

Expanding Europe's Security

Russia's Euro-Atlantic Puzzle

by Sergei Smolnikov

Russia's Vladimir Putin has inherited a complicated set of relations with the majority of European states and leading Western institutions, including the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However paradoxical it might seem to Russian politicians shaped by the zero-sum Soviet era, the very existence and extension of NATO is compatible with the long-term security interests of Russia itself. This is the case because those security interests, which are challenged by unconventional and internal rather than conventional and external threats, are unlikely to be secured by Russia without joint European and American assistance.

Russia and the West have serious decisions to make as concerns their future relations. In particular, Russia's instinctive policy to consider the West as threatening and something to be opposed may be of use domestically, but in the long term it will undermine rather than enhance Russia's strategic and economic interests.

CHALLENGES FROM WITHOUT

The extent to which Russia is affected by the policies of ever integrating Europe cannot be underestimated. Moscow's foreign policy must deal with the following four post-cold war realities.

1. The Central and East European (CEE) countries have been distancing themselves from Russia both politically and economically. Many of these states have explicitly identified their desire to join NATO (as some, like Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic did in 1999 despite strong Russian opposition) and the European Union.
2. Further enlargement of NATO might eventually reach all the way to the Baltic States and Ukraine.
3. NATO and the European Union are moving forward as the core of a new European order. Since Russia is not a member of either of these organizations, it does not have the right to vote in them. The UN Security Council and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), where Russia does have the right to vote, seem comparatively marginalized.
4. There is a progressive descent of Russia into the Third World in its growing discrepancy with the rest of Europe in terms of average life

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expectancy, rule of law, prosperity, social justice, and economic efficiency. It is conceivable, that, if exacerbated, these trends may multiply the unconventional security challenges in Europe. In fact, it is largely Western assistance that has so far been preventing Russia from becoming a failing state or an international outcast.

The geopolitical implications of the European challenge mean a likely expansion of the West up to the border with the Russian Federation, primarily Christian Orthodox and implicitly anti-Western. In the next several years, some of the former republics of the USSR, such as Estonia, as well as Moscow's former allies through the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, like Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, will join the EU.¹ In total, ten CEE countries are scheduled to enter the EU in the forthcoming ten to fifteen years.

Economically, the expansion of the EU is likely to result in much tougher competition for Russian exporters to these markets, "with big contracts going to Western suppliers, not Eastern ones . . . toughening visa regimes and customs services, making it harder for Russians to go and do business there."² This is already the case in the Czech Republic, which introduced a visa regime for Russian tourists and businessmen in June 2000.

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Politically, CEE countries and the Baltic States are striving to distance themselves from the post-Soviet space, including Russia. This desire rests upon their recent historic experience, national security interests, and deep political transformation. If the Baltic states join the EU, Russian foreign policy will have to adjust to deal with a large number of sensitive issues, particularly given that a large portion of ethnic Russians will become European citizens and given the strategic location of the Kaliningrad region adjacent to the Baltic States.

Moreover, one day the EU's eastern enlargement may bring about the issue of Ukraine's incorporation. This would be a substantial blow to the geopolitical plans of the pan-Slavic imperial protagonists among Russia's elites, who have been enhancing their influence over Moscow's politics for the last two years.

With the Eurounion's plans to obtain independent military-operational functions by 2003, the Moscow-EU rivalry over Ukraine may be transformed into a new, potentially militant challenge to all-European security in the forthcoming years. Ukraine, due to its geostrategic location, occupies a key place in the politics of all states in the subregion, including the adjacent CEE countries and, naturally, Russia. Meanwhile, the policies of Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest, with regard to Ukraine, are targeted at neutralizing factors that might prompt Ukraine's "belarussization," a scenario that would most likely involve Kiev's joining military agreements signed between Moscow and Minsk.

As scholar Margarita Balmaceda points out, "In its turn a strong military pres-

ence by Russia in Ukraine would mean that de facto Russia's military fortified border is shifted closer to the CEE states. This would change their geopolitical status once again.³ Since Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic all seek to prevent Russo-Ukrainian relations from developing into a scenario that would be unfavorable for these CEE countries, they have instead attempted to promote Ukraine's engagement in different projects of subregional cooperation, such as the Visegrad Group or the Central European Initiative.

These projects do not involve Russia's participation. It may be assumed that with EU membership the above-mentioned countries, and particularly Poland, will reinforce pressure on their West European partners in order to enhance the EU's influence on Kiev's politics. It is quite possible that a more assertive EU policy aimed at integrating Ukraine into the Euroland may emerge as an important instrument to firmly establish the EU as a regional superpower.

CHALLENGES FROM WITHIN

Vladimir Putin emerged on the political stage at a time when Russia's international role was fading. Judging by his *Strong State Doctrine*,⁴ he is seriously concerned with finding effective means to revitalize Russia's great-power status and regain respect from the West. A more assertive Russian foreign policy appears, therefore, to be considered by the Kremlin as a vital tool to meet these ambitious objectives. The question is: how will the Kremlin's new assertiveness unfold?

When analyzing the possible priorities and nature of Putin's foreign policy, one should not overlook the changes that his election has already brought at home. In sum, Russia's internal policy has been marked by rather backward shifts. What Western politicians call an indiscriminate use of force by the Russian military in Chechnya put Moscow's membership in the Council of Europe in jeopardy. In 1999–2000, with political and societal shifts caused by the second war in Chechnya and Yeltsin fatigue, a noticeable change of elites has taken place in Russia. As a result, a younger generation of bureaucrats, in particular from the security and military establishments, has taken over from the aged communist power-holders.

Some observers, such as the late St. Petersburg mayor Anatoly Sobchak, did link this transfer of power with the necessity for the new Russia to combat corruption, curtail criminality, secure the rule of law, and strengthen state institutions. Others—such as the widow of Andrei Sakharov, Yelena Bonner, and the leader of the liberal Yabloko party, Grigory Yavlinsky—perceive this trend rather as a threat to Russia's fragile democracy. They are afraid that a shift towards a disproportionate reinforcement of the state's police functions is fraught with the risk of suppression of the media and the political opposition. If a rebirth of Andropov-style authoritarianism eventually takes place in Russia, it may result in its ultimate degradation and international isolation.

The Kremlin can be seen to have two options in terms of foreign and security policy, laconically defined as *bandwagoning* and *balancing*.

The *bandwagoning* propensity derives from Russia's impoverished social and economic status, which implies a need for Western investment to modernize the economy and infrastructure. In this context, bandwagoning is a policy of accommodating the West to ensure a comprehensive engagement of its resources in a new round of Russian attempts to catch up with the First World. The proximity of a powerful and enlarging gravity zone of European states, concurrently perceived in Moscow as a counterbalance to the American hegemony, makes bandwagoning a plausible political option.

The *balancing* option stems from NATO's eastern enlargement. Its advancement to Russian borders—which is perceived in Moscow as a threat to Russian security—leads the Kremlin to attempt to contain NATO's enlargement and consolidation by all means possible.

The peculiarity of the challenges facing Moscow comes from the fact that the very Western alliance that Moscow seeks to balance is composed, in essence, of the same countries that the Kremlin seeks to bandwagon.

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Given the asymmetry of European security and the distortion of its architecture, previously guaranteed by the concurrent existence of two strategic poles—the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization—the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 prompted NATO to elaborate a new strategy for the alliance. In the meantime, Moscow has had to formulate new policy guidelines in regard to NATO, taking into account the newly emerged geopolitical realities.

NATO'S NEIGHBOR

The North Atlantic Alliance, as Rob de Wijk accurately points out, was initially “established to oppose the Soviet Union and was also intended to discourage a repeat of the German threat. Should NATO be conceived as a classic alliance, the organization can be abolished because it has already achieved its goals.”⁵

The necessity therefore arose for NATO strategists to work out new alliance doctrines and stipulate a new *raison d'être*, which was found in targeting NATO towards conflict prevention and control. Its activity has therefore been targeted toward anticipating potential conflicts and preventing them from breaking out, or striving to suppress conflicts once they have broken out by means of joint international action within the alliance.⁶

The peace reinforcement function of NATO presupposes a fundamental change in international perceptions of intervention for humanitarian reasons, which was not envisaged in the UN Charter half a century ago. This causes serious disagreements between the Kremlin and the West, since Russian politicians are committed to a tra-

ditional interpretation of military intervention. In contrast to this position, Javier Solana, then NATO's secretary-general, insisted that the alliance "has to have the opportunity on a case by case basis to act, if necessary, under their own decision, always with an appropriate legal base, and always within the spirit of the Charter." However, he asserted, "there may be a moment in which it is necessary to act for humanitarian reasons, when a UN Security Council resolution will not be necessary or will not be even appropriate because the UN charter does not contemplate humanitarian acts."⁷

NATO's eastward expansion has important economic and strategic implications for Russia. The focus on geopolitical implications often overlooks the fact that Russia will suffer economically as a result of its complete displacement from the arms market in CEE. It is a question not only of NATO's newcomers but also of other countries in the region that previously were Moscow's military clients. Thus, in March 1999, Slovakia refused Russian deliveries of the S-300 surface-to-air missile systems worth \$140 million to compensate Russia's debt to Bratislava. It will be U.S. and European companies, belonging to NATO member states, that will modernize the weapons of the new members of the alliance.

In addition, the Euro-Atlantic arms market has entered a stage of mega-alliances and internal liberalization. Russia's isolation from these developments means lost profits estimated at billions of dollars. The overall order package of Russia's arms export organization *Rosvooruzheniye* until 2004 is estimated at \$8.4 billion.⁸ These orders are placed primarily with China, India, and some other Third World countries.

Geopolitically, this means a shift of Russia's most advanced technological sector toward the Third World. Since the Russian military industrial complex does not have an opportunity to realize its material interests in the West, it has become NATO's normative adversary. Moreover, Russia's isolation from military-technological integration within the Euro-Atlantic alliance is fraught with the growth of technological backwardness in advanced sectors of Russian industry. This may result in marginalization of Russia's position in one of the few sectors where Russia may legitimately claim great-power status. Therefore, the most rational means to preserve Russia's top international ranking may be found in cohesion with NATO and integration into the Euro-Atlantic space both politically and military-economically.

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While the Yeltsin establishment seemed to neglect this kind of logic, Putin appears to have taken these deliberations into account when making his famous pro-NATO statement⁹ and advancing Moscow's recent initiative to set up a joint Euro-Russian-NATO nonstrategic missile defense.¹⁰ The pragmatist in Putin seems to understand that Russia lacks the resources necessary to confront NATO in every respect dealing with the issues of European security. Therefore, one may expect new accom-

modating initiatives on the Kremlin's part. At the same time, however, Russia attempts to manipulate its role in international events, and in particular the situation in Yugoslavia, in an opportunistic manner.

THE BALKANS

Moscow tried to balance the West by supporting the Milosevic regime, which was not only morally wrong but, in this author's view, badly calculated. These balancing tactics, aimed at containing Western hegemony in the Balkans, took the form of a formal disagreement with the West on the ways and means for settling the Kosovo issue. On the face of it, this disagreement might seem like a dispute caused by Russia's traditionalist support of Serbia, which dates back to the beginning of the nineteenth century and is based on ethnic and confessional solidarity.

But Moscow's officially reserved attitude toward democratic opposition to Milosevic while granting a \$102 million loan to Belgrade's regime, as well as hosting Serb defense minister Dragoljub Ojdanic when having an international obligation to detain him, could not but disclose that the Kremlin supported the Milosevic regime because of its anti-Western stance rather than its Christian Orthodox solidarity. (As an aside, the Serbian Orthodox Church has pronounced itself rather as anti-Milosevic.¹¹)

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Moscow's approach in fact turned out to be shortsighted. Investing too much of Russia's international image into support of the international outcast will be counterproductive for its long-term interests in the Balkans. It would have been much better for Russia to demonstrate its solidarity with Serbian democrats, especially since their leaders' visit to Moscow in June 2000 to seek the Kremlin's moral support provided Moscow with such an opportunity.

The Kremlin failed to use another opportunity to up its international clout by acting slowly during the presidential election in Yugoslavia in September 2000. With all its intelligence resources and claimed superb expertise in the Balkans, Moscow failed to objectively assess the political situation in Yugoslavia in advance and was ineffective in catching up with its dynamics.¹²

It is interesting to note that Moscow's lack of solidarity with Washington on the use of military force to settle the Kosovo crisis earlier (autumn 1998–winter 1999) coincided with a temporary wobbling among NATO's European members in their commitment to do what was described as "the risky job of preparing an intervention force to stand by, in nearby Macedonia, should the ceasefire in Kosovo fail and international monitors there need rescuing."¹³

However, this regional conflict highlighted that without U.S. intervention, the Europeans are unable to independently provide for security on the Continent in the case of escalation of ethnic wars and other unconventional threats. Traditionally, since

the Brezhnev era, Moscow's policy occasionally has been aimed at splitting the Euro-Atlantic alliance along that line.

Now it appears that with the coming strategic consolidation of the EU, fueled by European Monetary Union and the Kosovo-reinforced European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), and particularly with the provisional creation of a European rapid-reaction force outside NATO control, Europe may objectively become "emancipated" from U.S. guardianship. Moreover, Washington's plans to put forward its national missile defense could strategically "decouple" North America and Europe. As a result, in the next ten to fifteen years, Atlanticism (and its institutions) may be seriously diminished.

Many Russian strategic experts are proponents of the speedy de-Americanization of NATO. Conceptually, this idea is quite in line with the balance-of-power pattern, originated in former prime minister Yevgeny Primakov's doctrine of a multipolar world, and reportedly adopted by Putin in his foreign policy. The essence of this doctrine is to encourage the creation of power centers, or coalitions, in opposition to American hegemony. Sergei Ivanov, head of the Russian Security Council under Putin, is by his own words an adherent of the multipolar world concept.

If new Russian power-holders adopt opportunism as a policy concept to deal with NATO, they may in principle increase Russia's clout via skillfully designed war-mongering gestures. The Kosovo conflict definitely provided Russia, as some Western experts assumed, with an opportunity "to humiliate NATO."¹⁴ Thus, the adventurous march of Russian troops into Kosovo on June 12, 1999, to seize Pristina's airport ahead of NATO was primarily designed to take the alliance down a peg or two.

According to some Western analysts, to this end the Kremlin might have chosen among the following options: bringing Yugoslavia into the Russia-Belarus Slavic union; encouraging Russian volunteers to go to Yugoslavia as soldiers or as human shields; or helping Milosevic to bargain with or resist NATO more effectively by sharing Russian intelligence or sending weapons.¹⁵

It is not inconceivable that if the new Russian leadership advances these techniques, they—under similar circumstances—might effectively ruin NATO's solidarity, as Europe would certainly try to avoid the slightest risk of a military confrontation with Russia. Moreover, Russia seems not to suffer from the West's "Mogadishu syndrome," which implies that in genuine democracies public opinion cannot tolerate human losses. Unfortunately, it is in the deep cultural roots of Russian civilization for its power holders not to consider an individual's life as a top value.

THE NEED FOR A NEW PERSPECTIVE

It should be noted that Russia's new military doctrine identifies NATO's expansion as a potential threat to Russian security and lowers the threshold for possible use of nuclear weapons by Russia. This doctrine is intended to deter a new round of NATO expansion, particularly the inclusion of the three Baltic states. At the same time, the doctrine intends to increase Russia's international clout through reinforcement of its military muscle. Strategically, the Kremlin seems to seek to limit U.S.

influence over European politics and thereby cut into what Moscow perceives as U.S. hegemony in international affairs.

This policy at the same time is designed to provide Russia with a more stable zone of geopolitical influence and to deter the expansion of Western culture in Eurasia. However, an anti-American opportunism has some powerful normative limits for its implementation as the sole focus of the Kremlin's new foreign policy.

There are several reasons for this. First, a change in the current balance of power could in principle destabilize the economic situation in Russia and thereby cut short the incumbent regime. Secondly, if Russia ceases to be recognized by Washington as a reliable partner, it risks being deprived of its privileged political and economic status with the West—for example, retaining membership in the G-8, obtaining new IMF loans, re-scheduling Russia's debt to the Paris Club of official creditors, deferring ex-Soviet debt, and gaining Western financial and economic assistance critical for Russia's (and the world's) national security, like loose nukes and civil nuclear safety. Lastly, though it is not publicly recognized by the Kremlin, purposefully contributing to a decrease in U.S. hegemonic power would not necessarily be in the interests of national security: in the past hegemonic decline has led to global war.

Even if not implemented in full, the Kremlin's opportunism during the crisis in Yugoslavia put Russia's relations with the West at their lowest point since the end of the cold war. This policy was a threat to the very existence of Yeltsin's regime. First, it normatively led to a strengthening of the communists' position on the eve of the parliamentary election in Russia. Secondly, it put Russia in danger of crossing the red line in its relations with the West, which could lead to a halt in Western assistance to the Russian regime or even to Russia's being dragged into a war.

Having realized these dangers, Yeltsin pushed aside Primakov and prevented the Primakov-controlled Ministry of Foreign Affairs from negotiating on the Kosovo settlement, and instead appointed former prime minister Victor Chernomyrdin (a moderate representative of peace-prone gas industrialists) as a special envoy. It was this substitution that eventually enabled a more stable Russian involvement in Yugoslavia.

In short, NATO's de-Americanization would automatically result in a multiplication of risks to Russia's own security. The rescue operation by Norway and Britain to save the crew of the Russian submarine *Kursk* in August 2000, against the background of the failure of earlier autonomous efforts by the Russian navy and reluctance to ask for help, has been perhaps the strongest public policy blow to the anti-NATO tactics so far nurtured by the Kremlin. Ordinary Russians were shocked by their government's slow reaction to offers of help from NATO and at the same time appreciated Western assistance.

As Christoph Bluth accurately notes, "the threats that Russia faces to its security and stability derive not from the West but from its own internal problems."¹⁶ In fact, not only is the West *not* the principal threat to Russia, but it is the principal source of stability and security even for Russia itself.¹⁷

One of the lessons that the Russian administration should learn from the *Kursk* accident is that Russian voters in general are no longer inclined to place the super-power ambitions of the Kremlin higher than the lives of their compatriots. However,

it seems almost inconceivable that the incumbent Russian elite, now under the sway of ex-KGB servicemen and the military, would suddenly stop its hackneyed anti-NATO stance and publicly acknowledge that NATO's existence is in the interest of Russian security. This is inconceivable precisely because the existence and expansion of NATO have so far effectively proved a ready justification for strengthening the military-industrial complex in Russia. Portraying NATO as a potential threat may again become a useful diversion if the domestic socioeconomic situation in Russia deteriorates further.

While Russian policy is still a question mark, a kind of bandwagoning with the European Union appears to be of new strategic value. It is interesting to note that the recent trend in Moscow's policy has been to portray NATO and the European Union as completely different "faces" of the West, as if they were composed of entirely different countries. Indeed, economically, the European Union is a major trading partner for Russia and other European countries of the former Soviet Union, accounting for 32 percent of Russia's trade. When combined with the CEE, this number rises to 44 percent.

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In both the Soviet and post-Soviet eras, Western Europe has been the primary foreign center of Russia's industrial modernization. It was also the key source of Russia's hard-currency export profits. However, in technical and economic as well as legal terms, the level of Russia's integration into Europe is extremely low and not comparable with indicators in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and other countries that have made EU membership their top political priority.

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in June 1994 by Russia and the EU did not set up a free-trade regime in bilateral commerce. Moreover, neither Russia nor the EU is genuinely interested in fully liberalizing their bilateral trade. The former is afraid that liberalization will result in eventual evaporation of Russian mid-tech industry as a result of an inflow of more competitive European goods. The latter fears that such a regime will damage its sensitive traditional industries, steel production in particular.¹⁸

For its part, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU has appeared to be interested in a "limited" isolation of Russia from Europe and has favored a shifting of Moscow's foreign economic and political interests toward the Commonwealth of Independent States. At the same time, mostly as a result of lobbying by Germany under former chancellor Helmut Kohl and most recently by Finland, the EU has pursued a policy of assisting in moderate development of economic and political reforms in Russia. Though the EU seems to consider itself nowadays as a powerful independent player in world affairs, capable of dealing with Russia on its own, one should not overestimate the potential of any political and economic cohesion between Brussels

and Moscow in the future. Presented in some media sources as almost a breakthrough in bilateral relations,¹⁹ the EU-Russia summit held in Paris in October 2000 was focused on an energy deal between the two sides rather than on the creation of a hypothetical strategic nexus.

By all counts, conceptually, the EU seems to perceive Russia mainly as a source of potential danger to European economic, ecological, and military-political security. Therefore, it focuses its relations with Russia on protecting itself from any such damage. Characteristically, only when the risks of antagonizing Russia became apparent (as a result of growing hostility between Russia and the West during the Kosovo crisis) did Brussels approve the EU's Common Strategy for Russia on June 3, 1999. It called for increased cooperation on economic and political issues "from bringing Russia into the World Trade Organization and encouraging development of Russia's pipeline system to creating a stability pack for Kosovo."²⁰

As reasonably observed:

For all their talk of a "missing social dimension," European governments are still likely to take their cue from Washington when it comes to another bail-out for Russia. . . . The EU's own efforts have been mostly unimpressive. The most recent idea, \$500 m in food aid, has been a blatantly self-interested move by Europe's farm lobby. Most other EU aid so far has been technical advice, often not followed, and valuable chiefly to the well-paid Western consulting firms that deliver it.²¹

In the twenty-first century the EU-Russia rivalry may expand well beyond the CEE subregion to include the oil-rich countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus. The latter two regions are likely to be placed in a crosscutting zone of long-term European and Russian geoeconomic interests.

In the midterm, the geopolitical consequences of the Kremlin's balancing tactics through attempts to implicitly play Europe off against America, the ongoing orientation of military buildup against NATO, and strategy-lacking assertiveness might turn out to be counterproductive for Moscow for the purposes of enhancing Russia's international status on the European continent.

By and large, the West currently appears not to have any convincing policy alternative to its current policy of trying to avoid antagonizing its former foe. In the meantime, it looks as though Europe is inclined to react rather favorably to accommodating signs in Russia's new bandwagoning tactics, whereas U.S. policymakers are becoming increasingly alarmed by the Kremlin's domestic political stance and its balancing pattern abroad.

Unsure of how to proceed, the EU and the United States may eventually disagree on how to deal with Putin's Russia. The most dangerous scenario, however, will emerge if Brussels and Washington finally adopt radically different policy options with regard to the Kremlin. A new Western controversy over Russia will hardly contribute to making the entire world a more stable and secure place in the years to come.



Notes

- ¹ See "Bigger When?" *The Economist*, November 11, 2000, p. 75.
- ² See "A Wider European Union," *The Economist*, November 7, 1998, p. 15.
- ³ Margarita Balmaceda, "Rossiya-Ukraina-Vyshegradskaya gruppа: partnerstvo ili sopernichestvo," in *MEiMO*, 1997, no.10, p. 98.
- ⁴ See V. Putin, "Russia at the Turn of the Millennium" (available: http://www.government.gov.ru/english/statVP_engl_1.html).
- ⁵ Rob de Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium: The Battle for Consensus* (London: Brassey's, 1997), p.142.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 143.
- ⁷ A. Nicoll, "Cracks Still Appear in NATO's Collective Will for Air Strikes," *Financial Times*, October 9, 1998, p. 2.
- ⁸ Russian NTV, "Itogi" program, May 30, 1999.
- ⁹ Patrick E. Tyler, "Putin Sees Possibility of Russia in NATO," *International Herald Tribune*, March 6, 2000.
- ¹⁰ "Putin Proposes European Anti-Missile Shield, Agence France Press (Rome), June 5, 2000.
- ¹¹ CNN International, September 29, 2000.
- ¹² "Vladimir Putin Makes a Statement," *What Papers Say*, October 3, 2000; see also "Moskvu ne tuk ponyaly," *Segodnya*, October 3, 2000.
- ¹³ "NATO's Mid-Life Crisis," *The Economist*, December 12, 1998, p. 15.
- ¹⁴ *The Economist*, April 17, 1999, p. 62.
- ¹⁵ See *Ibid.*
- ¹⁶ Christoph Bluth, "The Post-Soviet Space and Europe," in *Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia*, Roy Allison and Christoph Bluth, Eds. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998), p. 332.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁸ The EU implements restrictive import quotas on Russian steel. This policy ensures that the "European market is protected while the American market suffered" because the latter "remained the only place Russian exporters could direct their product in hopes of gaining a return. EU quotas thus played an important role in aggravating US-Russian economic relations on this issue." See Peter J. Stavrakis, *After the Fall: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Next Stage of Post-Soviet History* (Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council of the United States, 1998), p. 28.
- ¹⁹ See details in *Segodnya*, October 31, 2000.
- ²⁰ "Russia's Peace Prize: Closer Ties to the West," *Business Week*, July 5, 1999, p. 33.
- ²¹ "Of Commissars and Commissioners," *The Economist*, January 2, 1999, p. 46.