

A True Measure of Success? The Discourse and Practice of Human Security in Haiti

by Robert Muggah and Keith Krause

Human security, an expression widely used today by governments, international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), is the latest attempt to challenge state-centered conceptions of security.² The concept was introduced by the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) *Human Development Report* and adopted as an explicit foreign policy theme by several middle powers including Canada, countries in Western Europe, Southeast Asia, and Africa more than five years ago.³ While the international agenda on human security has its own momentum and dynamic—the work of the Human Security Network and the Commission on Human Security are but two examples of this—the concept has also served as a useful fulcrum for an otherwise disparate set of actors and interests, providing leverage in policy debates.⁴ Human security has proven to be a wedge for opening sensitive debates on humanitarian intervention and the responsibility of sovereign states to protect their civilian populations (or, if they fail to act, the attendant obligations of the international community).

There are broad and narrow interpretations of human security, divided between the narrow vision of Canada and its partners in the Human Security Network, and the broader vision promoted by Japan, the Human Security Commission, and development actors in general.⁵ The narrow version of human security is often championed because it is feasible, tangible, coherent, and realistic. The broad version is often criticized for attempting to do too much: by advancing seven clusters of “insecurities,” it becomes analytically and practically unhelpful. While institutional and conceptual differences persist, there is wide agreement that the safety and well-being of the individual is the central referent for a human security framework. There is also agreement that security from the imminent threat of violence is part of human security, even if there is disagreement over how far to extend the concept. More importantly, a significant practical obstacle to advancing the concept at the declaratory (discursive or normative) level is unease expressed by, among others, the US, China, the Russian Federation, Iran, Egypt, and Indonesia, who perceive human security as encroaching on their sovereignty and freedom of action, and in some

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cases as constituting a form of neo-imperialism.⁶

The human security approach nevertheless remains significant because policymakers in a variety of states and international organizations have adopted its language to generate compelling foreign and security-policy initiatives. So, how are we to measure the influence of an idea such as human security? Widespread use of a label or slogan by itself is insufficient; similarly, the failure of major actors to take up an idea does not necessarily testify to its irrelevance.⁷ As John Ruggie pointed out in a different context, what matters is the fusion of social purpose—here represented by the idea of human security—and power, especially institutional power.⁸ For our purposes, it is thus important to assess the extent to which the idea of human security has been mainstreamed into policymaking and into institutional practices at the multilateral level.

The underlying priorities of a human security approach—promoting physical safety, violence reduction, human rights, control of the instruments of violence, use of child soldiers, and so forth—are increasingly showing up in international forums, even when the label of human security is formally eschewed.

This article attempts to tease out whether human security has been integrated in institutional discourses and practices, beyond its obviously limited currency in UN Security Council debates and resolutions. It starts from the observation that the underlying priorities of a human security approach—promoting physical safety, violence reduction, human rights, control of the instruments of violence, use of child soldiers, and so forth—are increasingly showing up in these forums, even when the label of human security is formally eschewed. In fact, several governments within and outside of the Security Council, have worked hard to implement human security policies through the so-called protection of civilians (POC) agenda. In the past five years, POC has made some important progress. While the expression human security itself may not have successfully entered the lexicon of a great many member states, human security priorities manifestly have.

This article will try to demonstrate this through a critical examination of two particular cases: the UN-sponsored missions in Haiti, spaced roughly ten years apart, before and after the human security agenda emerged. Haiti is an excellent case study because it is a priority engagement of proponents of human security, and because it is a prism through which many similar peace-support operations can also be examined or compared.

There are three dimensions to this question that will be examined in this article. The first is *discursive*—looking for how the concept of human security has been used in multilateral statements, submissions, and declarations. This is not just a matter of finding references to human security as an organizing or framing concept. Rather,

one must also examine the way in which the concept of human security is distinguished from other concepts, how it is linked to particular normative claims (about its desirability or not), how it is used to unite subordinate concepts or ideas, and how it is used to delimit a *discursive field* in which specific policy initiatives can be pursued in a coherent way.⁹

This leads to the second benchmark of whether a norm on human security is emerging: i.e. whether it has been *practically* translated into action. The influence of any idea is not measured by its discursive presence alone; rather, a concept must be linked to practices in such a way that new initiatives are undertaken, new modes of acting are engaged in, or new actors or coalitions of actors are empowered. In academic terms, one needs to know if discourses and behavioral change are linked in a meaningful way.¹⁰ Or, to put it in more prosaic terms: are policy statements being converted into operational practice?

One way to look at this is to see if, for all the theorizing and rhetoric, the concept of human security has been mainstreamed into the operational practices of relevant agencies or organizations. In this translation from discourse to practice, the concept of human security becomes a framing tool for the development of particular strategies and for the furthering of specific interests. It allows foreign ministries and some international agencies to adopt entrepreneurial and dynamic approaches to advancing security agendas that, among other things, speak to their particular understandings of their interests and role in the world.

A third and most important criterion is *internal* to the idea of human security: the extent to which the discourse and practices of human security have ultimately translated into improved safety and security for communities themselves. In principle, this is a measurable criterion, either through objective indicators such as crime and violence rates, the scale and lethality of armed violence, the incidence of internal and cross-border displacement, or other indicators of socioeconomic well-being (including subjective ones). However, in practice, this sort of information is difficult to gather and, as we shall see, the compilation of such evidence does not always form an integral part of the agenda of promoting human security, an absence that can call into question the strength of the commitment to this issue.

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Drawing on the three different dimensions of human security, this article first compares the extent to which human security concerns have been reflected discursively with regards to two UN missions—United Nations Mission in Haiti UNMIH (1993–1995) and United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti MINUSTAH (2003–2005).¹¹ Their similar contexts, as unfortunate as they may be, allow us to argue (perhaps somewhat optimistically) that human security priorities have emerged as a governing discourse in UN Security Council and General

Assembly multilateral statements over the past decade.

Second, the article examines in greater detail the situation on the ground, and the extent to which human security (or the protection of civilians agenda) is being realized. In other words, if we accept that human security norms have become embedded as part of multilateral peace and security discourses in 2005, what does this mean on the ground in actual peace and security operations? Is human security being meaningfully incorporated into operations and institutional practices, and is the security of target populations being improved? Despite the noble (and sometimes less honorable) intentions of the international community, we demonstrate that human security policies are some distance away from achieving what they set out to do. But, like other observers of the discourse and practice of human security, we acknowledge that it is still too early to tell—at least in the case of Haiti—whether or not a demonstrable shift in discourses and practices has led to a durable improvement in the security of Haitians in their daily lives.

THE DISCOURSE OF HUMAN SECURITY

The arguments set forth in this article rely primarily on a small sample of UN Security Council, General Assembly, and Secretary General resolutions and reports since the early 1990s as well as field research undertaken in 2004 and 2005.¹² It thus provides a brief review of two international interventions in Haiti and the externally derived discourses and policies that underpinned them. We argue that shifts in interpretation and policy prescriptions can be partly attributed to the introduction of a human security framework and attendant policy priorities mainly involving the POC framework. In comparing the two UN missions, we sought to determine whether human security concerns, priorities, and approaches were given greater prominence in the more recent intervention. Recognizing that the expression human security per se would not likely emerge in such texts, we focused instead on whether its themes were mentioned prominently alongside traditional national security concerns.

One could argue that it is not a human security framework itself that has prompted a shift in discourse (and emergence of new practices) over the past decade, but rather a combination of other, unrelated factors, ranging from the application of lessons learned to discrete lobbying or advocacy efforts from non-governmental agencies and human rights activists. But there is near unanimous consensus among UN ambassadors, representatives of foreign ministries, and practitioners that human security concerns are more present today in UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and statements on Haiti than they were a decade ago. A careful reading of these texts largely confirms this view. Moreover, given the reluctance among certain key governments to adopt many of the core features of the human security agenda, along with the bargaining and concessions required to ensure that its prescriptions are acknowledged in key resolutions and texts, it is unlikely that these references emerged spontaneously or that they have been retroactively shaped into a coherent framework, at least in the case of Haiti.

Table 1: Is History Repeating Itself? Comparing UNMIH and MINUSTAH

UNMIH (1993-1996)	MINUSTAH (2004-present)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coup and exile of President Aristide followed by rapid implementation of international economic/arms sanctions. • Chapter VII intervention, with the express purpose of restoring democracy, holding presidential and legislative elections, reforming the military and police, and safeguarding the security of civilians. • More than 6,000 multinational troops deployed (preceded by an advance mission of US and Canadian troops). • Slightly less than 1,000 police, under a Canadian Commissioner, also deployed and new government installed. • Hurricane strikes northern Haiti (Gordon) leaving over 400 dead, 15,000 internally displaced and 55,000 families affected. • Limited disarmament and demobilisation of the Haitian Armed Forces. • Police sector reform and training. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coup and exile of President Aristide. • Chapter VII intervention, with the express purpose of establishing a secure and stable environment for democratic elections and constitutional reform, reforming the police and ensuring comprehensive DDR, and of protecting civilians from the eminent threat of violence. • More than 6,000 multinational troops deployed (after an advance mission of US and Canadians troops). • Over 1,000 police, under a Canadian Commissioner, also deployed and Interim Government installed. • Major floods kill more than 2,000 in the south and a hurricane strikes northern Haiti (Jeanne), leaving over 2,000 dead and an estimated 33,000 internally displaced. • A comprehensive and integrated disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process of former army and factions is taking place. • Extensive police reform, recruitment, training and outreach.
<p>Sources: A/RES/47/208 (April 2004); S/1994/54 (Jan 1994); S/1994/593 (May 1994); S/1994/792 (June 1994); S/1994/871 (July 1994); S/1994/1012 (August 1994); S/1994/1143 (September 1994); S/1994/1180 (October 1994); S/1994/1322 (November 1994); S/1995/46 (January 1995); 995/305 (April 1995); S/1995/614 (July 1995); S/1995/922 (November 1995); S/1996/112 (February 1996).</p>	<p>Sources: S/RES/1529 (February 2004); S/2004/300 (April 2004); S/RES/1542 (April 2004); S/RES/1601 (May 2005); S/2004/698 (August 2004); S/PRST/2004/32 (September 2004); S/2004/908 (November 2004); S/RES/1576 (November 2004); S/PRST/2005/1 (January 2005); S/2005/313 (May 2005); S/RES/1608 (June 2005).</p>

Although the circumstances surrounding the two cases are different, the two UN missions in Haiti exhibit consistent, at times remarkable, parallels. By way of illustration, Table 1 provides a short narrative review of the sequence of events unfolding in Haiti from 1993 to 1996 and again from 2004 to the present. Accepting that the two periods offer comparable situations for testing our first proposition, let us now examine each mission in more detail.

In 1993, facing a rapidly deteriorating situation, a UN-led mission was launched with the express purpose of reinforcing national security and restoring the legitimately elected President Jean Bertrand Aristide to power. UNMIH was established by resolutions 867 (1993) and 940 (1994) and focused on supporting and strengthening the institutions of the state—including civilian control over the armed forces,¹⁸ reforming the national police,¹⁹ and restoring the rule of law.²⁰ These explicit objectives were advanced as part of the UN Charter’s Chapter VII mandate to maintain international peace and security.²¹ Thus, UNSC Resolution 867 authorized a Chapter VII intervention on September 23, 1993, to ensure the “maintenance of international peace and security, and permit the resumption of

normal operations of government, including police and military functions.”²² When UNMIH was finally in a position to deploy in earnest the UN called for “national reconciliation, the reinforcement of democratic institutions and the revitalization of the Haitian economy, legislative and local elections.”²³

Peace building and peace promotion became an explicit component of the MINUSTAH’s agenda.

The priorities set out for and implemented by UNMIH reflected the prevailing wisdom for transition operations at the time. The promotion of international and regional stability through good governance and the reinforcement and reform of public institutions, including the security sector, were regarded as top priorities—protection of civilians was not. While UN resolutions and reports devoted some attention to issues such as humanitarian assistance, negotiated access, the safety and security of aid workers and civilians, the collection and destruction of weapons, and sustained police retraining, the focus nevertheless remained on the restoration of *national* security, the promotion of the rule of law, and macroeconomic probity.²⁴ The means of achieving these state-centric goals relied heavily on the use of force and on rebuilding the institutions of the state. The primary motivation for intervening was premised not so much on the protection of civilians as on preventing Haiti’s imminent collapse and the regional contagion that would likely result.

Almost exactly ten years after the launch of UNMIH, the UN Security Council once again authorized a Chapter VII intervention in Haiti. Notwithstanding the eerie parallels with its predecessor, the rationale and objectives of the focus of the new UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) had subtly changed. To be sure, concerns with maintaining international peace and security and respect for sovereignty were etched into an array of Security Council resolutions and Secretary-General reports; however, reflections on *national* concerns were significantly watered down.²⁵ Rather, it appears that more attention was devoted in these documents to ostensibly human security or POC concerns—including the preservation of human rights, civilian safety and well-being, and integrated approaches to disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR). Each of these thematic issues represents an explicit human security priority.

For example, immediately following the ousting of President Aristide, UN Security Council Resolution 1529 demanded that “all parties to the conflict in Haiti cease using violent means” and reiterated that “all parties must respect *international law*, including with respect to *human rights*, and there will be *individual accountability* and *no impunity* for violators” [italics added].²⁶ The resolution called repeatedly for the “*protection of civilians* under *imminent threat of physical violence*, within its capabilities of deployment.”²⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1572, passed on November 29, 2004, resurrected more traditional state-centric concerns, but with a twist: requesting that MINUSTAH “explore actively all possible ways to include in the democratic and electoral process those who currently remain outside the transition process but have

rejected violence.”²⁸ Thus, peace building and peace promotion became an explicit component of the mission’s agenda. Accountability extended from the state to specific individuals. Moreover, the onus for external intervention was premised not exclusively on the preservation of international peace and security, but instead on the responsibility of the international community to protect civilians. Such concerns had not been stated as explicitly in the earlier resolutions mandating UNMIH.

Discursively, UNSC resolutions and statements between 2003 and 2005 ascribed more emphasis to themes advanced by proponents of human security and POC. Moreover, in addition to ensuring national dialogue, national elections, and police and judicial reform as in the previous mission, MINUSTAH was mandated with a comparatively narrow interpretation of human security. It was to work on, *inter alia*, reducing the threats of physical violence and intimidation against civilians, ensuring the continued safety and security of UN and NGO staff, assisting vulnerable groups (especially women and children), and ending the forced recruitment of child soldiers.²⁹ The emphasis was less on preserving international peace and stability—though this remained a pressing concern—than on creating a secure domestic environment explicitly for the purpose of enabling human rights, preventing “the loss of human life,” and restoring national “peace and security.”³⁰ In other words, human security concerns added a whole new layer to the peacekeeping enterprise.

HUMAN SECURITY IN PRACTICE

It is important to reflect not just on the discourse of human security, but also on how it is manifested in practice. We argue here that the human security framework, while potentially contributing to a shift in multilateral discourse, has not necessarily translated into radically new practical strategies, much less into positive outcomes *in situ*. This is because in some ways, the human security agenda is well ahead of the realities on the ground. Indeed, the political, practical, and financial constraints of applying a human security approach have in some cases not been adequately considered. A comparison of a few practical interventions launched by both UNMIH and MINUSTAH illustrates this gap between discourse and practice.

In some areas, the UNMIH and MINUSTAH interventions proposed comparable programs, despite the rhetorical differences between their mandates. For example, they adopted virtually identical programs for military and police deployment, judicial and penitentiary reform, and the promotion of good governance. Each mission invested in strengthening the judiciary, introducing new systems of public sector accountability, and improving the conditions of prisons. Both missions also advanced presidential and legislative elections as core pillars of their programs, primarily through provisional electoral councils and with the support of the Organization of American States.³¹ In other areas, however, some of the programs introduced by MINUSTAH included important adaptations from previous efforts carried out by UNMIH. Activities such as DDR and police reform were particularly instructive in this regard.

Because UNMIH was not actually mandated by the Security Council to

undertake DDR, disarmament was instead administered by the US Army, while a limited demobilization program was carried out by USAID and the International Organization for Migration (IOM)—a somewhat unlikely institutional partner for DDR.³² The objectives of these two discrete interventions were political in nature—they were meant to neutralize spoilers, reduce the number of weapons in society, promote national stability, bolster the security sector, and create the conditions for development assistance to proceed. In all, more than 15,000 firearms, explosives, and materials were collected, and more than 5,400 former soldiers demobilized. Despite the comparatively high number of weapons collected and former soldiers demobilized, many perceived the gains to be modest, at least in terms of durable reintegration and improvements in the security situation.

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Though lacking a formal peace agreement to guide the DDR process or a national consensus on the role of a future army, MINUSTAH, by comparison, was explicitly mandated to undertake a DDR program as a pillar of the overall UN intervention.³³ In fact, the issue of DDR in Haiti was presented as a test for integrated missions more generally, which entail cooperation between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and UNDP.³⁴ Drawing lessons from the previous disarmament and demobilization efforts carried out elsewhere, MINUSTAH sought not only to neutralize spoilers, but also to focus on ensuring meaningful reintegration of former soldiers and gang members, and mobilizing and sensitizing civil society, drawing on a community-based approach to ensure sustainability and appropriate budgeting.³⁵ Far from “rewarding” armed elements, DDR was conceived as means to ensure a modicum of protection for communities on the ground—the collection and destruction of weapons (or putting them “beyond use”) was treated as an important priority. UNSC resolutions placed considerable emphasis on building robust connections between the DDR program and sustainable security sector reform—a link which reflects declared human security priorities.³⁶ From a human security perspective, DDR seems to have been introduced as a necessary component of Haiti’s transition, even though many of the basic preconditions remained unfulfilled on the ground.³⁷ Unfortunately, the DDR program officially launched in late 2004 and has generated comparatively few positive outcomes to date.

In 1993, UNMIH had prioritized police and military reform. Following the dissolution of the Armed Forces (FADH) by presidential decree in 1994, the Haitian National Police (HNP) became the sole entity entrusted with providing national security. Police reform was carried out in parallel with the demobilization process, and by 1996 some 6,000 new HNP officers were reportedly trained and on duty.³⁸ Units specialized in crowd control, criminal investigation, and armed intervention

were recruited and deployed. Considerable focus was placed on training, infrastructure and logistics, and management and operations. Many outside observers described the initial results as positive.

MINUSTAH has adopted virtually identical benchmarks and targets as UNMIH, in addition to a host of other human security priorities designed to improve accountability in the security sector and extend human rights promotion and outreach. For example, while the composition, reputation, and behavior of the HNP remains extremely controversial, MINUSTAH has helped the HNP to explore new approaches to community policing and to ensure a sustained presence in particularly violent shanty-towns lining the capital, Port-au-Prince. Moreover, it has introduced more rigorous screening and human rights training for new entrants. The new national police recruits have also been mandated to respond immediately to “cases of sexual violence...awareness raising and preventive campaigns on inter alia HIV/AIDS, child protection and victims of sexual crimes.”³⁹ Though it is too early for a systematic evaluation, the police training programs have come under strong criticism, as many new recruits, themselves former soldiers, have been implicated in systematic human rights violations.⁴⁰

Though UNMIH and MINUSTAH are comparable in size and scale, the MINUSTAH intervention has adopted a number of the policy instruments championed by proponents of the human security framework despite the fact that (or perhaps precisely because) the reality on the ground has disconcerting similarities to the situation ten years ago. In other words, a *human-centred* framework has emerged in parallel with a *state-centred* framework. The true test of the value of this framework, of course, is whether this normative and practical transformation has translated into meaningful gains for Haitians on the ground. Unfortunately, the early signs are not positive in this regard.

HUMAN SECURITY FOR HAITIANS

Partly because the human security framework is relatively recent, its positive dividends are not yet apparent. After more than twenty-four months, real and perceived security for Haitians remains elusive, perhaps more elusive under MINUSTAH than during a comparable period after the deployment of UNMIH.⁴¹ When examining armed violence trends in Haiti, it appears that in spite of the early efforts of MINUSTAH, the security situation has deteriorated since their arrival. With over 1,600 violent deaths recorded since early 2004, it seems (since figures are incomplete) that the rates of people shot and killed following the arrival of MINUSTAH are at least as high as before the UN-mandated intervention.⁴²

While the circumstances shaping violence between 2004 and 2006 are of course very different than those in the mid-1990s, there has been a considerable escalation of armed violence and human rights violations directed against civilians in recent years.⁴³ Since the departure of Aristide, power vacuums emerged throughout the country and were later filled by armed gangs of various affiliations.⁴⁴ Though UNMIH reports highlighted the persistent threat of criminal violence in the months

and years following deployment in 1994, they have been dwarfed by the extent of the crisis which ensued since February 2004. Virtually all indicators of human security, including homicide, kidnapping, rape, intimidation, and harassment are on the rise. For example, homicide and injury declined significantly in 1995 and 1996 following the aggressive operations undertaken by UNMIH. By contrast, they appear to have become perhaps even more pronounced since the arrival of MINUSTAH.

Though both UNMIH and MINUSTAH experienced serious difficulties in ensuring the access of humanitarian and development agencies to civilians, humanitarian and development efforts were able to resume, albeit haltingly, under UNMIH. After MINUSTAH, they have virtually collapsed. While protection of aid workers and the insurance of access to basic needs is a core human security concern, the arrival of MINUSTAH has not yielded the anticipated outcomes.⁴⁵ It is perhaps too early to say to what extent the MINUSTAH intervention has been a success or a failure in advancing genuine human security on the ground. But while MINUSTAH has registered some important gains, including facilitating recent presidential elections, present and future challenges are daunting.

CONCLUSION

The mixed conclusions of this article are not meant to be an indictment of the human security framework or of the protection of civilians agenda. They are rather intended to introduce a cautionary note: while establishing a human security framework and attempting to implement it are necessary conditions, they are not necessarily sufficient for the achievement of improved safety and security on the ground. This article has argued, therefore, that the achievements of human security must be measured not just against the presence of a human security discourse and associated normative prescriptions, or against the subsequent implementation of specific policies and activities, but also by measurable improvements in the safety and security of vulnerable populations. Already, the move from discourse to practice, achieved in the case of MINUSTAH, is a positive sign of the promotion of human security in diplomatic terms. However, it should nevertheless be recalled that the true measure of human security—freedom from fear and improved safety and security—should be the ultimate benchmark of success.

The past decade of intervention in Haiti calls for a humble reevaluation of what can be achieved realistically in any given situation. There are tremendous limitations in promoting stability (much less human security) in Haiti due to a range of structural and political factors, including competing geo-political agendas, systemic drug trafficking, donor incoherence, and deplorable economic conditions.⁴⁶ Even so, it is worth noting that UNMIH—with its state-centric focus—achieved more during its short period of deployment than MINUSTAH achieved over a comparable period of time. However, it is important to recall that the gains of UNMIH evaporated shortly after the mission ended in 1996. The endemic instability in Haiti, despite “successful” elections held in February 2006, indicates that the conditions which led to the eruption of violence and collapse of the state ten years ago, still persist today.

Notes

¹ This paper draws upon previous work on human security by Keith Krause (Keith Krause, "Une approche critique de la sécurité humaine," in Jean-François Rioux, dir., *La sécurité humaine* (Paris: PHarmattan, 2002), 73-98), and fieldwork in Haiti between 2004-2005 by Robert Muggah, during which time he worked on projects for the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs and then as MINUSTAH DDR advisor.

² Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (the Palme Commission), *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival* (New York: 1982); Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry and John D. Steinbruner, *A New Concept of Cooperative Security* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1992);

Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder: Rienner Publishers, 1991).

³ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" *International Security* 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 87-102; Fen Osler Hampson et al., *Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

⁴ Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* (New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003). Note also the large-scale regional project on peace and human security run by UNESCO, with conferences and/or publications already resulting in Latin America, East Asia and the Middle East. See <http://www.unesco.org/secureipax/>.

⁵ Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*; Keith Krause, "Human Security: An Idea who's Time Has Come?" *Security and Peace* 23, no. 1 (2005): 1-6.

⁶ For an argument that human security warrants attention within the US military see Dan Henk, "Human Security: Relevance and Implications," *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 91-106. Chinese diplomats, in Geneva and Beijing, have also publicly endorsed the concept. (Personal communication, 2005).

⁷ For example, one would not gauge the significance or diffusion of the idea of human rights with reference solely to the reactions of major powers to it. See Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁸ John G. Ruggie, "Embedded Liberalism and the Postwar Economic Regimes," in *Constructing the World Polity* (New York: Routledge, 1998). Ruggie was referring to the outward projection of the American (and European) "New Deal welfare" state in the construction of post-1945 multilateral institutions.

⁹ This is a dramatic simplification of a more complex discussion of discourse analysis that we will defer here. See Jennifer Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 2 (1999): 225-254; Norman Fairclough, *Analyzing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research* (London, Routledge: 2003).

¹⁰ Arguably, most constructivist/critical international relations authors fail on this count, and treat discourses as significant themselves, without examining the link to actual practices. Two examples (among many) would be Bradley Klein's or Simon Dalby's analyses of American Cold War discourse, which rely heavily on a textual analysis of NSC-68 and other documents, rather than a fine-grained study of the practices these discourses were associated with. See Bradley Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Simon Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics* (New York: Guilford Publications, 1990).

¹¹ Robert Muggah, "Securing Haiti's Transition: Reviewing Human Insecurity and the Prospects for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," Occasional Paper 14 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005). There have been five peace-keeping missions in Haiti since the early 1990s. These include: (1) UNMIH (Resolution 867) from September 1993-June 1996 (and suspended from October 1993-March 1995); (2) the U.S.-led Multinational Force (Resolution 940) between September 1994 and March 1995; (3) UNSMIH (Resolution 1063) from July 1996 to July 1997; (4) UNTMIH authorized to operate from August 1997-November 1997; and (5) MIF and MINUSTAH, March 2004 to June 2005.

¹² This includes a dozen or so UNSC resolutions, statements and reports on Haiti between 1993-1995 and 2003-2005, as well as DPKO (1996).

¹³ On September 31, 1991, newly-elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown in a coup d'état headed by Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras. On October 11, 1991, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 46/7, which condemned the illegal replacement of President Aristide. Following considerable engagement by the Organization of American States (OAS), an International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) was approved in resolution 47/20B on April 20, 1993. The UNMIH was set up shortly thereafter by the UN Security Council (resolution 867), to begin reform of the police and army in September 1993. Because advance missions were unable to deploy effectively, the UNSC issued a statement on October 11, 2003, reiterating that serious and consistent non-compliance would lead to the reinstatement of previously

established arms and oil embargoes. MICIVIH, UNMIH and other staff were evacuated in November 1993 and sanctions were re-imposed. By June 1994, the Security Council reported no progress on implementation of the so-called Governors Island Agreement. The UN adopted UNSC 940 on July 31, 1994, which authorized the use of “all necessary means” to bring the legitimate government of President Aristide back to power in Haiti. Following the agreement between US representatives and then-President Cédras, on the “permissive entry of US forces”, 20,000 US troops participated in the military intervention in Haiti as part of the Multinational Force of Operation Uphold Democracy. President Aristide was reinstated on October 15, 1994. All measures against Haiti pursuant to resolutions 841 (1993), 873 (1993) and 917 (1994) were lifted on the same day. By March 1995, UNMIH held a ceremony to transfer responsibilities back to the government of Haiti.

¹⁴ Chapter VII of the Charter empowers the Security Council to determine the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, and to take measures to maintain or restore international peace and security. Security Council decisions under Chapter VII are binding on all UN member states.

¹⁵ The transition from the multinational force to UNMIH took place on March 31, 1995, in full compliance with an envisaged timetable. By April 10, 1995, UNMIH military component stood at 6,017.

¹⁶ Chief Superintendent Neil Pouliot (Canada) was named CIVPOL commander, and some 791 international police were deployed by the end of April 1995.

¹⁷ MINUSTAH authorized the deployment of some 6,700 peacekeepers and more than 1,200 police.

¹⁸ The military was ultimately disbanded by a Presidential Decree. However, the security risks presented by the ineffectively demobilized FADH represent a tremendous challenge to the current MINUSTAH operations and the transitional government.

¹⁹ The early deployment of a permanent and effective police force by the Haitian authorities was considered to be central to Haiti’s long-term stability. The Interim Public Security Force, consisting of some 3,300 screened and quickly retrained former military personnel, as well as 900 other trainees, was gradually being replaced by the new Haitian National Police. It was ultimately decided that the country would set up a police force consisting of some 5,000 officers.

²⁰ See, for example, UNSG report S/1995/305.

²¹ The “international” dimension of the “threat to international peace and security” involved reducing refugee flows to Miami and preventing Colombian cocaine – estimated at some ten to fifteen percent of total inflows into the US – from entering US markets.

²² See, for example, Muggah, “Securing Haiti’s Transition.” When an advance mission of UN-backed troops was prevented from landing in Haiti a few months later, UNSC Resolution 1153 on September 28, 1994 called for a military intervention as a means of “foster[ing] peace, promot[ing] freedom and democracy and avoid[ing] violence and bloodshed”.

²³ UNSC 940 (1994)

²⁴ Part of the reason for this was the fact that the mission sought to depose an illegitimate leadership and reinforce constitutional rule with the return of President Aristide.

²⁵ Again, this could potentially be attributed to the fact that prior to the military intervention, President Aristide was considered to be increasingly illegitimate and following the set-up of the MINUSTAH, there was only a “transitional government” and thus no legitimately elected leadership.

²⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 1542 on April 30, 2004, urged the government “to take all necessary measures to put an end to impunity and to ensure that the continued promotion and protection of human rights and the establishment of a State based on the rule of law and an independent judiciary are among its highest priorities,” thus placing human security priorities at the heart of the intervention.

²⁷ Note the words protection, imminent, and physical, all elements of the “narrow” definition of human security.

²⁸ Operational approaches to achieving these objectives are made explicit in the last UN Secretary General report which emphasized the importance of disarming armed groups who challenge the state, focusing on community-based DDR, and recognizing that “security is a necessary condition for the success of the transitional process but not sufficient ... [but that] the importance of parallel political involving all segments of society are vital” (UNSG 908 November 2004).

²⁹ It should be noted that various UN resolutions in 1993 and 1994, such as Resolution 867, observed the importance of ensuring the protection of UN staff. Article 6, for example, asks that the “Gouvernement haïtien de prendre toutes les mesures voulues pour assurer la sécurité du personnel des Nations Unies et la liberté de mouvement et de communication de la Mission et des ses membres, de même que les autres droits nécessaires pour lui permettre de s’acquitter de sa tâche ...” But in MINUSTAH resolutions, the security of staff are not advanced as a means—(e.g. ensuring access), but also as an end (their safety) in itself.

³⁰ These concerns were flagged in UN Security Council Resolution 1529 a few days after Aristide’s ouster in late February 2004.

³¹ UN Resolution 940 (1994) requested that “UNMIH assist the legitimate constitutional authorities of Haiti

in establishing an environment conducive to the organization of free and fair legislative elections to be called by those authorities and, when requested by them, monitored by the United Nations, in cooperation with the Organization of American States (OAS)."

³² Disarmament was undertaken by the 10th Mountain Division between 1994 and 1995. Demobilization and limited reintegration of the FADH was overseen by the USAID's Office of Transitional Initiatives (OTT) and the IOM between 1994-1996. Muggah, "Securing Transition in Haiti."

³³ Moreover, as prescribed by the DPKO (2000), budgeting for DDR was supposed to be supplied from the assessed MINUSTAH budget, though this process was severely delayed for administrative reasons Muggah, "Securing Transition in Haiti;" UNSC 1542, 2004; UNSC 1576, 2004

³⁴ It should be noted, however, that the concept of "integrated missions" is itself not new. In fact, exactly ten years before the deployment of MINUSTAH, a 1995 report of the Secretary General on Haiti (S/1995/305, April 13, 1995), observed in the case of Haiti that "this is the first time that the United Nations has linked a peacekeeping mission to development activities in this manner. It will promote closer cooperation between all concerned and will facilitate the transition from UNMUH to continuing peace-building activities by the United Nations with the established procedures for the coordination of operational activities for development."

³⁵ UNSC 2004b: 5.

³⁶ This remains something of a challenge for MINUSTAH and the DDR section. Though the importance of the issue is widely recognized, there is some confusion about how such linkages will be funded, implemented and, ultimately, measured.

³⁷ Muggah, "Securing Transition in Haiti."

³⁸ UNSG 416, 1996; UNSG 922, 1995.

³⁹ UNSC 2004b: 5-6.

⁴⁰ International Crisis Group, "A New Chance for Haiti?" *Latin America/Caribbean Report*, no. 10, November 18, 2004; International Crisis Group, "Spoiling Security in Haiti," *Latin America/Caribbean Report*, no. 13, May 31, 2005.

⁴¹ AMR/36/005/2005. Amnesty International, "Haiti: Disarmament Delayed, Justice Denied" (London, 2005).

⁴² A review of media reports, records maintained by human rights organizations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and private hospital registries, at least 700 individuals have been intentionally killed as a result of firearm-related violence between September 2003 and May 2005 and three to four times that number are estimated to have been non-fatally injured. See Muggah, "Securing Transition in Haiti."

⁴³ See, for example, Robert Muggah, "Dealing with Difficult Partners: Good Governance in Haiti," in Welsh, J. and N.. Woods, eds., *Aid for Good Governance: Learning from Experience* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), forthcoming.

