

Overcoming Bureaucratic Obstacles to the Human Security Agenda: Lessons from Conflict Management

by Antonia Chayes

The international community is not ready, nor is it willing, to take on the enormously idealistic and ambitious agenda of human security. The introduction to the Report of the Commission on Human Security presented to the secretary-general in May 2003 states, “Human Security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her own potential.”¹ The concept has been useful in shifting the focus from state security to individual security, and has helped to enlighten the debate about the right to intervene. But questions about the definition of human security—whether it creates the right balance among the competing needs for physical, economic, and political security; whether it is too inclusive or not inclusive enough—are not very useful. In my view, the concept should be taken symbolically, rather than literally. The questioning should then be directed to whether international institutions, now so sorely lacking in capacity and financing, can be made to embrace such an ambitious agenda. Or are the human security concept and agenda, taken literally, so ambitious that they will further paralyze the nations that comprise the institutions and lead to even less response to human suffering and development?

Realistically, the current records of institutional reform and national support for international organizations are hardly encouraging. Responsiveness to far less ambitious reform proposals, for example those in the 1992 *Agenda for Peace* and the 2000 Brahimi Report, that aim for greater integration in dealing with conflict and post-conflict reconstruction, has been poor. These proposals have not been implemented rapidly; where implemented, the implementation is weak; and in some cases, the recommendations have been rejected or ignored altogether.

In order to highlight the problems that must be overcome in order to begin to realize the human security agenda, this article revisits many of the obstacles that I have written about earlier in the area of conflict intervention and post-conflict

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statebuilding.² Even if these obstacles were overcome, the economic development aspects of this agenda alone will present new issues that are not adequately addressed by reform proposals in the area surrounding conflict. Post-conflict efforts have barely begun to grapple with widespread governmental corruption, corruption in the donor agencies themselves, and the widespread smuggling and trafficking in drugs and human beings. Moreover, the international community has not grasped the magnitude of developing a functioning, democratic rule of law in societies where legal norms did not flourish before the conflict erupted. All of these issues, and more, must be a part of the human security agenda.

The human security agenda, as set forth in the Human Security Commission report and subsequent documents, represents a long-term goal to which the world can aspire, but it is simply not politically feasible in the foreseeable future. The resources and commitment that would be required are exponentially beyond the scale of what is available now, or that nations seem willing to commit. My concern is that if human security becomes the metric by which all international action is measured, that action will necessarily fall short, and the degree of discouragement could result in less, rather than more, effort. Therefore, it may be wise to strive for more limited objectives on the way to a broader, more integrated view of human security. I will focus only on approaching that agenda post-conflict, and examine some of the pitfalls that war-torn societies present. Even with a narrowed focus, the international response to states in conflict and post-conflict states is rarely effective, always slower than necessary, and usually lacking in commitment. It is not realistic to think that the will and capacity to deal with the full human security agenda, including broad issues of poverty, disease, crime, and economic development, can be realized in the near term.

OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTING A HUMAN SECURITY AGENDA POST-CONFLICT

Despite major efforts to effect greater cooperation and coordination among the organizations and nations that work to rebuild a war-torn society, improvements have been slow in coming. Traditional approaches to coordination still do not work effectively enough to deal with problems of human security in statebuilding. For instance, since the UN system does not represent the totality of interveners in any post-conflict situation, the reforms that place a secretary-general's special representative in charge of UN activities remain insufficient, even when fully implemented. Nor will the innovation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq overcome the problems. Four main categories will highlight the obstacles that continue.

First, an unwieldy number of actors intervene in every conflict. They operate with differing perspectives and different agendas, and the wide variety of tasks they perform often overlap or are contradictory. Each actor is likely to express these differences as they deal with the parties and stakeholders to the conflict. Arriving at

coherence is never simple, but it is the first task. The typical array of participants includes the United Nations and some of its departments; its specialized intergovernmental agencies, such as the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization; international financial organizations, particularly the World Bank; regional organizations like the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the powerful EU, whose reach extends beyond Europe; nation-states, both as political actors and as donors in bilateral aid programs; military organizations; and a host of international and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). These organizations have different mandates, funding sources, constituencies, and needs—and most importantly, capabilities not fully appreciated by the others. Additionally, NGOs large and small operate within a tradition of fierce independence and autonomy, although they require security. There is scant opportunity to harmonize the different approaches ahead of time, and control from headquarters makes collaboration on the ground even more difficult.

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Second, bureaucratic rigidity and jealousy pervade this multiplicity of interveners. Even the bare-bones listing of players above makes it evident that there is no office or organization with the legal authority, let alone the practical power or political and economic resources, to impose order. The independence of NGOs makes cooperation especially difficult when a civil-military interface exists, as it does now in Afghanistan. Exhortations for clear leadership are applauded, but go unheeded. In comparison with the early 1990s, some recognition and appreciation of different bureaucratic approaches, and the beginnings of the softening of rigidities, especially on the ground, have emerged. “Turf consciousness” and jealousy are magnified as donor fatigue sets in, however, and competition for scarce resources is fierce. Civilian organizations compete for priority and visibility, and militaries are overstretched. Some, such as the United States in the Balkans and Afghanistan, want to limit their duration and commitment. Others lack the resources to make a significant long-term contribution to peace operations.

The third and perhaps worst obstacle—and one that structural or institutional change does not fix—is the lack of clear political direction and commitment from powerful or otherwise involved states. Political leaders and policy analysts call for clear, consistent mandates and well-defined missions to guide and organize interventions, but states, acting on their own and within the international organizations of which they are members, pursue divergent agendas in response to their different interests. Conflicting policies struggle for predominance within a single international organization and even within a single government. The machinery with which the international community decides to intervene is incapable

of producing more than vague and ambiguous compromise on the scope and purpose of an intervention. These fundamental political disagreements are evident in examining almost any set of Security Council resolutions with respect to a single conflict. These resolutions are often compromises that paper over deep policy differences—for example the Security Council resolutions on Bosnia during its war, Somalia, or Iraq from 2002 to 2006. Many resolutions are also written, at least in part, for domestic constituencies, and may be internally inconsistent. This ambiguity is inherent in the political conditions under which international organizations and even states make decisions. It cannot be cured by exhortation. It is true that intrepid and wise leadership on the ground may sometimes limit a non-doable mandate from the UN Security Council, but it is hard to work around policy confusion in a fast-moving crisis or a situation where resources cannot be stretched to perform the tasks mandated.

Finally, the international community wants low-cost fixes, and seems to lack the patience and persistence to assure that a conflict will be unlikely to recur. Lack of funding is a major problem, particularly as new crises emerge to drain funds from “old wars,” and trained manpower is in short supply. Additionally, unwelcome danger to civilians and military personnel adversely affects domestic political constituencies. It has taken years to absorb some of the lessons of the lack of response to the Rwandan genocide, but kidnappings of UN personnel in Sierra Leone may increase reluctance once again. In recent years, the international community, in fact, has learned about these obstacles and begun to address them, but the same old mistakes are also repeated by new people in new situations.

Bureaucratic Rigidity and Resistance to Change

The first obstacle—the multiplicity of actors—is by now a recognized fact of life in conflict intervention. Current solutions have helped somewhat, but not sufficiently, and differing goals and agendas further confound an already confused situation. These are compounded by the second point—the bureaucratic rigidity of large international organizations and their resistance to change of any kind. Both experience and organizational research indicate that even though the logic for major organizational change may be compelling, the actual process turns out to be slow and painstakingly difficult.³ Analysts across the range of organizational studies, from business to public bureaucracies, agree. Major cultural change is painful, disruptive, and likely to be resisted at all levels of the organization. Even when the chief executive provides the impetus for change, the rest of senior management may be less enthusiastic, perceiving risks both to the organization and their positions.

Chandler, in a classic study, *Strategy and Structure*, discusses the obstacles to implementing major structural change in four large companies. He concludes that “one of the primary reasons structure was slow to follow strategy was that the existing management was unable to change its ways.”⁴ There is always a fear that results may not be as intended, and change may give rise to new, unanticipated problems. Even though it may be clear that the external operating environment has

changed radically and the organization needs to follow, the exact form of adaptation to the new environment is not apparent. Thus, responsible management may lack confidence that a particular form of non-incremental change will improve the situation. Whatever else is doubtful, there will surely be “discontinuity, disorder, and distraction,”⁵ and the organization may seem out of control. “Even when institutions do not conform to the demands of a given environment, they may nevertheless endure because...the prospective gains from altering them are outweighed by the costs of making the changes.”⁶

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For international governmental organizations, the difficulties are compounded. Perhaps the most important single factor is the fact that these organizations must respond to the nation-states that comprise their membership. With every major change in organizational pattern and structure, negotiations have to take place both within the international organization and at the second level of domestic constituency.⁷ Thus, for example, some of the recommendations in the Brahimi Report were not implemented—particularly the proposals on the Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat, which would have upgraded and integrated fact-gathering and intelligence resources within the UN. Similarly, strengthening of the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) through the secondment of military and intelligence personnel was temporarily curtailed because of a combined reluctance of third world countries to have intelligence and military officers from industrialized countries working in that UN department instead of jobs being opened for their own personnel. Since there were no funds available to create these jobs, seconded personnel were sent home, and DPKO was weakened for a time. While criticism after criticism has been heaped upon the UN, the fact is that the failure of the Security Council to act effectively and in a timely manner is in large part the responsibility of its members, on whose approval action depends.

On top of these problems in effecting change in international organizations remain the problems of internal structure and management that resist reform. Most of our present array of international organizations were created in the wake of World War II, the heyday of the centralized organization, when the ideal form was a smooth pyramid with strong senior management. This form of organization has managed to persist in most public bureaucracies. Each of the international organizations was set up with a specific function and purpose, and each focused on its special contribution and on performing its task well. The downside has been parochialism, tunnel vision, and worse, bureaucratic jealousies and information-hoarding that developed over the years. Functional specialization led over time to institutional insularity, and communication and coordination with others were not ideals to be pursued. With the demands of conflict resolution and post-conflict

missions in the post–Cold War era, international organizations have had to share common tasks in the same arena. In fact, their very limitations should be a greater source of strength than they are. They are specialized and experienced. No organization has the skills to do all the tasks needed, but together they come close. At a high level of abstraction they share common goals—preventing or ending conflict, providing assistance to the people who have suffered, rebuilding the physical structures, and helping to establish democratic institutions that can deal with conflict. These commonalities ought to provide a basis for cooperative action.

Bureaucratic competition for primacy has not yielded to strong recognition of the necessary interdependence of all interveners, civilian and military.

Yet, the insistence on preserving bureaucratic domains has, if anything, hardened with scarce funds. Each organization has sought to carve its niche on the world scene, develop its own external support and sources of funding, and establish its identity in order to survive. Bureaucratic competition for primacy has not yielded to strong recognition of the necessary interdependence of all interveners, civilian and military. It has not seemed important for the senior managers of most international organizations to make the effort to fully appreciate the skills of other organizational players, the contribution they could make, their views of the problem, their conceptions of their roles—much less their organizational goals. Thus, Secretary-General Kofi Annan was prompted to state to the Special Meeting of the General Assembly on Reform in July 1997: “Where we should have been flexible and adaptable, we have, all too often, been bureaucratic. Where we should have reached across sectoral lines and institutional boundaries, we have stayed within rigid structures, working in isolation, with little or no coordination.”⁸ Despite these words, the conception that cooperation is the *only* means of attaining shared goals of successful conflict management is not yet embedded in the corporate cultures of most intervening organizations.⁹ The imperative of each organization often remains its own performance, its bureaucratic position, and its funding goals.

The threatening aspects of organizational change loom especially large in a climate of cost-cutting and downsizing, where “re-engineering” often translates into personnel cuts. In such a climate, radical changes that are undertaken primarily for other purposes will nevertheless be perceived as job elimination, and resisted on that ground. Change feels like loss—and people need time to mourn before they can adapt.¹⁰ The personnel practices pursued by international organizations create a special problem. These organizations have traditionally responded to member states’ demands for equity of representation by increasing personnel at all levels, especially prestigious management positions. As new positions have built up, barnacle-like, accusations of “bloated bureaucracy” have multiplied. As a consequence, a major focus of reform, especially in the UN system, has been personnel reductions.¹¹ Kofi Annan, in one of his early acts as secretary-general, bowed to the pressure for cost-

cutting and sought the elimination of 1,000 posts.¹² After such an action, remaining staff tend to “circle the wagons” to protect their own positions, which does not lead to the acceptance of new ideas or redirection of policy.¹³

Added to all these problems is the fact that organizational change must be accommodated while meeting the urgent new demands of ongoing conflict intervention. Given the shortages of personnel and funding, the intensive internal efforts necessary to bring about organizational change are likely to seem an annoying distraction. It is difficult to mobilize the people in the organization for the hard work of change when officials are constantly being pulled off to deal with urgent crises and this has been the experience of broad UN reform efforts. In *Planning for Intervention*, we applauded the efforts of UNHCR under High Commissioner Sadako Ogata to decentralize its operations, a requirement we concluded was essential to effective cooperation and collaboration in the field. In revisiting the accomplishments of the Delphi Plan several years later, we found that implementation had gone very slowly, and that the tradition of central micromanagement was still being asserted. In fact, in response to a question asked in late 2005, Sadako Ogata, later co-chair of the Human Security Commission, remarked that she had just about forgotten about the Delphi Plan.¹⁴

Finally, resistance to cooperation, even in the field, is reinforced by the welter of other players, each with strong traditions of organizational independence. NGOs are fierce defenders of their independence. Some organizations, like the International Committee of the Red Cross, remain aloof because they believe their access to the people they are committed to helping requires uncompromising neutrality and distance from political activities; and this attitude is spreading. At the same time, human rights organizations refuse to deal with the “bad actors,” even though their cooperation may be necessary to reach a stable peace and recovery. Yet, despite centrifugal inclinations, these NGOs must be brought into team operations. In the earlier post–Cold War interventions, they arrived on the scene at their own initiative, with their own resources and missions. No one could tell them to leave. In the intervening years they have become essential operational elements of conflict intervention in a more formal sense. Much of the assistance provided by international and national organizations—UNHCR, USAID, and the EU’s Humanitarian Aid Department (known as ECHO)—is given through NGOs under contract. Thus, these NGOs have become dependent upon the large international organizations for financial support, and often upon the military for logistics, and so the dependence is mutual.

Lack of Clarity in Policy and Direction

The lack of consistent political leadership from powerful and otherwise involved states further hinders the transition of a war-torn society to a functioning state capable of providing human security. Clarity, coherence, and agreement among members of the international community, and particularly within the UN Security Council, are essential to an effective post-conflict statebuilding effort. However,

these goals are rarely met, despite all hopes. In situation after situation, a mismatch can be seen between the policy goals—expressed in broad terms in the mandates—and the resources and time allotted to them. Haiti is one of the saddest examples of this mismatch. The UN presence was reduced far too quickly, before any measure of democratic stability was reached. Rule of law in the democratization process had been a high priority, and yet the resources that might have enabled the international community and the government to help train and to develop a functioning judiciary, together with a criminal law system, were never made available. Then, when the Haitian election process was corrupted, donors—particularly the United States—withdraw aid, rather than intensifying efforts to build that state and support its constructive elements.

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There are also policy contradictions in a post-conflict situation—the international community in pursuit of one of the human security goals may trample on another. The Bosnia response, for example, has been fraught with inconsistencies that may have been impossible to avoid. The structure that was imposed in the Dayton Accords was not workable, as many observers noted at the time. Nevertheless, it was the only resolution that was acceptable to all the parties; and the UN Security Council subsequently affirmed the detailed scheme of the Dayton Accords, spelling out the respective obligations of the parties and international organizations.¹⁵ It reaffirmed the awkward structure of a tripartite presidency and the “development of a Bosnian state based on the principles of democracy and consisting of two Entities.”¹⁶ Also negotiated at Dayton was a constitution, prepared by the Americans and affirmed by the Security Council.¹⁷ Unsurprisingly, self-rule has been very slow in coming. The high representative, given increasing powers by the Peace Implementation Council (the major donor nations), ousted two disruptive presidents and several cabinet ministers. He imposed legislation and nullified acts of the parliament. But, nearly a decade after an unstable peace was reached, Lord Paddy Ashdown, the high representative until January 2006, managed to integrate the armed forces of the entities and move towards a simplified governance structure with a single presidency. But, although these moves have been heralded in many quarters as progress, are they consistent with building an independent democracy—a crucial part of the human security agenda? It may be that the pull of integration into the European Union will be the final impetus for Bosnia to make the changes necessary to join the community of nations, but it is not clear that this war-torn nation, even a decade later, is capable of self-governance that would be acceptable to the democracies of the world.

Clear, consistent mandates and well-defined missions are essential to an effective post-conflict statebuilding effort. States, however, face opposition at home, and the

words used publicly must take account of domestic political vulnerability. Legitimacy in such situations comes from the one form of joint statement that international law has to offer—the UN Security Council resolution invoking UN Charter Chapter VII, which deals with, among other things, “threats to the peace.” The structure and requirements of the UN Charter require at least a broad agreement among the permanent five to avoid a veto, and bridging the differences often requires the very vagueness complained about as a “fuzzy mandate.”¹⁸

Nonetheless, the calls for a “clear and practicable mandate” continue unabated, despite the difficulties of forming and maintaining a coalition for the whole range of Chapter VII actions exemplified by these cases and many others.¹⁹ In most of the internal civil violence since 1991, the nations that comprise the international community perceive both the situation and their interests differently. Even the response to the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, required artful coalition building, despite immediate, overwhelming international support for the United States. Within a month it began to erode. The Iraq war fractured the coalition further. Forging a coalition is always difficult and painstaking work, particularly when military forces are required, or high costs imposed. Maintaining a coalition is even harder, in the light of continuing sacrifices, as we have seen over the years of sanctions against Iraq and other nations.

A search for greater clarity is worth the effort, but it should be understood that in most complex cases, interveners will have to settle for only broad policy from the top, leaving other ways to be developed to harmonize efforts on the ground. Unfortunately, this state of affairs often leads to timidity and indecisiveness on the part of international bureaucrats. It is “jello bureaucracy,” as one senior diplomat states. “These organizations strive for the lowest common denominator to avoid making waves.”²⁰ Given this fact of life, international organizations, like domestic administrative agencies, should be more forthcoming in developing the vague mandates into clearer policy guidance, and accept the risk of member state rebuke.

Lack of Funding and Donor Fatigue

Inadequate funding and lack of stamina for helping a war-torn nation further threaten such a nation’s transition into a functioning and peaceful member of the international community. Thus far, the international community has combined lofty ambitions with low-cost action; the constant emergence of new crises divert funds and experienced personnel from finishing the job of helping a society reconstruct itself. The ineffective actions that arise from such a situation serve to further limit the funding available for assistance.

As Foreman and Patrick²¹ point out, generous promises of aid often dissipate into delayed performance, and often do not materialize. There is usually a considerable lag between the time that assistance is promised and aid actually arriving. For example, the EU, as a major source of post-conflict funding, is so bound up in complex bureaucratic procedures that it cannot and does not meet obligations and promises. The United States failed to pay its UN dues for years and

only recently began to reduce its debt, though it has been a generous donor in other ways. Nor does it seem that the rhetoric of patience and persistence in combating terrorism is being followed by strong international support for the slow, painstaking process of rebuilding the devastated societies of Afghanistan and Iraq. Again, the domestic constituency is just as important to bilateral donors as are the recipients. Thus, flashy projects such as the road from Kabul to Kandahar in Afghanistan, became a political imperative in the Bush administration. It was hastily—and apparently shabbily—constructed after previous delays, in time for American elections. Other badly needed roads to connect the country have been delayed inordinately, at great political, social, and economic cost to Afghans.

Adding to the lack of effectiveness of interventions, the international organizations that provide funds are not yet able to deal with the political and social contexts into which funds are poured. It is now understood that without adequate institutions to support the influx of funds, corruption and crime are likely to flourish. Yet even though, as Susan Woodward writes,²² the paradigm has shifted from marketization to “good governance,” donor agencies have not shown themselves capable of engaging in the painstaking steps that would lead to effective self-governance. That would require a degree of cooperation and pooled expertise among agencies that still remains elusive.

The problem is compounded further as new crises erupt. What we have observed is that organizations faced with requirements to take on new missions elsewhere, coupled with a shortage of funds, tend to hunker down, cut staff across the board, send their most experienced staff to deal with new crises, extend the workload of those who remain, and replace full-time employees with temporary workers. Temporary staff, although well-meaning, are often inadequately briefed about a situation and make mistakes that might have been avoided with more continuity. Constant start-up time is wasteful and often destructive.

Even though the similarities between business and international organizations should not be exaggerated, no business organization would survive without making the connection between its performance and reduced revenues. It is far too easy to blame donor fatigue and new demands for reduced resources, rather than dealing with internal bureaucratic rigidity that resists change at every level. The linkage of reduced budgets to ineffective performance needs to be made with thoughtfulness, precision, and persistence. Loss of relevance, which has occurred in many organizations, is the “moral equivalent” of the bottom line.

A POSSIBLE WAY FORWARD

The obstacles sketched out above are not so intractable that they cannot be tackled. In fact, a start has been made, and international efforts at dealing with some of the human security agenda show spurts of attention and improvement. For every hopeful sign, however, there seems to be a Darfur-like scenario, or the reinforcement of warlordism in Afghanistan. What is needed is some consistent, systematic attention to obvious needs, so that international efforts show the degree of

cooperation and integration that the needs demand.

Joint Planning

In societies that have suffered violent conflict, there are many simultaneous actions that interveners must take to help the society recover and to prevent recurrence. Welding multiple actors and actions into a coherent whole is a huge undertaking. Internal organizational planning is important, but it is not enough. Intended effects are bound to be distorted by the actions of others. Further, crisis response without a comprehensive understanding of what the consequences of any specific intervention might be can do more harm than good. Comprehensive civil-military planning that begins early and is ongoing provides the best hope for effective physical and social reconstruction. A number of questions emerge: Where and when should collaborative planning take place? Who should be involved? What type of process is effective? Planning must be an ongoing process, taking place early and continuing as a situation unfolds, so that officials are not merely reacting to surprises as they occur. Planning must take place at several different levels, with a somewhat different emphasis at each level.

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First, *strategic policy planning* is needed at the highest level among the major actors—states, international organizations, and NGOs. This should be the major emphasis of the headquarters-level in any operation that is undertaken. The most available model is a military one, but in the sort of conflicts that the last decade has witnessed, even the most effective and sophisticated military planning has not been adequate, because it excluded the necessary civil component. Additionally, less planning appears to be done for the post-conflict phases, despite the risk that the situation will devolve back to conflict during this period.

Second, *operational planning* in the field is just as necessary, and also in the spirit of the military approach. Detailed day-to-day operations cannot be anticipated in advance, nor at the highest levels, but have to be dealt with locally, on a shorter-range basis, with flexibility and foresight. Issues that might require major shifts in policy or the overall strategic approach, however, are referred to a higher level, ensuring constant reciprocity among field and headquarters in the planning process. It is at this local level, too, that the affected populations must be involved. If they are not, the consequences of action cannot be evaluated, and the transitional administration lacks legitimacy. It is not doing its job of helping pass governmental authority to the local population. This need for planning locally leads to the recommendation, discussed below, for decentralization.

The third key level is *intra-organizational planning*—the planning that permits each organization to undertake specific tasks with competence and adequate resources to

do the job. This level of planning will reassure policymakers that the larger strategic planning process is workable, and enable them to use the perspectives of each participating group to anticipate the gaps and the overlaps that a successful operation must overcome. It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe the planning process in detail, but it should begin with military planning, grow to include what organizations do, and further link civil and military planning.

The object of the three levels of planning described above is not to predict the future, but to develop options for dealing with a broad range of possible contingencies. The process itself teaches people to pay attention to different perspectives and work together more cooperatively. It is far more effective than simple coordination and it does more than identify the overlaps and gaps. When officials from different units within an organization or from different organizations try to work through the demands of a problem that they must address jointly, they come to know each other, to understand the unique capabilities of individuals and organizations, and to develop a degree of collaboration in action that no process of coordination can achieve. Differences of viewpoint between individuals and organizations can be dealt with in the planning process, rather than in the course of the operation. In the best case, the beginnings of trust will emerge, a sense that each component can be relied on to do its part. The situations faced in post-conflict societies such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda do not present the same urgency as a country in crisis. There is time for an ongoing planning process to bring post-conflict societies out of high risk and into the international community. In the Balkans, that “jointness” must continue to be civil-military. Rwanda, however, faces limited funds and a greater NGO presence than that of the international organizations, making joint planning more difficult. Afghanistan is proving even more complex—while some UN planning has been done among its agencies, a civil-military process has not yet been developed.

The situations faced in post-conflict societies such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda do not present the same urgency as a country in crisis.

The tradition of planning, so familiar to military organizations, has only begun to be seen in foreign ministries, even well-staffed ones, and is still regarded with some disdain by NGOs, whose participants often resist strategic analysis and planning in favor of responding to crises. Some say: “The issues are so complex and fast-moving that it is essential to be on the ground quickly to understand them”; or “We need to move in early—that is when we are most needed—there is no time to engage in a planning process”; or “We just don’t have the funds and staff to plan and act.” These comments may reflect some realities but they can also cause a rapid response that does more harm than good.

Planning for response to a crisis may be more accepted than a decade ago, but contingency planning done in advance still remains a remote goal. Particularly for

civilian organizations, it seems to be a luxury, a waste of time and money, to plan for a contingency that may never occur when there are so many crises that need immediate attention. Planning for such contingencies, however, may be the key to intervention—crisis or otherwise. Even though the contingency may be different from what ultimately occurs, initial thinking about analogous situations has helped train people and organizations to act coherently. The planning process is not only the best form of interorganizational coordination; it may be the most cost-effective form of staff training.

An effective cooperative planning effort would go far to lay out the options for ultimate decision makers.

A more difficult problem is the international political sensitivity about planning absent international consensus, which rarely occurs before a crisis has erupted. “We can only intervene when we have a consensus of our members. This takes a long time to develop,” stated one high UN official. The Rwanda genocide is the glaring case of this, and Sudan stares us in the face. When a crisis seems to be brewing, officials fear that even theoretical discussions of international involvement could adversely affect possible peaceful settlement. Although relevant military organizations are likely to be involved in contingency planning at that time, the many scenarios out there—for the American military, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Colombia, to name only a few—mean that the sensitivity of any one is not heightened by such standard (and highly classified) activity. Civil reluctance to start such planning is accentuated by the issue of jurisdiction and control at the highest levels of international organizations—particularly at the UN Secretariat. Security Council members do not take kindly to initiatives that might usurp their prerogatives, and states are reluctant to relinquish to international organizations any suggestion of power to control the fact, timing, or extent of intervention. Nor is this a UN problem only. In the OSCE, the consensus decision rule, the deliberate understaffing, and the reluctance of members to create a strong secretariat all reflect unwillingness to empower the organization to act forcefully and early.²³ An effective cooperative planning effort would go far to lay out the options for ultimate decision makers.

The military has not historically facilitated the process of joint civil-military efforts, although the UK and NATO’s work with civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) lent greater understanding to this interdependence. The tradition of secrecy that serves the military so well in preserving the advantage of surprise and protecting the safety of forces erects barriers against opening the planning process to civilians. Moreover, for many nations, the desire to protect intelligence sources and methods imposes a further constraint on the sharing of operational planning data. Even in the Gulf War—a far more typical military engagement than Bosnia—this was a problem within the coalition against Iraq.²⁴ Yet the disastrous ambush of the US Rangers in Somalia argues forcefully for more collaborative civil-military planning, even on the

narrow grounds of the safety of military personnel. The rationale for failure to plan is even less persuasive in a post-conflict situation. The international community is already in place and some form of interorganizational relationship has already begun, yet the efforts are far less effective than they might be. The United States learned some important lessons after the failure to anticipate the consequences of its actions in Somalia. The Haiti operation was a definite improvement in this respect, but represented only a rudimentary civil-military planning process.

Now that we realize that well-meaning efforts may have unintended consequences and even create new problems, it should be obvious that a concerted planning process that helps anticipate results has real value.

In *Planning for Intervention*, Chayes and Chayes described how Bosnia in the early post-war stages illustrated the costs of a lack of cooperative planning. The military aspects of Bosnia had been planned meticulously by well-oiled NATO staff that had been working on the Bosnia problem years before Dayton. The nature and specific contours of NATO involvement were defined in advance, and clearly circumscribed commitments had been hammered out in the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Despite the large size of the Intervention Force (IFOR), the military goals were modest, and well within the bounds of traditional peacekeeping, although unlike “classical” peacekeeping efforts, IFOR was authorized to use force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As a result, the military intervention went off without a hitch. The military objectives were secured within a few weeks, well in advance of the scheduled time frame.

The contrast with the civil side of the Bosnian intervention could hardly be starker. The problems that plagued the early reconstruction effort in Bosnia illustrate many of the consequences of the absence of interorganizational planning.²⁵ True, no one knew just when and how the war would end, but everyone knew that it would end, almost certainly before the century ended, from sheer exhaustion if nothing else. It was also predictable that the outcome would be some kind of brokered peace, however precarious, not one imposed by the military victory of one side or the other. It was also possible, on the basis of the experience in other post-Cold War internal conflicts, to anticipate the physical and social elements that would be involved in rebuilding a peaceful society. For instance, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) would have to be fed, sheltered, protected, and ultimately resettled, and the larger population would need assistance meeting basic human needs for food, shelter, and medical care. These needs became increasingly clear as the conflict unfolded, and some efforts were made to address them even before the conflict ended. Further, local civil police, who were dispersed or corrupted during the war, would have to be retrained or replaced, and former military combatants would have to be integrated into society.²⁶

Addressing these needs and the many others required careful planning and

training. The international community had demonstrated some organizational learning as they responded to the crises in Kosovo and East Timor, and some improvements were made—certainly in creating a structure for civil administration. In Kosovo, civil and military planners did not work together in advance. Perhaps they could not have appreciated all the possible effects of military action, but a joint-planning process—allowing for security requirements—that is well entrenched in the international community, would make the options and choices clearer. Now that we realize that well-meaning efforts may have unintended consequences and even create new problems, it should be obvious that a concerted planning process that helps anticipate results has real value.

In the early days of Bosnia, these elements were not only knowable, but known and widely discussed.²⁷ Some key organizations addressed them during ongoing planning, but many agencies with urgently needed core competencies did not. Even the plans for raising the sums to cement an uneasy peace were far from complete, although it was clear that an immediate infusion of funds would be needed. As for collaborative planning, there was none at all. The collaborative aspects of the process were simply disregarded, and so there was no attempt to push the traditional NATO planning envelope to include civil-military planning. Once the operation was underway, efforts to reach across the civil-military divide and to work out a sensible division of labor among the many civil organizations on the scene were helpful, but it was hard to play catch-up after initial expectations had formed. In the beginning, coordination was lacking even at ground level—joint coordination meetings were not convened until months into the operation.

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Ten years after Dayton, many lessons have been learned. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) has a coordinating role, and country-level planning is done through the periodic meetings of the Reconstruction and Return Task Force. To the extent that funds become available, new problems are dealt with, if not fully anticipated. For example, there was increasing concern that the economy was not growing fast enough to sustain the gradual withdrawal of foreign assistance funds, and so international organizations have redoubled their efforts to generate small enterprises. The need for economic growth has been accelerated by the exponential increase in the rate of refugee and IDP return since OHR insisted on tough property rights laws in both Bosnian entities. There are other successes in joint planning—the civil police and military (SFOR) now function in a smoother interface. But corruption and customs issues, though addressed, present challenges.

Joint planning needs to take place early and on a continuing basis. There are good models for this, though unfortunately, not consistently used. Interagency planning and training exercises were given a robust start in the Clinton administration with PDD-56. An ambitious attempt to institutionalize joint planning and joint operations, it defined a specific and detailed process for interagency planning and cooperation in conflict intervention. It evolved over several years and correctives were made to the accompanying training to fit American needs. However, it was not an international effort, so its impact was limited. Although there are similar processes in place in the current Bush administration, they were ignored in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The lack of planning for the aftermath has become a touchstone for the criticism of the war.

The UN developed a process that is quite similar to the US PDD-56 planning process. Joint planning was conducted under interdepartmental task forces that bring together all the elements needed for planning a comprehensive peace operation, including post-conflict reconstruction.²⁸ The Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) concept in the Brahimi Report carried the idea forward. It is improving with experience, but remains timid, incomplete, and underfunded; and it is insufficiently inclusive, since only UN departments are involved. It has not included the World Bank, which must play a major role in reconstruction. Regional organizations are not included until after designations of roles and responsibilities are made, which usually happens after a peace agreement has been achieved, when work must start at once. Most importantly, the IMTF process has not worked with military organizations. A further missed opportunity to create an expert planning capability at the UN is the refusal to implement the Brahimi Report's recommendation to create a strategy and analysis entity (the Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat).²⁹

Joint planning needs to take place early and on a continuing basis.

There are good and bad examples of international cooperation in intervention, but a systematic joint planning process could improve cooperation by implementing policy into a more coherent whole. Some policies must be set at the highest international levels in an interorganizational planning process, for instance, emphasizing the need for coexistence in particular war-torn societies. What priority should such a policy be given in comparison with other strategies? Should it be made an integral part of other actions, such as providing shelter, protecting refugees, economic development, or education, even if its implementation slows them down? What are the costs and benefits? If these policy considerations are not considered at the highest level, they are not likely to be implemented on the ground in a systematic way.

Planning at field level also requires a systematic effort. At field level, the lack of coordination is most counterproductive, especially when basic needs are not met. In some cases, a spontaneous effort at cooperation has been made, as was the case

under Ambassador Robert Oakley in the UN Task Force (UNITAF) phase of Somalia, discussed below. The current effort to create and operate Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan is an innovative move to bring together military and civilian organizations in the reconstruction process. Moreover, the composition and focus of a PRT varies depending on which nation or organization operates it—whether US, NATO, or Germany, for example. Although NGOs have complained bitterly that these teams give the impression of the military performing “their” work, which only increases civilian worker vulnerability, it is a model that needs careful evaluation over an extended time period.

Planned Decentralization

The notion that decentralization might prove a better approach to achieving collaboration and cooperation among the multiplicity of interveners in post-conflict situations has developed both from observations in the field and from business experience. In this conception, operational responsibility is delegated to the field, but requires policy direction from a joint strategic planning process at headquarters level. This means that a broad strategy has been established, and there are some policy guidelines, even though they may paper over national differences. It is also important that a structure has been established for cooperation and ongoing planning on the ground. Although little progress on real policy planning has been made thus far, there has been some improvement in understanding that a structure for cooperation and collaboration is important, and some impressive examples of such a structure have emerged from felt need.

The argument for considerable delegation of operations to the field is based in part on the near-impossibility of centralized micromanagement. Only staff on the ground can fully appreciate the uniqueness of the problems and the fit of international efforts to a fluid situation. Even though the broad needs are understood at headquarters, implementation in the field can adapt more readily to the subtleties that any community presents. Moreover, it can begin to include the local population, a necessary step for a successful intervention.

Since the early 1970s, the literature of corporate change had been preaching the need to move away from rigid, hierarchical organizations to a flexible, more lateral, and decentralized form of organization.³⁰ As the business environment shifted, many companies became less competitive and less profitable in an increasingly global market, and business organizations began to question the way they were structured and operated. Many were prepared to make fundamental changes in their corporate culture to meet the challenges of rapid technological change, increasing competition in the world market, and loss of market share.

What academic organization theorists preached, American businesses put into practice over the last three decades. This period has seen radical shifts in the organizational form of US businesses from highly centralized functional organizations to decentralized units and cross-functional teams. They began to develop innovative modes of responding to the complexities they faced, usually by

moving towards decentralized, flexible structures that could adapt quickly to constantly changing business demands. It took fits and starts, and a good deal of experimentation over a fifteen-year period, but the change is well-seated. For corporations, the dominant motivation was the “bottom line.” Some companies succeeded; others went under. It is clear that policy direction for these businesses remains at the top, but creativity in reaching broad goals is decentralized.

International bureaucrats with whom we spoke early in our research were hard-pressed to see the parallels with business organizations, but in fact, it should be clear that there may be a “bottom line” in this arena as well. International organizations have witnessed the drying up of funds and the unwillingness of donors to keep contributing to the slow process of reconstruction and redevelopment after violence has ended, although they do not fully perceive a connection with donor fatigue. They have seen their reputations tarnished, and have been subject to severe criticism.

UNHCR was the first to mount a serious effort at decentralization, through the Delphi Project. As pointed out earlier, it has not been wholly successful, and certainly illustrates the power of institutional resistance. Nevertheless, it was a start. Further, where the bureaucratic leadership at headquarters has been unresponsive, the need for concerted action is being recognized in the field in reaction to the immediacy of issues that must be dealt with on the ground. Smaller units that are flexible and hospitable to innovation are much better able to mount creative responses to complex, fast-moving situations.³¹

In most situations, cooperation on the ground surpasses coordination at headquarters. While there is still “turf” or jurisdictional competition, often imposed from above, bureaucratic rigidities seem less important than needs on the ground, although this regrettably becomes less true when the conflict is no longer acute. Entrenched bureaucratic jealousies have, however, yielded to pragmatic needs in some cases. While lack of adequate funds will not be solved in the field, some duplication of efforts can be avoided by cooperation on the ground. This may, in some small measure, alleviate donor fatigue, which seems to be composed of both weariness of conflict proliferation and ineffectual responses. Policy incoherence among major states, however, can only be helped somewhat by better field workarounds. Neither planning nor decentralization will totally cure that problem.

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In the UNITAF phase of the Somalia intervention, an effective model of decentralized coordinated action emerged not by policy design, but by superb in-country, consensus-building leadership. For some months in early 1993, a loosely organized set of venues on the ground in Somalia succeeded in coordinating what was an extraordinarily complex and multifaceted humanitarian assistance operation.

The hub of this network was the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC), which became the central clearing-house for all humanitarian assistance in Somalia. The principal instrumentality was the institution of regular meetings held each morning.³² Within weeks, the meetings were drawing crowds of a hundred people, including representatives of NGOs, UN agencies, UNOSOM, and the military, as well as Somalis working for UNITAF and the relief community.³³ The meetings began with basic military briefings on security and the weather. Thereafter, the NGOs would provide information on their activities, locations, needs, and observations in the field. Everyone was given an opportunity to speak as discussion worked its way around the room following particular topics, locations, and relief activities. In the process, there was also an opportunity to voice criticisms and concerns. A general consensus would emerge on what needed to be done and in what order. The large meeting would then break down into smaller groups for discussion of specific tasks. These smaller, task-specific meetings were facilitated by a floating USAID representative, who maintained an overall sense of the planning process, passing information from one group to another and setting up spot conferences among representatives of different groups as needed. Thus, the HOC was able to sustain a rolling consensus on the overall humanitarian operation as well as specific day-to-day assignments.

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Military participation in and liaison with the HOC was carried out by the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), co-located with it. The CMOC grew out of an ad hoc arrangement developed after the Gulf War for coordinating military and humanitarian operations to provide relief to the Kurds.³⁴ This instrumentality created a sense of shared purpose and generated a specific agenda, even if only a few days in advance. Humanitarian workers, HOC personnel, and military officers knew who was doing what, and what the needs and requirements of the situation were. Frequent face-to-face contacts and shared efforts to address those needs fostered good working relationships among the people directly involved. People from dramatically different organizations—the UN, the military, the NGO community—developed an understanding of each other's perspectives and the sense that they were all in it together. All that changed when UNOSOM II took over—there was a failure of learning from experience, and the disasters that ensued can be traced to the lack of collaborative effort.³⁵

Similar mechanisms were developed in some aspects of the peace process in El Salvador, in the humanitarian effort to assist the Kurds in northern Iraq, and in other cases.³⁶ In all these situations, there was an ad hoc forum at ground level in which all the actors met frequently and regularly face-to-face. It was informal, open to all, unstructured, and transparent. There was little hierarchy. The principal activities were

information-sharing and consensus-building, and these led to coherent responses and even efficient use of available resources in extraordinarily difficult and demanding circumstances. The model has since been formalized and extended as a vehicle for civil-military coordination in humanitarian interventions when Western troops are involved. The British military has developed the concept even further, and the model is well understood and used by NATO.

Planned decentralization is designed as a systematic way to replicate these successes in the field. As the early organizational chaos in Bosnia demonstrates, there is no guarantee that this form of cooperation will self-generate, and even if it does, it can take a long time. It is best if a structure is established to make sure that it does. The organization of UNMIK in Kosovo represents, in part, a structural response, as does the UN response in East Timor. The kind of consensus leadership exercised by Ambassador Robert Oakley in Somalia, however, is not always available, and no structure can generate collaboration on a foolproof basis.

Ambassador Oakley's approach, in fact, shows parallels to business models of decentralization, such as product development teams. All members of the team, with their varied skills, were essential to effective functioning. The further lesson from business is that lead roles necessarily change over time, as the work evolves. For example, the designers predominate the early phase, manufacturing the next, and so on. In a war-torn society, those concerned with security, infrastructure repair, and refugees may predominate first—economic opportunity comes later. Timing and flexibility to meet emerging needs can be best responded to in the field, not at headquarters. This is the broad logic of planned decentralization.

CONCLUSION

A discussion of ways to improve the performance of international organizations in conflict resolution and post-conflict societies may seem orthogonal to the theoretical issues of human security. If any of the goals that human security represents are ever to be realized, however, attention must be focused on the means to accomplish them. The move to a culture of joint planning will empower international organizations to make better choices, because they have a better understanding of the issues and the likely impact of what they do. Moreover, if they begin to move away from the top-heavy, centralized structures that lead to micromanagement, they will be better able to implement their policies with sensitivity. They will need strong and persistent leadership and adequate training, however, to replace an entrenched culture with one that is more flexible, adroit, and responsive. It is that impetus that this paper has tried to offer.

Notes

¹ Quoting Kofi Annan in Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* (New York: 2003), 4.

² On the present article, I draw heavily on the following: Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes, *Planning for Intervention: International Cooperation in Conflict Management* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999); and Antonia Chayes, "Bureaucratic Obstacles to Imagining Coexistence," in Antonia Chayes and Martha Minows, eds. *Imagined Coexistence: Restoring Humanity After Violent Ethnic Conflict* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003).

³David A. Nadler, "Concepts for the Management of Organizational Change," in J. Richard Hackman, Edward E. Lawler III, and Lyman W. Porter, eds., second edition, *Perspectives on Behavior in Organizations* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1983).

⁴ Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., *Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1962), 320.

⁵ Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Barry A. Stein, and Todd D. Jick, *The Challenges of Organizational Change: How Companies Experience It and Leaders Guide It* (New York: Free Press, 1992), 216.

⁶ Paul J. Dimaggio and Walter W. Powell, "Introduction," in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. Dimaggio, eds., *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 4.

⁷ Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427-460.

⁸ Kofi Annan, "The Secretary-General: Statement to the Special Meeting of the General Assembly on Reform" (New York: UN, July 16, 1997).

⁹ As discussed later in this chapter, perhaps the most notable exception is UNHCR, which is systematically trying to change its approach and self-image by moving to regional joint planning, early cooperation with other organizations and significant decentralization to the field as part of reform efforts in its Delphi Plan.

¹⁰ Nadler, "Concepts," 557.

¹¹ Wendell Gordon, *The United Nations at the Crossroads of Reform* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994), 64.

¹² United Nations, *Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform* (New York: UN, 1997).

¹³ United Nations, *Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (New York: UN, 2001).

¹⁴ Conversation with the author at the Great Negotiator Award events at the Program on Negotiation at the Harvard Law School, October 2005.

¹⁵ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1088. UN SCOR, 51st Session, 3723rd Meeting, UN Doc. no. S/RES/1088 (1996).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid* at Annex 4; Dayton Accords, *US Department of State Supplement*, vol. 7, no. 1, 1995. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosagree.html>.

¹⁸ The history of the Bosnian war is a classic example. The United States disagreed with its allies and undermined the European proposals embodied in the proposed Vance-Owen agreement, yet several years later drove an agreement at Dayton that was not materially different. In Rwanda, failure of political agreement among potential interveners frustrated UN action until after the genocide. See Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, (New York: Basic Books, 2002).

¹⁹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace", UN Doc. no. A/47/277-S/2411 (1992), in Chayes and Chayes, *Planning for Intervention*, 33. See also John M. Shalikashvili, "Foreword," in Andrew J. Goodpaster, *When Diplomacy Is Not Enough: Managing Multinational Military Interventions* (New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1996).

²⁰ Confidential interview with a senior diplomat, August 2001.

²¹ Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick, eds., *Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).

²² Susan Woodward, forthcoming

²³ Diana Chigas, with Elizabeth McClintock, and Christophe Kamp, "Preventing Diplomacy and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Creating Incentives for Dialogue and Cooperation," in Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, eds., *Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996).

²⁴ Confidential interviews with senior US commanders following the Gulf War, spring and summer, 1991.

²⁵ Jonathan Moore, *The UN and Complex Emergencies: Rehabilitation in Third World Transitions* (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1996); Nicole Ball and Tammy Halevy, *Making Peace Work: The Role of the International Development Community* (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1996).

²⁶ Ball, *Making Peace Work*; Moore, *UN and Complex Emergencies*; L. Rohter, "Guatemala Foes Now Train for Peace," *New York Times*, March 11, 1997. p. A3. Compare the situation in El Salvador: C. Cervenak, *Learning on the Job: Organizational Interaction in El Salvador, 1991-1995*, (Cambridge, MA: Conflict Management Group, 1997).

²⁷ Richard H. Ullman, "Introduction: The World and Yugoslavia's Wars," in Richard Ullman, ed., *The World and Yugoslavia's Wars* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996).

²⁸ The Executive Committee on Peace and Security, which meets biweekly is made up of the heads of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the Department of Political Affairs, UNHCR, UNDP, and other UN agencies or departments.

²⁹ United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (New York: UN, 2000). This report is

also called the “Brahimi Report.”

³⁰ Nadler, “Concepts”; Chandler, *Strategy and Structure*; Kanter, Stein, and Jick, *Challenge of Organizational Change*; Powell and DiMaggio, *New Institutionalism*; Luther Gulick, “Notes on the Theory of Organization,” in Luther Gulick and L. Urwick (eds.), *Papers on the Science of Administration* (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1937); John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996); Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, second edition (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992); Michael Hammer and James Champy, *Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business Revolution* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993).

³¹ Chayes and Chayes, *Planning for Intervention*.

³² Taylor Seybolt, *The Success and Failures of Humanitarian Coordination in Somalia*, (Cambridge, MA: Conflict Management Group, 1999); John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995).

³³ Susan Rosegrant and Michael D. Watkins, *A “Seamless” Transition: United States and United Nations Operations in Somalia, 1992–1993*, Kennedy School of Government Case Program no. C09-96-1324.0 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1996).

³⁴ Chris Seiple, *The US Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Peacekeeping Institute, US Army War College, 1996).

³⁵ Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999).

³⁶ Chayes and Chayes, *Planning for Intervention*.