

Human Security and the Liberal Peace: Tensions and Contradictions

by Oliver P. Richmond

Human security (HS) is designed and constructed with the notion of “others” in mind, and its provision is dependent upon an external act of definition as well as the capacity of HS’s actors to act. Inasmuch as liberal concepts—democratization, the rule of law, human rights, free trade, globalized markets, and neoliberal economic development—depend on the recognition and acceptance by others, HS is then conceptually liberal. The actors generally associated with HS are foreign donors, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), international agencies, international financial institutions (IFIs), and regional organizations, all of which present HS as a universal set of very basic security needs. This is then extended to reflect the right of such “internationals” to bypass state sovereignty and officialdom, and to intervene in areas that are normally reserved for domestic, subregional, community, or familial competency. The definitions, associated rights, needs, and limits of HS are therefore constructed according to an external liberal consensus with the automatic assumption that what translates into a merging of military, security, and humanitarian provisions conforms to local expectations and needs, while serving as a universally liberal normative regime.

Such processes are conducted by donor states and IOs, such as the UN and its agencies, the World Trade Organization and the World Bank, in association with civil society.¹ The discourses and practices associated with HS-oriented approaches involve a normative commitment to the just settlement of conflict, the reframing of security debates, and the involvement of either external non-state actors with access to conflict zones, or domestic non-state actors. This is connected to the role and status that civil society now has in the construction of peace. A civil society–focused intervention is important in the wider legitimization of what is now commonly termed “the liberal peace,” which comprises a combination of democratization, economic liberalization, neoliberal development, human rights, and the rule of law.²

There are four main strands of thinking within the liberal peace framework. These include the victor’s peace, the institutional peace, the constitutional peace, and the civil peace. The victor’s peace has evolved from the age-old argument that a

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peace that rests on a military victory, and upon the hegemony or domination of that victor, is more likely to survive. The institutional peace rests upon the attempts to anchor states within a normative and legal context in which states multilaterally agree how to behave and how to enforce or determine their behavior. The constitutional peace rests upon the Kantian argument that peace rests upon democracy, trade, and a set of cosmopolitan values that begin from the notion that individuals are ends in themselves, rather than means to an end. The civil peace is derived from the phenomena of direct action, of citizen advocacy and mobilization, in the attainment or defense of basic human rights and values.³ All of these components are important for the liberal peace model and its claims of leading to a sustainable peace. Without a civil peace and HS, however, an institutional and constitutional peace is unlikely to be legitimate, and the resulting focus on a victor's peace will merely resemble a post-colonial praxis of intervention.

In this context, HS enables the implementation of a civil peace contributing to the construction of a constitutional peace in a broader international context. At the same time, states, international institutions, and IOs are provided with legitimate access to the norms, regimes, and institutions of civil society and the HS discourses they deploy. Partly because of this, the liberal peace has become an end that appears to legitimize the means, giving rise to some significant contradictions in contemporary non-state practices designed to construct a liberal peace from the bottom up. Such processes can be directly linked to liberal assumptions generally deployed about the civil society discourse of peace (as opposed to an "uncivil society"). They also contribute to the constitutional and institutional discourses of peace in that their role is conditional upon their contribution to democratization, free market reform, the rule of law, and the anchoring of the new liberal peace within an international institutional context of global governance. This conditionality also suggests a link with the age-old victor's peace in that dominant actors in the state system (i.e., states and their associated agencies or institutions) define the agendas of bottom-up peacebuilding approaches inherent within HS and in the liberal peace. This essay investigates the relationship between the liberal peace and human security, and, in particular, outlines discourses that illustrate the linkages developing between HS, governance, and the interventionist practices and assumptions more normally associated with the victor's peace.

PEACE THROUGH HUMAN SECURITY

HS, and its associated concepts and frameworks, is enacted at several levels. Non-state actors, and especially NGOs, are engaged in constructing a version of the liberal peace at the grassroots level. IOs and states, on the other hand, have a role that impinges upon both the grassroots and the state levels. Such differences have shaped HS's conceptualization. HS emerged during the 1990s in response to what Hedley Bull might have described as a "new medievalism."⁴ The HS debate⁵ has been notable mainly because of its acceptance in key policy circles (such as within the UN, and by major donor states such as Japan or Canada), and in what has been identified

as “global civil society”—that interconnected space which links civil society, NGOs, IOs, international agencies, donors, and IFIs.⁶ This debate calls for the subjects of security to be redefined from the “state” to the “individual.” In other words, the shift is from managing interstate relations to building peace by introducing social, political, and economic reforms.

“Freedom from want, freedom from fear” is HS’s most common expression in policy circles mainly related to the UN agencies and NGOs. Mahbub ul Haq is credited with shaping this as a concept in the 1994 UN Development Report. Its initial acceptance was mainly because liberal-state and international-organization objectives shifted from status-quo management to the multidimensional approaches toward peacebuilding in which strategies are applied that aim to transform conflict “into peaceful non-violent process of social and political change.”⁷ These developments can be observed in the context of UN “Agenda reports” for the reform of international approaches to peace published throughout the 1990s, in which it is clear that the envisioned notion of peace depends largely on nongovernmental actors and agencies due to their unparalleled access to conflict zones. This access is far beyond those actors that form part of the official political, economic, and developmental discourse.⁸

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The development of the concept of HS encapsulates this evolution best. Yet, the attempt to construct a more inclusive terrain for the notoriously narrow and simplistic debates that have disfigured the discussion of security appears to have fallen into the same trap to which classical debates on security were subject. Classical debates, as illustrated by multiple versions of realism, often culminate in the protection of the concept and framework of the Westphalian state, rather than the populations they house. The concept of human security broadens the actors and structures identified as being causes of insecurity and responsible for its eradication so far that it becomes very difficult to prioritize crucial areas that may be most effective in ameliorating insecurity. In a sense, it could be argued that because of this HS both helps improve security but also adds to our understanding of what causes insecurity. The concept has been likened to “carrying a band aid” to deal with humanitarian crises caused by war.⁹ At the same time, HS recognizes the complexity of security issues and the breadth of the actors affected by them. Clearly, security is far more complex than traditional realist and liberal approaches would have it, and HS, while not necessarily providing theoretical simplicity, at least opens up the debate about what would be needed for a humanist, free-standing, and self-sustaining peace.

Since their emergence, HS-oriented approaches have offered a vision of the liberal peace in which social welfare and justice can be incorporated into parallel constitutional and institutional projects toward peace. Liberal peace projects aim more specifically at building the shell of a state where such structures have failed or never existed at all. Incorporating HS into this liberal peacebuilding project has been taken to effectively legitimize its different strands and discourses, and increasingly has outweighed the interventionary aspects of this project associated with the victor's peace. HS has been utilized by theorists and policymakers in order to fill this empty shell by motivating international and local attempts to deal with issues that impinge upon the individual. This strategy has also had the side effect of legitimizing the statebuilding project by providing a more humanist dimension, rather than it being merely an exercise in the pacification of warlords or regional states, as it sometimes appears.

While it is likely that actors engaged in HS practices often replicate state practices (particularly through their conditional relationship with their state donors), this criticism also tends to overlook the independent capacity of HS actors that has also emerged, which enables them to act outside of institutional and state control. Yet, there is a broad concurrence between HS-oriented agents and their actions, and that of states and their organizations within the liberal peace context. While this concept and these types of actors seem to provide a challenge to the traditional foundations of the international system, most non-state actors must work within the confines of the dominant institutions and regimes of the state to preserve their very existence. In a sense, this reduces their role in the negotiation and renegotiation of the peacebuilding consensus (representing the common agreement between liberal states, donors, IOs, IFIs and NGOs, that the liberal peace is the objective of all HS-oriented interventions) as subservient to that of states. However, most commentators agree that non-state actors are a vital part of peacebuilding and, indeed, that global governance is not possible without their cooperation.¹⁰ They have become integral to the overall project of the liberal peace because the many different actors involved in, and the many approaches to, peacebuilding have been used to provide avenues of legitimize intervention for the broader state-led liberal peace project. These ever-deeper forms of intervention involve structural policies whereby social, political, economic, and cultural frameworks are altered or introduced to contribute to the creation of the liberal peace.

Non-state actors are vital to the liberal peace, by definition, from the bottom-up. Moreover, their vitality is drawn from their ability to administer provisions from inside the conflict zone. This effectively provides both a private and a local aspect to the negotiation of the peacebuilding consensus and the installation of the liberal peace. Although non-state actors' early attempts to become involved in international politics were not necessarily always fruitful, there was a realization that peace could only be constructed if civil society was accessed, influenced, and involved.¹¹ Furthermore, although the UN Declaration of Human Rights dates back to 1948, human rights continued to be a relatively minor issue and subordinate to sovereignty

until the 1970s, when NGOs and other non-state actors became key players in advocating change and development in this respect. Amnesty International, the first such organization founded in 1961, was a key actor in this development, which as Ignatieff has explained “was a harbinger of the huge international human rights movement that was to develop.”¹² Such developments were encapsulated in the agreement over the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.¹³ From these events developed a powerful body of non-state actors, and a development of a language of rights and norms that has undermined the absolutism of Westphalian sovereignty and reinforced the agency of the individual. This has led to a rebalancing of the liberal paradigm of governance towards more individual rights, agency, and freedom, and away from the notion that individuals were merely subjects of regimes of constraint and regulation in which they often had little say. This has been an extremely important addition to the peacebuilding consensus as well as the liberal peace project. Also, the dynamics of humanitarian intervention by states and by non-state actors has developed in this context. States may intervene for humanitarian reasons on the basis of the legitimacy of these norms, despite the fact that the act of intervention is itself illegal, as were the cases of the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 or India and East Pakistan in 1971. Intervention by non-state actors, and more specifically that of NGOs, is perceived unquestionably as legitimate because of their normative and practical roles as well as their perceived distance from the interests of a specific state.

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One of the side effects in the deployment of the HS concept in practical terms, particularly in the context of the UN system and the humanitarian community has been that the provision of basic needs of populations in conflict zones has been privatized. By the end of the 1990s, most countries dispersed 25 percent of their overseas aid through NGOs: the EU Commission Humanitarian Aid Office was using NGOs to disperse at least 60 percent of its budget.¹⁴ This dispersal has effectively created a market situation where NGOs have to compete for funds, and therefore must respect the conditionalities imposed upon them by donors. These processes have been characterized by their complex and multi-level, multidimensional nature, and represent a securitization of development, economy, human rights, as well as politics.¹⁵ This development, guided by the HS framework, has had a major impact on the practice and efficacy of intervention. In this, the UN and its relationship with NGOs has become crucial, because of its recognition of the multiple political, social, economic, and humanitarian dynamics of “peace” via the

concept of human security. A series of “Agenda” reports from the UN secretary-general’s office in the 1990s enabled the UN to become engaged in social justice and political issues. This was as close as this documentation came to a broad conceptualization of peace. The reports on democratization and on development moved the debate further into the terrain of the liberal peace, though at no point in any of this documentation is there an acknowledgement of multiple conceptualizations of peace, and that the liberal peace might be but one of those; the liberal peace is presented implicitly as an ideal form and ontologically stable.¹⁶ HS provides a framework to guide non-state and state actors in its achievement.

Various other documents support this hypothesis, including Oxfam’s *Poverty Report* and the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s report, *The Responsibility to Protect*, which projected a similar concern with broad security issues and with the development of methods to address the broader roots of conflict through multiple forms of intervention.¹⁷ The former grappled with the inverse relationship between peace and poverty while the latter examined the responsibility that the “international community” has to intervene in conflicts and crises regardless of the norms of sovereignty. Both documents see international intervention in civil society as a vital response to human security problems, in coordination with international institutions and organizations. Such documentation also indicates a tension in the humanitarian discourse in which two opposing arguments are casually made: firstly, that outsiders should and can do more to intervene in conflict, development, and human rights problems within civil society; and, secondly, that recipients should do more to help themselves.¹⁸

The implication of this is that both interveners and domestic actors effectively need to agree on what constitutes the peace to be installed, and how this is to be carried out. HS effectively provides a response to these concerns: the peace to be created protects the individual, and a mixture of international, local, official, and unofficial actors can take part in its provision. The Brahimi and the more recent High-Level Panel reports retained similar contradictions by declaring clear aspirations towards human security, but accepting their delegation to state provisions for peacebuilding through NGOs and other actors.¹⁹ As already noted, what was characteristic of these developments was the emergence of democratization as a key objective in which civil society could be stabilized in a sustainable manner and HS could be guaranteed.²⁰ Secretary-General Kofi Annan saw this as an attempt to construct democratic governance at the local level, particularly in conflict zones, and to “explore democratic principles at the global level.”²¹ This indicated that any form of intervention in a conflict, whether by a state, IO, or NGO, has become implicitly contingent upon the actor’s contribution to democratization processes. Similarly, this belief is also associated with arguments about the need for development, which is itself linked to the entry of the conflict zone into the globalized economy. As can be seen from El Salvador to Angola, Mozambique and Cambodia, democratization provides an umbrella for liberal constructions that are seen as integral to the creation of long-term sustainable conditions of peace. From Bosnia, to Kosovo and East

Timor, transitional administrations have taken a firm grip of this democratization and neoliberal development process.²² Aid and its provision, often through NGOs and UN and government agencies, has now become linked to governance.²³ The agendas established for creating HS mean that civil society has become intricately entwined with official actors and transitional administrations through conditionalities relating to the construction of the liberal peace by donors vis-à-vis NGOs and their target populations. Indeed, Duffield argues in the context of the Dinka in the transition zone in Sudan that this relationship has acted as a form of cultural suppression, as it has attempted to reorder the communities into western socioeconomic groups.²⁴

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The role of non-state actors and agencies in a HS framework is susceptible to this accusation.²⁵ As a concept, HS works as a form of “biopower,” through which intervention is designed to impact upon the most intimate aspects of human life. This is aimed at domesticating and normalizing mainly non-western societies and communities caught up in humanitarian crises, bringing their political structures and socioeconomic interactions into a liberal peace and governance framework. It is in this bottom-up guise that peace may become a form of biopower, which involves interveners in conflict taking on the role of “administering life.” This requires the importation of expert knowledge into conflict zones, both for the many tasks associated with humanitarianism and security, and to establish “governmentality” in which control is taken over most political, social, economic, and identity functions of groups involved in conflict and in the construction of peace at the level of civil society. This governmentality actually depends upon the maintenance of a space between the local, the state, and the international level, in order to maintain authority, even though this may undermine local consent. Both the community and the individual are governed in a manner through which external actors defer responsibility for creating peace.²⁶ These practices and discourses have rapidly become a normalized part of our understanding of the liberal peace.²⁷ Essentially, from this bottom-up analysis, the liberal peace can be said to be a hegemonic peace, broadly consensual from the perspective of the coalition of external actors involved in it. But, its consensuality also depends on the incentives provided by, or conditionality of, such forms of intervention. What this indicates is that the privatization of peace and the increasing subcontracting of peace activities to private actors also masks a tendency for bottom-up peacebuilding to represent international rather than local consensus, and to overwhelm the voices of local actors involved in the civil-society efforts regarding the liberal peace. In defense of the international consensus approach, it is important to note that the version of the liberal peace

propagated at this level is more concerned with social welfare and justice than the more conservative version propagated by states. Non-state actors and agencies working along the lines indicated by HS effectively serve as a filter for the liberal peace, renegotiating its priorities between its propagators and its recipients.

The question of intervention on the part of non-state actors, and whether they intervene on a rights or needs basis, is an important step toward identifying the type of peace they are attempting to construct. Intervention on a rights basis generally follows liberal state norms, whereas intervention on a needs basis often bypasses state sovereignty. In either case, NGOs form intimate, conditional relationships involving sponsors and recipients. This points to a civil notion of peace that incorporates a broader program of social, political, economic, humanitarian, and developmental engineering according to the liberal peace which is propagated by major donor states, agencies, and IFIs. This indicates that the liberal peace is actually contested, to a large degree, by NGOs, state actors, and organizations that gain access to civil society through NGOs and local recipients. The debate over whether to intervene on a rights basis revolves around a set of norms and rights from within the liberal peace. In this sense, the question over intervention on a needs basis is apolitical and, thus, it sees victims and aggressors as being equally weighted, rather than evaluated according to their respective positions relative to the installation of the liberal peace.

The liberal order is understood to be peaceful internally and progressive in its external impact on other states, as well as characterized by democracy, free trade, human rights, and a broad presence of public consent for HS activity by NGOs, agencies, states, IFIs, and IOs.

This represents the differing positions taken by humanitarian pragmatists and humanitarian idealists in which regulation of such activity to preserve an overarching normative framework is contrasted with the liberalization of NGOs to provide assistance for those that need it regardless of their position as victim or aggressor, on one hand, or their location within the overall normative framework of the international system, on the other. Furthermore, what is often overlooked in both views is that making a decision on the basis of pragmatic or idealistic humanitarianism is itself a hegemonic act made by third parties over “others.” This opposition can be observed in the position of the International Committee of the Red Cross and Medecins Sans Frontieres.²⁸ Such actors are far from nonpolitical (or even apolitical actors). They have increasingly adopted a liberal discourse of peace in order to justify the strategic choices they make in the field as to which actors they work with and for. The debate on needs-based involvement versus rights-based intervention means that these actors have to make strategic choices in two directions. First, they must decide whom to help and why. The second direction is to determine

whether to accept the dominant, and perhaps even hegemonic, liberal peace discourse engendered in the peacebuilding consensus in order to curry favor and amass resources.

CONSTRUCTING THE CIVIL PEACE

The expectation has been that where IOs, IFIs, regional organizations, agencies, and NGOs have cooperated for humanitarian reasons, HS concerns have tended to transcend the interests of actors engaged in the conflict, making the creation of the liberal peace more plausible at the civil level. Such a coalition of actors would therefore be able to engage in the construction of a liberal, multidimensional, and multi-level peace, spanning the civil to constitutional and institutional levels. Yet it may also be the case that the ideology of human security and the dependent relationship between disputants and interveners in constructing the liberal peace means that forms of liberal dependency and conditionality are also part of this relationship being formed around humanitarianism and the peacebuilding consensus. The question is whether they are dependent upon the liberal states and their institutions in creating this conditional relationship vis-à-vis disputants and the liberal peace, or whether they are agents themselves in this relationship. Given the nature of the conditionality surrounding the construction of the liberal peace and non-state-actor dependency upon donors, this is far from clear. What is clear, however, is that non-state-actor legitimacy vis-à-vis their access within civil societies is very useful in the construction of the liberal peace. This depends on social engineering whereby non-state actors are seen to be “neutral” in a political sense, and yet bring with them the baggage of liberal political thought, as well as resources and expertise. It also depends upon their interactions with state institutions. It might be argued that the civil peace strand of the liberal peace conceptualization both legitimizes deep intervention at the civil level as well as requiring interventionist practices in order to expand the liberal peace.

Non-state actors, NGOs, and international agencies and institutions have played an important role in this evolution. As key actors in humanitarianism, in the peacebuilding consensus, and in the construction of the liberal peace, non-state actors contribute to the construction of peace-as-governance in conflict zones. For example, HS-motivated approaches to peacebuilding have become embedded into a governance approach to ending conflict in Kosovo since 1999 through the UN Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK) and its four pillars, the presence of the United Nations Development Programme, and the involvement of NGOs. These actors cooperated in establishing the necessary liberal institutions of a democratic state involving broad institution building to reconstruct the political, social, and economic infrastructure of the state. This specific purpose is succinctly stated in the mandate and role of UNMIK.²⁹ However, there is a contradiction between the discourses and practices of human security in such a governance context. Humanitarian assistance is not apolitical but provides states with a tool with which to become deeply engaged in conflicts as well as the ability to directly avoid foreign

policy engagement³⁰ through the work of the many agencies and NGOs involved in conflict zones. In this sense, the main agents of the liberal peace have both options open to them, and therefore can use more traditional interest-based criteria to evaluate why they may want to become more directly involved. This is perhaps why it is more accurate to argue that the work of these actors has become part of foreign policy in the general sense of constructing a liberal peace.

In the earliest development of humanitarianism and the emergence of non-state actors, there existed a fundamental tension between humanitarianism and imperialism. In the case of the anti-slavery movement in the nineteenth century, many involved, including states such as Britain, non-state actors, and individuals involved in lobbying against slavery, were imperialists at the same time, and believed in its moral value as a system of constructing peace within empires. This tension between humanitarianism and imperialism still exists in the modern context. As Rieff argues that

*contemporary advocates of state humanitarianism share something of the same faith that a combination of high moral intent, military force, the imposition of good government, and benign tutelage (for Kipling's "lesser breeds beyond the law," read today's "jailed states") could be a force for the betterment of humanity.*³¹

Despite the intentions behind the notions of HS and the many non-state actors and agencies that promote it, the assumption that the liberal peace has resulted in a peacebuilding consensus at the civil level is problematic. In heavy contestation is whether civil peace and the relevant roles of actors therein are a highly legitimate aim for the humanitarian community. The liberal order is understood to be peaceful internally and progressive in its external impact on other states, as well as characterized by democracy, free trade, human rights, and a broad presence of public consent for HS activity by NGOs, agencies, states, IFIs, and IOs. This differentiates the peacebuilding consensus from previous imperial regimes.³² Even at the level of civil society, however, the liberal peace often rests on coercion and conditionality in order to install liberal norms and regimes.³³ Implicit in this understanding of the liberal peace, as Laffey illustrates, is the return of the "language of empire" divided between accounts of US imperialism and accounts of a more general liberal empire.³⁴ In terms of the HS debate outlined above, the dependency and conditionality it often rests upon has more in common with practices of colonialism than empire. This has important implications both in terms of the universalism that is often claimed for humanitarianism and the many actors in human security, and for the role of the many non-state actors that claim legitimacy for their interventions on this basis. It implies that peacebuilding and humanitarian strategies are generally directed by external actors, even where they are HS oriented, and that recipients are perceived to be more likely to accept these strategies if there is an element of stick to add to the carrot. Thus, even HS strategies are politicized, requiring external control, conditionality, and may also be in danger of creating dependency.

CONCLUSION

The discourse of humanitarianism and human security has become an important indicator of the involvement of IOs, agencies, and non-state actors in their contribution to the civil peace. This contribution is very important with regard to the development of the constitutional and institutional aspects of the liberal peace project. Furthermore, such actors, with access, reach, and legitimacy, are crucial in the evolving peacebuilding consensus. This has allowed intervention upon a humanitarian basis to forge its own legitimacy regardless of the norm of nonintervention. Furthermore this has created an apparent normative requirement for such action in the event of conflicts and crises on the part of the international community as part of its commitment to the liberal peace. NGOs and other non-state actors, as well as international agencies, often go so far as to call for the use of force to clear the way, or provide security, for their own actions and interventions in conflict zones.

In their conditional relationship with recipients, donors, IOs, and IFIs, non-state actors have developed the capacity for the most intimate forms of intervention in civil society in order to develop a civil peace and contribute to the broader liberal peace project through the institutionalization of bottom-up forms of governance. These interventions are clearly engendered in the liberal peace project. Indeed, it is through this conditionality that dominant actors of the international system pass on the norms and regimes associated with the liberal peace, and through which they receive any feedback at all from recipients and local actors. This process also has the inadvertent advantage of allowing states access to civil society, as well as providing non-state actors with the capacity to survive and become influential at the civil and global levels. The version of the liberal peace that emerges through this non-state-actor level of the peacebuilding consensus tends to not only be more concerned with aspects of social justice, development, and identity, but also facilitates and legitimizes official intervention at this level through non-state actors that are influenced by their relationship with donors. Many such actors retain some independence by negotiating continuously with donors over their roles. Even so, the liberal peace serves to regulate their behavior.

This leads to one irreconcilable conclusion. The liberal peace has given rise to a situation where non-state actors may concur with its crusading victor's aspect, perhaps even justifying the use of force for the end of producing the liberal order in which human security exists. This crusading aspect can be legitimized by the establishment of a civil society and a stable system of governance.³⁵ If the local state actors cannot secure these aspects of the liberal peace, outside actors effectively take over.³⁶ Often human rights violations or a lack of HS provides the basis for both state and non-state forms of intervention, whereby the governance of the state in question and existence of civil society comes to depend upon outside actors.³⁷ This provides external actors with both an ethical obligation to intervene into civil society if they are to live up to human rights and humanitarian rhetoric, and also an

opportunity to intervene at the level of both state and civil society.

Clearly, the ideology of HS and the nature of the role of non-state actors in conflict zones in reproducing these types of dependencies mean that they are complicit in the reproduction of the liberal peace as the dominant form of conflict settlement. Because of this relationship of conditionality, this means that the civil peace generally reflects the dominant concerns of states and donors (governance, capacity building, and ownership are often mentioned in this context) and therefore is actually very close to the constitutional and institutional discourses of peace. Some actors happily accept this concurrence as inevitable in the context of the peacebuilding consensus, while others, perhaps more focused on issues of social justice, may resist it. Yet our comfortable, perhaps verging upon the hegemonic, assumptions about HS and the liberal peace may obscure some of their important problems, particularly as they have been experienced by local actors in places like Kosovo or East Timor. In the context of capacity building via the peacebuilding consensus, the problem may be not that only a limited capacity is being built but that institutional and local capacity is being destroyed in target conflict environments. In this, it may well be that HS approaches and broader approaches to liberal peacebuilding need a more careful appraisal: clearly making the human being a referent for security is laudable, but the liberal peace framework is far more heavily weighted towards statebuilding than toward civil society.³⁸

Notes

¹ John Keane, *Global Civil Society?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2.

² For more on this, see the conclusion of Oliver P. Richmond, *The Transformation of Peace* (London: Palgrave, 2005).

³ For more on these contributory strands, see chapters 1 and 2 of Richmond, *Transformation of Peace*.

⁴ See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 264-276.

⁵ See, among others, United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" *International Security* 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001), 87-102; Yuen Foong Khong, "Human Security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?" *Global Governance* 7, no. 3 (July-Sept. 2001), 231-236.

⁶ See in particular, John Keane, *Global Civil Society?*

⁷ Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1999), 22.

⁸ Paris argues that the inclusion of development means that peacebuilding is effectively a new era in developed/developing world relations. Roland Paris, "International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice,'" *Review of International Studies* 28, no. 4 (2002), 638.

⁹ See Yuen Foong Khong, "Human Security: A Shotgun Approach."

¹⁰ Wolfgang H. Reinicke, *Global Public Policy* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 259.

¹¹ Non-state actors have been involved in constructing a peace that is more "local" in many ways. Non-state actors were directly involved with the International Labor Organization since its founding in 1919, and though they were excluded from the Hague Conferences in 1899 and 1907, their very exclusion was also an acknowledgement of their existence. The League of Nations also provided non-state actors with informal consultative status.

¹² Michael Ignatieff, "Human Rights, Sovereignty and Intervention," in *Human Rights, Human Wrongs: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 2001*, ed. Nicholas Owen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 54-55.

¹³ Of course, this document, as with the UN Charter, and many other such documents, is very careful to make clear that states and their territorial integrity are still paramount.

¹⁴ Nicola Reindorp, "Global Humanitarian Assistance," *Humanitarian Exchange* 18, (March 2001), 31.

¹⁵ Mark Duffield, "NGO Relief in War Zones: Toward an Analysis of the New Aid Paradigm," *Third World*

Quarterly 18, no. 3 (Sept. 1997): 527-542.

¹⁶ See UN Secretary-General, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping," A/47/277-S/24111, June 17, 1992; An Agenda for Development: Report of the Secretary-General, A/48/935, May 6, 1994; An Agenda for Democratisation, A/50/332 and A/51/512, December 17, 1996.

¹⁷ Kevin Watkins, *Oxfam Poverty Report* (Oxford: Oxfam Academic, 1995); International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect: The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre, 2001).

¹⁸ With respect to the former point, one of the refrains of the humanitarian community is that "intervention must take place without there being any intervention." This has been repeated several times to me by several senior members of this community. Of course it raises the question of whether this is actually possible (which is very unlikely), and if it is how would such power be made accountable?

¹⁹ United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, and UN Secretary Council, Fifty-fifth Year, Identical Letters Dated August 21, 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809. See also United Nations, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility," *Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, 2004.

²⁰ Kofi A. Annan, "Democracy as an International Issue," *Global Governance* 8, no. 2 (Apr-Jun 2002):135-142

²¹ *Ibid.*, 135.

²² The UN has also established the Electoral Assistance Division to guide states making a transition to democracy.

²³ Mark Duffield, "Aid and Complicity: The Case of War-Displaced Southerners in the Northern Sudan," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 40, no.1 (March 2002): 83-104.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 90.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 91-93.

²⁶ Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, eds. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 87-104.

²⁷ Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, Vol.1 (London: Penguin, 1990).

²⁸ David Rieff, *A Bed for the Night* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 66-67.

²⁹ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1244, S/RES/1244, June 10, 1999. paras. 9-17.

³⁰ Fiona Terry, *Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2002), 218-219.

³¹ Rieff, *A Bed for the Night*, 61.

³² *Ibid.*, 64.

³³ Mark Laffey, "Discerning the Patterns of World Order: Noam Chomsky and International Theory after the Cold War," *Review of International Studies* 29, no. 4, (2003), 593.

³⁴ Laffey, "Patterns of World Order," 593.

³⁵ Richard J. Goldstone, "Whither Kosovo? Whither Democracy?" *Global Governance* 8, no. 2 (April-June 2002): 144.

³⁶ See Richard Falk, *Human Rights Horizons: The Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing World* (London: Routledge, 2000), 68.

³⁷ David Chandler, *From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention* (Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 2002), 194.

³⁸ Francis Fukuyama, *State Building: Governance and Order in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Profile Books, 2004), 53.

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