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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
Indian Army 2020: A Vision Statement on Strategy and Capability
V.K. Shrivastava, Senior Fellow, IDSA
Abstract
This article takes note of India's relative lack of strategic thinking and then of its complex security environment. Some futuristic assertions then set the stage for the main text to follow. Vision statements reflect upon a set of issues ranging from the necessity of an informed debate on matters military, and the structures of higher defence management, to the tricky issue of a more proactive stance and of 'downsizing' the army. The write-up then goes on to state some of the desired capabilities of the army in the years ahead. In the absence of any national defence policy, or any tri-Service strategy paper, the evolution and maturing of the military strategy have suffered. This write-up would have served its purpose if it could provide a reference point for a more deliberate discussion.
Past Imperfect: An Analytical Introduction
For centuries, Indians continued to weave their notions of security around the seemingly impregnable high mountain ranges in the north and the vast expanse of deep seas surrounding the peninsular south. These misplaced notions remained in place for almost 2,000 years despite repeated external aggressions across these geographical barriers-from the time of Alexander the Great to the time the British arrived in India-resulting in plunder and prolonged subjugation. What is even more surprising is that, time and again, the ruler in Delhi did not sally out to block the invader at the mountain passes, or to challenge him at the frontier of his kingdom, but allowed him to march on to the very seat of his authority. In the events that followed, the ruler and his ill-prepared, ponderous army invariably lost to the smaller but qualitatively superior foe or, alternately, lost out while suing for peace. Even without a more detailed recourse of the historical facts, some analytical observations of the events relevant to this paper merit a mention. These being:
With very few exceptions, the Mauryas and the Cholas, for example, the Indian rulers of the time displayed little understanding of the strategic frontiers stretching beyond the borders of their kingdoms.
Rarely, if at all, did they venture beyond the Indian geographical limits to create a 'buffer', or to establish outposts for greater security.
Their extreme defensive orientations allowed deep and uncontested ingress to the enterprising invaders-Babur fought the decisive battle only on the outskirts of Delhi at Panipat. In the process, they first lost their freedom of action and then their kingdoms.
They had invariably failed to keep abreast of the warring techniques and were overwhelmed by the tactical superiority of the aggressor.
Even when on a winning streak, they did not finish off the opponent. Prithviraj Chauhan let go of Ghori 16 times. If finally cost him his kingdom and his life. Interestingly, Genghis Khan's concept of victory is believed to have included the opponent's head.
It was usual for them to apply their intelligence network for palace intrigues rather than to assess the impending threats from without.
The multitude of princely states never came together for the larger cause of warding off an external threat. Their petty differences and infighting were exploited to the hilt by the invaders and the colonisers-the British thrived on the policy of 'Divide and Rule'.
We do not seem to have learnt our lessons. A scrutiny of events of the post-independence era points to the same set of shortfalls as those in the past. In an attempt to examine the Indian thoughts on strategy, George K. Tanham has observed, "Deeply embedded habits of thoughts related to Indian geography, history, culture.... exert a powerful influence....they will, in the foreseeable future, help to shape its strategic thinking and its strategy." 1 His interpretive essay devotes a full section to analyse the basis for India's relative lack of strategic thinking.
In 1990-91, while responding to a question by a Committee of the Parliament, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) accepted, "...from time to time, vis-à-vis our immediate neighbours, vis-à-vis Bangladesh at a point of time, and vis-à-vis Sri Lanka more recently, the policy proceeded to grapple with the problem as it arose." 2 The MoD went on to state, "We are trying to proceed more rapidly in that direction" (reference here is to the formulation of the National Defence Policy)." 3 That was ten years ago and we still do not have the policy document.
The closing decades of the 20th century saw the beginning of the search, for the third time in that century, for a new world order. We have, thus, entered the new millennium in an environment of marked uncertainty. Understandably, therefore, our security environments in the time horizon of this paper would remain exceedingly complex and volatile-disputed borders and frequent flare-ups along these, our illegally occupied and ceded territories, the fallouts of the ongoing proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), the rise and spread of fundamentalism in and from our neighbourhood, the unchecked proliferation of small arms in the region, the menace of drug-trafficking, and so on. Then there are also the ongoing socio-political upheavals within, compounded by the demographic aggressions from across our porous borders, which will continue to cause unrest and tensions.
Since the strategies and the armies are a product of their own times and circumstances, despite the absence of a National Defence Policy, and any tri-Service paper on Joint Strategy, this is an attempt to make an army specific vision statement. The effort, to see through the smoke-screens and reflectors, can be faulted for its 'stand alone mode' and yet it would have served its purpose if it could provide a reference point for debate and disagreements.
Some Futuristic Assertions
Defence and development are complementary. Therefore, an army, to be relevant, cannot but remain in step with the national endeavours. It would, thus, be in the fitness of things to make some assertions about India 2020. Only the ones considered necessary to sustain the text that follows are being made. Since the aim and scope of this paper do not permit inclusion of supporting facts and figures, suffice it to say that the ongoing trends and indicators form the basis for these. Like any other futuristic prediction, the ones in the following paragraphs are also prone to pitfalls.
In the next two decades, our borders will certainly be far better managed than at present. However, boundary disputes are unlikely to get resolved. Peace and tranquillity should be expected along the Sino-Indian border. Even so, with every steady stride towards superpower status, the Chinese attitude towards India could harden. China should be expected to vigorously pursue its strategic game plan to keep India strictly confined to South Asia. This game plan would be matched militarily through modernisation programmes, enhanced infrastructural facilities in Tibet-roads, railways, airfields, missile sites, communication facilities-and a stronger naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Here, attention must be drawn to the Rand Report for the United States Air Force, concluded in October 1999, which observes, "China is not a satisfied power... refuses to abandon the principle of power."
The ongoing turmoil in Pakistan is unlikely to change for the better in the years ahead. Therefore, frustrations of an unstable Pakistan, backed by the authoritative presence of the Pakistan Army in the affairs of the state, will continue to be a cause of concern to India. As hithertofore, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) should be expected to fish in the troubled waters to exploit our internal tensions and, worse still, create some where none exist. Pakistan's anti-Indian stance, suiting Chinese strategic designs, will tend to bring them closer still.
Independent of the foregoing, the central feature of the emerging security environment in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) will be the number of players and their diverse interests. Even so, what is likely to shape the strategic arrangement is the emergence of the 'triangle' involving India, South Africa and Australia. The USA, because of its global interests, is sure to make its presence and commitment felt. Indeed, the US Department of Defence Report hints at a stronger naval presence in the IOR. Thus, it would be the US endeavour to make the 'triangle' into a 'quadrille'. China and Japan, prompted by their concerns about the security of sea lines of communications (for their access to the sources of energy, raw materials and the markets) would strive to be part of the security arrangement. These economic realities and energy security issues are sure to create tensions in the IOR. Therein, the army's role in the power projection would be in terms of the amphibious capabilities-admittedly in conjunction with the Indian Navy.
Even so, with the economic reforms in full flow, the Indian economy is estimated to be the fourth largest in the world by 2020. By then, we would have also made our distinct mark in the fields of frontier technologies-nuclear, space, missile, information, and the like. The rising expectations of the people, fanned by the information explosion, will have forced the pace of change to ensure a quantum jump in social justice. Increasingly educated and awakened Indian society will step up its demands, and will insist on better governance. The sheer strength of India's numbers, their skills and expertise, their energy and enterprise, will have propelled the country well forward.
Thus, notwithstanding the external and the internal pressures, the year 2020 will see a far more confident India, an acknowledged nuclear power and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, deservedly having a greater say in world affairs.
Some Strategic Visions
Strategy as a word traces its origin to the Greek Stratos. From Stratos comes Strategos, general, as well as Strategia, which, depending on the context, can mean a campaign, generalship, or the general's office. 4 As a logical follow-up, it is the strategic pitch that allows emergence of the innovative tactics-the original Greek word tactics meant order, and stood for the conduct of the battle; in plain words, the actual act of fighting. 5
Origins and meanings apart, the necessity and the urgency of attending to much neglected issues of the national goals, and the strategy to attain them, cannot be over-emphasised. More so in the context of our newly acquired nuclear status, our recent entry into the space arena, the changing nature of war, and the ongoing revolution in military affairs. "The sheer number of ideas, concepts, opinions and differing points of view can be confusing...." 6 All the more reason to set the process in motion.
In the Vedic period of the four Vama (class) society, the responsibility of bearing arms rested with the Kshatriyas (the warrior class). Others took no particular interest in the matter and generally attended to their own callings. Centuries later, Kautilya's masterly treatise, Arthashastra, establishing linkages between statecraft and warfare, created little impact on the cultural milieu of the era. In more recent times, the British, to perpetuate their colonial hold on India, kept the army insulated from the civil society. We seem to have remained prisoner to these past legacies. Under the mistaken notion of 'security', the army has remained outside the public domain for too long. Confidence in the army (fortunately) and apathy towards it (regrettably) coexist.
Therefore, the first step that the army needs to take to realise its futuristic goals and visions is to systematically generate public awareness. There are more than enough existing channels and methods to do that-the army's public relations organisation, institutions and think-tanks, departments of defence studies in scores of universities across the country, Territorial Army (TA) units, the National Cadet Corps, and, of course, the imaginative use of the media. Awareness amongst the masses will generate informed debate on matters military with far-reaching effects-the most important being the people's quest for accountability. All state actors will have to perform.
The situation and the time to start the process could not have been better either. The National Security Council has come alive after a decade of total dormancy. The pending issue of integration of the Services Headquarters with the MoD is being talked of in more definitive terms. If reports are to be believed, the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) appears to be in the offing. Releases of the Kargil Committee Report and the official accounts of the Indo-Pak conflicts of 1965 and 1971 have generated some interest amongst the people. These actions indicate the government's readiness to debate matters military.
The army's next strategic step, therefore, must be to persist and prevail to ensure that the military considerations increasingly influence the formulation of the government's defence policies and the grand strategy. After all, the Estimates Committee, in its report tabled in the Parliament in August 1992, had found serious flaws and had observed, "There is confusion in MoD...on the effectiveness of the decision-making process in the Ministry." 7 Therefore, the professional rationale of the currently alive issues of integration of the Service Headquarters with the MoD, and that of the CDS, must be impressed upon the government. The process of integration must not be allowed to end in an ad hoc 'mix' of sorts; what should be insisted upon must be an 'alloy'. As far as the CDS is concerned, the Services, the bureaucrats and the politicians have their own visions of the proposed appointment and its charter. Here again, the final outcome must not be allowed to become an exercise in cosmetic changes to the existing system of Chiefs of Staff Committee. In sum, the army's long-term interests and intentions must be to quickly get the institutions of higher defence management in place, nurse their dynamism while these are taking roots, and then work the system to retain its rightful place in the decision-making loop. By so doing, the army should aim to secure four fundamentals of its future strategy-to fight a one-front war, from a moral high ground, prosecuted from a position of military advantage, and in consonance with other constituents of national power.
The next aspect of the strategic vision centres on the nuclear issue. As may be recalled, Pokhran II of May 1998 signalled India's entry into the nuclear club. Pakistan had soon followed suit and China was already a nuclear power. In this setting, a series of articles have since appeared, addressing the issues of weaponisation, nuclear philosophy, decision-making process, aspects of command and control, delivery systems, and the like. Surprisingly, however, the issue of interfacing nuclear deterrence with the conventional operations seems to have been overlooked. Be that as it may, in the context of the obtainable nuclear environment, the army's strategy should be guided by the following five cardinal principles:
Prepare for the most likely conventional/unconventional contingencies without forgetting the most devastating one-albeit the least likely.
The basic doctrine must be that of war prevention. A conventional deterrence must also operate.
Concepts of war-waging should address the issues of successfully prosecuting a war, whether limited or otherwise, within the assessed nuclear thresholds of the adversary. Therein, it must not be the operational commander's burden to worry about the 'threshold'. The political leadership should fine-tune this aspect of brinkmanship.
The strategy must take note of the intricacies of prosecuting a war while combatting heightened insurgency in the theatre of operations.
As a strategy, confidence-building measures must be resorted to without forgetting that only a confident nation, with a strong army, can enter into such arrangements.
In the nuclear context, it is also necessary to have a clear vision of what constitutes a victory. It can no longer be in the absolute terms of a victor and a vanquished. The international community is in no mood to accept the use of force to realign borders, and certainly not to annex a weaker state. Yet wars will surely be fought and the outcome thereof will be far more critical to the two warring sides than ever before. Therefore, strictly militarily, the concept of victory should stand scrutiny on two counts-one, attainment of the specified military objective; and two, creation of a strategic asymmetry that nudges the adversary towards the negotiating table. In the overall context, it should have created options and opportunities for the furtherance of the political aim. After all, "Military victories do not themselves determine the outcome of wars; they only provide potential opportunities to the victors." 8 In the ultimate analysis, however, the concept of victory should signify greater peace.
Former Defence Minister George Fernandes is on record stating, "India has traditionally pursued a non-aggressive, non-provocative defence policy based on the philosophy of defensive defence". 9 In sharp contrast, the next vision statement demands a strategic shift in our existing approach. To that end, some explanations are warranted.
War is "a mental and a physical struggle conducted by means of the latter". 10 Therein, the 'attitude' towards war is perhaps the most significant component of the 'mental struggle'. On that score, we as a nation have erred consistently. Because of our high level of tolerance and rather defensive attitude, we have forever been reacting to the situations thrust upon us. Worse still, with our forgiving nature, we were apt to squander away the advantages of the military situation to allow a wounded adversary to get away when he could have been maimed.
The situation needs to be remedied-indeed reversed-so that the army does not operate in a reactive setting with all the attendant disadvantages. As a strategy therefore, the army must have a proactive stance. That the war will be carried into, and then fought in, the enemy territory, must be our declared policy. The army's capabilities and deliberated readiness to use them must act as 'a threat in being'. Its aggressive presence in any given setting must be a cause of concern to the adversary. Well orchestrated posturing must hold out veiled threats. Physical and technological ascendancy must be established at the point(s) of choosing. There must be willingness to execute preemptive strikes to avoid possible reverses. The adversary must be out-escalated and kept on the defensive.
It should be evident that the desired shift cannot be made abruptly. It will have to come about over a period of time during which a sterner stand must be taken while dealing with seemingly small aberrations and events on the glaciers, along the Line of Control (LoC) and along the disputed northern borders. Indeed, those are the right opportunities to issue forthright signals. Also that the government's stronger resolve in dealing with crisis situations-a case of hijacking, for example-can only strengthen the army's cause.
To be forewarned is to be forearmed. Therefore, timely and reliable intelligence, both strategic and operational, is an important component of the desired shift. It can keep one ahead of the events. Regrettably, our track record on this score has been poor. On the strategic plane, the effort must be directed to critically assess the strengths and the weaknesses of our competitors and potential adversaries. Responses can then be orchestrated to negate their strengths and to exploit their weaknesses. On the basis of the Kargil Committee Report, the government is reportedly considering some changes to galvanise the present set-up. The time appears to be right to drive home the point-intelligence agencies must be responsive to the intelligence users and must be accountable.
Sheer superiority of numbers has rarely won a war. Innovative orchestration of combat power invariably has. The observation in the modern context signifies synergised application of the land, sea and air power to ensure success. It can best be achieved through jointmanship furthering the common perceptions of the three Services. The fact that future military ventures in our context will have primacy of ground operations, demands the army's clarity of vision on the subject of jointmanship. Existing army and air force doctrines understandably have single Service biases. In his book titled Defending India, Jaswant Singh, member of Parliament, has noted, "The Army has not fully grasped the value and appropriate employment of air power primarily because the Air Force itself has been ambivalent in its doctrines". 11 Besides, the army and the air force are also known to have contrasting points of view on Prithvi missiles. Similar differing perceptions may also surface once the naval doctrine makes its appearance; on some aspect of amphibious operations, for example. Therefore, the necessity of a Military Doctrine (or a Joint Doctrine) needs no elaboration. There are many reasons for urgency; not the least being the proposed formation of the Strategic Command. The document, ratified by the three Services, could then be instrumental in evolving joint strategy, organisational structures, equipment profiles, communication philosophy, and so on. Pending preparation and promulgation of such a formal paper, the emphasis should be on joint planning. Therein, the army would do well to articulate its professional views and be guided by its long-term necessity to enhance its strategic reach, operational impact, and tactical punch-whether in a conventional setting, proxy war, or counter-insurgency commitment.
Emerging technologies are changing the very nature of war-waging. These have increased battlefield transparency, have speeded up the process of making command decisions, and have enabled pinpoint destruction of targets at long ranges. A write-up in The Economist titled "Select Enemy. Delete" 12 summed it all up. Thus, the army's long-term efforts towards modernisation should encompass the following five issues:
The army's technological visions must take note of our operational conditions and of the emerging capabilities of our potential adversaries.
The aim must be to step up from the present mid-level to the higher plane of technological sophistication. Also to raise the technological threshold in the army.
Considering the cost factor, the process should include the add-ons, software upgrades, and retrofitments while moving on to the next generation of high-tech weapons and systems.
It should promote greater technological interface with the other two Services.
The effort should be to establish a closer relationship with the academia and the corporate sector that have a lead in many of the emerging technologies.
The next aspect of the strategic vision relates to the tricky question of the army's internal commitments. These have steadily increased from a solitary infantry battalion in the mid-Fifties to the present state when many divisions remain committed in J&K and in the northeast. The unenviable task of combatting the proxy war and insurgencies in these parts, fouled by the failed policies, vested political interests, and corruption, has led to near permanence of the army's presence. There were also prolonged commitments in Punjab and in Sri Lanka in the late Eighties and beyond. Indeed, the recourse of 'calling out the army', to aid the civil authorities is resorted to rather readily by the government.
The unhappy situation adversely affects the army's operational efficiency in more ways than one-sucking in reserves, causing operational imbalances, affecting training schedules, and casualties in men and material, to state a few. Most of all, it keeps the army away from its basic task of remaining ready to ward off external threats. Since the current internal situation is also likely to obtain in the next two decades, the army needs to have a long-term strategy to progressively extricate itself from these commitments. Efforts in that direction should revolve around the following:
The government should not only be apprised of the implications-emphatically and repeatedly-but should also be given possible alternatives.
It should be the army's game plan to essentially commit the Rashtriya Rifles in J&K and employ the Assam Rifles in the northeast. Raising, structuring and training of these two organisations in the coming years should sustain this endeavour.
The government should be implored to radically upgrade the capabilities of the Central Police Organisations (CPOs). This has truly been overdue. Besides the usual aspects of upgradations, the CPOs need to be weaned away from their increasing police-like ethos and also need to be freed from the clutches of the bureaucrats. Their moves, deployment, and tasking deserve a far mere professional touch.
The army should seek revision of the existing provisos, as also the enactment of stringent acts to restrict the army's possible and prolonged deployments. For example, any deployment beyond a specific period of time (say, six months, for the sake of argument) should be subject to a debate and approval by the Parliament.
The army's visions cannot afford to overlook the oft raised issues of 'downsizing' prompted by the financial considerations. With the passage of time, and in conformity with the trends worldwide, the demand will get stronger. That having been stated, a closer scrutiny of our operational compulsions is required. The army's commitments of manning the LoC and the disputed borders with China are manpower heavy. Lowering of guard is not an option. Counter-insurgency commitments too are manpower intensive. Then there are flashpoints like Siachen to be attended to and, of course, the strategic reserves must be maintained.
In early 1998, the then Chief of Army Staff (COAS) had announced a suppression of 50,000 personnel to save manpower costs. Efforts to explore other possibilities must never cease. To that end, the concept of TA enjoys many advantages and offers many opportunities. To start with, there is no manpower ceiling on the strength of the TA. The COAS is empowered to embody as many as 84 companies at any one time. TA units gave a promising account of themselves in Sri Lanka and continue to do so in J&K. They can be tasked to perform numerous peace-time duties too-air defence components deployed in Mumbai, or the troops for demonstration purposes in Mhow, could well be TA units, for example. Other than the TA, the technological advancements also offer opportunities to selectively exercise manpower cuts. The overall philosophy must be to 'right size' the army without compromising on operational imperatives.
On the Army's Capabilities
We are already seeing the last century as the 'Bloody Twentieth' that had vast armies fighting ghastly wars, razing cities to the ground, and even resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. Similarly, the closing decades of the present century are sure to record in wonder that even in the first half of the twenty-first century, there were scores of troubled societies that remained engaged, for prolonged periods, in ruthless killings on religious and ethnic grounds. Also that there were many states actually sponsoring proxy wars and terrorism. It is in that era of conflict that we are living now. The preceding text has already outlined the contours of the likely military threats to India and of the possible responses to them. Deriving from these, some macro aspects of the army's desired capabilities are now being reflected upon.
To start with, and to state the obvious, the army must be capable of fighting resolute defensive battles which must form a shield of skillfully delivered blows; whether in the mountains, plains, or deserts. The aggressive content of the defensive battle must enable a quick switchover to the offensive so that the battle can be carried into the enemy territory at the earliest.
In the event of a war, the army should be capable of successfully prosecuting and winning a one-front war. Other constituents of the national power must ensure the setting. Even so, one-front war signifies strategic defence of the other front and, in the context of the restive J&K and northeast, an ability to attend to the insurgency in the theatre of operation.
Past experiences, including the recent one in Kargil, demand an exceedingly high state of operational readiness. The army must be capable of mobilising, and taking to the field at short notice, ready to grapple with a range of possible contingencies under varying terrain conditions. The army's operational orientations, organisational structures and logistic back-up must sustain such eventualities.
Every single inch of our disputed territory is in the high Himalayas. With the exception of the war in 1971, all others were fought mostly in the mountains. That is where troubles should be expected to erupt in the future too. Therefore, to ensure decisive outcomes, the army needs to have larger reserves for the mountains. Indeed, the level and the requirement of offensive formations/capabilities are greater in the mountains than in the plains.
The army must be able to execute inter and intra-theatre moves of reserves and resources to create the desired asymmetry and, thus, keep the enemy on the defensive. In the context of the visualised short duration of wars, speed of action will be critical and must beat that of the enemy.
There are many ways of strategic force projections. Specific to the army, it means capability of fielding a parachute brigade group, and a brigade sized amphibious task force-in concert with the navy and the air force, of course. Both these are considered essential in relation to the out of area contingencies, coalition challenges, and the United Nations peace-keeping missions.
Over a period of the next decade or so, the army's capabilities must include acquisition and assimilation of force multipliers at the operational level. These should include Prithvi missiles, attack helicopters, special/commando forces, heli-lift capabilities for heli-borne operations, a far greater density of surveillance devices and more means of conducting electronic warfare. Similarly, Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C3I) systems must be fully functional in the mountains also.
Lastly, though a nuclear exchange is least likely, the army would do well to selectively strengthen defences, harden communication equipment, and acquire protective gear to operate in such contingencies. At the other end of the conflict spectrum, a justified desire to extricate from the internal commitments notwithstanding, all calculations of the army's capabilities must take note of the existing realities.
The concluding paragraph conveys the complexities and the contradictions of the army's expected range of capabilities. It surely is a daunting task.
Conclusion
Whether in the distant past, or in the decades since independence, we in India have neither taken a long-term view of our security concerns nor evolved a coherent national policy. That is so despite our many experiences of wars and insurgencies. In the absence of any grand strategy, to protect and to further our national interests, the evolution and maturing of the military strategy has suffered. There is a need to identify threats, possible military objectives, range of response options, and, of course, the most purposeful application of military might in consonance with other constituents of national power. More so, since the complexities of a modern war do not lend themselves to easy analyses or solutions. Only well-deliberated visions can help in acquiring the desired capabilities to effectively counter the visualised threats.
Endnotes
Note 1: George K. Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1993) p. 28. Back
Note 2: Jaswant Singh, member of Parliament, National Security: An Outline of Concerns (New Delhi: Lancer Publications, 1996), p. 58. Back
Note 3: Ibid., p. 58. Back
Note 4: Martin van Creveld, On Future War (UK, Brassey's), p. 95. Back
Note 5: Ibid., p. 96. Back
Note 6: Strategy and Force Planning, second edition, edited by Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, Naval War College, Newport, R 1, p. 2. Back
Note 7: Nineteenth Report-Estimates Committee (1992-93), pp. 52-54. Back
Note 8: Michael Howard, "When Are Wars Decisive," Survival, vol. 41, Spring 1999, p. 130. Back
Note 9: Inaugural address by George Fernandes at the national seminar on "The Challenges of Limited War," at India Habitat Centre, January 5, 2000. Back
Note 10: See n. 4, p. 104. Back
Note 11: Jaswant Singh, Defending India (Bangalore: Macmillan India Ltd, 1999), p. 136. Back
Note 12: The Economist, March 8, 1997. Back