

Operation Exporting Freedom: The Quest for Democratization via United States Military Operations

by John A. Tures

The wave of the future is not the conquest of the world by a single dogmatic creed, but the liberation of the diverse energies of free nations and free men.
—President John F. Kennedy, University of California at Berkeley Address, March 23, 1962

INTRODUCTION¹

Since September 11, 2001, the United States has launched military operations against Afghanistan and Iraq. The names of these operations, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, imply that at least part of the mission will be devoted to promoting democracy in these countries. Proponents of exporting freedom extol the virtues of such policies, pointing to success stories in Germany and Japan after World War II, as well as more recent cases, such as Panama after 1989. Critics assail America's track record of using military force to promote democratization, citing failures in Somalia and Haiti, as well as incomplete efforts such as Bosnia. The question before us is whether Afghanistan and Iraq will look more like the former group, or begin to resemble the latter group.

The answer is critical for the future of American foreign policy. Other "Axis of Evil" states are awaiting confrontation with the United States. People in Central Asia, the Middle East, East Asia, and Africa could find themselves along the battle lines in the "War on Terrorism." Furthermore, Americans, who are being asked to sacrifice the things they hold dear, are anxious about the outcome. If the United States can effectively promote democratization, others might support the spread of freedom. Democratic revolutions may topple autocratic leaders, or authoritarian regimes may be pressured to reform. Such support for freedom could deny the terrorists bases of operation, as well as motives for attacking Americans. However, the consequences of failure would be severe. Cynicism resulting from unsuccessful democratization efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq would dampen support for freedom elsewhere. America's autocratic enemies and allies would point to such shortcomings

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as an excuse not to democratize. The purported “Third Wave of Democratization,” which began in Southern Europe, then spread to Latin American and Eastern Europe, could be rolled back. Such “counter waves” have undermined previous waves of democratization.²

Recognizing the importance of exporting freedom, a number of articles and books have been devoted to the subject. These efforts however well intentioned have provided inconclusive results. Such studies have typically focused on either a handful of cases or a limited time span. They have examined only local factors, ignoring the important external elements. Few articles support their arguments with any statistical evidence.

The present article addresses these problems by focusing on an extensive database of United States military operations (USMOs), which incorporates all cases from 1973 to the early days of 2004. It also looks at cases of humanitarian intervention and joint military exercises, as well as at the role that external factors play in shaping internal politics of USMO targets. Results of statistical tests identifying which international factors have a greater impact upon a military operation target’s chances of democratizing are used to explain how those findings can be applied to the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as to American foreign policy in general.

STUDYING USMOs AND THE GOVERNMENTS THAT FOLLOW

Given the important role that exporting freedom plays in American foreign policy, it should not be surprising that a number of studies have been devoted to the subject. Some are critical of the United States’ attempts to impose democracy by force, noting the scant number of successes.³ Other studies find more support for America’s ability to expand democracy by force.⁴ These articles have not resolved the debate over the question of whether or not America’s military presence facilitates democratization.

One of the possible sources of the inconsistency of results stems from the quantity and quality of cases analyzed. The problem with these studies is that they only look at a handful of cases that tend to involve the highest levels of conflict.⁵ While such events certainly have the highest profile, excluding all other cases produces several problems. First, wars represent only a fraction of all uses of the United States military.⁶ Military interventions involve a wider array of actions, including humanitarian missions, interdiction efforts, military training, border control, and peacekeeping.⁷ All of these events have the potential to influence a country’s governing institutions. Second, not all conflicts begin with guns blazing. The Vietnam War began with the provision of military advisers to train the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. The intervention in Somalia started as a humanitarian operation. It is often not apparent that bloody battles will break out until the operation is well under way. In other words, any use of the United States military abroad not only has the capacity to alter the target state’s regime, but also can result in conflict at a later time period. This is why, in this article, high profile combat cases are treated as a subset

of all USMOs. Conflict acts as a potential factor in policies of exporting freedom, not as a case selection mechanism.

This article also examines a broad time period (1973–2004), which is not context-bound, such as studies that merely focus on the Cold War era.⁸ The present study, which includes events ranging from the withdrawal from Vietnam to Operation Secure Tomorrow in Haiti, covers a broad chronological spectrum of cases from the Cold War to the years following September 11, 2001. While case selection is limited due to democracy data constraints, a more inclusive selection provides the advantage of seeing how Americans acted in several different international scenarios.⁹ Other studies fall short of explaining which factors help the democratization process, as well as which elements hinder such transitions. Unless we conclude that a USMO always generates democracy or never does so, this information is vital to policymakers, as well as students of American foreign policy. Otherwise, we run the risk of concluding that we should use America's military in every case or no case, rather than finding both the beneficial and detrimental effects of uses of the United States military.

Some articles do examine accelerants and inhibitors of democratization, but focus exclusively on the role that internal factors play in post-military operation transitions. These studies look at geographic location, colonial history, prior democratic culture, macroeconomic figures, natural resource distribution, ethno-linguistic divisions, educational systems, and religious influences.¹⁰ Such factors certainly do play a role in a country's attempts at democratization. However, limiting the analysis to domestic matters ignores the fact that the American military was present and that it influenced a country's government.

EXAMINING EXTERNAL FACTORS

To correct this oversight, I develop a model that examines a variety of potential external influences on a country's possible democratization in the wake of a USMO. As demonstrated in Figure 1, this model tests whether external factors combine with internal elements to affect the post-USMO government. Such results will tell us whether external factors matter, and, if they are important, which ones play a significant role in the process. Such factors can be bundled together with internal determinants to show a clearer picture of the process of democratization after a USMO has concluded its work.

I have grouped these factors into three categories: "Internal Politics of the Intervener," "Intervention Characteristics," and "International Institutions." The following paragraphs describe the external factors, as well as how they might influence a post-USMO government.

Internal politics of the intervener

First, I determine whether any political factors in America had a role in shaping the post-intervention agenda. I examine such factors because the United States, by

virtue of sending troops to the target country in question, exerted a great deal of influence over the target state. The United States has the ability to dictate its own political and security terms upon the target's leaders. As an international hegemon, the United States can call upon military and economic allies to pressure the target state into compliance. Political diversity within the United States also affects how much force its leaders will choose to project onto the target state. Different political actors can have differing agendas that make a target's democratization more or less likely to occur. Pressures related to America's own democratic system might also affect the outcome of democratization within the targeted country.

The two traditional American political parties have held widely different views regarding the use of US forces to generate democratization abroad.

Among the internal U S politics factors, I study the political party the president belongs to. The two traditional American political parties have held widely different views regarding the use of U.S. forces to generate democratization abroad. Democratic presidents have generally sought to uphold human rights and call for the use of armed force in order to remove tyrants from power. Republican presidents, while not engaging in undemocratic behavior, are less likely to support military operations that are perceived to be exercises in "nation building."¹¹

Another important factor is the role that election year politics in America may have had on the success of the USMOs, as well as regime changes in the target country. In the United States, no political period receives more scrutiny from the media, the people, and political actors than the election season. Each step taken at this time by the incumbent president is likely to receive more praise from supporters, more criticism from opponents, and more interest from independents attempting to decide for whom they will vote. Given these pressures, the US president is likely to be very sensitive to outcomes in the countries where American troops are operating. Bringing about democratization is likely to resonate well with voters, who consistently support such policies in polls.¹² Likewise, an American president who is seen as propping up an undemocratic foreign regime could be replaced by his or her constituency.

I check whether an American president's approval ratings affect his or her policies in conducting a USMO.¹³ As Commander-in-Chief, the US president has control over the military. The president also has a secretary of defense charged with running the day-to-day functions of the military. Whoever is America's chief executive is therefore held accountable for the actions of the armed forces. As mentioned before, the public has shown support for spreading democracy abroad. American leaders with high approval ratings are unlikely to risk public approval ratings by working towards something other than democratization. Unpopular American presidents, on the other hand, have a difficult choice to make. On the one hand,

they may desire higher approval ratings, and therefore take steps to improve their public image. On the other hand, democratization is not an overnight process. It takes a great deal of time. America's commander-in-chief may not have the luxury of waiting for democracy to bloom in the target country. The president may be tempted to skip the democratization process and install a relatively safe leader who will do America's bidding, while forgoing free elections and the establishment of key freedoms for the people of the target country.

Finally, it is important to look at how a divided government might influence American policies toward USMO targets. As noted earlier, the US political spectrum includes many diverse actors and institutions. When power is dispersed within such a system, America's ability to control the future of the post-USMO regime may be diminished. The US may not be able to guide the democratization process in a target state if the administration's attention is focused on domestic disagreements rather than on issues facing a foreign government.

Intervention characteristics

Elements related to the characteristics of the intervention also need to be examined. One such characteristic is whether or not combat was present during the intervention. If the United States uses its firepower against a foreign regime, such a display of force could serve to convince foreign leaders that the US "means business," and democratization should follow quickly. The present study also determines whether the deaths of United States military personnel impact a country's democratization in the wake of a USMO. Should American servicemen and women be killed in the line of duty, there would be great pressure within the US to ensure that their deaths were not in vain. One way that this could be accomplished would be to set up a democratic regime in the target state. If dictatorship prevails and American troops incur casualties, the families of soldiers, the press, domestic political actors, and voters are likely to regard the outcome of the intervention unfavorably.

The duration of a mission could also serve as a key determinant of whether a country will democratize following a USMO. If American forces remain in the target country for a long time, they may have a greater ability to provide lessons in the realm of civil-military relations, training necessary to maintain security, as well as protection for a nascent democratic government. Shorter military missions may leave the country more vulnerable to undemocratic elements.

Another intervention characteristic which could make a difference in the post-USMO environment is whether or not the target country consented to the mission. Normally, one might expect that maintaining genial relations with the target government might ease the democratization process, given the absence of friction over US military mandates. However, a clever target leader may accept America's demands to accept foreign troops, in order to tell the US what it wants to hear, and keep a tight control over his or her country. That is why this article also addresses the issue of whether or not the removal of the target state's leader has any impact on the post-USMO regime. If an undemocratic ruler is replaced, this should create the

conditions for democracy that would not have been possible if the ruler were kept in power. The ousted authoritarian leader would be unable to challenge a new regime dedicated to respecting the freedom of its constituents.

International institutions

Finally, this study examines the role international institutions have had on government changes in the aftermath of a USMO. These include whether the UN or NATO supported the mission, as well as whether or not an alliance existed between America and the target state at the time of the USMO.

The role of international institutions matters because operations commenced under the auspices of international organizations must conform to institutional dictates. In addition to charters that support freedom and the rights of individuals, many countries belonging to these organizations have democratic governments. Military operations undertaken in a unilateral fashion may give the initiating country more leeway in the conduct and outcome of the mission.

The latter element is important due to the historical ties between democracies. Scholars have found that democratic governments tend to refrain from war with each other, sign military defense pacts, and become economic partners.¹⁴ Therefore, democratic governments have a vested interest in maintaining or enhancing freedom in the other states where they may roam.

MEASURING MILITARY OPERATIONS AND DEMOCRATIZATIONS

In order to test the impact that each of these external elements has had upon interventions, and the government that emerges in their aftermath, I will explain how I operationalize both USMOs and democracy. I code all cases of USMOs since 1973, including those that did not result in democratization. The list of military operations, collected by the Federation of American Scientists and posted by GlobalSecurity.org, is supplemented by additional research.¹⁵ The data set thus arrived at contains 228 USMOs.¹⁶

In this study, I employ the Freedom House data set to measure democracy.¹⁷ Freedom House codes a country's respect for political rights and civil liberties.¹⁸ Examples of political rights include the presence of free and fair elections, the right to organize political groups, the right of elected leaders to make policy, the presence or absence of corruption, etc.¹⁹ Civil liberties comprise freedoms of expression and belief, rights to form societal organizations, respect for rule of law, and other personal freedoms and individual rights.²⁰ Scores are given to countries on a 1–7 scale (lower = more free). Countries are coded as “free,” “partly free,” or “not free” based upon their ability to honor these civil liberties and political rights.²¹

I look at several forms of democratization. I first examine whether the country has made a full transition to another category, such as from either “not free” to “partly free” or from “partly free” to “free.” I also look at cases of autocratization, where a country's rating has been downgraded from “free” to “partly free” or from

“partly free” to “not free.” Cases of full democratization are given a score of 2, while full autocratization cases receive a -2. I also include cases of partial democratization or partial autocratization. These occur when countries make improvements or deteriorations in their civil liberties and political rights scores without jumping categories. This allows for the observation of modest, as well as significant alterations in a country’s regime after America’s forces have left.

To determine whether partial or full democratization, autocratization, or the status quo persists, I examine the country’s government the year before the USMO began, given that Freedom House measures a country’s level of freedom based on a series of annual scores.²² I then examine a country’s Freedom House scores the year after the USMO concludes. I exclude cases ending in 2003 or continuing through 2004 because there is no data for one full year subsequent to the conclusion of the USMO.²³

RESULTS

This section begins with a discussion of the dependent variable, which incorporates changes in the target government that occurred during a USMO. As demonstrated in Table 1, the modal category was “no change” in the country’s governing institutions from the year before the USMO began to the year after the USMO was completed. Yet these 96 “status quo” cases only represent a plurality, not a majority, of the outcomes. Of the remaining 132 cases, there were 69 instances where the USMO target became less democratic over the period of time. In the remaining 63 cases, a country adopted partial or full democratization during the span of a USMO.

These findings mirror those of aforementioned inconclusive studies regarding whether or not American military forces have a positive effect upon democratization elsewhere in the world. On the one hand, optimists might note that a minority of cases has had a deleterious effect on the promotion of freedom abroad. On the other hand, pessimists may point out that barely one quarter of all cases produced democratization in the countries where American military forces were operational. Given the ambiguity of the results, as well as the prevalence of cases with no change

Table 1. Did Target Change Regime During a USMO?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	-2	33	14.2	14.5	14.5
	-1	36	15.5	15.8	30.3
	0	96	41.2	42.1	72.4
	1	36	15.5	15.8	88.2
	2	27	11.6	11.8	100
	Total	228	97.9	100	
Missing	-999	5	2.1		
Total		233	100.0		

2=Improved Designation; 1=Improved Only Scores Within Designation; 0=No Change,
-1=Worsening Scores Without Changing Designation; -2=Worsening Designation

in regime, it is imperative to redirect research towards uncovering those external factors specifically associated with democratization, autocratization or maintenance of status quo.

Additional research indicates that some of the external factors described above played a significant role by encouraging or discouraging democratization after the American military departed from the area. All findings are included in Table 2, which also lists the variables. The table also specifically lists those variables that had a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. The direction of the relationship, noting how the variable is associated with democratization, is also indicated. The article concludes with a detailed discussion of the findings and their implications for American foreign policy, USMOs, and the prospects for democratization abroad.

Table 2. Evaluating Potential External Determinants of Democratization in USMO Targets

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>Impact of Variable</i>
<i>Internal Politics of the US</i>		
Political Party Control of the White House	Significant	Democrat Party Control Associated with Post-USMO Democratization
Elections	Not Significant	
Presidential Approval Ratings	Significant	Higher Approval Ratings Associated with Post-USMO Democratization
Divided Government	Not Significant	
<i>Intervention Characteristics</i>		
Combat during the USMO	Significant	Presence of Combat Associated with Post-USMO Autocratization
US Military Deaths	Not Significant	
Length of USMO	Conditional Significance	Longer USMOs Associated with Post-USMO Democratization
Target Consent to USMO	Not Significant	
USMO Ousts Target Regime	Significant	USMOs that Oust Target Regime Associated with Post-USMO Democratization
<i>International Institutions</i>		
UN and/or NATO Approval of USMO	Not Significant	
Presence of Alliance between US and Target	Not Significant	

Two American internal politics variables affect the post-USMO regime. Who controls the US executive branch is one such factor. Democrats are more likely to initiate military operations that result in democratization; Republicans, on the other hand, lead military operations that result in the establishment of less democratic regimes. Presidential approval ratings of the US leader are also an important factor in the governance of the target county. If the President of the US is popular at

home, he or she is more likely to initiate a USMO that facilitates democratization in the targeted state. The presence or absence of elections in the US, as well as divisions within the US government, have little impact upon the post-USMO regime. Several intervention characteristics are also likely to affect democratization in the aftermath of a USMO. These include the presence or absence of combat during a USMO, the length of a USMO, and whether or not the USMO removes the target regime. Contrary to my expectations, if fighting breaks out during a USMO, the prospects for democratization are generally poor. Cases in which the United States ousts the target regime exhibit improved chances of democratization in the target country. The duration of a USMO has only conditional significance, depending upon which cases are analyzed. In the data set, the relationship between the USMO duration and the dependent variable is not statistically significant. However, it is important to note that if ongoing cases that ended in 2003 are included, the length of a USMO is significant. Using this expanded data set leads to the conclusion that longer USMOs tend to facilitate democratic transitions.²⁴

Other intervention characteristics do not have an impact on democratization. Those other external factors which did not display a statistically significant relationship included the presence or absence of US military personnel deaths, as well as the target state's decision to grant permission for the USMO. Likewise, in the framework of this study, international institutions do not seem to play a significant role in the process of democratization.²⁵ Neither the role of the UN or the influence of NATO support facilitates or stifles democratization. Similarly, the presence of an alliance between the US and the target regime preceding the USMO does not affect the post-USMO government.²⁶

IMPLICATIONS

To summarize the results, I find that the political affiliation of the US president at the time the USMO began does influence the prospects for democratization within the target country. American presidents with higher approval ratings also initiate military operations that are more likely to spread democratization. Active combat during a USMO tends to slow down democratization after the USMO is completed. If US troops remove foreign leaders, the chances of democratization in the target country improve dramatically. Depending on which cases are analyzed, the duration of the USMO can affect democratization. Longer USMOs tend to usher in democratic reforms within the target regime.

To demonstrate how external influences on democratization work in the practical world, I apply these variables to the contemporary cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. I did so in order to forecast the prospects of bringing freedom to these countries. In each case studied, a Republican president has been in office. In addition, democratization may be hindered by the presence of combat in each case. This has been especially true in Iraq.

However, the chances for democratization in Afghanistan and Iraq are not bleak. President George W. Bush had high approval ratings at the time of both USMOs, which tends to improve a target country's chances of undergoing democratization. In both cases, the US chose to remove the existing regimes (the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, respectively). Ousting target regimes tends to facilitate the democratization process. The "wildcard" may be the length of the USMO. Despite waning popularity for both missions in America and in the occupied countries, evidence shows that the longer US forces stay in Afghanistan and Iraq, the greater the chances are for both countries to become more democratic.²⁷

RECOMMENDATIONS

Now that we have isolated the variables that are more likely to influence democratization in the aftermath of a USMO, what can be done to facilitate the establishment of freedom in target countries? Rather than attributing success to the US Democratic Party, I offer that the issue may have more to do with which theory an American president supports. Traditionally, Democrats have followed the idealist prescriptions of Woodrow Wilson, who advocated, "making the world safe for democracy." Democratic presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton generally followed Wilson's policies. Republicans, on the other hand, have relied on realist theory, as voiced, for instance, by Henry Kissinger. Realists prefer maintaining the status quo and preserving national security. If Republicans were to adopt pro-democratization theories, this may change how a US president conducts a USMO, and therefore the chances of democratization in the target country. Preliminary evidence shows that George W. Bush may already be adopting a more liberal strategy. Not only has his rhetoric embraced calls for democratization, but also his USMOs have produced modest gains in democratization in targeted countries.²⁸

The finding that longer military missions are generally more conducive towards democratic outcomes in many cases should not be ignored by decision makers.

Presidential approval ratings also play a role in USMOs, as well as any democratization that follows them. Results show that presidents with higher approval ratings act as though they have a mandate to fulfill the wishes of the public, and facilitate the advent of democracy in target countries. US chief executives with low approval ratings have a greater temptation to "gamble," and settle for something less-than-democratic in a USMO target. For example, an unpopular U.S. president may believe that promoting democratization after a USMO is too costly a process. He or she may prefer to settle for a "short-cut" or an undemocratically chosen leader who is easy to install and purports to do America's bidding. America's congressional leaders and public must be aware of such temptations, and "hold the president's feet to the fire," to ensure that the president will help the target make the democratic transition.

As for the role of combat it seems that the best policy may be an “all-or-nothing” strategy. If the US elects to dispatch its military forces abroad, it should either be to sustain freedom by training a democratic government’s forces to repel threats to its regime, or to oust the targeted regime. Cases where the US uses military force against a foreign regime, but does not remove such a leader, seem to be the most problematic for democracy. Foreign leaders might use America’s actions as a justification for their undemocratic practices, thereby labeling those who clamor for freedom as supporters of the occupying forces and traitors to their own country.

The key variable may well be the duration of a USMO. USMOs that last longer give democratization a greater chance of implementation. USMOs with a greater duration allow American decision makers to work longer with democratic-minded individuals in the target countries so as to enact democratic reforms. They also provide American troops with time to secure the target country against undemocratic forces. Any temptation to “cut-and-run” in order to avoid the perception of a quagmire could actually weaken any chances for democratization in the targeted country. Such findings corroborate with evidence that shows that a lack of long-term commitment by United States military and policymakers imperils democracy in the target country in subsequent years.²⁹ It is paramount for the American leaders to advise new democratic leaders in target states about the long-term difficulties and benefits of democratization.

LESSONS LEARNED

The purpose of this study is to shed light on the external sources of democratization. To date, most studies of US military actions abroad have been pessimistic about the ability of the US to boost democracy. This study finds a relatively mixed record linking USMOs and democratization.³⁰ However, unlike other studies, this one looks at the factors that made democratization more or less likely to emerge. The analysis of new factors points to the conclusion that the political affiliation of the US president, presidential approval, the use of combat, removal of the target regime, and, in some cases, the duration of the USMO, all play a role in changing the target state’s government in the aftermath of an intervention. Rather than having a study with a narrow focus or vague prescriptions, we now have a clearer idea about the circumstances that make democratization more likely to occur after American forces are sent abroad.

Those factors displaying statistical significance are scrutinized and placed into context along with other important elements to create a coherent picture of USMOs and their potential as catalysts of democratization. For example, we learn that it is perhaps the ideology of the party leaders, and not partisan differences that account for different mission outcomes in the target regime. The study also shows which military operations deserve closer examination by Congress, the media, and the public before approval is granted. Another lesson is that combat during a USMO may be counterproductive for democratization, unless it displaces the leader of the target government. Finally, the finding that longer military missions are generally more

conducive towards democratic outcomes in many cases should not be ignored by decision makers as well.

Given a clearer understanding of the important external elements associated with democratization after USMOs, the next logical step is to combine the key external and internal factors to form a model that describes, explains and predicts the level of democratization within countries undergoing a USMO.

Notes

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² Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr, "Transitions to Democracy: Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data," *Journal of Peace Research* 32 (1995): 469-482.

³ Pei, Amin and Garz (See Minxin Pei, Samia Amin and Seth Garz, "Why Nation-Building Fails in Mid-Course," *International Herald Tribune*, March 17, 2004.) find that nascent democracies built by the United States begin to unravel in the decade after American forces leave, as a result of political elites changing the rules to suit their purposes. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, "Why Gun-Barrel Democracy Doesn't Work," *Hoover Digest*, 2, 2004) discover that few countries become democratic after an American military intervention. Both authors find that, in most cases, democratization is either arrested or never begins. Lawson and Thacker (See Chappell Lawson and Strom C. Tucker, "Democracy? In Iraq?" *Hoover Digest*, 3, no. 3, 2003) contend that American attempts to democratize Iraq are likely to be difficult because the country lacks characteristics traditionally associated with democracy.

⁴ Hermann and Kegley (See Margaret G. Hermann and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "The U.S. Use of Military Intervention to Promote Democracy: Evaluating the Record," *International Interactions* 24, no. 2 (1998): 91-114) discover that military interventions designed to promote or protect democracy abroad increase freedom in those countries. Peceny (See Mark Peceny, *Democracy at the Point of Bayonets*, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999) notes that democratization was more likely to occur and be stable in cases where U.S. military interventions supported free and fair elections. But some, like Gleditsch, Christiansen and Hegre (See Nils Petter Gleditsch, Lene Siljeholm and Havard Hegre, "Democratic Jihad? Military Intervention and Democracy," paper presented at the workshop on Resources, Governance Structure and Civil War, Uppsala, Sweden, April 13-18, 2004) find the process of democratization by force to be more unpredictable when assessing long-term results.

⁵ Pei, Amin and Garz ("Why Nation-Building Fails in Mid-Course") point to 14 cases of military intervention in the twentieth century, while Lawson and Thacker ("Democracy? In Iraq?") cite 19 cases "in the last century." Peceny (*Democracy at the Point of Bayonets*) locates 25 cases between 1898 and 1992. Using Tillema's (See Herbert K. Tillema, *Foreign Overt Military Interventions, 1945-1991: OMLIST Codebook*, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO; 1997) military intervention dataset, as Hermann and Kegley ("The U.S. Use of Military Intervention to Promote Democracy: Evaluating the Record") do, I find 30 military interventions between 1945 and 1991. Finally, de Mesquita and Downs ("Why Gun-Barrel Democracy Doesn't Work") generate a list of 35 cases in the developing world since World War II.

⁶ Mesquita and Downs ("Why Gun-Barrel Democracy Doesn't Work") should be lauded for their decision to include "small actions like flyovers or 'advisory' missions." But the numbers they generate are still surprisingly small, considering the numerous flyovers and advisory missions since the end of World War II.

⁷ Richard N. Haass, *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World* (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1999).

⁸ Lawson and Thacker ("Democracy? In Iraq?"), for example, only focus on the years 1996 through 2000 for their test of social, economic and political conditions, although they expand their study of occupations to include the last century.

⁹ While the study does not reach as early as those that extend back through World War II and even the end of the Spanish-American War, this is offset by a more rigorous analysis of interventions in those analyzed years.

¹⁰ See David P. Forsythe and Barbara Ann J. Rieffer, "U.S. Foreign Policy and Enlarging the Democratic Community," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 22, no. 4 (2000): 22, 4: 988-1010; Robert J. Barro, "Democracy in Afghanistan: Don't Hold Your Breath," *Hoover Digest*, Spring 2002, No. 2.; Thomas Carothers, "Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2003 p. 84.; Stephen D. Krasner, "We Don't Know How To Build Democracy," *Los Angeles Times* November 26, 2003; Lawson and Tucker, "Democracy? In Iraq?"; Larry Diamond, "The Long Haul," *Hoover Digest*, 2, 2004.

¹¹ Republicans have been perceived to prefer stability to democracy during this time frame, as evidenced by the role played by Henry Kissinger in several G.O.P. administrations. In his book *Diplomacy*, Kissinger (1993: 811-812) says "That there is an area of discretion which should be exercised in favor of governments and institutions promoting democratic values and human rights is also clear. The difficulty arises in determining the precise price to be paid and its relationship to other essential American priorities, including national security and the overall geopolitical balance." During the second Presidential debate in 2000, Governor Bush was asked to evaluate a series of United States military operations since 1980. He singled out cases in Somalia and Haiti as missions he would not support because they engaged in "nation-building" (Commission on Presidential Debates, "Transcript of the Second Election 2000 Debate," Wait Chapel, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, October 11, 2000).

¹² "Gallup/CCFR Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1986," The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, conducted by The Gallup Organization, October 30–November 12, 1986; *ABC News/Washington Post* "Do You Think the U.S. Government Should Try to Promote Democracy Around the World?" conducted by ABC News/Washington Post, February 10–14, 1989; *Americans Talk Security* "New World Order—What the Peace Should Be," conducted by Market Strategies, March 19–24, 1991; *Times Mirror* "International Policy Opinion Survey," conducted by the Princeton Survey Research Associates, September 9-15, 1993; The Pew Research Center "People and The Press: Global Attitudes Survey," conducted by the Princeton Survey Research Associates, September 9-15, 2002. Data for all of the polls was provided by The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

¹³ The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrn.exe/roperweb/PresJobRatings40/PresJobRatings40.htm?start=HS_presapproval_home.

¹⁴ Bruce Russett, John R. Oneal and David R. Davis, "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-1985," *International Organization*, 52, no. 3 (1998): 441-487; Gleditsch, Siljeholm and Hegre, "Democratic Jihad? Military Intervention and Democracy" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal Canada, March 19, 2004).

¹⁵ This data can be located at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/index.html>

¹⁶ John A. Tures et. al., "United States Military Operations in the New World Order: An Examination of the Evidence," *American Diplomacy*, 2, no. 22 (2002).

¹⁷ Most studies linking intervention with democratization tend to employ the Polity data set. While well respected, it has its limitations. Polity tends to focus on institutional criteria, including the dispersion of power throughout the government; such information does not necessarily reflect how the government treats its citizens. Its data lead many researchers to code apartheid governments in South Africa and Rhodesia as democracies. It would be interesting to see what conclusions can be drawn from different measures of democracy.

¹⁸ *Freedom in the World*, Freedom House, 2004, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm>

¹⁹ *Freedom in the World 2003: Survey Methodology*, Freedom House, 2003, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm>

²⁰ *Freedom in the World 2003: Survey Methodology*.

²¹ There have been many valid critiques concerning the way scholars have analyzed the concept of democracy in their studies. It has been suggested that there are differences concerning country specificities on how democracy is perceived in theory, as opposed to its implementation in practice. Others have questioned whether democracy reflects people power or mobocracy. Still others insist upon a measure examining constitutional liberalism, backed by the rule of law. This is why I employ the Freedom House dataset. This measure conceptualizes freedom using the standards adopted by the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed by a large multitude of states and nations. Rather than examine a country's constitution for the presence of a law, its coders determine whether those rights are protected in practice. Instead of ascertaining that an election took place, Freedom House examines respect for political rights and civil liberties. The former constitutes the right to vote, compete for elective office, and have representatives that have a meaningful input in public policymaking. The latter reflects the freedom of people to develop opinions, organize groups, and behave with a minimum of governmental intrusion (see Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2003: Survey Methodology*, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm>).

²² Freedom House began coding countries in 1972.

²³ In a separate analysis, I look at cases ending in the year 2003 or are currently on going. To code these, I use the most recent country score from Freedom House, to determine if any democratization progress has occurred or not, then report the findings in the results section.

²⁴ The duration of the USMO is the only variable to be affected by adding in all cases that are ongoing or ended in 2003. No other variable changes in significance or direction of the statistical relationship.

²⁵ It has been suggested that there are other reasons why international institutions may have an anemic showing when it comes to facilitating democratization in the context of a USMO. Critics of these organizations have pointed out that organizations like the United Nations have a poor record of effective peacekeeping, as evidenced in cases of Bosnia and Rwanda (see William Shawcross *Deliver Us from Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict*, 2000, Touchstone Books and Kenneth Cain "The Real Reason Kofi Annan Must Go" *The Wall Street Journal*, December 20, 2004) as well as programs such as Iraq's "Oil for Food" program, where complicity with local authoritarians is now being revealed (see "Oil-for-fraud," *The Economist*, Global Agenda, April 22, 2004). Certainly, the latter may stem from corruption; in the conflict cases, it represents the difficulty of the United Nations' pledge of neutrality. The United States military operation is not bound by such a doctrine of impartiality; it can confront a faction not committed to freedom and democracy. Furthermore, the United States government answers to its citizens, whereas the United Nations is only accountable to governments, many of which have questionable democratic credentials (see Ramesh Thakur "Human Rights: Amnesty International and the United Nations," *Journal of Peace Research*, 31, 2, 1994, 143-160). These international organizations may deliberately or unintentionally undermine any attempts at democratization in a target state. This is not to imply that the United States always prefers democracy and the United Nations does not, but the former is not bound by some of the latter's membership and accountability standards.

²⁶ The overall model is also statistically significant at the .01 level, indicating that the combined presence of all of the external factors in the same model have some influence on democratization in the targets of United States military missions.

²⁷ Critics wonder if there are certain countries, which have an "authoritarian culture;" these areas may have a culture, history or traditions that is antithetical to democracy (see The National Endowment for Democracy, "Strategy Document," January 2002). Such regions have been identified as the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia and South Asia. Yet history shows that there is no guarantee that being labeled an "authoritarian culture" is a stumbling block to democratization. After World War II, skeptics of nation building efforts in Japan, Germany and Italy claimed that these countries did not have a democratic culture. Some scholars felt that the Catholic countries of Latin America and East Europe were unlikely to democratize due to their nations' autocratic tendencies. Both groups failed to anticipate the stability of democracy in these former Axis countries, or the democratic waves that spread throughout Central and South America, as well as the Warsaw Pact in the 1980s (see Carl Gershman, "A Democracy Strategy for the Middle East," Conference on Mideast Regional Security, National Endowment for Democracy, December 12, 2003). Furthermore, Alfred Stepan and Graeme Robertson find that non-Arab Muslim countries have higher levels of democracy than would be expected, given their level of economic development (see Alfred C. Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, "An 'Arab' More Than 'Muslim' Electoral Gap," *Journal of Democracy*, 14, 3, July 2003, pp. 30-44). What this means is that no culture is authoritarian by nature, and the relative dearth of democracy in areas such as the Middle East is by no means a permanent feature.

²⁸ Political scientists have debated whether or not the realist-liberal theoretical divide provides an adequate explanation of international relations behavior. Some focus on the constructivist approach, which claims that a state's subjective views of international politics influence their behavior more than any objective criteria (see James Lee Ray and Juliet Kaarbo, *Global Politics, Eighth Edition*, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co.). This affects USMOs and democratization based upon both American

political party views of freedom. Republicans tend to see freedom in terms of economic freedom, as well as religious freedom (for an example, see George W. Bush, "Remarks by President Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington, DC, November 6, 2003). Democrats view freedom in terms of political participation rights and respect for civil rights, as well as access to economic, social and cultural rights (see Dorothy Q. Thomas, "Into the Bright Sunshine," *The American Prospect*, October 1, 2004). Resolving this debate is beyond the scope of this article, but it should be mentioned that some of the differences in democratization could be attributable to the dataset employed, which may favor an interpretation closer to the Democratic Party view of freedom. Critics complain (see Manuel Vega-Gordillo and Jose L. Alvarez-Acre, "Economic Growth and Freedom: A Causality Study," *Cato Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 2, Fall 2003) that Freedom House does not provide as strong of a measure of economic freedom as free market liberals would prefer.

²⁹ Pei, Amin and Garz, "Why Nation-Building Fails in Mid-Course."

³⁰ As noted earlier, many United States military operation cases result in maintaining the regime's status quo, but other USMO outcomes are closely divided between democratization and autocratization.

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