

Human Security, Mutual Vulnerability, and Sustainable Development: A Critical View

by Jorge Nef

This essay is an attempt to provide a historical and structural frame of reference for the study of human security, from a distinctively “foreign” standpoint.¹ More specifically, the essay explores its various meanings, intellectual roots, and antecedents, as well as, the debates and controversies about its significance and its implications for the conduct of global politics and foreign policy. In addition, and more substantively, the aim of the paper is to advance some tentative observations regarding the interface among peace, human rights, and sustainable development in a post–Cold War context. The main thesis in this analysis is that growing interdependence, a main consequence of integration and globalization, creates mutual vulnerability for all nations, groups, and individuals.

With the end of World War II, military security and economic development became the parameters of what was then construed as a rigid bipolar world system. The end of the Cold War spearheaded a tendency to celebrate unipolarity and the “end of history”² as the inevitable result of globalization and the work of market forces. However, this neofunctional utopia came to an abrupt end with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In its stead, an all-encompassing and already evolving mutation of the national security doctrine reemerged, centered not on deterrence but on preemption. Its prime manifestation has been the War on Terror. As with the Cold War, but without the constraint of mutual deterrence, security is perceived once again as an endless zero-sum game.³ In this new context, the once unthinkable, yet omnipresent, negative-score game, has become a distinct probability.

The Limits of Prevailing Common Wisdom

It is increasingly obvious that unilateralism and the dominant vision of national security today do not guarantee real security for most people on the planet.⁴ This vision does not even guarantee the safety of those in the “home front” it proclaims to protect. Nor could the porous neoliberal promises of Trilateralism⁵ and globalization—at the other end of the liberal-conservative continuum—lead to its proclaimed end of contradictions, and of history itself. Realism, and its US national security corollary, have been, and remain, in essence, reductionist and one-

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dimensional views of security. This extreme version of realism overemphasizes power politics and the centrality of force at the expense of diplomacy, law, and other forms of cultural, social, economic, or environmental interaction. In turn, neoliberal regime theory and its corollary of globalism⁶ tend to present a mechanistic quasi-Marxist base-superstructure mindset. It is a type of economic and market determinism of the Right, in which the logic of the market substitutes for politics.

To paraphrase a well-known dictum: Not being part of the solution, the ideologies of national security and globalism may well be part of the problem.

The post–September 11 world reveals, simultaneously, a profound crisis of both neoliberal globalism, and the illusion of national security based upon the sovereignty of the state. Both perspectives fail to understand the persistent and real challenges resulting from human–environmental interactions. Threats of this nature range from epidemics, to geological or climatic disasters such as the recent Asian tsunami, to the obvious impact of Hurricane Katrina upon vulnerable populations. These events are examples of profound, yet latent, human insecurity becoming manifest and catastrophic. National security and regime theory also fail to address other more mundane issues including hunger, unemployment, and exclusion. To paraphrase a well-known dictum: Not being part of the solution, the ideologies of national security and globalism may well be part of the problem.

The Need for a New Perspective

To engage in a rational but not dispassionate analysis of the current global predicament, and to devise a system of international norms, institutions, and appropriate responses to real challenges, requires a new critical, systemic, and reflective approach. Put simply, questions and problems need to precede prescriptions and solutions, even at the cost of learning to live with cognitive dissonance. The concepts of human security and mutual vulnerability,⁷ by putting people at the center, offer a multivariate, complex, but intelligible systemic perspective without the nationalist distortions of realism, or the global biases of neoliberalism.

Human security issues relate to the well-being, safety, and dignity of people.⁸ As such, they have largely remained at the margin of the literature of international relations and international security.⁹ This peripheral character of the field is both by neglect and by design. On the one hand, the daily survival, livelihoods, and resilience of billions of people, as well as the global commons, is less glamorous than the challenges confronted by the usual heroes of international lore, namely princes and merchants.¹⁰ The periphery does not quite “fit” the arcane and exclusive discourse of international relations and global politics. On the other hand, the term human security is perceived, by many in the global core, with utmost suspicion. For others, at least until the events of September 11 and the string of recent environmental

disasters, it has seemed impractical, or simply, “hot air.”¹¹ Putting both the ethnocentric and militaristic assumptions of nationalist “realism” and those of neoliberal globalism to question often evokes a highly emotive response.¹² There are also critical and progressive analysts who see human security as a doubled-edged sword, with the capacity to be co-opted by aggressive would-be imperialists to justify “humanitarian” interventionism, or worse, to “securitize” and militarize all aspects of human life.¹³

DOCTRINES AND DOMINANT DISCOURSES

Beneath the seemingly antagonistic divide between Pentagonists¹⁴ and free-trading Trilateralists,¹⁵ national security and neoliberal discourses still hold their sway among mainstream thinkers and decision makers in the US, a good part of the G-8, and their peripheral client states. For mainstream intellectuals and politicians, and for those benefiting most from the “New World Order,”¹⁶ the dynamics and effects of national security and/or pro-business policies are tantamount to categorical imperatives, the power of nature, or metaphysical manifestations of a Hegelian idea-force. In a world driven by the invisible hand, unquestionable scientific truths, atavistic instincts, or human nature, even Providence itself,¹⁷ these abstractions end up building a virtual reality where civilizations inevitably collide,¹⁸ or a felicitous “end of history” becomes a tautological final state.

Answers Without Questions

In this deterministic realm, as was once the case with scientific socialism, there is no room for ambiguity: what is real is rational; what is rational is real. Indeterminacy always disturbs those looking for clear-cut answers to unformulated questions. In a tight worldview things are either willed into existence, or are tautologically predictable beyond material proof or refutation. It is assumed that all rational actors can do is first to understand, and then to adjust to objective “laws” of economics, warfare, or human nature.

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The language of strategic studies, as was the case with development, modernization, and globalization, is replete with implicit teleologies.¹⁹ So is the self-justifying discourse associated with the dynamics of war, driven by either sacred or civic religion.²⁰ From this narrow point of view, the most people can do is to seek the best way to reach a predetermined end. A functional and instrumental rationality of means²¹ prevails. Conversely, substantive considerations related to ethics,²² goals, circumstances, and consequences tend to fall by the wayside.

In the Manichean, good-evil bipolarity of the Cold War, elites fended off the double threat of “international communism” and domestic insurgency. Few ever

dared to question the morality, or even the effectiveness, of this deadly logic, short of being accused of subversion and heresy. From the 1960s through the 1970s, national security regimes and unabashed state terrorism became a staple of daily life for millions of people in Latin America. This ideological “software,” enthusiastically endorsed by US policymakers,²³ was the prescription of choice. At the level of praxis, this policy translated into torture, mass murder, and disappearances. These methods, justified by the prevailing national security doctrine, constituted the instrumentalities—or social engineering—to attain stability, roll back reform and “over-participation,” and facilitate the advance of economic “freedom.”²⁴

The Exhaustion of National Security

The perpetual state of emergency, conceptualized by Carl Schmitt,²⁵ rested upon the widespread and persistent insecurity of most of the population. This feature constituted the distinct trait of national security.²⁶ At its peak in 1975, this mode of repressive conflict management affected fifteen of the twenty Latin American republics, home to over two-thirds of the region’s population. Even after decades of alleged democratic restoration, the consequences of the states of exception under the national security regimes have been a lingering legacy of democratic deficits²⁷ and socioeconomic inequality.²⁸

The shift from bureaucratic authoritarianism to restricted democracy started in the late 1970s. Yet, with the exception of Nicaragua in 1979, the transitions were not the result of the overthrowing of the dictatorships, but rather of a soft landing strategy superintended by Washington.²⁹ In the protracted early phase of “normalization,” the exiting repressive regimes, and their business and military supporters, retained the upper hand. These authoritarian preserves retained “metapower”³⁰ by controlling the rules of the game and the political agendas of transition. Adherence to the economic model advanced in the Washington consensus, “burying the past,” and maintaining areas of exceptionality in security forces exemplified a type of policy blueprints for reemerging democracies.³¹ These constraints included strict neoliberal prescriptions and structural adjustments, combined with blanket immunities to perpetrators of human rights abuses. Structural adjustment policies (SAPs) became even more astringent in subsequent years through the conditionalities attached to debt management schemes.

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To secure the compliance as well as the continuity of this formula, the political regimes to emerge from these skewed negotiations were very restricted, “low intensity,” “governable,” and tame democracies.³² They were also characterized by significant exclusion of political actors and agendas. In them, the extraterritoriality

and un-touchability of the security forces was not only maintained, but also guaranteed.³³ So was their role as insurance policy and political arbiter of last resort, in order to prevent left-leaning coalitions and populist policies to set root, let alone gain an upper hand. These were basically the same military, police, paramilitary, and “secret armies” that had perpetrated the most extreme abuses of human rights during the “regimes of exception.” In most cases, the transition meant little more than the consolidation of the old dictatorial market-friendly models, under newly democratically elected management. In other words, seen from a broader perspective, national security and transition to democratic neoliberalism were two sides of the same coin. The shift involved, in most cases, the consolidation of the socioeconomic regime created by the dictatorships.

THE ROOTS OF HUMAN SECURITY

The notion of human security emerged against the backdrop of numerous national security regime crises in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the tide of popular revolts and rebellions in Central America that the Reagan administration sought to counteract. The crises in that region were clearly ones of domination,³⁴ punctuated by the inability of the illegitimate authoritarian regimes to retain control by military force. By the early 1980s, national security and counterinsurgent strategies had failed to contain popular demands by imposing dictatorship over deeply rooted legitimacy crises. These regimes faced the real possibility of defeat by insurgency.

Conceptual Antecedents and Circumstances

Human security also emerged as a way of conceiving another, broader, conception of security. In this sense, it was and continues to be a “work in progress,” centered upon people’s needs,³⁵ not on the instruments of force, counterinsurgency, or the fleeting strategic interests of superpowers. Here, human security constituted a development and synthesis of many evolving and hitherto piecemeal conceptual strains. For decades, terms such as personal security, food security, health security,³⁶ economic (e.g. job and income) security, environmental security, and social security have been used throughout the region.³⁷ These were often connected to notions of sustainable development,³⁸ equity, need satisfaction, and basic human needs.³⁹ All these were rooted in homegrown theories and practices: from the structuralism of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America⁴⁰ to Liberation theology,⁴¹ Freirean pedagogy,⁴² and environmentalism, to democratic socialism, self-management, co-operativism, or Christian-humanism’s ideas on communitarian solidarity.⁴³

Even in the realm of traditional military security, the Falklands-Malvinas and the Peru-Ecuadorian conflicts produced an increasing interest among regional political elites in what was referred to as cooperative security, “common hemispheric security,” and confidence-building measures. A growing consensus emerged in the 1980s that the Rio Treaty (TIAR), unlike Europe’s NATO, was not conducive to creating a security community, let alone regional peace. The multilayered civil wars in Central America, and the hotly contested regional peace initiatives, such as the

Contadora peace process, and Esquipulas I and II, were a challenge to American concepts of hemispheric security.⁴⁴ Cast against the background of late twentieth-century world politics, the idea of human security was also the result of the end of the Cold War and the need felt by many intellectuals and policymakers outside the US to take a fresh look at the world, and reexamine the very concepts of development, development assistance, and multilateralism without the bipolar lenses of the Cold War (Galtung, PRIO, Rosenau).

It is very likely that the theoretical foundations of human security date back to Harold Lasswell's concept of "human dignity,"⁴⁵ Kenneth Boulding's work on peace research, and Johan Galtung's and Robert Cox's critical international political economy⁴⁶—especially their contributions to what is known as global theory. The origins of the human security idiom in the Americas can be traced back to the work of the Ottawa-based International Development Research Centre (IDRC) special Presidential Commission on South-North Relations, established by its then president, Ivan Head, in 1988, along with the publication of Head's *On a Hinge of History; The Mutual Vulnerability of South and North* (1992),⁴⁷ and Nef's *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability: An Exploration into the Global Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment* (1995).⁴⁸ In 1975, the IDRC had already sponsored the pioneering work of the Bariloche Foundation and its alternative model,⁴⁹ which challenged the Malthusian developmental assumptions of the *Limits to Growth*.⁵⁰ Our own use of the term human security dates back to a document prepared at the United Nations ECLA in Santiago, in 1991, in which national security was contrasted with a "different kind of security: human security."⁵¹ An operational conceptual framework for human security, and the term itself, officially emerged in the UNDP's 1994 *Human Development Report*.

DEFINING AND OPERATIONALIZING HUMAN SECURITY

There are two interrelated concepts in our broader systemic framework: human security and mutual vulnerability.⁵² The former refers to the creation and maintenance of circumstances conducive to the reduction of risk and uncertainty, in order to achieve what Lasswell referred to as "human dignity."⁵³ Human security can be understood as the probability of risk reduction: the abatement of insecurity. Risk-reduction in any system, from domestic to global, other things remaining constant, is a function of the achievement of security at the lower and more exposed levels. Mutual vulnerability, in turn, refers to the interconnectedness of system dysfunctions, producing imbalances and entropy both at the micro and macro levels. Any system and any level of aggregation are only as strong as their weakest links. This means both that components are interconnected, and systems are subsystem dependent. In a national, regional, or global context, this translates into a situation of shared and reciprocal vulnerability among all the actors. Epidemics, environmental stress, economic recession, or the effects of man-made catastrophes often do not stop at socially-constructed borders. Increasingly, communications, financial, and even migratory flows are hard to control, especially in the context of

globalization. In a sense, mutual vulnerability has been enhanced by globalization.

Dimensions of Security and Insecurity

Security implies, at a minimum, a number of interwoven and interconnected dimensions (subsystems or regimes): the ecosystem, the economy, the society, the polity, and the culture. Needless to say, this typology is an abstract and simplified manner for looking at complex, concrete, and multisided phenomena. Under these labels, there are numerous specific assets and liabilities affecting people. These include environmental sustainability and resilience; good health; employment; well-being; social support networks; and freedom from fear, want, and discrimination. They also include cultural attributes like knowledge, skills, and hope.

All these individual and collective dimensions of security constitute values that are both scarce and necessary. However, it is the political-governance dimension that holds the key to safeguarding physical-environmental, economic, social, and cultural rights. Politics is also central for articulating, legitimizing, and representing demands, and for determining the enforceable “rules of the game”—in Lasswell’s words, “who gets what, when and how.”⁵⁴ As there is much more to security than politics, there is also much more to politics than conflict, might, and force. The latter, may remain an instrument of last resort in power relations, but not its only instrument. War, as an extreme and widespread use of force, may be seen as a continuation of politics, but it is also its antithesis: the very failure of politics.⁵⁵ Political interactions are eminently about power and powerlessness, conflict management, conflict resolution, and the attainment and maintenance of social and intersocietal peace.

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Peace is at the root of political security, but peace is not simply the absence of explicit violence. Issues of equity, accessibility, and fairness are, by their very nature, simultaneously fundamental political issues and pressing security concerns. Thus, peace, human rights, and sustainable development are interconnected components of human security and insecurity. Unlike realism and national security, or neoliberal regime theory, the perspective developed here offers a flexible, multidimensional, and systemic framework to understand the human predicament. Human security’s main focus is people and humanity at large, rather than nation-states (or more specifically their rulers), or business elites in a neofunctional regime.

As mentioned above, human security can be conceived in terms of five subsystems and their regimes: environmental, economic, social, political, and cultural. Insecurity threats emerge as a direct consequence of dysfunctional regimes in their multiple and overlapping systemic dimensions. For instance, the reproduction and expansion of environmental insecurity (i.e., un-sustainability), both at the micro and macro levels, are manifested through closely interconnected

“drivers.” The latter includes the cultural understanding of environment, the specific context and circumstances in which human-environmental interface takes place, the structures of social action related to this interface, the dynamics and processes of human-environment interaction, and the consequences of these processes. That is, actions and behaviors are influenced by values, they occur in a context, they are materialized in structures, and above all, they have effects.

Challenging Conventional Fallacies

Social systems are built on habits and conventions; they are neither automatic, nor inherently self-correcting. The acquisition of knowledge, combined with the ability to manage regimes (environmental, economic, social, political, and cultural), is central to the attainment of security, both as a structural attribute and as a cultural practice.⁵⁶ The existence and maintenance of a viable structure of peace and security is contingent upon a culture and pedagogy of peace,⁵⁷ and the latter is, in turn, constrained and conditioned by the former. In this sense, ethics, agency, and consequences are intrinsically tied together in systems of knowledge and action.

This mode of analysis brings into question the fundamental premise of the dominant international paradigms that emerged at the end of World War II, and more recently with the collapse of the Soviet Union. This refers specifically to the notion that the developed and pluralist North is inherently secure and virtually immune to catastrophic failure, while the South is not. In an increasingly interdependent world, the weaknesses in the global South, and those pockets of insecurity within developed societies, increase the vulnerability of the North in ways that have not been accounted for in standard international relations and development theory—leading to shared vulnerability. This can be summarized and simplified in Table 1.

Without venturing into the arcane realm of prediction, this conceptual perspective made it possible to foresee, already in the late 1980s and early 1990s, that the mounting problems of the less developed periphery transformed themselves into problems for the center. Issues of environmental deterioration (in the biosphere, hydrosphere, soil, and climate), communicable diseases (such as HIV/AIDS, Hanta, or cholera), massive migrations, low intensity conflict, and state failure do not only feed on each other, they also unleash a perverse synergy that exhibits an “epidemiological” proclivity to severely affect far-away regions, physically separate from the origin of the stress.

Likewise, a more systemic and open-ended paradigm could offer a conceptual insight into the dynamics, etiology, context, cultures, structures, and lingering effects of violence; for instance, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC in 2001, Madrid in 2004, and London in 2005. This mode of analysis can also highlight the predictability of decision makers given the prevailing paradigms in international affairs. From the vantage point of a multivariate perspective such as this it could have been possible to forecast, as far back as 1995, that many policies designed to fight subversion would have the unintended effect of multiplying insecurity in both the

Table 1: Human Security/Insecurity: Analytical Matrix

Variables	ECOLOGY (Life) <i>Environmental Capital</i>	ECONOMY (Wealth) <i>Economic Capital</i>	SOCIETY (Support: well-being, respect, rectitude) <i>Social Capital</i>	POLITY (Power) <i>Political Capital</i>	CULTURE (Knowledge, Skill) <i>Cultural Capital</i>
Context	The natural environment: biophysical surroundings of social life	Styles of development: economic practices	Expectations, social practices and traditions	External and internal conflicts: capabilities/ expectations, elites/masses, sovereignty/ dependency	Construction of the social and physical world and collective experiences
Culture	Ecoculture: Cosmivision of environment	Economic doctrines: ways of understanding the economy	Social doctrines: Values, norms and attitudes; identity and modal personality	Ideologies: the role of the state and its relations with the governed	Philosophy: (axiologies, teleologies and deontologies), ethical and moral codes
Structure	Natural vs. resource endowment, spatial distribution (relationship between environment and resources), and "environmental footprint"	Economic units: consumers/ producers; labor/capital	Roles and status: social structures, groups, classes, fractions	Brokers and institutions: interest groups, parties, cliques, governments, bureaucracies	Educational structures, both formal and informal: schools, universities, learning communities
Processes	Destruction/ regeneration of air, water, land, flora and fauna	Production and distribution of goods and services	Interactions: cooperation, conflict, mobilization/ De-mobilization	Conflict-management: consensus, repression, rebellion, stalemate	Learning: construction of consciousness, knowledge, base values, processes and teleologies
Effect	Sustainability-entropy	Prosperity-poverty	Equity-inequity	Peace-violence	Wisdom-stupidity

periphery and the center. In fact, policies proclaimed in the name of antiterrorism ended up fuelling terrorism, enhancing antidemocratic predispositions, and government by deceit.⁵⁸

This mode of analysis can contribute as well as assess the multidimensional and interconnected nature of complex humanitarian emergencies, not as exceptionalities, but as the likely outcome of interrelated and predictable environmental, economic, social, political, and cultural interfaces. In addition, doing so could help challenge some of the misleading presuppositions and mythologies surrounding conventional development and security thinking. Such proverbial “mantras,” magic bullets, and recipes include: the idea that growth will solve most problems, the faith in homeostatic invisible hands, the virtues of lifeboat ethics, the lures of unilateralism, the belief that military might equals security, or the conviction that there is no problem that cannot be tackled by technological fixes.

HUMAN SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

In the late 1990s, the ideas generated in the above mentioned 1988 Ottawa-based IDRC commission working on Ivan Head’s South-North hypothesis were brought to the attention of the then Canadian minister of external affairs, Lloyd Axworthy. This happened through the intermediation of his deputy minister, Gordon Smith. Canadian officials had been looking for a paradigm of development and foreign policy different from the conventional *realpolitik* attached to a modernization and growth model that permeated their involvement with international development.⁵⁹ Human security offered that possibility at a significant point of inflection in global politics, what Head referred to as “a hinge of history.”⁶⁰ It was also capable of providing a solution of continuity within an established tradition of multilateralism, which is rooted in the legacies of former prime ministers Lester B. Pearson⁶¹ and Pierre Elliot Trudeau.

Over the years, a number of centers, institutes, and academic programs, loosely connected with the idea of human security, peacebuilding, and the like, began to proliferate in Canada. These include among others the, Liu Institute for Global Issues⁶² at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, the Human Security and Peacebuilding program at Royal Roads University in Victoria,⁶³ the University of Manitoba (where Axworthy was appointed president in 2003), and Dalhousie University’s International Development program. Moreover, in recent years, the Canadian Association for the Study of International Development (CASID) began to include human security in numerous sections, and academic research and publications on the field have expanded significantly.⁶⁴ Despite this surge, the content of the subject is far from homogeneous. It ranges from a redefinition of development studies, to ideas of sustainable livelihoods,⁶⁵ from the health of ecosystems, to even a vaguely disguised reediting of national security. This proliferation in the area of human security has paralleled a similar development in Europe, predominantly in Scandinavia, as well as in South Africa, the Low Countries, and Japan.

The second country in the Americas to adopt human security as an explicit framework for its foreign policy was Chile. This official embrace of the new perspective occurred during the center-left *Concertación* Government of Eduardo Frei (1994–2000). President Frei and Canada's former prime minister Jean Chrétien had built a close rapport and a common strategy on numerous issues, including human rights, democracy, and free trade. Between 1999 and 2001, during the tenure of two ministers of external affairs (José M. Insulza and Soledad Alvear), and two governments (Frei and Lagos), Chile joined the international Human Security Network (HSN), which originated in a bilateral Canadian-Norwegian agreement signed on the island of Lysøen, Norway, in 1998.⁶⁶ By becoming a signatory, Chile broke a long legal-formalistic and more recently geopolitical tradition developed during the military dictatorship, better characterized as peripheral realism. This move coincided with an internal power struggle between External Affairs and the thoroughly neoliberal Ministry of Finance—in which the more political External Affairs prevailed—regarding who would take the lead in trade negotiations with Canada and the US.

In 2002, the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) in Santiago held an international symposium on human security at the same time that Chile was holding the annual consultative meeting of the HSN. Under the joint sponsorship of FLACSO's Secretariat and UNESCO, an academic initiative resulted in an edited volume, *Human Security, Conflict Prevention, and Peace*.⁶⁷

In general, the adoption of the term human security refers to a position taken by these middle- and small-sized international actors, strong supporters of multilateralism and the United Nations, and those discretely concerned with growing US unilateralism.

The Lysøen document of 1998 that gave birth to the multilateral Human Security Network articulated some of the common ground between the two countries centered on the ideas of the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development, the 1993 Rio Declaration, and the shape of global politics in the post-Cold War era. Subsequently, the term human security appeared in the foreign policy matrices of a small, though significant, group of like-minded countries. The HSN has become significantly internationalized. It is comprised of fourteen member states: Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland, and Thailand.⁶⁸ Japan, though not a HSN member has, since 1998, made human security the basis of its foreign policy, as has the European Union, since 2004. Several other countries, including India, Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil, while outside the network, have elements of their foreign policies that reflect human security concerns and discontinuities with Western orthodoxy.

The specific uses and emphases of these human security frameworks vary in content and focus from country to country. In general, the adoption of the term refers to a position taken by these middle- and small-sized international actors, strong supporters of multilateralism and the United Nations, and those discretely concerned with growing US unilateralism. In many cases, pressures from within and without have shaped some hybrid policies under the label of human security. These incorporate and coexist with neoliberal globalization, and after September 11, 2001, increasing US pressure to embrace its distinctively geopolitical War on Terror.

The above-mentioned constraints and challenges upon human security do not only come from ostensible foreign sources. A significant opposition to human security in many countries, including those in the HSN, comes from their own business sector, the military, and security establishments. Their perspectives are shaped by entrenched neoliberal or realist ideologies and attachments. These groups provide internal linkages⁶⁹ with broader regional or international alignments vis-à-vis transnational actors and constituencies (e.g., the US and various global and regional defense and trade regimes). They also are involved in building governing alliances and internal correlations of forces that partake in foreign policymaking.⁷⁰

The paradox is that terrorism is a kind of highly asymmetrical and unconventional security threat, one that is not properly addressed from a conventional military-realist paradigm.

In a manner similar to pre-1989 Eastern Europe⁷¹ vis-à-vis the USSR, penetrability, complex dependence,⁷² and continuity, with at least some aspects of US policy, are facts of life in the Western hemisphere. Yet, as it was also the case in Eastern Europe, there are significant and often hidden discontinuities with the dominant power. Dominance and hegemony are two different things, and the Western hemisphere reflects this contradiction. For instance, since the Reagan administration withdrew its support for the Pinochet regime in the late 1980s, former pro-US hardliners in the Chilean military establishment grew resentful with Washington's interventionist stand; though, they continued sharing quite similar mindsets. Subsequent actions in Panama and Iraq, from the 1980s through 2004 only deepened this resentment. The same was the case with another former ally, General Galtieri of Argentina who, in 1982, bitterly labeled the lack of US support for the Falklands-Malvinas invasion as "an act of treason."⁷³ The problem with the antagonistic nature of realism and national security, and its tenet of "national interest," is that beyond similarities in logic and methods the question remains as to whose concrete interest is at stake.

Beyond alignment, most military officers are trained and integrated in regional and global compacts, and disdain the presence of "wimpy" displays of soft power and humanitarian concerns. Nevertheless, some military planners in the Americas see human security as a way to exercise and justify a professional presence for

humanitarian reasons, or in implementing other “securitized” issue areas.⁷⁴ A good example is the area of disaster management and humanitarian relief, and the use of force for peacemaking and peacebuilding.⁷⁵ All these cases point towards an attempt to militarize or “re-securitize” human security and bring it back to a realist conception of international politics.

In turn, business interests—and in general, neoliberal Trilateralists—wary of extremism, neo-Keynesianism, and hyper-nationalism in the War on Terror have taken into their discourse some of the soft power implications of human security. Yet on the whole, they loathe its popular and egalitarian implications. One clear example of this contradiction is in the area of environmental security⁷⁶ and regulation, particularly around the contentious issue of the Kyoto Protocol.⁷⁷ In the specific case of Canada, heavy pressure by Kyoto-weary Western oil interests on Prime Minister Martin’s Cabinet, may have led to the removal of the environmental security dimension in its entirety from the human security equation in 2002. The Human Security Institute and the Ministry of External Affairs concentrated instead on issues such as small arms, landmines, crime, and terrorism.

As with defense-related issues, there are also important discontinuities emerging between US and Latin American business elites. For instance, a 2002 survey across the Latin American region found “evidence of increased support for redistributive taxation among the wealthy.”⁷⁸ This happened at a time when large economies like Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, and even smaller ones, like Ecuador and Bolivia, were experiencing severe deprivations, ostensibly as a result of neoliberal policies. Unlike their US and Canadian counterparts, Latin America’s well-to-do seem prone to accept wealth redistribution as a measure to prevent social unrest and economic insecurity.

While the term human security has been gaining general acceptance across the board,⁷⁹ old habits and institutional and political interests, as well as a persistent opposition in US official and academic establishments, makes it difficult for human security to become as widely recognized as realism or globalism. For as long as the War on Terror—America’s surrogate for the Cold War—continues to occupy a mesmerizing central stage in the collective imagination, it is unlikely that other discourses, including the once predominant Trilateralism, can gain a significant foothold. The paradox is that terrorism is a kind of highly asymmetrical and unconventional security threat, one that is not properly addressed from a conventional military-realist paradigm.

However, as the discrepancy between the rhetoric and the reality (and the dismal results) of the preemptive version of national security continues to widen, domestic incredulity and international isolation end up devaluing its appeal. Natural and man-made catastrophes may also play a role in undermining simplistic and mechanical views. In turn, ultranationalists in the US, concerned with loss of power and industrial decay, aggressively question some of the trans-nationalist implications of globalism, complex interdependency, and regime theory.⁸⁰ This, combined with a rather disastrous performance of neoliberal prescriptions worldwide,⁸¹ has damaged

the once triumphant hegemony of its neo-materialist discourse. In Latin America, there is a deep and expanding dissatisfaction with structural adjustment and unbridled market policies,⁸² as there is generally strong resentment with the criminal brutality of militarism and national security. Recent developments in a number of countries, like Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela, are causing a departure from the Rio Treaty, economic orthodoxy, and the IMF.⁸³ This tilt to a moderate, though more assertive Left could open the opportunity for redefining the foreign policies in numerous Latin American states, and regional hemispheric security in the OAS itself. In this sense it is not impossible to predict that other countries either join the ranks of those in the human security fold, or develop policy frameworks at odds with realism or national security.

CONCLUSIONS

As a global crisis continues to unfold, ruling elites at the world's core, their consent-manufacturing propaganda, and their publics, seem to retain a built-in ability for denial and resistance to change, while clinging to outmoded mental models and dysfunctional solutions. A "hard" military response to any threat, and the magical pseudo-rationalism of market mechanics, offer a simple and comforting, albeit false, sense of security. This level of comfort may explain why the porous discourses of modernity, economic reductionism, and conventional national security have exhibited a remarkable ability to persist, while incorporating or trivializing intellectual challenges to their hegemony. These ideologies are elite-created artifacts for mass consumption and have been efficient in securing mass arousal and quiescence, while masking intra-elite operating agendas. Their alternate, opposite fall-back position may be, in the present conjuncture, a millennial and prophetic view of an apocalyptic "end of history."

As a praxis, globalization does not mean just the interconnectedness of one part of civil society, namely businesses articulated in the "holy triangle" (the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank) and global mega-flows of capital, trade, communications, and finance. A myriad of other non-business interests are beginning to emerge and organize: NGOs, indigenous peoples, new social movements, and in particular, and somewhat paradoxically, the "anti-globalization movement" itself. Increasingly and still utterly unrepresented, a citizen-based "third system," along the lines envisioned by Nerfin⁸⁴ is beginning to take shape. This people-centered perspective of long-term social, economic, and environmental sustainability offers the most promising opportunity for reframing and challenging the ruling orthodoxy. The 2001 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg and the World Social Forums (beginning in 2001 in Porto Alegre, Brazil through 2006 in Caracas, Venezuela) have provided perhaps a prime opportunity for advancing a citizen-based global agenda of sustainability, partly inspired by, and partly influencing the UN Millennium Development Goals.⁸⁵ These alternative summits, as well as growing demands for an International Criminal Court with universal jurisdiction, and a serious and concerted effort on the part of these new actors in improving health, reducing poverty, and

increasing grassroots mobilization, have highlighted real security threats. They have also raised universal awareness about mutual vulnerability in an era of hyper-globalization and unipolarity.

There is an urgent need to bring new voices into the ongoing security and globalization monologue and turn it into a true debate.⁸⁶ This is already happening in every corner of the world, even in the US. There is a need, too, for taking a fresh look at the world to break the present cycle of self-reinforcing dysfunctions. The world's citizens must redefine the global paradigm of human security, understood as the indivisible security of humankind. By necessity, it must be democratic, and seek the reduction of insecurity by preventing the causes of insecurity, rather than containing its symptoms.

Finally, human security is a call for truly global learning and understanding, constructed on an ethical base of mutual respect and cultural diversity. What UNESCO has called a culture of peace⁸⁷ is a necessity for re-conceptualizing the world order, its sources of stress, and possible interventions, rather than offering more of the same morally bankrupt and dysfunctional responses. A deepening crisis in the stratified disorder, euphemistically called the "world order," may present a window of opportunity to bring new voices and perspectives into a forum to examine the global predicament in a concerted and integrated way. As conventional paradigms of development and security reveal their weaknesses and profound inconsistencies, people the world over, including public intellectuals, are able to cast out prevailing prejudices and stereotypes, and look at the world as a global community. This is the essence of mutual vulnerability. This growing consciousness—the recognition that there is something profoundly wrong—is making it possible to effectively move forward in addressing the world's most pressing and urgent threats to its citizens' well-being, and survival.

Notes

¹ The concept refers to the dialectical phenomenology in the works of Alfred Schutz, Paulo Freire, and Dorothy E. Smith. See Dorothy E. Smith, *The Everyday Life as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1987), 1; also Paulo Freire, *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Continuum, 1993), and Alfred Schutz, *Phenomenology and Social Reality* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970) and *Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).

² Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest* 16, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 2–28.

³ Anatol Rapoport, *Fights, Games and Debates* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1960).

⁴ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), 15; also Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, The United Nations Commission on Human Security, 2003. Available at: <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/index.html> (Accessed January 20, 2006).

⁵ Holly Sklar, "Trilateralism: Managing Dependency and Democracy—an Overview," in *Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management*, ed. Holly Sklar (Boston: South End Press, 1980), 1–55.

⁶ Manfred B. Steger, *Globalism: The New Market Ideology* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).

⁷ Concepts of mutuality are found in Independent Commission on International Development Issues, *North-South, a Programme for Survival: Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980), 7–47; and Independent Commission on International Development Issues, *Common Crisis: North South Cooperation for World Recovery* (London: Pan Books, 1983), 1–38.

⁸ Jorge Nef, *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability: The Global Political Economy of Development and*

Underdevelopment, Second Edition (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1999).

⁹ Jeremy Youde, "Enter the Fourth Horseman: Health Security and International Relations Theory," *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 6, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2005): 193.

¹⁰ Marc Nerfin, "Neither Prince nor Merchant: Citizen. Introduction to the Third System," *IFDA Dossier* 56 (November/December 1986): 3–28.

¹¹ Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" *International Security* 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 87–102.

¹² Hal Klepak, "Peace, Human Security, and Conflict Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean—A View from North America," in *Human Security, Conflict Prevention, and Peace*, ed. Francisco Rojas Aravena and Moufida Goucha (Santiago: UNESCO-FLASCO, 2003), 73, 79–80.

¹³ Gaston Chillier and Laurie Freeman, "Potential Threat: The New OAS Concept of Hemispheric Security," *WOLA Special Report* (July 2005): 1–10.

¹⁴ Juan Bosch, *El Pentagonismo, Substituto del Imperialismo* (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1967).

¹⁵ Sklar, "Trilateralism: Managing Dependency and Democracy—an Overview," 1–55.

¹⁶ The term was used by President George H. W. Bush in a speech to Congress on March 6, 1991, with reference to the end of Operation Desert Storm and the defeat of Iraq at the hands of a UN-sponsored coalition, led by the US. It has also been referred to as a characterization of a unipolar, neoliberal world, under US hegemony.

¹⁷ Helio Jaguaribe, *Economic and Political Development: A Theoretical Approach and a Brazilian Case Study* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 4–12.

¹⁸ Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22–49.

¹⁹ Arturo Escobar, "Discourse and Power in Development: Michel Foucault and the Relevance of his Work to the Third World," *Alternatives* 10, no. 3 (Winter 1984–1985): 377–400.

²⁰ A concept used by Plato and also J. J. Rousseau. For its application in the US, see Leroy S. Rouser, "What is an American? Civil Religion, Cultural Diversity, and American Civilization," *The Key Reporter*, Spring 1999. Available at: <http://www.pbk.org/pubs/Keyreporter/Spring99/Rouser3.htm> (Accessed January 19, 2006).

²¹ A discussion about the differences between substantive (goal-oriented) and functional (means-oriented) rationality can be found in Karl Mannheim, *Diagnosis of Our Time: Wartime Essays of a Sociologist* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1943), and Mannheim's *Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950).

²² For an examination of development processes and human security from an ethical framework, see Denis Goulet, *Development Ethics: A Guide to Theory and Practice* (New York: The Apex Press, 1995), 14, and Jorge Nef, "The Ethics of Mutual Vulnerability: A Developmental Perspective for Foreign Policy," in *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Rosalind Irwin (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 17.

²³ Nelson A. Rockefeller, *The Rockefeller Report on the Americas: The Official Report of a United States Presidential Mission for the Western Hemisphere* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969).

²⁴ Orlando Letelier, "Chile: Economic 'Freedom's' Awful Toll: the 'Chicago Boys' in Chile," *Review of Radical Political Economy* 8, no. 3 (Fall 1976): 44–52.

²⁵ Alan Wolfe, "A Fascist Philosopher Helps Us Understand Contemporary Politics," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, April 2, 2004. Available at: <http://chronicle.com/free/v50/i30/30b01601.htm> (Accessed January 20, 2006).

²⁶ Jorge Nef, "Some Thoughts on Contemporary Terrorism: Domestic and International Perspectives," in *Terrorism in Theory and Practice*, ed. John Carson (Toronto: The Atlantic Council of Canada, 1978), 4–21.

²⁷ The concept has been developed by Nye to refer to the lack of accountability and "revocability" of political officers. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr. et al., "The 'Democracy Deficit' in the *Global Economy: Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Global Institutions* (Washington: The Trilateral Commission, 2003).

²⁸ "Panorama Social de America Latina 2004," Comision Economica para America Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), November, 2004. Available at <http://www.eclac.cl/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/publicaciones/xml/6/20386/P20386.xml&x> (Accessed January 20, 2005).

²⁹ For a discussion of the transition from Pentagonism to Trilateralism in the Americas, see Arturo Siat and Gregorio Iriarte, "De la Seguridad Nacional al Trilateralismo," *Cuadernos de Cristianismo y Sociedad* (Buenos Aires: May 1978), 17–30; also Washington Office for Latin America, *Latin America Update* 1, no. 5 (October 1980), 1.

³⁰ It refers to relational control or the capability to affect the outcome of a power play by changing the terms of reference of the interaction. See Tom Baumgartner et al., "Meta-Power and the Structuring of Social Hierarchies," in *Power and Control: Social Structures and Their Transformation*, ed. Tom R. Burns and Walter Buckley (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976), 224–25.

³¹ Jorge Nef and Francisco Rojas Aravena, "Dependencia compleja y transnacionalización del estado en America Latina", *Relaciones Internacionales*, nos. 8 and 9 (December 1984): 101–122; also Jorge Nef, "Crise politique et transnationalisation de l'Etat en Amérique latine: une interprétation théorique," *Etudes Internationales* 17, no. 2 (1986): 279–306; and Jorge Nef, "The Political Economy of Inter-American Relations: A Structural and Historical Overview," in *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*, ed. Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D.

Underhill (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Inc., 1994), 404–418.

³² Barry Gills et al., *Low Intensity Democracy* (London: Pluto Press, 1993), 8 and Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 1 (January 1994): 55–69.

³³ Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Convoking Elections (and Provoking Parties)," in *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, ed. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 62.

³⁴ The term has been used in the sense given by Gramsci: a crisis of rule by force. A systematic treatment and application of Antonio Gramsci's concepts of hegemony (*direzzione*) and domination (*dominazione*) is contained in Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 12, no. 2 (1983): 162–175. Hegemony basically relates to power by consensus—control over "the hearts and minds"—as opposed to domination that requires the recourse to force. Weber uses the concepts of *macht* (force) to refer to the application or threat of physical violence, while *herrschaft* (authority) refers to voluntary compliance based upon some basis of legitimacy.

³⁵ Richard E. Rubenstein, "Basic Human Needs: The Next Steps in Theory Development," *International Journal of Peace Studies* 6, no. 1 (Spring 2001). Available at: http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol6_1/Rubenstein.htm (Accessed January 25, 2006).

³⁶ Jorge Nef, "Socioeconomic and Political Factors of Health Security and Insecurity in Latin America and the Caribbean," *Journal of Developing Societies* 19, no. 2–3 (2003); also Johan Galtung, "Peace and Conflict Research in the Age of the Cholera: Ten Pointers to the Future of Peace Studies," *The International Journal of Peace Studies* 1, no. 1 (January 1996).

³⁷ Jorge Nef and Jokelee Vanderkop, "Food Systems and Food Security in Latin America: A Systemic Approach to Politics, Ideology, and Technology," in *The World Food Crisis: Food Security in Comparative Perspective*, ed. J.I. Hans Bakker (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 1990), 97–136; also Jorge Nef, "Socioeconomic and Political Factors of Health Security and Insecurity in Latin America and the Caribbean," *Journal of Developing Societies* 19, no. 2–3 (2003): 172–226.

³⁸ "The Johannesburg Summit Test: What Will Change?" *United Nations: Johannesburg Summit 2002*, September 25, 2002. Available at: http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/whats_new/feature_story41.html (Accessed January 25, 2006).

³⁹ Rubenstein, "Basic Human Needs: The Next Steps in Theory Development."

⁴⁰ The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, today ECLAC (Latin America and the Caribbean), has analyzed underdevelopment as being conditioned by structural socio-political factors, such as domestic inequality, and external constraints, such as export-oriented, dependent, and mono-producer economies. The so-called ECLA Doctrine has been long associated with the work of its first Secretary General, Argentinean Raul Prebisch, but also to the works of Antonio Mayobre, Osvaldo Sunkel, and then critical sociologists Fernando Enrique Cradoso, Enzo Faletto, Theotonio Dos Santos, Andre Gunder Frank, and many others. Concepts such as deterioration of terms of trade and later dependent development were first created within ECLA.

⁴¹ The seminal work in the subject is Gustavo Gutiérrez, *A Theology of Liberation* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1973).

⁴² Paulo Freire's approaches to critical education and consciousness are most relevant. See Paulo Freire, *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Continuum, 1993), 19–56; *Cultural Action for Freedom*, (Cambridge: Harvard Educational Review, 1970), *Education, the Practice of Freedom* (London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, 1976), as well as his works with Antonio Faundez, *Learning to Question: a Pedagogy of Liberation* (New York: Continuum, 1989), Donald Macedo, *Literacy: Reading the Word & the World* (South Hadley: Bergin & Garvey Publishers, 1987), *The Paulo Freire Resource Collection for Studies in Cultural Action* (Toronto: Ontario Institute for Studies in Education Library, 1979), Ira Shor and Paulo Freire, *A Pedagogy for Liberation: Dialogues on Transforming Education* (South Hadley: Bergin & Garvey Publishers, 1987); *Pedagogy in Process: the Letters to Guinea-Bissau* (London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, 1978), and *Pedagogy of Hope: Reliving Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Continuum, 1994).

⁴³ For a definition of self-managed urban communities see Michel Azcueta, *Apuntes Sobre Comunicación y Educación Popular* (Canada: International Development Research Centre, 1986).

⁴⁴ For a critical analysis of the peace process in Central America, see Rodrigo Jaubert Rojas, *El Plan de Paz de Oscar Arias: ¿Intervencionismo de Nuevo Tipo o Negociación Regional?* (Mexico: PECA-CIDE, CICAH, 1987).

⁴⁵ Harold Lasswell, *Politics. Who Gets What, When and How?* (New York: Peter Smith, 1950), 3–25.

⁴⁶ Robert Cox, *Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), and Johannes Galtung, *The True Worlds: a Transnational Perspective* (New York: Free Press, 1980).

⁴⁷ Ivan L. Head, *On a Hinge of History: The Mutual Vulnerability of South and North* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991).

⁴⁸ Jorge Nef, *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability: The Global Political Economy of Development and*

Underdevelopment (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1995).

⁴⁹ Canada's IDRC has financed the Bariloche Foundation Project since 1972. Amílcar O. Herrera, Hugo D. Scolnick, Gabriela Chichilinsky, Gilberto C. Gallopin, Jorge E. Hardoy, Diana Mosovich, Enrique Oteiza, Gilda L. de Romero, Carlos E. Suárez, and Luis Talavera, *¿Catástrofe o Nueva Sociedad? Modelo mundial latinoamericano 30 años después: Segunda Edición* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2004).

⁵⁰ Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, and William W. Behrens III., *The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind* (New York: Universe Publishing, 1972).

⁵¹ Jorge Nef "Development Theory and Development-Mongering: Some Reflections about Operational Contradictions between Theory and Practice," *Global Programme in Training in Population and Development* (Santiago, Chile: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean CELADE/ECLAC, February 13, 1991).

⁵² Jorge Nef, *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability. An Exploration into the Global Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre Books, 1995).

⁵³ Lasswell, *Politics*, 3-25.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *Historical and Political Writings*, eds., by Peter Paret & Daniel Moran (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).

⁵⁶ On the transformative nature of the learning process, see Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, *Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Cognitive* (Boston: T. Reidel Publisher, 1980), 63-72, ("Preface" by Safford Beer) 73-86, 112-123; also Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, *The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding* (Boston: New Science Library, distributed in the United States by Random House, 1987) 15-30, 205-235, 239-250.

⁵⁷ Jorge Nef, "Terrorism and the Pedagogy of Violence: A Critical Analysis," *Comparative Education, Terrorism and Human Security: From Pedagogy to Peacebuilding?* ed. Wayne Nelles (2003), 47-62.

⁵⁸ Jorge Nef, *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability: An Exploration into the Global Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment* (Ottawa: IDRC Books, 1995).

⁵⁹ Jorge Nef, "Ivan Head's Vision of Human Security; A Personal Reflection, Special session Remembering Ivan Head, (1930-2004): CASID-IDRC panel in honor of the late Ivan Head CASID" *Congress 2005; the Learned Societies, University of Western Ontario*, June 2, 2005.

⁶⁰ Ivan L. Head, "South-North Dangers," *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 3 (Summer, 1989): 71-86.

⁶¹ Lester Pearson, et al. *Partners in Development Report of the Commission on International Development* (New York: Praeger, 1969), 3-79.

⁶² Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia at Vancouver. Available at <http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/> (Accessed April 3, 2006).

⁶³ Royal Roads University at Victoria, British Columbia. Available at <http://www.royalroads.ca/programs/faculties-schools-centres/faculty-social-applied-sciences/peace-conflict-management/mhsp/> (Accessed April 3, 2006).

⁶⁴ There are numerous books in the pipeline and Ph.D. and MA theses on the subject are increasingly frequent in academic programs, both disciplinary and inter-disciplinary. See Peter Stoett, *Human and Global Security: An Exploration of Terms* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999); Rosalind Irwin, ed., *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001); and *Comparative Education, Terrorism and Human Security. From Critical Pedagogy to Peacebuilding?* ed. Wayne Nelles (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2003).

⁶⁵ Anne Thompson, "Food Security and Sustainable Livelihoods: A Policy Challenge", *Development* 44, no. 4 (2001): 24-28; Livelihoods Connects, "Frequently Asked Questions on the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach," electronic version, June 20, 2002, 4-15, also Institute for Development Studies (IDS) and DFID. Available at <http://www.livelihoods.org/enquirydesk/enquiryfaq.html> (Accessed on April 3, 2006); also in Susanna Davies and Naomi Hossain, "Livelihood, Adaptation, Public Action and Civil Society: A Review of the Literature", *IDS Working Paper 57* (Brighton, UK, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, July 1997): 1-48.

⁶⁶ Claudia Fuentes, "Human Security Network: From Lysoen to Santiago," *Human Security, Conflict Prevention and Peace*, eds. Moufida Goucha and Francisco Rojas (Santiago: FLACSO and UNESCO, 2003): 83-100.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 83.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ Jorge Nef and Remonda Bensabat, "'Governability' and the Receiver State in Latin America: Analysis and Prospects," *Latin America to the Year 2000: Reactivating Growth, Improving Equity, Sustaining Democracy*, eds. Archibald RM Ritter, Maxwell A. Cameron and David H. Pollock (New York: Praeger, 1992), 77; also Douglas Chalmers, "Developing in the Periphery; External Factors in Latin American Politics" *Contemporary Inter-American Relations. A Reader in Theory and Issues*, ed. Yale H. Ferguson (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 12-31.

⁷⁰ Barbara Stallings, *Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile, 1958-1973* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1978), 10 and 51-52.

⁷¹ Terry-Lynn Karl and Richard Fagen, "The Logic of Hegemony: The United States as a Superpower in

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⁷³ Jorge Nef and Francis Hallman, “Reflections on the Anglo-Argentinean War,” *International Perspectives* (Sept.-Oct. 1982): 6-10.

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⁷⁶ Kheryn Klubnikin and Douglas Causey, “Environmental Security: Metaphor for the Millennium,” *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 3, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 2002): 104-133.

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⁷⁸ Carol Graham and Sandip Sukhtankar, “Does Economic Crisis Reduce Support for Markets and Democracy in Latin America? Lessons from Surveys of Public Opinion and Well Being,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* (May 2004) Available at <http://brookings.edu/views/articles/graham/20040210.htm> (Accessed on April 4, 2006).

⁷⁹ This issue of the *Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* is an example.

⁸⁰ Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 24-29.

⁸¹ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Report of the World Social Situation 2005: The Inequality Predicament* (New York: United Nations 2005) ; Available at <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/rwss/media%2005/cd-docs/press.htm> (Accessed on April 4, 2006).

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⁸⁴ Marc Nerfin, “Neither Prince nor Merchant: Citizen—An Introduction to the Third System,” *Development Dialogue* 1 (1987): 170-195.

⁸⁵ United Nations Development Goals, *What are the Millennium Development Goals?* 2006. Available at <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/> (Accessed on April 4, 2006).

⁸⁶ United Nations International Labor Organization, World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization, *A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All* (Geneva, Switzerland: ILO, February 2003), 14.

⁸⁷ Federico Mayor, “Culture of Peace,” in *Our Fragile World: Challenges and Opportunities for Sustainable Development*, Forerunner to the Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems, ed. M. K. Tolba (Oxford: EOLSS Publications, 2001), 849-855.

