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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
Ballistic Missile Defences: Implications for India
Manpreet Sethi, Research Officer, IDSA
Abstract
Given the profound implications of ballistic missile defences (BMD), it is imperative for India to accord adequate thought and attention to the issue. Most countries-not just Russia and China-and including US allies, are sceptical about the efficacy of the BMD and apprehensive about its repercussions on international security and stability. What exactly does the BMD entail? This article attempts to explore some of the major issues that the BMD shall throw up for India and how it can best respond to these developments to maximise the gains and minimise the costs.
One issue that has generated a powerful impule in the international arena is that of the ballistic missile defences (BMD). 1 The US' determination to operationalise a national missile defence (NMD) system to protect itself from errant incoming missiles launched from a state of "proliferation concern", 2 as also a theatre missile defence (TMD) system for its friends and allies in Europe and Asia, threatens to throw the traditional concept of nuclear deterrence out of gear. Its likely impact on the existing international nuclear fabric has compelled nearly every country to take note of this new development and assess the potential ramifications for its own security.
President Bush explained the concept of missile defence in a landmark speech delivered at the National Defence University (NDU) on May 1, 2001. Therein, he described it as a positive development since "deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation." 3 However, not everyone, not even within the US, is convinced of this. Most countries, and not just Russia and China, but also the US allies, are sceptical about the efficacy of the BMD and apprehensive that its repercussions on international security and stability may not be all benign. 4
Given its profound implications, it is of crucial significance that India should accord adequate attention and thought to this issue. President Bush's speech at the NDU that provided a sketchy description of the main planks of the new security framework was, in a rather uncharacteristically quick response, welcomed by the Indian officialdom. However, the initial enthusiasm had waned within a few days as official Indian statements became tempered with greater caution. In fact, by the time of the visit of US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to New Delhi with the stated objective of explaining the broad contours of the US initiative, India had shifted to a more cautious approach. Since then, and as was evident during External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh's visit to Russia in early June 2001, India appears to have further watered down its support for the US proposed global security set-up based on a renunciation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the construction of the NMD. 5
These mood swings within the official corridors tend to be as confusing for the people at home as for other countries wanting to broadly coordinate their positions on the issue. Given Indian aspirations to play a significant role in the international arena, and given the potential of NMD to reshape concepts of global security, it would be only right that the country must arrive at a considered position. In order to do so, India will have to carefully study how the NMD would impact on its own security by prudently examining all the attendant risks that could be generated in the likely responses of China, and, by extension, of Pakistan, the two main security concerns of India.
A methodical analysis of this kind would also better equip India to convey its concerns to the US. Washington has included India in its list of allies and friends with whom it proposes to engage in "real consultations" to discuss the "common responsibility to create a new framework for security and stability that reflects the world of today." 6 It is now up to India to articulate a coherent and well thought out response to the US plan and make use of the 'consultations' to ensure that the new framework that may emerge takes adequate cognisance of India's security concerns.
This would nevertheless require addressing questions such as: What exactly does the BMD entail? How are India's adversaries likely to react to it? Should India be satisfied that the NMD will be accompanied by a reduction in US nuclear forces? Will these reductions necessarily lead to similar cutbacks in the arsenals of others? Would not China respond by increasing the numbers and sophistication of its nuclear arsenal and would this not have an effect on the Indian credible minimum deterrent? Should India extend support to the US initiative even at the risk of an increase in its own threat perceptions? Can India expect the US to come to its rescue in times of need? Should New Delhi endorse the plan for the sake of forging a closer relationship with the US, especially since Indo-US relations are presently on an upswing?
Finding answers to these queries would mean passing through a number of as yet dark alleys. The relative 'newness' of the idea of juxtaposing a defensive framework with a reduction in nuclear arsenals, and its formalisation at a time when international relations are being transformed due to globalisation, the revolutions in military affairs and information technology does not make the task of assessing the possible ramifications of ballistic missile defences any easier. This paper attempts to explore some of the major issues that the BMD shall throw up for India. Divided into six broad sections, the first two provide a brief introduction to the present strategic context in which missile defences are being projected by the US as the most viable means of meeting the emerging threats to international security. The next three sections provide a deeper insight into the likely effects it would have on the regional and international nuclear landscape from a primarily Indian perspective. The conclusion as the last section, then sums up how India could best respond to these developments in order to maximise gains and minimise costs.
The Context
On May 1, 2001, US President George Bush, Jr., belaboured to drive home a point. "Today, the sun comes up on a vastly different world. The wall is gone and so is the Soviet Union...Yet, this is still a dangerous world, a less certain, a less predictable one." 7 Indeed, with the disappearance of the Iron Curtain, the US world view has changed dramatically. For nearly 40 long years, Communist Soviet Union, with its formidable conventional and nuclear might, had remained the single most crucial defining feature for the United States. All its policies-security, military, political and economic-had hinged on two objectives: one, to undercut Soviet influence where it existed: and the second, to prevent it from spreading to newer regions. In the face of the Soviet threat, all others paled into insignificance and appeared inconsequential.
However, the dissipation of the USSR and an improvement in strategic relations between the US and Russia have now freed the US enough to dwell upon other issues of concern. It has since discovered new threats to the security of its homeland as also to that of its allies. The most palpable and real among these is believed to be the threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including missiles capable of threatening the American mainland. A bipartisan commission instituted in the second half of the 1990s reported that "the threat to the US posed by these emerging (missile) technologies is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the Intelligence Community." 8 The commission, known more commonly as the Rumsfeld Commission, after its chair, Donald Rumsfeld, who is now the secretary of defence in the Bush Administration, identified countries such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Libya as states of proliferation concern. Its findings that were put out in July 1998 appeared to have been vindicated when within weeks of the report, North Korea, in a surprise move, test-fired a long-range version of its Taepo Dong 1 missile on August 31, 1998.
While it may take several years before Pyongyang, 9 or Tehran or Baghdad, would be able to deploy operational missiles capable of striking the US mainland, spread of WMD technologies to these countries which are not particularly friendly to the US and which Washington describes as the "world's least responsible states" 10 is being perceived as the biggest threat to the country and its allies. This then, has prompted the US to reorient its national security strategy from one that was geared to meet the threat from a huge Soviet arsenal to one that seeks to provide protection against states that might have a "small number of missiles", but "for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life." 11
Of course, every country has the right to undertake periodic threat assessments and arrive at means that it considers the most appropriate to defend itself. 12 During the years of the Cold War, when the two superpowers were nuclear armed to the teeth, offence was deemed as the best form of defence. Mutual vulnerability was considered crucial to hold nuclear deterrence in place since the near-certainty of assured destruction was sure to keep the use of nuclear weapons in check. However, with the change in the nature of threats, the US has perceived a need to change the nature of its security strategy from purely offence to a mix of offence and defence. During his term, President Clinton signed this into law as the National Missile Defence Act. It confirmed the US policy to "deploy, as soon as it is technologically possible, an effective National Missile Defence system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack." 13 Since moving into the White House, President Bush has lent complete support to the NMD and in his speech rendered at the NDU in May 2001, declared it the cornerstone of future US security strategy.
The emphasis now is on constructing a new security paradigm. As President Bush put it, "We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces." 14 He has hinted at three main planks of the new security architecture: active non-proliferation; counter-proliferation; and defences. The amount of importance that is accorded to each of these and how they are pursued is, however, still not clear. As far as non-proliferation is concerned, it has been a long held objective of the US. It has been pursued through the establishment of regimes such as the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Nevertheless, the success record of the regime is not blemish free. Rather, it is perhaps a failure of the NPT that the nuclear weapons and/or their technologies have today become available with countries that are non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) parties to the treaty, and hence legitimately prohibited from acquiring or developing the same. In fact, the acquisition or development of WMD technologies has been largely a result of collusion of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) themselves. Selective proliferation has been blatantly pursued by some of the NWS, leading to the contemporary situation in which the US now perceives a threat from the small WMD capabilities of states, all of which, ironically, are NNWS of the NPT. This raises the fundamental question of whether the NPT, in spite of its permanent extension, will prevent future proliferation, considering that 187 countries are members of the treaty and only four (three of them nuclear anyway) are outside it? As regards the CTBT, the denial of ratification to it by the US Senate has virtually spelt its death knell. 15 The FMCT is nowhere near conclusion. In fact, negotiations remain stalled mainly owing to the different perceptions of how the NMD would eventually lead to the next phase of militarisation of outer space. 16 In this context, what direction future US non-proliferation initiatives will take remains unclear.
Neither is the strategy of counter-proliferation in place. While the concept has been doing the rounds of the US strategic circles from the early 1990s, counter-proliferation is still fluid and vaguely defined. It basically encompasses a fight against proliferation through the launch of preemptive strikes aimed at a surgical removal of WMD facilities of a country perceived to be an enemy of the US. The initiative assumes that offensive military operations can neutralise or roll back the threat of strategic weapons proliferation. However, the two main operations that sought to apply the strategy of counter-proliferation in the late 1990s are not considered clear successes. In 1998, US cruise missiles were fired against a suspected Sudanese chemical weapons plant that later was discovered to be a pharmaceutical factory. Similarly, US attacks against Iraqi chemical, biological and missile production plants have still not enabled the US to confidently assert that the threat from Iraq has been completely neutralised. 17
Hence, given the limited efficacy of the strategy and the possibility of its implementation on false assumptions, it arouses scepticism, and even apprehension, amongst other countries. In the US Administration, a Counter-Proliferation Directorate continues to function, though the exact contours of its mission, modus operandi, etc remain vague. How these will be fleshed out under the new Bush initiative is not yet clear since, for the moment, all attention appears to be focussed on missile defences.
Missile Defences
Predominant wisdom on missile defences during the Cold War years was based on two broad assumptions. One, that a national missile shield that could blunt a large-scale attack had a destabilising influence on the strategic balance. Hence, it increased the risk of war and eroded one's faith in one's own nuclear deterrent. In other words, it carried the risk of one country triggering off a war because it felt secure under its own missile cover and not afraid of retaliation. 18 Second, it was presumed that the deployment of such defence systems would trigger an arms race in the upgradation of offensive capabilities in a bid to attack the other's perceived sense of invulnerability. 19 Besides, these two assumptions, of course, on another front, the technological feasibility of the BMD was also in doubt, especially since the threat to be catered for was not a country with a few missiles but the USSR that had thousands of warheads and a formidable delivery capability. Then, in view of the technical challenge and the immense costs it would have involved, Washington preferred deterrence to defence.
It was in the context of these parameters that the US and the erstwhile USSR had signed the ABM Treaty in 1972. It prohibited the deployment of strategically significant ballistic missile defences that could erode the other's nuclear deterrent. Both sides agreed to remain mutually vulnerable to each other's nuclear weaponry and hoped that this would prevent a nuclear exchange. Of course, Article III of the treaty permitted each side to deploy an ABM system at two sites (later amended to one site in 1974), each limited to 100 interceptors. During the years of the Cold War that were marked by a lack of trust on either side about the other's intentions, this treaty did serve its purpose.
However, in the present context, three main developments are cited by US strategic experts as providing reason enough for a rethink on the ABM Treaty. The first is the end of the period of hostility between the US and USSR and the gradual blossoming of a cooperative relationship. This development has, in turn, timed well with the emergence of WMD threats from smaller arsenals in rogue states. As the Rumsfeld Commission concluded, "A new strategic environment now gives emerging ballistic missile powers the capacity, through a combination of domestic development and foreign assistance, to acquire the means to strike (the US) within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability (ten years in the case of Iraq)." 20 The prospective missile arsenals of these countries can only be modest, in low, two-digit numbers. These can then be neutralised by an NMD, especially since there have been advancements in missile defence technologies that now make it possible to effectively blunt these threats better than in the past. Naturally then, the US Administration sees sense in deploying this latest technology to address its threat perceptions. It can be expected to safeguard the US' freedom of action even in the face of coercive missile threats from smaller regional powers, and also be a protective shield in case deterrence fails.
Consequently, in the new post-Cold War context, the concept of NMD has reemerged in a transformed strategic environment, with a new mission, against a new kind of a threat, and equipped with newer advancements in technology. It is also much less ambitious compared to what President Reagan had envisaged in the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) in the 1980s. Recognising the limitations of technology, the current NMD system seeks to protect the US against only a small-scale missile attack of no more than a few warheads.
Even this may not be easy and guaranteed. While the Pentagon has demonstrated the basic feasibility of the hit-to-kill concept, not all tests have succeeded in intercepting an incoming missile. Several technical problems still underlie an effective NMD system 21 that would be required to detect an offensive missile launch, track the missile in flight and finally intercept and destroy the missile or the warhead(s). The director of the US Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation, General Ronald Kamish, has stated that the technologies presently under development will only be able to defend against incoming missiles in their terminal stages. 22 However, the US hopes that by the first quarter of this new century, the country would have mastered the capability to build sophisticated ground-based radars as well as a new space-based missile tracking system that would be able to kill an enemy missile mid-course while it is still cruising towards the target.
India's Concerns
Even as the US remains engaged in the research and development of a sophisticated NMD, other countries will have to be concerned about what these advances would mean for nuclear deterrence in general, and their national security in particular. From the Indian perspective, it is essential to look at two issues:
(a)Whether India shares the US' threat perceptions?
(b)Whether India considers the US' modus operandi as the best way of dealing with these threats?
Significantly, countries that have been enumerated as states of proliferation concern by the US are not essentially perceived as posing any direct threat to India. India's security concerns primarily emanate from its own neighbourhood. In fact, India happens to be in a region where WMD proliferation has been an acute and worrisome reality for several decades now. China has been in possession of a fairly sophisticated WMD arsenal for the past several decades. For India, this has constantly been a source of insecurity, especially given the fact that China lays claims to thousands of square kilometres of Indian territory, and border disputes persist. Moreover, India has always been conscious of the growing imbalance of power in Asia due to the rise of an increasingly politically vocal, economically powerful and militarily assertive China and a relative decline in the economic and military strength of Russia and Japan.
Until 1998, when India finally decided to exercise its nuclear option in favour of weaponisation, the India-China relationship had existed as one that had nothing in common with that of mutual assured destruction (MAD) that the US had with the USSR. From the second half of the 1960s to the latter half of the 1990s, India had lived wth the fear of a nuclear capability, deliverable not only from its eastern but its western side as well. In fact, the threat from China was further compounded by its lack of compunctions about transferring its WMD weaponry and technology to other states, especially Pakistan, for commercial and strategic gains. Given the turbulent and traumatic history of partition and the continuing border disputes, India-Pakistan relations have never been smooth. In an astute move, China has sought to exploit this situation by setting up a thriving nuclear and missile nexus with Pakistan. In fact, it is owing to this collaboration that Pakistan is estimated in some quarters as having a comparatively surer delivery capability for a modest nuclear arsenal. 23
Placed in a scenario such as this, sandwiched between two adversaries that work in close strategic collaboration and confronted with real missile threats, if there is any country that needs an NMD, it is India. However, it has never had the luxury of the requisite financial resources, nor the technological capability to pursue dedicated research and development in this field. In fact, to aspire for one through indigenous development would be unrealistic, at least over the next two-three decades, given India's financial and technological constraints. At the same time, to believe that the US shall be ready to put a missile shield over India on account of the improving Indo-US relations would smack of naivete. Despite spending billions of dollars, the US still faces serious technical difficulties with its NMD system. The risk of its frustration by counter-measures such as firing a barrage of missiles rather than one or two at a time, concealing the warhead by simultaneously releasing dozens of decoys or even cooling the warhead's nose cone with liquid nitrogen to foil heat sensors, etc. are practical problems that are yet to be surmounted. Even more significantly, any protective TMD system that the US may venture to establish over India will have to be technologically even more sophisticated since it shall have to provide protection against short, medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles that are faster and have shorter trajectories. Naturally, this translates into lesser response time, making their interception even more difficult.
Apart from the technical problems, politico-strategic reasons would also stand in the way of an Indian acceptance of a BMD system from the US. To have itself placed under such a system would essentially mean supporting and sustaining unipolarity. Of course, economically it could make sense to avail of the US offer, when and if ever it comes. But surely the US would extract a price for the protective umbrella, perhaps in terms of a blanket Indian endorsement for all its initiatives as the only globocop. Having transformed itself into an invulnerable state, through an NMD coupled with a policy of counter-proliferation, it is not unthinkable that there could be a natural increase in the American tendency to arbitrarily and unilaterally intervene in the affairs of other states. Iraq and Yugoslavia already represent two instances in which the US chose to act without UN authorisation.
Naturally, this is viewed as a disturbing trend by all the major powers. Indeed, its implications are not lost on Russia that fears a possible US intervention in Chechnya, nor on China that fears US policy on Taiwan. The trend can be no less worrisome for India especially in the context of Kashmir. US officials have not shied away from referring to Kashmir as a "dangerous nuclear flashpoint". While at present, Indo-US relations are inclined towards mutual respect and friendship, there is nothing to suggest that the relations might not sour at some point in the future, as has happened in the past. It should also be remembered that despite its occasional criticism of Pakistani abetment of militant activities in Kashmir, the US has always stopped short of declaring it a rogue state.
India and the US do not necessarily share congruent threat perceptions. In fact, India must maintain that its security lies in a polycentric world order in which each country has sufficient space for action and manoeuvrability. An issue-based alignment with the US on a case-to-case basis would be a sensible policy to follow instead of providing a blanket endorsement to the US for all its actions in return for a not even absolutely foolproof BMD system. India would also do well to remember that even long-time allies of the US have periodically been troubled by the thought of an eventual US isolationism that could leave them to fend for themselves. In Europe especially, the NMD has elicited several such expressions of concern. The prospect of a "Fortress America" has, in fact, led some of these countries to buttress their own security systems. A number of European countries are engaged in research and development of TMD systems. There is every likelihood that Europe's nascent TMD systems could be drawn into an overarching global BMD system as is being considered by the Bush Administration. However, it would be naïve to expect in the near future a similar deployment over that part of Asia of which India is a constituent.
Therefore, it might be best for India to continue to be militarily self-reliant, to whatever extent possible. It is already engaged in the process of building a credible minimum nuclear deterrent. This process, in the present context, must accord due importance to two factors: the Chinese response to NMD; and the impact of NMD on non-proliferation and disarmament at the global level.
The Chinese Response
For most strategic analysts in the US, the NMD has largely been viewed as being of concern only to the Russians. Given the fact that the NMD deployment requires an amendment or abrogation of the ABM Treaty, a bilateral agreement between the US and Russia, the focus has mostly been on reaching some sort of an accommodation with Moscow on the issue. 24 China has received little attention in this context. However, China has itself lost no time in factoring the US NMD into its strategic and security calculations. Extremely conscious of the adverse impact that a reliable missile defence would have on its small strategic deterrent missile force, China's official stance vehemently opposes the NMD/TMD. In fact, China's strategy in this regard encompasses three main elements-enhancement of its nuclear deterrence capabilities through military modernisation; alignment with like-minded countries; and, increase in its bargaining power by holding out threats of proliferation of WMD technologies to countries perceived as states of concern by the US.
China realises that even a limited US missile defence has the potential to undercut its nuclear deterrent. With a limited ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) force of only about 20 missiles, China looks upon the US plans of NMD deployment as having the potential to severely constrain its ability to deter the US. With the NMD, Americans are likely to be freed of the fear of Chinese retaliation since the shield would be able to cater for the small number of Chinese nuclear weapons that might survive a US first strike. This, from the Chinese perspective, disturbs strategic stability and cannot be a welcome prospect, given the disputed status of Taiwan.
Mindful of the 1958 Taiwan crisis, Beijing is averse to any eventuality in which its nuclear vulnerability is exposed and it is left without a retaliatory option. If the US were to become immune to Chinese missiles, it would erode the effectiveness of Chinese nuclear forces and handicap Beijing's use of force against Taiwan, if and ever required, to achieve its reunification. This is perceived by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as a major erosion of its power projection capabilities. Having faced the threat of the use of nuclear weapons in the 1950s, first during the Korean War and then during the Taiwan Strait crisis, the Chinese decision to acquire a demonstrated nuclear capability in 1964 stemmed from a desire to "oppose the US imperialist policy of nuclear blackmail and threats..." 25
Therefore, an NMD that threatens to curtail Chinese manoeuvrability by virtually disarming it would most likely be met by an increase in the number, sophistication and survivability of missiles in order to saturate US defences. In any case, China's military is engaged in an ambitious programme of nuclear and missile modernisation. Research and development is on to graduate to a new generation of solid fuelled, multiple warhead and road-mobile missiles. The first of these new missiles, the Dong Feng 31, was tested in July 1999, and efforts are being concentrated in this direction to improve the chances of survivability of these missiles. A US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) revealed in August 2000 that China could decide to deploy upto 200 ICBMs by 2015. 26 China is also believed to be using the Global Positioning System (GPS) to make significant improvement in the accuracy of its missiles. It has also reached agreement to share the Russian space-based Global Navigation Satellite System. 27 In fact, on the issue of the NMD, Russia and China find themselves on the same side of the fence. At regularly held meetings, both have decried the US move. Russian arms sales to China have increased and so has bilateral trade. All these developments seek to strengthen Beijing's hand, economically, politically and diplomatically.
In fact, it should be expected that China would use every tool to meet the perceived threat from the NMD. And yet, its actions could prove wrong those who believe that the actual motive of the NMD may be to pull China into an arms race that would bring upon it economic ruin as happened in the case of the USSR. Two factors negate such a possibility. One, Chinese shrewdness and understanding of international relations; and two, the $100 billion worth trade with the USA. In the light of these two realities, it would be naïve to assume that the Chinese would fall into such a trap. Rather, it should be expected that they would use other means to shore up their defences.
Apart from the steps taken to directly bridge the missile gap with the US, it is also highly probable that Beijing would craft its responses along different lines. For instance, China has hinted at becoming more belligerent and less cooperative on a range of non-proliferation and arms control issues. The Chinese ambassador revealed as much when he said that China will be "uncooperative in all multi- and bilateral arms control fora if the US proceeds with NMD". 28 While this should be of concern to the international community in general, the matter acquires greater significance for India, given the close Sino-Pak nuclear and missile nexus. In any case, Beijing is acknowledged to have a long history of selling nuclear and ballistic missile technology to other countries. But, with reference to the NMD, China has not hesitated to openly state that in a bid to restore the strategic balance disturbed by the NMD, it shall be compelled to reconsider its approach and subscription to all arms control and non-proliferation agreements.
Proliferation could then well be on the anvil. Apart from the purely strategic reasons, commercial considerations may also dictate such a policy. The development of sophisticated counter-measures or an NMD resistant system would call for a substantial influx of finances that would impose a strain on the country's economy. In order to recover some of these costs, China could see economic (as well as strategic) sense in selling the relatively older technologies to other countries. In any case, China has never let any international agreement stand in the way of such transfer. If it so desires in the future, the NMD, in fact, shall provide it with a perfect excuse to proliferate with impunity. As Brahma Chellaney writes citing an intelligence report from the Pentagon, "Beijing has found ingenious ways to proliferate 'on a consistent basis without technically breaking agreements with the (United States).'" 29
On another front, the Chinese strategy of dealing with the NMD has involved criticising it at every international forum for its potential impact on global security and stability. The possibility of an upgradation of the NMD to facilitate an eventual deployment of space-based assets has caused maximum concern to China. Consequently, Chinese spokespersons have elaborately spelt out the dangers from militarisation of outer space at every international and bilateral discussion. In fact, negotiations for the conclusion of an FMCT remain stalled owing to China's insistence that an ad hoc committee be instituted to simultaneously consider the issue of prevention of arms race in outer space (PAROS). China could also be keeping its option open with regard to accumulating more fissile material in case the NMD requires it to increase its arsenal. Similarly, the need to develop counter-measures such as manoeuvring warheads could make Beijing opt out of the CTBT and conduct the necessary tests. 30
The US may not feel the need to be unduly concerned with these developments in China since even a ten or twenty-fold increase in the Chinese ICBM force would not alter the strategic balance with Washington in Beijing's favour. But, from the Indian point of view, any increase in Chinese missiles, even if of limited or no value for Washington, would, however, carry ominous portents for the region. In any case, China has never hidden its intention or desire to play a more dominant role in Asia, and the upgradation of its missile force shall only add to this capability. At this point of time, the nuclear balance is tilted in favour of China, even as India is struggling to build a credible minimum deterrent. China's nuclear modernisation plans that seek to replace its ageing, liquid-fuelled, cave and silo-based missiles with newer solid-fuelled, mobile missiles with shorter launch preparation period, or attempts to MIRV the existing arsenal, or to develop counter-measures can only add to India's insecurities, at least until such time as the neighbours resolve their border differences and embark upon meaningful nuclear confidence building measures.
In any case, the Chinese are engaged in a process of military modernisation. While some argue that this process is going to run its course independent of the US plans on the NMD, 31 an important difference must be kept in mind. Had the Chinese been engaged in the modernisation of their conventional and nuclear forces at a time when the international security environment had been one of relative stability, it would have been perceived as an aggressive act, certain to invite criticism from others. But, with the Chinese activity taking place at a time when the prospect of NMD deployment looms large, the former appears to have gained a measure of legitimacy. It is as if the NMD has provided a useful shield to Beijing to carry on with its military modernisation, a development that India's security establishment shall have to take due note of.
Reflections on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
President Bush claims that "defences can strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for proliferation." The logic that underlines this argument is that since enemy missiles shall not be able to penetrate the missile shield, with the passage of time, countries shall sense lesser and lesser utility in such weapons. The argument, acceptable on face value, has many other facets, beyond the scope of this paper, that need to be reflected upon. Suffice to say that the overall impact of the NMD on global non-proliferation trends does not appear to be a reassuring one. By the time BMD systems are perfected to meet the threats perceived today, the threats themselves could have altered in nature, gravity or complexion. Of course, it is not the intention of the article to undermine or underestimate the possible technological breakthroughs that might be achieved in the coming years, but to question whether trudging down this path would not lead to the makings of new threats. Suspicious attitudes and actions premised on mistrust can naturally be expected to breed more of the same. American threat perceptions that are prompting it to build a missile shield could end up upsetting existing international security arrangements and fostering a worldwide lack of confidence. And yet, despite causing so much turbulence, the shield may not act with a credible guarantee of the possibility of every missile being neutralised well in time.
At another level, President Bush has held out a sop of sorts for the campaigners of disarmament by announcing that he would follow up NMD deployment with a change in the size, composition and character of US nuclear forces. While this would have been a laudable objective by itself, coupled as it is with the NMD, it loses much of its value since the reduction in the US nuclear arsenal is unlikely to be seen as a case of "lead(ing) by example" by the others. Neither Russia, nor China is likely to be impressed by these reductions. These cutbacks are rather representative of a rationalisation of the US nuclear forces and not part of any strategy that envisages the elimination of nuclear weapons over time. With a protective missile shield in place, there would be little need for the US to maintain the huge stockpiles that now exist. The same, however, may not hold valid for Russia and China. As has been discussed in an earlier section of this paper, China, in the wake of the NMD, is more prone to feel the need to refurbish and expand its nuclear forces in order to restore a semblance of strategic stability vis-à-vis the US. Russia too, though presently constrained by its economic conditions to maintain even the present level of its nuclear forces, may feel compelled by the NMD to retain a larger stockpile by going back on its committed reductions under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II and even re-MIRVing its existing missiles. In fact, President Putin has hinted that doing so would rather allow Russia to "maintain its deterrent more economically".
Meanwhile, US reduction of its nuclear weapons cannot mean anything significant from the nuclear disarmament perspective. It is a move designed purely on the basis of national interest and cannot contribute to international stability in any significant way, at least not for Indian security. Rather, the very fact that the president should have spoken of nuclear reduction while maintaining that "nuclear weapons still have a vital role to play in our security and that of our allies" negates any positive signal that it could have been meant to send. While the erection of a defence system might be a technologically and economically challenging prospect, acquiring the sword would be much easier. Therefore, by raising insecurities, the BMD systems may instead trigger an increase in the global count of nuclear weapons and their delivery mechanisms.
Conclusion
The US missile defence initiative encompasses a number of moves. Considered individually, not all of them have negative overtones. For instance, it seeks to build a cooperative world order premised at some time in the future on 'joint defence' or collective security. It envisages a move away from the Cold War logic of nuclear deterrence. It also embodies a reduction in US nuclear forces.
However, when considered holistically as a package, most of these moves lose their positive sheen. The cooperative world order is to be formalised (and, hence, polarised) between those whom the US considers as its friends and allies and those that it does not. Actions against or in favour of them shall be controlled by the US, thereby reinforcing unipolarity. Then, the alleged move away from nuclear deterrence envisages a shift towards missile defences and not elimination of nuclear weapons. In fact, to view it from the perspective of nuclear disarmament would amount to missing the trees for the wood. Rather, it may actually exacerbate insecurities and prove more detrimental to international stability than one based on a balance of terror.
Thus, the implications of BMD are many. It will definitely set into motion an action-reaction process, the ripples of which are not likely to leave Indian shores untouched. Therefore, any cooperation, material or conceptual, that New Delhi agrees to extend to the US plan must be carefully weighed against the costs-tangible and intangible-that it might accumulate in the process of helping the US deal with its own threat perceptions.
Through the NMD, the US is certainly seeking freedom of military action. As President Nixon had said even at the time of the ABM Treaty, "If you have a shield, it is easier to use the sword". 32 Meanwhile, the US is also investing its resources in sharpening the sword through constant research and development in its offensive military capabilities. Security in offence and defence would most likely give a boost to unilateralism. In doing so, however, the signal being received by some countries (especially China) is that the US is insensitive to its concerns or interests-a feeling that could foster a confrontational world order. Such a scenario shall be counter-productive for India and force it to invest undue resources on activities other than economic development that must be its present priority.
In the ultimate analysis, it must be reiterated that for India, as also for the rest of the world, a guarantee of absolute security lies not in erecting missile defences that could still be penetrated, but in doing away with the threat of nuclear weapons in toto. As French President Jacques Chirac has warned:
If you look at world history, ever since men began waging war, you will see that there's a permanent race between sword and shield. The sword always wins. The more improvements are made in the shield, the more improvements are made to the sword. We think that with these systems we are just going to spur swordmakers to intensify their efforts. 33
An effective end to this protracted cycle can be found in measures that devalue and delegitimise these WMD and thereby reduce their salience and acceptability in the international community. The true answer lies in helping engender an international climate in which countries become less dependent on their military prowess and, therefore, less inclined to use missiles in the first place.
Endnotes
Note 1: BMD is like an umbrella concept that encompasses both the NMD and the TMD. While the former aims at protecting the continental US from a limited missile attack, the latter seeks to provide protection to forward deployed troops and naval fleets against short range, medium range and intermediate range ballistic missiles. The Bush Administration, however, no longer makes any clear distinction between the NMD and the TMD. As the US secretary of defence has said, "...I have concluded that 'national' and 'theater' are words that are not useful...What's national depends on where you live, and what's theater depends on where you live," Mark Bromley, "European Missile Defence: New Emphasis, New Roles," BASIC Paper no. 36, May 2001 http://www.basic.int.org Back
Note 2: North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya are generally referred to as the states of proliferation concern by the USA. Back
Note 3: President Bush's speech on missile defence, delivered at the NDU, Washington, May 1, 2001, and as available on http://www.acronym.org.uk Back
Note 4: Soon after his speech at the NDU, President Bush despatched senior officials from his Administration to the capitals of major countries, including Moscow, Beijing, London and New Delhi in order to brief them on the proposed NMD initiative. However, it has since been disclosed that the whirlwind tour of the US representatives has not brought any positive tidings for the US plan of creating a new framework for strategic thinking on nuclear deterrence. See Proliferation News at http://ceip.org Back
Note 5: Vladimir Radyuhin, "Russia 'Sways' India on ABM Treaty," The Hindu, June 7, 2001, p. 11. Back
Note 6: Ibid. Back
Note 7: Ibid. Back
Note 8: Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, July 15, 1998, p. 1. As available on http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm. It may be recalled that during the mid-1990s, the US NIEs had downplayed any new missile threat to the country. In November 1995, the NIE had noted that North Korea was unlikely to obtain the technological capability to develop a long range ICBM that could threaten the US heartland, and that there was an even lesser chance of Iran or Iraq developing such a capability. Back
Note 9: As of now, North Korea's nuclear programme remains frozen and the Clinton Administration was able to dissuade Pyongyang from testing the Taepo Dong 2. In return for the lifting of some US economic sanctions, North Korea had agreed to halt its missiles tests in September 1999, at least till such time as "the talks (with the US) are underway." See Kathryn Tolbert, "North Korea Confirms it will not Test Missile", Washington Post, September 25, 1999. Back
Note 10: President Bush's speech, n. 1. Back
Note 11: Ibid. Back
Note 12: Indeed, it was one such assessment of the threats to its security that had led India to conduct nuclear tests in May 1998, after 25 years of nuclear restraint. Back
Note 13: Public Law 106-38, July 22, 1999. As quoted in Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Goldgeier and James M. Lindsay, "Deploying NMD: Not Whether, But How," Suvival, vol. 42, no. 1, Spring 2000, p. 10. Back
Note 14: President Bush's speech, n. 1. Emphasis added. Back
Note 15: For more on this, see Manpreet Sethi, "CTBT and Indian Options," Strategic Analysis, vol. XXIV, no. 6, September 2000. Back
Note 16: Details on the state of this treaty can be found in Manpreet Sethi, "The Fissile Material Cut-off Debate," Strategic Analysis, vol. XXII, no. 9, December 1998. Back
Note 17: Henry D. Sokoloski, "Counter-Proliferation", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March-April 2001, p. 63. Back
Note 18: The idea that the "rejection of the nuclear shield made the nuclear sword less dangerous" has echoed in several writings. For a more recent articulation, see Igor Ivanov, "The Missile Defence Mistake," Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 5, September-October 2000. Back
Note 19: For more on both these viewpoints, see Keith B. Payne, "Looming Security Threats: The Case for NMD," Orbis, Spring 2000, p. 189. Back
Note 20: Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the US, Executive Summary, July 15, 1998. Back
Note 21: Some American scientists have cynically observed that "the probability of the NMD coming into force in the next few years is only moderately higher than a snowflake's chance in hell." V. Sudarshan and Yukteshwar Kumar, "The Triangle", Outlook, May 21, 2001, p. 44. Back
Note 22: "US Missile Defence Director Cites Progress, Challenges," a Washington File report as cited in Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 55, March 2001. Back
Note 23: NBC news report, June 2000. Back
Note 24: For an interesting Russian perspective on NMD, see Ivan Safrunchuk, "Russian Views on Missile Defences," Pugwash Occasional Papers, vol. 2, no. 2, March 2001, pp. 32-43. Back
Note 25: Official Chinese statements as cited in John Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 241-242 and quoted by Michael McDevitt, "Beijing's Bind," Washington Quarterly, Summer 2000, p. 181. Back
Note 26: A New York Times, report cited by Charles D. Ferguson and John E. Pike, "Will Missile Defence Shoot Down Arms Control?", Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Digest), vol. 5, no. 4, Fall 2000. Back
Note 27: McDevitt, n. 25. Back
Note 28: Ambassador Hu Xiaodi's statement at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as quoted by Sverre Lodgaard, "European Views of the US NMD Programme", Pugwash Occasional Papers, vol. 2, no. 2, March 2001, p. 50. Back
Note 29: Brahma Chellaney, "New Delhi's Dilemma," Washington Quarterly, Summer 2000, p. 149. Back
Note 30: Li Bin, "Impact of US NMD on Chinese Nuclear Modernisation," Pugwash Occasional Papers, vol. 2, no. 3, June 2001, p. 67. Back
Note 31: See Brad Roberts, "US Ballistic Missile Defence: Implications for Asia," in Jasjit Singh, ed., Reshaping Asian Security (New Delhi: IDSA, 2001). Back
Note 32: Lodgaard, n. 28, p. 52. Back
Note 33: New York Times, December 17, 1999. Back