.²¹ The public should not be surprised that an administration famous for its ability to "stay on message" would be so deliberate in its choice of terms and disciplined in its consistent usage to describe threats. However, what is of interest to the authors is why, contrary to popular usage, the administration calls regimes "outlaws" rather than "rogues."

The administration employs the term "outlaws" because it has constructed a very different view of international life than the previous administration. Both experienced international terrorism—Bill Clinton was faced with attacks on the Khobar Towers, bloodbaths at American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and the bombing of the USS Cole. Both faced regimes that refused to comply with the standards of international life such as Iraq and North Korea. However, the Bush administration has designated such regimes as outlaws, and thus, responded very differently. Why?

Throughout the tenure of the Bush administration the case has been made that international life is increasingly dangerous due to state sponsors of terror, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to nondemocratic states, and regimes repressing their own populations. As President Bush says, "today, the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons."²²

The administration has consistently pointed out that such behavior is unlawful and illegal—it violates not only the written constitutions of most of those societies, but also the covenants of international life: the UN Declaration of Human Rights, elements of the UN Charter, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the like. The administration's position is that such behavior is wrongful, and therefore, the international community has a responsibility to uphold the rule of law by forceful action, be it economic sanctions, political coercion, or even the use of force. In other words, such states are criminals and the international justice system should focus its attention on the dishonest, prohibited, and dangerous behavior of such lawbreakers.

For the Bush administration, much is at stake. If regimes such as Iraq are merely “rogues,” the policy implication is that they can be reasoned with and persuaded to go along with the rest of the international community. Clearly this was the policy of the Clinton administration. In contrast, the Bush administration, in the wake of September 11, views such policies as failures and defines states such as Hussein's Iraq as lawbreakers. The policy implication is that justice must be served against criminal behavior. The Bush administration argues that the UN and other cooperative agencies have the responsibility to act against such lawbreakers. Moreover, the Bush administration has demonstrated its belief that the rule of law supersedes the authority of the UN. In other words, if the delegated authorities at the UN will not act, the US and its allies may make a “citizen's arrest” as in the cases of Kosovo and Iraq.

IMPLICATIONS OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S REVOLUTION IN SOVEREIGNTY

Like Woodrow Wilson, President Bush has drastically departed from his inaugural goals of a “humbler” US foreign policy, and, motivated by attacks on his homeland and a changing world, articulated a vision for a revised global society of states. The administration's pronouncements are consistent in their understanding of world politics and articulate innovations to our views of sovereignty. Of course, some argued for similar changes in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, but certainly no major world leader has acted to revise the international status quo as President George W. Bush has since September 11.

Thus, the question is, what are the implications for President Bush's view of sovereignty? Moreover, how likely is it that his vision will be implemented? Will President Bush, like his predecessor Ronald Reagan, live to see his vision of a changed world come to pass? Or, like Woodrow Wilson, will his attempt at building a more secure international order falter due to the entrenched interests of domestic and international actors?

Like Woodrow Wilson before him, President Bush is attempting to reframe the international consensus with regards to issues of security, democracy, and sovereignty. However, the initial appeal of the administration's position has almost entirely diminished at the international level due to the war in Iraq. This may be the fault of the administration for failing to read the signs that the international

community would simply not have the stomach to intervene in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Or it may be the fault of the international community's conservative nature—even the grossest human rights and security violations are rarely addressed with little more than rhetoric in New York, Geneva, and The Hague.

In any event, it is one thing to persuade the international community to act; it is an entirely different thing to coerce changes in international life. As Stephen Krasner writes,

If, however, conventional rules [of sovereignty] are violated through coercion rather than voluntary agreement, their durability and robustness will be more problematic...sustaining violations of Westphalian sovereignty has proven difficult because over the long run the costs of intervention have outweighed the benefits. The governance costs involved in sustaining institutional arrangements that would fail in the absence of external support can be substantial... [and] are more likely to be durable if they are the result of voluntary initiatives rather than coercion.²³

To many in the international community and at home in the US, it is unclear if the war in Iraq is simply a justification for self-interested US action or actually a policy designed to inaugurate a brave new world. In private, even many of America's allies seem to think the former. However, it seems clear that President Bush, in contrast to presidential-candidate Bush in 2000, is committed to more than simply American security interests. Like Wilson before him, Bush has converted to a liberal internationalism that marries American security interests with a larger American mission to reshape the world.²⁴

Thus, it is entirely possible that in twenty years the international community will look back on the occupation and rebuilding of Iraq as the cornerstone of fundamental changes across the Middle East, Central Asia, and parts of Africa. It is already the case that tough American actions have resulted in Libya and other countries backing away from WMDs. Moreover, it is impossible to imagine the "Arab Spring" of 2005—democratic movements in Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere—without US intervention in Iraq in 2003. Many in the administration hope that US action has initiated a new wave of democratization in the region, analogous to those a decade ago in Eastern Europe.

Nevertheless, the dilemma for US foreign policy is how to advance its revised notion of sovereignty, and international affairs more generally, if other states refuse to buy in. This may be an unfair question, because the simple truth of the matter is that most Western publics do support the idea that sovereignty rests in the hands of the people and that nondemocratic and repressive governments are illegitimate. However, substantive change on the issue of sovereignty would require not only sentiment but also action. In the aftermath of Iraq, it seems unlikely that the international community will act in ways commensurate with the Bush administration's view of sovereignty.

Is the Bush administration then at a loss? Must it "go it alone" to remake a world order that is not only secure but enshrines the Bush paradigm of sovereignty? Perhaps not. It is unlikely that the UN is the appropriate forum for the enactment of

a revised international relations based on the new vision of sovereignty. However, it is possible that the democratic “pacific union,” characterized by the West and its institutions such as NATO, can act on a case-by-case basis to realize the new view of sovereignty.²⁵ Perhaps a democratic caucus is needed at the UN or a new organization made up of exclusively democratic regimes. Certainly, intervention in Kosovo and Afghanistan fits this model. In both cases the long-term results were more than intervention for mere security. Instead, a revised model of sovereignty, which includes human rights, freedom, and representative government, was initiated. The continued commitment and resources expended in both cases testify that, in some cases, the West does have the resolve to enact the administration’s vision of sovereignty.

What the administration really needs are committed European allies, in addition to Tony Blair, who are willing to actively pursue a global commitment to freedom and human rights. Rhetoric about democracy and human rights is the grist of contemporary European discourse, but what is needed is action. An opportunity for such resolve is Sudan. If the Bush administration could build a consensus for action in Sudan in collaboration with major European partners, and if Europeans would act to halt the killing, the administration would extend its paradigm of internal sovereignty as well as redefine its relationship with Europe in terms of collaboration.

The cooperation of European and Asian capitals is crucial for the Bush administration, because it is likely that the Security Council will continue to be a poor forum for articulating the administration’s worldview. Certainly both the Chinese and the Russians fear Islamic fundamentalism and acts of terrorism, but neither is keen on the administration’s advocacy of NATO expansion, forward military basing, and independent democracies in Eastern Europe (Georgia, the Baltic states, Ukraine) and Asia (former Soviet republics, Taiwan, etc.).

At the end of World War II, the world system was in a period of flux and uncertainty and history could have taken one of many disparate paths. At that time, one of the least popular American presidents of the twentieth century shaped world politics for decades through his administration’s commitment to a revised world order. Likewise, in the aftermath of attacks on the American homeland, the Bush administration could have taken any of several policy roads. The path the president has taken calls for a full-scale reconsideration of sovereignty and other foundations of international life. Only time will tell if September 11, instead of dealing a blow to American ideas, resulted in a global revolution in sovereignty.

APPENDIX 1

The White House website provides the text of dozens of speeches on national security, most of which have been delivered by President Bush. All of the speeches listed on the site were analyzed for their use of language identifying regimes as “outlaws” or “rogues.” The evidence suggests that the administration consistently utilizes the former. The 2005 State of the Union address used neither term.

Venue/Audience	Speaker	Date	Outlaw	Rogue
Presidential Address to the Nation	Bush	10/7/2001	x	
State of the Union	Bush	1/29/2002	x	
UN General Assembly	Bush	9/12/2002	x	
Cincinnati Museum Center, OH	Bush	10/7/2002	x	
Radio Address	Bush	11/9/2002	x	
National Defense Authorization Act	Bush	12/2/2002	x	
Troops, Fort Hood, TX	Bush	1/3/2003	x	
State of the Union	Bush	1/28/2003	x	
USS Abraham, San Diego, CA	Bush	5/1/2003	x	
National Legal Center for Public Interest, NY	Rice	10/31/2003		x
State of the Union	Bush	1/20/2004	x	
Library of Congress	Bush	2/4/2004		x
Fort Lesley J. McNair	Bush	2/11/2004	x	
Bush's Radio Address	Bush	2/14/2004		x
Ronald Reagan Library	Rice	2/26/2004	x	
University of Louisville, KY	Rice	3/8/2004	x	
Three-Years Progress on War of Terror	Bush	9/11/2004	x	x

Notes

¹ Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). Philpott's first revolution was the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Prior to Westphalia, Europe's governing structure was a complex feudal arrangement with numerous minor states based on vertical and horizontal networks of reciprocal obligation. Prior to Westphalia, there was no single definitive model of the state, just as in world history numerous models of governance have been possible. Westphalia defined states as the legitimate polities of international life, ending the medieval Catholic consensus and delegitimizing the political authority of both Rome and the Holy Roman Empire. Moreover, Westphalia is the foundation for the principle of domestic autonomy of states, and thus the most hallowed commandment of international life: nonintervention. Philpott argues that the second great revolution in sovereignty was the decolonization period following World War II, in which the principles of democracy and self-determination were globalized. Interestingly, Philpott suggests that in the 1990s we may have seen a third revolution—the rise of military humanitarian intervention, which directly violates the old principle of state sovereignty in places like Bosnia and Kosovo.

² *Ibid.*, 4.

³ For more on structural realism, or neorealism, see Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

⁴ Stephen Krasner, ed., *Problematic Sovereignty* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), viii.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1-23. Krasner distinguishes between four types of sovereignty, two of which are commensurate with this traditional view of sovereignty: "Westphalian" (state autonomy) and "international legal" (mutual recognition among states).

⁶ Michael Banks, ed., *Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective on International Relations* (Brighton, Sussex, England: Wheatsheaf Books, 1984); Kenneth Boulding, *The World as a Total System* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1985); Richard Falk, Friedrich Kratochwil, and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., *International Law: A Contemporary Perspective* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985); and John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation-State," *American Journal of Sociology* 103, no. 1 (Fall 1997).

⁷ President George W. Bush, "State of the Union" (presented at the US Capitol, Washington, DC, January 28, 2003).

⁸ President George W. Bush, "Remarks by the President on Winston Churchill and the War on Terror" (presented at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., February 4, 2004). President George W. Bush, "Presidential Address to the Nation" (presented at the Treaty Room, Washington, DC, October 7, 2001).

⁹ President George W. Bush, "President Signs National Defense Authorization Act" (presented at the Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia, December 2, 2002).

¹⁰ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Michael Oakshott (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1962), 85.

¹¹ Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, 18.

¹² President George W. Bush, "State of the Union" (presented at the U.S. Capitol, Washington, DC, February 2, 2005).

¹³ President Bush, "State of the Union" (2003).

¹⁴ President Bush, "State of the Union" (2005).

¹⁵ Kofi Annan, "In Larger Freedom: Decision Time at the UN," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 3 (May/June 2005): 21.

¹⁶ President George W. Bush, "President Rallies Troops at Fort Hood" (presented at Fort Hood, Texas, January 3, 2003). Condoleezza Rice, "Remarks by National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice to the National Legal Center for the Public Interest" (presented at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York, New York, October 31, 2003). This language is more blunt, yet reminiscent, of the Administration's National Security Strategy (2002).

¹⁷ President Bush, "National Defense Authorization Act" (2002).

¹⁸ Condoleezza Rice, "National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses War on Terror at McConnell Center for Political Leadership" (presented at the University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky, March 8, 2004).

¹⁹ President Bush, "State of the Union" (2003).

²⁰ Krasner, *Problematic Sovereignty* (2001), 7–9. Krasner's second kind of sovereignty is domestic sovereignty: the structure of authority within a state and the effectiveness of its control within its territory. Krasner suggests that domestic sovereignty is concerned with both legitimate authority at home and the capacity of the state to maintain control within its borders. Domestic sovereignty has not been a major focus of Realists in political science because it evaluates domestic political features rather than the international environment. In contrast, the Bush administration is keenly interested in the domestic sovereignty of states.

²¹ President George W. Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, speeches posted online from October 2001 through January 2005. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/nationalsecurity/> and <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/> (Accessed January 9, 2006). A content analysis was done on over eighty policy speeches listed under the "National Security" heading at the White House website (www.whitehouse.gov). The speeches are primarily those of President Bush, with a few by then national security advisor Rice and Vice President Cheney. We also analyzed each of the State of the Union Addresses from 2002–2005. Seventeen speeches use the language "rogue" or "outlaw" regarding other governments. In thirteen of those speeches, spanning from October 2001 through the most recent State of the Union, "outlaws" is the preferred term. In only a single additional speech were the terms "rogue" and "outlaw" utilized. See Appendix 1 for details.

²² President Bush, "State of the Union" (2003).

²³ Krasner, *Problematic Sovereignty* (2001), 4–5.

²⁴ David M. Kennedy, "What 'W' Owes to 'WW,'" *Atlantic* 295, no. 2 (March 2005): 36–40. The comparison of George W. Bush to Woodrow Wilson has been made by numerous commentators.

²⁵ Immanuel Kant, *To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing, 2004). The notion of a pacific union, based on collective security among representative governments and a cosmopolitan ethic, is the cornerstone of Immanuel Kant's argument.

