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Vol. 8, Nos. 2/3 (Winter 1998/99–Spring 1999)
National security is said to depend on the politics of identity for two reasons: first, the internal coherence of the nation-state promotes efficient responses to external threats; and second, identities ascribed to other states facilitate recognition of these threats. Out of these two functions of national identity arise two kinds of theory. Internal theories seek to explain the cohesion and stability of the nation-state as an institutional form. External theories, on the other hand, address distinctions among nation-states. Constructivists argue that attention to identity politics will contribute to accounts of interests that rationalist approaches ignore. The distinction between internal and external aspects of identity clarifies what constructivists (and other students of national identity) have to offer. External theories explain what nation states want, or appear to want, whereas internal theories ask whether this matters or whether the preferences of other agents are likely to be more important.
This essay defends the view that a focus on the conduct of “public controversy” better accounts for post-Cold War global political developments (ethnic disputes, nationalist reassertion) than constructivism, neorealism, or primordialism. Consideration for how ethnic and nationalist identity claims are mediated through public argument reveals the process by which culture is constituted through talk, even as the potential for redefinition is limited by history and other material constraints on collective action. Huntington’s “Clash of Civilization” hypothesis is contrasted to this argumentation framework to argue for the importance of heightened theoretical attention both to the practice of public deliberation and the spaces for exchange opened up through talk.
The article examines three ways of understanding security and the political implications of each. Specific attetntion is given to the concept of “human security.” It suggests that more than one understanding may be operative in any particular case and that a one-dimensional understanding of security is inadequate both in terms of scholarship and policy-making. It illustrate this by examining U.S. policy and discourse regarding Haiti circa 1991–1994.
Current explanations for democratic peace are problematic. Institutional explanations are incomplete. Ideational explanations provide critical insights into aspects of liberal-democratic relations that institutional accounts leave unexplained or underexplained, but have not been taken far enough. These inadequacies can be addressed by grounding ideational explanations for the democratic peace in constructivist theory. Constructivists argue that certain processes can lead states to positively identify with one another. This sort of positive collective identification holds the key to understanding why liberal democracies rarely fight one another. Collective liberal identity leads to a definition of state interests and appropriate state strategies which facilitates cooperative relations, a tendency for liberal-democracies to ally with one another, and peaceful resolution of conflicts of interest. Positive collective identification thus allows liberal-democracies to opt out of the Hobbesian world described by neorealists in their relations with one another. After outlining the argument and several propositions, specific epistemological and methodological suggestions are made for improving the democratic peace research program by incorporating a rigorous constructivist analysis.
The article addresses two issues of current interest to students of international relations. The first is the extent to which societal collective identity, and especially national collective identity, has causal significance for international interaction and for the strategic behavior of states that are committed to different forms of sovereign identity. The second is the issue of change in the international system. The impact of two distinct forms of sovereign identity, territorial-sovereign identity and national-sovereign identity on state security policy is explored and elaborated for cases encompassing the Seven Years’ War and the Franco–Prussian War.
Why do Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries strive to become NATO members? Why did NATO decide to expand to the East, and why did it (only) invite the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to become members? The most prominent rationalist IR approaches account for the CEE countries’ bid to join NATO but fail to explain the interest of NATO in expansion. This puzzle for rationalism is solved by a constructivist approach. In this perspective, NATO represents the Euro-Atlantic community of liberal values and norms. Countries strive for NATO membership inasmuch they share the community values and norms. NATO expands in order to strengthen liberal democracy and multilateralism and to build, in Central and Eastern Europe, a stable peace based on these norms. When a country has internalized the community values and norms, it is admitted as a full member to the organization. Finally, NATO admits those countries first that are most advanced in the internalization of the community values and beliefs
The paper examines and upholds the theoretical claim that states can develop positive identity with one another. Whereas realism posits that interstate relations necessarily remain at the negative end of the identity continuum, I argue that states can develop relations that move toward the positive end of the identity continuum. In my case study, I show that positive identity between Germany and the U.S. has emerged through the trans-Atlantic security relationship. Going beyond many constructivist and liberal-institutionalist analyses, I argue that positive identity arises between states through the conscious construction of shared history, and is reinforced through socialization over time. Starting in the 1950s, and continuing thoughout the past half century, an important part of the U.S. mission through NATO was to help establish a sense of shared history and destiny between the U.S. and Germany. Considering both the positive and negative evidence for the claim, I conclude that by and large the objective of creating positive identity has been realized.
This article demonstrates the deficiencies of structural models for understanding interstate relationships by examining an anomaly that cannot be easily explained by neorealist or neoliberal theories of cooperation: the voluntary cession of sovereignty by a group of independent states to create an entirely new political authority. Specifically, it examines why the Italian peninsula transformed from a competitive balance of power system of independent states to an amalgamated security community in the mid nineteenth century. In doing so, it explores the conditions under which a disparate group of states will redefine themselves in transnational terms so as to form a new political community. Drawing from social identity theory and symbolic interaction sociology, the article suggests that political integration requires two conditions: the development of a transnational identity that is grounded in a cosmopolitan rather than a parochial nationalism and a “reference other” which embodies this identity and forms the core around which the independent units can coalesce. Under these conditions, juridical borders are no longer viewed as a protection of autonomy, but rather as impediments toward unity.
When leaders perceive their states to be part of a group of states, they are more likely to favor cooperation within this group than they would otherwise. Group identification contributes to intimate international cooperation; lack of group identification makes such cooperation unlikely. I apply this social psychological insight to demonstrate how identity affects state policy. Specifically, I explain why France and Great Britain joined NATO in 1949, why France dropped out of NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966, and why Great Britain remained in the structure.
Jordan’s decision to not join the American coalition during the 1990–91 Gulf crisis and its turn against Iraq in 1995 represent important and puzzling cases for international relations theory. Major rationalist approaches, including neorealist alliance theory and political economy explanations, underdetermine Jordan’s behavior. Existing constructivist accounts also do not explain this behavior. This paper proposes an alternative account based on the contestation of state identity and interests within the public sphere. During the Gulf crisis, the Jordanian public sphere became the primary site for the articulation of Jordanian identity and interests, with a significant impact on Jordanian behavior. Afterwards, the state struggled against the normative consensus governing Iraq policy produced during the crisis in a bid for rehabilitation in the international arena. The systemic shock produced by the Jordanian–Israeli peace treaty provided the incentive and the opportunity to break with the consensus on Iraq, in an attempted redefinition of Jordan’s essential identity and interests. The public sphere struggle over this redefinition, and the state’s increasingly repressive response, best explains Jordanian behavior towards Iraq after 1995.