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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
The Kashmir Policy of the United States: A Study of the Perceptions, Conflicts and Dilemmas
Parama Sinha Palit, Researcher, IDSA
Abstract
The Kashmir dispute has been one of the most important factors in determining the balance of power in South Asia after World War II. The American views on Kashmir have been shaped by a variety of regional interests pursued by the US in South Asia. Changing circumstances have given birth to new US perspectives, which have often been at variance with each other. This paper focusses upon the conflicts and contradictions typifying the Kashmir policy of the US over a span of slightly over five decades, subsequent to the partition of the Indian subcontinent. Different developments in the South Asian region, impacting on the US perceptions and evoking the changing views, have been chronicled in this paper from a historical standpoint.
Introduction
Historically, the two largest democracies, the United States of America and India, have not been the closest of partners. Among other issues, the controversies over Kashmir have been one of the major sources of discord between the two countries. American views on Kashmir have been consistent in their inconsistency. Changing circumstances have shaped the diverse views, with new priorities replacing the old ones.
The roots of the conflicting perceptions between India and the US on Kashmir lie in the Cold War, the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, and the changing nature of the US relations with India and Pakistan. One of the fallouts of the territorial division was the controversy over the status of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Initially, the US was reluctant to get involved in the contention, and avoided supporting either India or Pakistan. But the evolving Cold War with the Soviet Union in Iran, Turkey and West Asia forced the US to review the significance of South Asia. With India identified as 'neutral' in the Cold War and increasingly friendly towards the Soviet Union, Pakistan became the focus of American partnership in the strategically vital Southwest Asia abutting the Gulf, Soviet Central Asia, China and India. Cultivating friendship with Pakistan implied protection of Anglo-American interests in the oil-rich Persian Gulf-the principal goal of British and American policy.
This paper reviews the changing US perceptions on Kashmir in the history of independent India. It argues that while the US has traditionally been reluctant to appreciate the Indian concerns on Kashmir due to its strategic alliance with Pakistan through the Cold War years, there has been a gradual change in the US attitude, especially during, and since, the Clinton visit in 2000. The change has been brought about by the end of the Cold War and associated strategic considerations, the emergence of India as a commercially significant entity, the nuclear tests of 1998, and the growing concern in India and the US about terrorism as a serious security threat.
US Perceptions on Kashmir
(a) 1947-1972: The Growth of the Conflict
Kashmir was tainted with controversy right from the time the accession of states was being decided on the eve of India's independence. The British government gave 565 princely states under its suzerainty the option of joining either India or Pakistan. Kashmir, however, was unique in its complexities. It was Muslim dominated, yet ruled by a Hindu king, Maharaja Hari Singh. The Muslims were in a majority in the Kashmir Valley (95 per cent), while the Hindus dominated Jammu (about 67 per cent), and the Buddhists, Ladakh. 1 Linguistically too, the state was divided into distinct groups in the various regions-Dogri in Jammu, Kashmiri in the Valley, Ladakhi, and other dialects in the Northern areas, Kargil, etc. Initially, the maharaja toyed with the idea of maintaining some kind of independent status for the state. Accordingly, even after India's independence in August 1947, Kashmir did not join either India or Pakistan, and instead entered into a Standstill Agreement till a formal decision on accession was taken. 2
But Pakistan was desperate to consolidate its identity by incorporating the state. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the governor general of Pakistan, ordered an economic blockade in August 1947, to force Kashmir to fall in line. Following the failure of the move, in October that year, Pakistan dispatched armed Pathan tribesmen from its North-West Frontier Province into Kashmir to forcibly annex it in violation of the Standstill Agreement then in force between Kashmir, and India and Pakistan. With the invading and pillaging forces threatening to enter Srinagar, Maharaja Hari Singh was compelled to solicit Indian support. However, India was unwilling to intervene in the internal affairs of J&K as long as it did not accede to it, thereby conferring upon India the sovereign right to protect its integrity and thwart the invasion. Strongly backed by Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference Party-the state's most popular political forum that had waged a long and tenuous struggle against the feudal regime of the Dogra kings-and facing a national calamity as the marauders threatened to sweep through the Valley, Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession in favour of India. In return, India agreed to protect it from Pakistani aggression. 3
The developments constituted the first major crisis of the newly divided Indian subcontinent. They also paved the way for UN intervention in the matter, the first in the series of several more in the future. The issue of 'wishes of the people' introduced by Nehru and Mountbatten was submitted at the UN for the latter's mandate. The salient clauses of the UN Security Council's Kashmir Resolution (1948) are indicated below:
Restoration of Peace and Order:
1 The Govt. of Pakistan should undertake to use its best endeavours:
(a)To secure the withdrawal from the State of J&K of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting and to prevent any intrusion into the State of such elements and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in the State.
2 The Govt. of India should:
(a)When it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in accordance with the Council's Resolution of January 20 that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective, put into operation, in consultation with the Commission, a plan for withdrawing their own forces from J&K and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of Law and Order.
(c)When the Indian forces shall have been reduced to the minimum strength mentioned in (a) above, arrange in consultation with the Commission for the stationing of the following principles:
(i)That the presence of troops should not afford any intimidation to the inhabitants of the State.
(ii)That as small a number as possible should be retained in forward areas.
(iii)That any reserve of troops, which may be included in the total strength, should be located within their present base area.
3 The Govt. of India should agree that until such time as the Plebiscite Administration referred to below finds it necessary to exercise the power of direction and supervision over the State forces and police provided for in Paragraph 8, they will be held in areas to be agreed upon with the Plebiscite Administration. 4
The 1947 war created the ground for superpower rivalry in the subcontinent. The tensions of partition between India and Pakistan had made the region vulnerable to external influence. Pakistan requested the United Nations to set up a Commission for J&K for ensuring ceasefire and withdrawal of troops. This was to precede the establishment of an impartial administration in Kashmir and a plebiscite for assessing the people's wishes. According to Pakistan, there was no other way of giving substance to the opinion of the people of Kashmir, which would be nothing other than freedom from India. India, however, was emphatic about holding a plebiscite only after complete withdrawal of all tribal invaders and other Pakistani forces from the state.
Around this time, Britain began pressing the United States for official recognition of the Pakistani occupation of the northern parts of Kashmir, defying the accession to India. Washington had earlier opted for a low profile policy in South Asia during the British withdrawal, realising that Britain would not easily accept a more conspicuous role. The British felt the majority opinion in the Muslim dominated state would be against becoming a part of sovereign India. The ulterior motive behind the British initiative, strengthened by American support to the proposal during the discussion on Kashmir at the UN Security Council, was securing Pakistani cooperation, in the event of any confrontation with the Soviets. Besides, the US and Britain were keen on developing strong ties with Pakistan since the country was considered the main artery into Central Asia. 5 During the period 1947-1956 (the Suez Canal crisis), America's South Asian policy was heavily influenced by the British. 6
The resolution passed by the UN Security Council on January 17, 1948, set the trend for the nature of the UN involvement in the Kashmir controversy in the years to come. The US influence was evident in the tone and content of the resolution. The resolution
4 ..calls upon both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan to take immediately all measures within their power (including public appeals to their people) calculated to improve the situation and to refrain from making any statements and from doing or causing to be done or permitting any act which might aggravate the situation...(It)...further requests each of these Governments to inform the Council immediately of any material change in the situation which occurs or appears to either of them to be about to occur while the matter is under consideration by the Council and consult with the Council thereon. 7
The resolution was destined to fail with India upset with the Security Council for holding both countries equally responsible for the crisis and not condemning Pakistan as the aggressor. The US and the UK were also instrumental in Pakistan not implementing the resolution. The reasons for the action can be traced to the desire of the US to make Pakistan an important input of its Middle East strategy. 8 The US, by and large, accepted the view, following the UN Resolution of 1948, that the accession was incomplete and Kashmir was a disputed territory. 9
The US' motives behind patronising Pakistan lay in its importance as a vital cog in the balance of power in the region and in its greater reliability as a partner. 10 The geopolitical configuration of Pakistan has shaped the history of superpower intervention in South Asian politics. The US was quick to realise the importance of having a geographically strategic ally in the region for balancing the Soviet influence. Pakistan was an important location for establishing air bases and intelligence gathering facilities for countering the Soviets. Moreover, Pakistan's proximity to the Persian Gulf made it useful as a shield for protecting the Middle East oil fields in the eventuality of hostilities in Asia. The US gradually began encouraging Pakistan as a partner and an ally. The country was invited to join US sponsored defence pacts like the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), originally the Baghdad Pact, and began receiving American weapons. 11 In May 1954, the US and Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, formally confirming Pakistan's alignment with the West. This was viewed with much pessimism in India. It was feared that such an agreement would foster an arms race in the subcontinent and foreclose prospects for the peaceful settlement of regional disputes.
Till 1953, Indo-Soviet relations were basically lukewarm. The international Communist movement castigated Nehru's policy of non-alignment and considered him a pro-West leader. Joseph Stalin looked down upon Nehru as a "bourgeois democrat" and "lackey" of British imperialism. 12 However, after Stalin's death in 1953, and the Khruschev-Bulganin visit to India in 1954, new fronts opened up in the Indo-Soviet relationship. Ties between the two nations improved as a result of the US committing itself towards Pakistan on the Kashmir issue and the Mutual Security Agreement of 1953. The non-alignment policy of the Indian government was viewed with suspicion by the US, which felt that the Indian objective behind distancing itself from the major powers was to camouflage its Soviet tilt. Non-alignment was also dismissed by Dulles as "an immoral and short-sighted conception" 13 which did not allow India to resist Communism.
The American decision to ignore the historical imperatives behind regional politics in South Asia made India pursue the non-alignment strategy with determination during the 1950s, thereby paving the way for confrontation with US foreign policy. 14 In the year 1954, Pakistan joined SEATO. Despite Nehru's reservations on Pakistan's entry into the alliance, Dulles overlooked the contentions. Towards the end of his life, however, Dulles conceded that a democratic India was in itself a deterrent to totalitarian expansionism. Following his death, President Eisenhower pursued rapprochement more actively and even visited India. 15
It was only natural that an American-armed Pakistan would encourage closer Indo-Soviet ties. By the time of the Korean War (1950), 16 India, despite no active initiative on its part, had begun to be identified as a Soviet ally. India's position on Hungary added fuel to the fire. The Soviets came forward to assist India in its efforts to develop a sound industrial base, especially in core sectors like energy, in 1954. The economic and technical exchange between the two countries peeved the US. India also supported Communist China's application for UN membership, even after its entry into the Korean conflict, and acted as a mediator between the US and China in Korea. In all the contemporary confrontations between the superpowers (Hungary, Vietnam and the Japan peace treaty, for example), India's stand was contrary to American interests.
Though Indo-US relations improved during the second term of President Eisenhower, following the 1954 arms pact with Pakistan, the US kept the Kashmir issue alive for displaying its solidarity in the matter to Pakistan. In January 1957, the UN Security Council admitted the Kashmir question. Nehru was upset with the US for agreeing to bring up Kashmir before the Security Council and for its continued support to plebiscite in the state. After the Soviets vetoed a resolution calling for stationing of UN troops in Kashmir, the Security Council agreed to send its president, Sweden's Gunnar Jarring, to the subcontinent, who confirmed the deadlock over the dispute. In late 1957, Pakistan again raised the issue before the Security Council. The Council sent another mission to South Asia under Frank Graham, which also turned out to be fruitless. Subjecting India to constant pressure by scrutiny of Kashmir through various futile missions showed the influence of the US in determining the actions of the UN. The moves also underlined the discriminatory attitude inherent in the US foreign policy between treatment of aligned and non-aligned nations.
The UN, traditionally, has been a passive observer in the Kashmir controversy. Its lack of authority in the matter was clearly brought out in the resolution issued on December 2, 1957, "...the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan...refrain from making any statements and from doing or causing to be done any acts which might aggravate the situation and to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations; and that the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan...make... recommendations to the parties for further appropriate action with a view to making progress towards the implementation of the Resolutions of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan of 13th August, 1948 and 5th January, 1949 and towards a peaceful settlement." 17
The hallmark of the US policy on Kashmir has been its inconsistency. This was evident during the Chinese War of 1962, with America promptly coming to India's aid, much to the displeasure of Pakistan. Stemming the tide of Communism remained the ultimate objective of US foreign policy during the Kennedy Administration and was the motivation behind the military support the US gave India during the Chinese war. President Kennedy firmly believed that a strong India was important for a free and politically stable Asia. The US sought to utilise its status of donor by pressuring India for settling the Kashmir dispute. The US had realised that with the Kashmir conflict unresolved, the Indian subcontinent was vulnerable to exogenous influences, leading to a highly fragile equilibrium in the regional balance of power. The then US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, visited India in 1963. He left India realising the complications of the Kashmir issue and penned a gloomy assessment on the prospects for any early settlement. 18 President Kennedy, however, always knew that India and Pakistan regarded the Kashmir dispute "as more important than the struggle against the Communists." 19
The conflicting perceptions on Kashmir resurfaced at the meeting of the UN Security Council in February 1962. While Pakistan reopened the question in the context of possession of the whole of Kashmir, India felt the territorial issue was redundant with Kashmir being a recognised part of the Indian republic. The US refrained from making negotiated settlement to Kashmir a necessary precondition for continuing military assistance to Pakistan, despite noticeable Congressional pressure to act otherwise. Adlai Stevenson, the president of the Security Council, ruled out possibilities of further negotiations in the matter in view of the disagreements. The majority opinion in the UN was in favour of a plebiscite. The US, China, and the UK supported a plebiscite, while India and the USSR opposed it. General Ayub Khan, the Pakistani premier, realised that the alliance in which Pakistan had invested so much, was being eroded. Its support for Beijing's representation on the Security Council and its continued efforts to normalise relations with China, measures that deeply disturbed America, stemmed logically from the calculation that exclusive reliance on the US could no longer be justified.
In December 1963, Kashmir shot sharply into international focus with the disappearance of a sacred Islamic relic, a strand of hair of the Prophet Muhammad, from the Hazratbal shrine. The event sparked off major civil disturbances in the Valley with Pakistan bringing up Kashmir again at the Security Council. Though the Council adjourned the debate, the tension continued, culminating in the outbreak of war. The hostilities commenced at a time when the US was on the threshold of greater involvement in the civil strife in Vietnam, making it imperative for America to suppress the growth of one more contentious issue in its foreign policy agenda. Accordingly, the resolution adopted in the Security Council demanded "...that a ceasefire should take effect on Wednesday, September 22, 1965, at 0700 hours GMT, and calls upon both Governments to issue orders for a ceasefire at that moment and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel back to positions held by them before August 5, 1965." 20 In the history of UN action on the Kashmir dispute till then, this was the first instance of the UN actually demanding concrete action from India and Pakistan. The war stopped on September 23, 1965.
The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 stands as a watershed in the history of American relations with the Indian subcontinent. President Johnson and his chief foreign policy advisers recognised the obvious: the war signalled the frustrating end to a policy cycle set in motion with the formation of the Pakistani-American alliance eleven years earlier. Pakistan's alignment with the US, combined with subsequent US efforts to balance its South Asian priorities by pumping massive economic assistance into India during the late 1950s and military aid as well as after 1962, had been predicated on the belief that the US could cultivate friendly, productive relations with both countries. All these illusions lay shattered along with the peace of the subcontinent.
The unwillingness of either India or Pakistan to stand by the US in Vietnam further separated America from South Asia. Convinced that previous Administrations had exaggerated the salience of India and Pakistan for broader Cold War security interests, President Johnson directed that the US adopt a lower profile in the subcontinent and pursue a more limited policy objective there. President Johnson's backing for a pro-Soviet mediation offer reveals just how radically the war had shaken the long-held American policy assumptions about the region. Rusk recalled that the Administration encouraged the Soviet initiative because "we felt we had nothing to lose". 21
In the late 1960s, civil unrest broke out in Pakistan over granting recognition to the Bengali language in East Pakistan. The Awami League government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was derecognised by the ruling military regime. The army was summoned for suppressing popular discontent. The initial protests matured into an armed struggle for the freedom of the Eastern province spearheaded by the Mukti Bahini. The unrest witnessed heavy migration of refugees from East Pakistan, numbering more than 10 million, into India. The fledgling nation, Bangladesh, was officially recognised by India in 1971, and Indian troops were dispatched for supporting the Mukti Bahini. Calling the act an intrusion in its internal affairs, Pakistan declared war on India. It was unable to withstand India militarily, and consented to a ceasefire on December 17, 1971.
After the war, Indira Gandhi and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto met in Simla and formalised the Simla Agreement (July 2, 1972). The agreement underlined the resolve of both countries to settle differences through bilateral negotiations or by other peaceful means mutually agreed upon. It also specified that both nations would respect each other's territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality, in accordance with the UN Charter. With regard to J&K it was decided that the LoC (Line of Control), resulting at the time of the ceasefire on December 17, 1971, should be respected by both countries. The tacit understanding reached was that the LoC would gradually emerge as an international border and, thus, the Kashmir issue would be settled. 22 The US was receptive to the spirit of the accord. Henry Kissinger visited India from October 27-30, 1974. 23 The tone of his visit was mixed, but generally positive, and reaffirmed the US support to the Simla process (i.e. India and Pakistan to resolve their disputes bilaterally without outside interference).
(b) 1972-1992: After the Simla Pact: Militarisation of the Indian Subcontinent
During the Seventies and Eighties, the Indian subcontinent gradually became a more volatile region with the emergence of a variety of new security threats and challenges, including the steady growth in nuclear capability of the two countries. The most critical event shaping the political history of the subcontinent during this period was the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. This was subsequent to the Left-wing revolution in Kabul in April 1978. The Soviet move was instrumental in reinforcing military ties between the US and Pakistan that had weakened during the Bhutto years. It was also responsible for tailoring the US approach towards India and Kashmir. The American magnanimity in extending military and financial support helped Pakistan in covertly developing its nuclear potential with Chinese assistance. Events, however, took a different turn with the end of the Cold War in 1990.
Kashmir was mentioned in the Joint Communique issued by the US and China during President Nixon's visit to Beijing in 1972. The issuance was an official recognition of the Kashmir dispute by both nations and drew strong reactions from India. Indo-US relations were at rock bottom at this time. The US was a committed military ally of Pakistan, while India had developed close links with the USSR, by signing the peace and friendship treaty in 1971. The intense acrimony between the US and the Soviets was mirrored in the relationships between India and Pakistan, and between India and the US.
The US military alliance with Pakistan and the firm Soviet bonding with India had divided the subcontinent bipolarly, limiting the scope of bilateral negotiations. Attempts by the US to initiate a dialogue between India and Pakistan were viewed sceptically by the former. A hitch in US military support to Pakistan arose in the form of the Glenn-Symington Amendment passed by the US Congress in 1977. The law called for termination of assistance to any state importing uranium enrichment equipment or technology after 1977. Pakistan violated the law by importing equipment for its uranium-enrichment plant at Kahuta, leading to termination of US economic and military aid. However, changing circumstances in the subcontinent reversed the tide soon after.
In 1981, the US suspended the sanctions applicable under the Glenn-Symington Amendment with respect to Pakistan for a period of six years. The reason, ostensibly, was the situation arising out of the deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the long-term objective of thwarting further Soviet expansion by strengthening Pakistan. The Reagan Administration justified greater military assistance to Pakistan on the grounds of promoting nuclear non-proliferation goals by pointing out that a more secure Pakistan would not have nuclear ambitions. Pakistan put the magnanimity to good use and progressed steadily towards giving final shape to a covert nuclear programme. 24 Realising the consequences of Pakistan's growing nuclear capabilities, the US tried to discourage Pakistan occasionally. But it could never be forceful due to the country's critical support in Afghanistan.
The Pressler Amendment, enacted in 1985, specified freezing of US aid and government-to-government military sales to Pakistan, unless the US president certified at the beginning of each fiscal year that Pakistan "...did not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed US assistance programme will significantly reduce the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device." 25 Unfortunately, the law was often rendered ineffective with the US Administration seeking waivers at all possible opportunities.
Over the period 1982-1987, the relationship between India and the US took a decidedly positive turn. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was invited by President Ronald Reagan to visit Washington in 1982. 26 The visit elevated India to a higher plane in American policy-making. As then American Ambassador Harry Barnes recalled, "The whole tone of the relationship changed." 27 The two heads of state decided to enhance cooperation in the areas of science and technology and designated 1985 as "the year of India," calling for a major Indian art and culture exhibition to tour the US.
After Mrs Gandhi's assassination and Rajiv Gandhi's ascent to power, the latter also displayed keenness in improving ties with the US. The willingness was mutual. Many felt that India could be a counter to Communist China in Asia while others wanted to wean India away from the Soviet Union. 28 India wanted the US' cooperation in sectors involving state-to-art technology for development, including defence systems. This led the two countries to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on technology transfer in December 1984. Subsequently, an agreement was also signed on the light combat aircraft (LCA), thus, breaking a two-decade drought in defence cooperation between the two countries. 29 During 1987, Rajiv Gandhi and Ronald Reagan met for exploring opportunities in expansion of bilateral trade and overall cooperation in the fields of science, technology and space research, particularly in the LCA programme.
The 1990s began with the Gulf War that brought the Islamic states together in a show of solidarity with Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The US intervention in Kuwait did not find favour with the people of Pakistan, though the government supported Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Pakistan, however, was running into trouble with US aid. The Pressler Amendment, after being successfully waived till 1990, was implemented from October 1990 onward, with the US president unable to make the required certification to the Congress under Section 620 E (e) of the Foreign Assistance Act.
From the early 1990s, a clear shift was discernible in the US perspective on Kashmir. In place of a plebiscite, the US began favouring bilateral negotiations within the framework of the Simla Agreement. In the hearings of the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Relations in March 1991, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Teresita Scheffer, stated that the UN Resolutions on plebiscite in Kashmir, strongly supported by the US in the past, were no longer tenable and the US presently was in favour of bilateral negotiations within the framework of the Simla Agreement of 1972. 30 The US commitment towards bilateral negotiations prevented Pakistan from raising the issue of Kashmir in the Security Council.
With Afghanistan ceasing to figure as a key parameter in Southeast Asia, the US went public in voicing its concern over certain activities of Pakistan. During George Bush's presidency, there was a strong move towards declaring Pakistan a terrorist state. In the waning days of the Bush Administration, acting Secretary of State Laurence Eagleburgar, in a letter to the US Congress, specified that the Administration should take 120-160 days to decide on the issue of listing Pakistan as a terrorist state. 31 This, till now, is the closest instance of Pakistan being declared a 'terrorist' state.
(c) 1992-2001: The Changing Trends
(i) 1992-1996: Towards Rock Bottom Again
The early years of the Clinton era were not positive for Indo-US relations. With the Cold War ceasing to be a deciding factor in global politics, the US found it difficult to focus its foreign policy. Throughout 1993, the US stressed upon India to improve its human rights record in Kashmir. The emphasis on human rights was coupled with the realisation that the Kashmir problem involved a much larger issue, i.e., the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir. The most significant aspect of the US' Kashmir policy under President Clinton was that it questioned the very legality of Kashmir's accession to India and denounced India for human rights abuses in the state.
The end of the Cold War gave birth to a series of self-determination movements in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and certain other countries that had adopted the Soviet model. These developments, coupled with the end of bipolarity, were responsible for introducing a marked indecisiveness in US foreign policy. Human rights emerged as an important parameter of contemporary American foreign policy. The sympathetic perspective of Kashmir's separatist movement can also be traced to the issue of human rights. The greater emphasis on human rights undermined much of the Pakistan promoted Islamic fundamentalism that had become dominant in Kashmir.
One of the key personalities responsible for shaping the US South Asian policy of the time was Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Robin Raphael. The lack of direction in foreign policy became evident when Robin Raphael questioned the very accession of Kashmir to India. She declared the whole of Kashmir as "disputed" with three contending parties-India, Pakistan and Kashmir. She also downplayed the Simla Agreement and added a new dimension to the controversy by stating that the Kashmiris should be active participants in ultimate peace negotiations for deciding the future of J&K.
Recognising the Kashmiris' right of self-determination was nothing short of questioning the very concept of an integrated India. The US Administration carried the anti-India tirade further by highlighting India's allegedly "poor" human rights record in J&K and Punjab. Clinton's reference to Kashmir in his address to the United Nations General Assembly "....bloody ethnic, religious and civil wars range from Angola to the Caucus to Kashmir", 32 evoked popular resentment. A reference of this kind from the US president at an international forum was unprecedented. Responding to a question on the reasons behind the reference, Robin Raphael said, "It was meant to say, we see Kashmir on a radar screen along with Yuguslavia and Somalia and lots of other places in the former Soviet Union, Georgia, where there is civil conflict going on. We cannot easily overlook it, and there is a message in that." 33
The Indian nuclear programme too, became a live issue with the US, acquiring national security dimensions. In 1993, America successfully refrained Russia from transferring cryogenic technology to India on the grounds of violation of MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) norms. The US also advised India to stop progressing with its medium and short-range missile programmes. Around this time, the US foreign policy-makers expounded the notion that Indian nuclear ambitions were a security threat for the US military installations in Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The threat perceptions in South Asia were further intensified with the US linking the Pakistani nuclear programme to the Kashmir dispute, and highlighting the region as a sensitive nuclear zone. The outcome of all these was a record low in the Indo-US relationship by March 1994.
The Clinton Administration sought a one-time exception to the Pressler Amendment for transferring F-16 aircraft and other weapons to Pakistan. In 1992, the US Congress had amended the Foreign Assistance Act, making regional non-proliferation a formal goal of US policy and imposing the requirement of periodic progress reports in the matter to the executive bench. The inconsistency in US foreign policy became evident once again with the visit of Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao to Washington during May 1994. His visit and the subsequent negotiations led to withdrawal of criticism on India's human rights record, and relaxation of pressures created by other security related insecurities. The year 1995 also saw the visits by Energy Secretary, Hazel O'Leary, Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and Defence Secretary William Perry in quick succession for promoting bilateral trade and improving mutual ties. 34
Economically, the early 1990s were difficult times for India. At the end of the Gulf War, the country's foreign exchange reserves had dwindled to negligible levels. The country was forced to adopt drastic economic restructuring. Decontrol of the Indian economy opened up one of the world's largest markets to international business opportunities. The US was quick to realise this and stepped up efforts for promoting bilateral trade and investment. In 1995, several high-ranking US officials visited India for providing a fillip to economic relations. At the same time, the US insisted on India signing the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). Apart from capping India's nuclear programme, this would have helped the US to maintain its lead in global technology. In the meantime, US granted US $368 million worth of military spares and hardware to Pakistan. Apart from assisting a loyal friend, the transaction aimed to support Pakistan as a moderate Islamic state in view of the growing threat of Islamic fundamentalism.
(ii) 1996-2001: Looking Up and Ahead
The tides of change in the Indo-US relationship became evident from the beginning of President Clinton's second term in office. For the first time in nearly 50 years, the US began viewing India on a one-to-one basis and not as a mere pawn in the balance of power in South Asia. The outcome of the positive outlook was greater consistency in US foreign policy. In December 1997, William M. Daley, the then US secretary of commerce, commented during his visit to India, "President Clinton has asked me to help him strengthen America's relationship with India. Our business development mission is a statement of this Administration's commitment as well as recognition of the ties that bind our two great countries". 35 The statement clearly indicated the keenness on the part of the US to change equations.
Otherwise also, the US took concrete steps to display its changing attitude. After his reelection, President Clinton replaced Robin Raphael with Rick Inderfurth in the Bureau of South Asian Affairs, sending out positive signals to India. On his first visit to South Asia, Rick Inderfurth went to India first, and Pakistan later. The US also, gradually, came round to accepting India's assertion of Pakistan sponsoring cross-border terrorism in Punjab, the northeast, and J&K in particular.
The convergence of Indian and American views on terrorism has been significant in bringing the two countries closer. The US extradited Dayek Singh Lahoria, a terrorist wanted by India, and followed up by signing an extradition treaty with India in August 1997. A Pakistan based terrorist outfit, the Harkat-ul-Ansar, funded by the Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan, was branded a "terrorist organisation" by the US, despite vehement protests by Pakistan. During his visit to India in October 1997, Under-Secretary of State Thomas Pickering stated, "Both of us are committed to work together to enhance our capacity to fight terrorism, whether it is sponsored from the moon or from any other corner." 36 US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright reiterated the same resolve during her visit to South Asia in November 1997.
In retrospect, Thomas Pickering's visit can be designated as an important landmark in the changing currents of the Indo-US relationship that became evident during the later years of Bill Clinton's presidency. Two high points of the occasion are worth mentioning. The first was the initiation of a process of 'strategic dialogue' between the world's two largest democracies, 37 which, historically, had been anything but compatible bedfellows. Secondly, Pickering's visit saw the two nations moving beyond the issue of nuclear non-proliferation, the bread-and-butter diet of all patchy attempts to talk between the two in recent times, to other mutually significant perspectives. In particular, Pickering shared with India the US concerns about the growing menace of terrorism. This was the first time that a senior US dignitary was so candid in spelling out, and appreciating, the mutual concerns relating to terrorism. 38
Terrorism has emerged as a major concern for the US in the 1990s. The key figure in this respect, responsible for spreading alarm, has been the Saudi billionaire Osama bin Laden. The US Federal Bureau has alleged that while Laden has been making attempts to procure chemical and biological agents for terrorist activities, he also has connections with Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, the Islamic guerilla convicted of the World Trade Centre bombing in New York in 1993. 39 On November 14, 1999, the UN slapped punitive sanctions on Afghanistan, demanding the arrest and turning over of Laden. 40
The similarity of thoughts between the US and India in tackling terrorism has been accompanied by mutually clearer perceptions on Kashmir. It took more than a decade's terrorist mayhem in Kashmir to make the US realise that the demand for self-determination is only a ruse for helping the terrorists create a homogeneous community in Kashmir by driving out the pundits. As the State Department Policy Planning staff member James Steinberg said, "It is ironic that some self-determination movements have very undemocratic aims such as the creation of a homogeneous mono-ethnic state." The US has pledged the full support of the Group of Eight (G-8) to India's proposal for an international convention on terrorism under the aegis of the UN. It has also added thrust to its joint efforts with India to combat terrorism by including narcotics as an issue for common action. Both countries have expressed concern over the narcotics trade in South Asia, particularly through Afghanistan.
In May 1998, the almost linked explosions at Pokhran and Chagai demonstrated the nuclear capabilities of both India and Pakistan. India insisted that it would retain the right to test the various missile systems under development. In response to UN Security Council Resolution 1172 of July 6, 1998, Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee stated, "The call made in the Resolution that we should stop our nuclear programmes or missile programmes is unacceptable". 41
With nuclear ambitions well and truly settled, India and Pakistan began efforts to engage in talks, leading to Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to Lahore by bus in February 1990. The visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee led to the signing of the Lahore Declaration (1999) between the two countries. Twenty-six years after the Simla Agreement, the Lahore Declaration once again kindled hopes of better ties between the two nations. Signed on February 21, 1999, between Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Sharif, the Declaration aimed to identify measures for promoting an environment of peace and security between the two nations. The statement embodied a shared vision of peace and stability between the two countries and the progress and prosperity of the citizens of both. 42
It did not take long for the euphoria to fade. Throughout the end of 1998 and early 1999, the world got the impression that the two nations were coming closer. Pakistan, however, had other ideas, and stepped up terrorism in Kashmir and the border areas, while continuing consultations. The ploy was exposed in May 1999, leading to open warfare at Kargil. A ceasefire ensued with the retreat of the Pakistani forces after more than a month of fierce hostilities.
The Kargil War exposed the Pakistani doublespeak on Kashmir and brought to light the country's involvement in fostering terrorism through active patronisation of armed Islamic separatist and militant groups. This evoked strong reactions from the international community. The US, in particular, came down heavily on Pakistan for its nefarious activities. The restraint shown by India in not crossing the LoC despite strong provocation was lauded by the US. Pakistan's misadventure in Kargil only succeeded in drawing India closer to the US.
In March 2000, President Clinton visited India, the first visit by a US head of state since President Carter's in 1978. The American president's submission, just ahead of his tour, that the Kashmir issue was a nuclear flashpoint, had led many to conclude that he would seek to play a more direct role in South Asia. In the course of his visit, President Clinton made it clear that India was the natural leader of South Asia and Indians had every right to say that the US had no role in the Kashmir issue. Emphasising that the Kashmir issue did not have any military solution, he pointed out that the LoC has to be reaffirmed and respected. Indicating that Pakistan must create conditions for dialogue to succeed, he came down heavily upon terrorism, saying that the international community rejects the notion that jehad can be a part of any civilised country's foreign policy. 43 The four Rs outlined by Clinton during his trip, namely, respect for the LoC, restraint, renunciation of violence and restoration of dialogue, 44 were indicators of a 'shift' in US policy, closer to that of India. 45
The militants had their own response to the Clinton trip. They struck at Chhattisinghpura on March 21, 2000, the day the president began his official tour of India, in a clear bid to defy the president's intentions for creating better ground between India and Pakistan. It was also a challenge to the Indo-US joint efforts at fighting terrorism, as exemplified by the efforts of the two countries in setting up a Joint Working Group on counter-terrorism. 46
During President Clinton's visit to New Delhi, a vision statement (Indo-US Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century) was signed by the president and Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee. The statement aims to "create a closer and qualitatively new relationship between the US and India" based on shared democratic values and increasingly convergent, pragmatic interests in the political, economic, environmental and other domains. 47
The presidential visit underscored the importance of India as a political and economic partner to the US in the emerging world configuration. In his brief stopover in Pakistan, President Clinton made the American displeasure at the removal of democracy in Pakistan and encouragement of cross-border terrorism, evident to General Musharraf. 48 The US also strongly condemned the terrorist attacks and mass killings in Kashmir while praising the Indian initiative for talks with the Hizbul Mujahideen. As for Pakistan, despite acknowledging it as an old friend, America admitted to the surfacing of serious differences between the two nations.
President Clinton's visit to India was followed by Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to Washington in September 2000. The reciprocal visit further broadened the scope of dialogue and mutual cooperation between the two countries, particularly in core areas like abatement of terrorism, and expansion of trade and commerce. By now, it was evident that India was being considered a vital strategic ally in South Asia by the US-an ally who not only promised tempting returns to US capital, but also offered crucial friendship based on the stable platform created by more than five decades of ably functioning democratic institutions.
The Indian stand on Kashmir received a major shot-in-the-arm when UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, during his South Asian tour in March 2001, categorically ruled out UN intervention for enforcement of the 1948-49 Security Council Resolutions favouring plebiscite in Kashmir. 49 He also pointed out that the Lahore Declaration (1999) should be the basis for all agreements over J&K. The unambiguous stand of the secretary-general dashed Pakistan's hopes of reinforcing its case for third party mediation in Kashmir. It also highlighted the international community's reluctance to force third party intervention when one of the two main parties (India in this case) was thoroughly opposed to the move.
The military regime in Pakistan limited the possibility of resumption of the process of dialogue between India and Pakistan, which met an abrupt end after Kargil. In the middle of 2001, Prime Minister Vajpayee decided to set the ball rolling and invited General Musharraf for talks to India. The ground for a harmonious discussion was paved with India calling off the six-month-old ceasefire in J&K and signalling its intent to deal firmly with the terrorists operating in the region. General Musharraf too, appeared keen on shedding his image of an indefatigable warrior against India, by taking on a more reasonable disposition. He chose the significant occasion of the Holy Prophet's birthday to caution leaders of Islamic parties and organisations from making statements which prompt the rest of the world to question Pakistan's credibility as a responsible state. He also asserted that he would not allow religion to be used for political gains and expressed serious concerns over the fragile Pakistani economy and its dwindling international credibility.
The conciliatory posture of General Musharraf was supplemented by supportive moves on other fronts. The former All Party Hurriyat Conference chairman and pro-Pakistan Jamaat-e-Islami leader Syed Ali Geelani, a vocal advocate of armed struggle for achieving independence in Kashmir, criticised the jehadi groups for spreading hatred against India. He called it unIslamic to "malign a nation and its people." The Hizbul Mujahideen also softened its stand and for once, envisaged giving peace a chance on the eve of the Vajpayee-Musharraf talks. 50
The Agra Summit (July 14-16, 2001) failed to live up to the expectations it had generated in the course of its build-up. Stopping just short of calling the talks a complete failure, both sides left the summit with mutual assurances of continuing the dialogue. For many, though, the resumption of a constructive process of communication was reason enough for calling the talks fruitful. Interestingly, the US echoed the optimistic sentiments. "It should be seen as a first step in a difficult and lengthy process...you cannot solve differences of 50 years over three days," commented Christina Rocca, the US assistant secretary for South Asian Affairs, in a Press conference prior to her departure for South Asia. 51
The stalemate in Agra arose principally from General Musharraf's insistence on branding Kashmir as the "core issue," barring resolution of which further talks were deemed irrelevant by Pakistan. India, naturally, differed with the view, placing equal emphasis on cross-border terrorism as a precondition to greater engagement. Reacting on the issue of Kashmir in the context of the Agra Summit, the US preferred to call it a bilateral issue, and suggested that it would help only if asked to. However, it categorically mentioned that the solution to the issue must take into consideration the views of "those most directly affected, the Kashmiris." 52 There is nothing radically different in this current strand of American thought. Way back in 1997, George Pickart, a senior advisor to the South Asian Bureau of the State Department, had commented, "The USA believes that J&K is a disputed territory and is an issue to be resolved between India and Pakistan taking the desires of the Kashmiri people into account". 53
Almost at the same time that Christina Rocca visited India, US Chief-of-Joint Staff General Henry Shelton also visited the country. The visit led to extensive talks on various aspects of Indo-US military cooperation, which had touched a low after the Shakti tests (1998). Among the important issues discussed were the revival of the Indo-US Defence Policy Group and the possibility of India's joining the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) of the US. At the same time, Rocca indicated to Pakistan in no uncertain terms that the US was keen to see democracy restored in Pakistan, and a more proactive role by it in curbing terrorism.
Conclusion
The Kashmir saga reflects an unending tale of hostility and mistrust between two nations, once a part of each other. It also depicts the clash of interests between military superpowers in the erstwhile bipolar world for maintaining regional supremacy in a geopolitically sensitive zone. The conflict has progressively disrupted peace and stability in the region, causing greater hostility between India and Pakistan, eventually leading to the nuclearisation of South Asia.
The basic dispute has been regarding the status of Kashmir. While India believes that Kashmir is an integral part of its territory, Pakistan feels otherwise. If Kashmir decides its own future, there can be three possible outcomes: to remain in India, or in Pakistan, or become an autonomous territory. Historically, Pakistan has stressed more on Kashmir's autonomy while covertly voicing its claim on Kashmir.
The American concern for Kashmir was captured in the infancy of the dispute in the statement of Ambassador Grady, opining that Kashmir was one great problem, which might cause the downfall of two dominions. 54 The US initiatives in Kashmir have not been direct interventions but strategic alliances, forged with the objective of tailoring the balance of power in the region. Without a proactive US, Pakistan could not have become nuclear and the Indian subcontinent would not have developed nuclear threat perceptions. The US strategies were a direct fallout of its intentions to restrict Soviet influence in the region.
A neutral perspective on Kashmir would assume that the territory is disputed. The incorporation of Article 370 in the Indian Constitution, giving special status to Kashmir, is itself indicative of discrimination. At the time of signing the Instrument of Accession, Maharaja Hari Singh had little choice. The people of Kashmir never got the opportunity of expressing their views, which could have been otherwise, given the Muslim majority in the Valley.
Opinions favouring an autonomous Kashmir point out the faulty implementation of Article 370, in the form of repeated 'interference' by Indian governments in the internal matters of the state. The allegedly distorted implementations of Article 370 were the genesis of the recent moves on autonomy by the J&K government. The autonomy proposal of the J&K Assembly contained several controversial features and was rejected by the Central Government of India. 55 Notwithstanding its rejection, the mooting of the proposal by the democratically elected government of Farooq Abdullah (also a partner in the ruling coalition at the centre), underlines the emotive appeal of the issue. Self-determination continues to arouse strong sentiments in the Valley. The vulnerable psyche of Kashmir has been systematically exploited by Pakistan through the promotion of terrorism and insurgency. With the US veering towards bilateral negotiations after the Simla Agreement, Pakistan could no longer demand self-determination at international fora. Instead, it sponsored militancy in the Valley, under the guise of the demand for self-determination.
The autonomy proposal and its rejection went almost unnoticed in the US. There were no official reactions. Stephen P. Cohen referred to the matter as a "two steps forward-two steps backward" development. Washington's almost complete indifference could be on account of its appreciation of India's sensitiveness in the matter and the desire to maintain the recent upbeat trends in Indo-US relations. A small but vocal lobby within the US Congress, sympathetic to Kashmiri and Khalistani terrorists, however, had urged President Clinton to declare India a sponsor of terrorism. This group may well rake up the autonomy issue in the future again. The Washington based Kashmir Study Group had proposed sovereignty for Kashmir, with or without India and Pakistan, in its report entitled "Kashmir: A Way Forward, February 2000".
India, low on the list of US priorities for nearly 50 years (there were occasional periods of mutual bonhomie e.g. 1959-66 and 1982-87, in the relationship), has risen significantly in the US perspective in recent years. While the termination of the Cold War has marginalised Pakistan in terms of US interests, Pakistan's internal problems, due to regional tensions, weakened democratic institutions, communal strife, extremism and economic weakness, have undermined its value as a strong and capable ally. In contrast, India is beginning to emerge as an ideal partner for cultivating permanent institutions for friendship and cooperation. 56 In late 1999, the US House of Representatives had passed a non-binding resolution calling for a "strategic partnership" with India, denoting closer understanding in bilateral and world affairs.
Both India and Pakistan have gone nuclear, providing official confirmation to the rest of the world about their capabilities. 57 Their proven status as nuclear powers has added a new dimension to South Asian politics. The twin explosions in May 1998 heightened the volatility of the Indian subcontinent, with Kashmir emerging as the nuclear flashpoint, 58 and the US linking Kashmir to the broader issue of nuclear non-proliferation. President Bill Clinton expressed American concerns about the region by describing South Asia, and the LoC, demarcating Kashmir in particular, "as the most dangerous place in the world right now." 59 The emergence of South Asia as a nuclear zone has aggrieved the international community, with the promise of disarmament in the non-proliferation era remaining unfulfilled, notwithstanding the absence of clear motives for deploying nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era.
Apart from the growing volatility in the South Asian region, the emerging pan-Islamic fundamentalism is threatening stability in various parts of the world. Osama bin Laden has been declared an international terrorist by the US. Traditionally, Pakistan has been perceived as a softer Islamic nation by Washington and has received favourable treatment. It is still important to the US, geopolitically and otherwise, as indicated by President Clinton's stopover at Pakistan during his visit to the Indian subcontinent.
In the Cold War era, the US policy was marked by zero-sum dynamics. The US appears to have discarded the previous dynamics in favour of 'engaging' in the Indian subcontinent. Clinton's visit to Pakistan, America's refusal to declare Pakistan a terrorist state despite evidence, and its non-reaction to India's rejection of the autonomy proposal must be seen in this light.
From the late 1970s and early 1980s, terrorism and insurgency became major problems for India. Apart from J&K, secessionist movements arose in Punjab and the northeastern parts. Interestingly, from this time onward, Pakistan came under a military regime under General Zia-ul-Haq. While there is no concrete evidence to suggest that military rule in Pakistan was responsible for promoting terrorism in India, the coincidence is quite remarkable. Since then, for the last two decades, Pakistan has kept India engaged in the so-called 'low intensity warfare' by aiding terrorism blatantly.
Terrorism has added a new dimension to the Kashmir issue. In the beginning, Pakistan stressed upon plebiscite and self-determination. Despite its strong demands, violence and strife never surfaced in Kashmir. Since 1989, the Kashmir problem has assumed violent proportions in terms of loss of human lives and disruption of civilian activities. The rampant militancy by outfits like the Harkat-ul-Ansar, Lashkar-e-Taiba and others, have been glorified by Pakistan. 60 Efforts to suppress militancy have been castigated as oppression of human rights by India in the Valley. Pakistan's objective has been to keep India engaged in tackling secessionist activities in Kashmir, so that the region continues to invite international attention.
That terrorism will continue to be Pakistan's forte in keeping the Kashmir issue alive was evident from the acceleration in militancy in the Valley right after the conclusion of the Agra Summit. The killings in Doda district (August 2001) are ample testimony to a renewed surge in militancy and Pakistan's attempts to demonstrate India's lack of appreciation of the sentiments of the Kashmiri people and the grassroots issues in the region.
Despite Pakistan's historical ties with the US, a section of the US intelligentsia has always argued for the opposite. Robert J. McMahon, for example, had long ago suggested evolution of closer ties between India and the US for the mutual benefit of both. 61 Though belatedly, a beginning seems to have been made in the desired direction. The coming together of India and the US on terrorism is a positive development. In this regard, the efforts outlined for institutionalising a framework for future cooperation in Afghanistan deserve special mention. The revival of the Indo-US defence policy group (which was set up in 1995 and ceased functioning from 1997) 62 after the visit of General Shelton has created the opportunity for greater cooperation between the two nations in defence related matters. Moreover, India's rapid growth in the field of information technology and the potential for business that it offers to the US is also significant 63 and has certainly helped in enhancing India's position for the US.
Over the years, the expatriate Indian community residing in the US has come to play an important role in building bridges between the two nations. The India Caucus, a lobby within the US Congress set up for influencing representatives on issues relating to India, was established in 1994. 64 The broader objective behind lobbying select Congress representatives was that these members, in turn, could question the Administration and influence policy towards India. The Caucus has been appreciated by Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee for its role in bringing closer the two largest democracies. 65
In another development that may create considerable common ground between the two nations for greater policy cooperation in the future, Indian and American views on China have begun converging closer. Several strategic analysts in India perceive China as the primary security threat for India. At the same time, many in Washington consider China as the principal strategic competitor of the US, not only in Asia, but also in the world as a whole.66 It is quite possible that the common threat perceptions regarding China may see India and America interacting more fruitfully on security and strategic considerations in the near future.
The US has clearly assigned higher priority to better bilateral relations with India. Instead of the traditionally practised zero-sum payoff (what is good for Pakistan is necessarily bad for India), it would prefer to engage both countries separately, and, to the extent possible, mutually. It would also prefer to remain non-committal on Kashmir, a stand that gels well with its new priorities. That, however, is no guarantee for subduing militancy in Kashmir and facilitating a quicker solution of the dispute.
Endnotes
Note 1: Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy: 1846-1990 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992). Back
Note 2: Standstill Agreement with India and Pakistan: "Jammu and Kashmir Government would welcome Standstill Agreement with India (Pakistan) on all matters on which these exist at the present moment with the outgoing British India Government. It is suggested that existing arrangements should continue pending settlement of details." Reply from Government of Pakistan sent on August 15, 1947, "Your telegram of the 12th. The Government of Pakistan agree to have a Standstill Agreement with the Government of Jammu and Kashmir for the continuance of the existing arrangements pending settlement of details and formal execution." Reply from Government of India, "Government of India would be glad if you or some other Minister duly authorised in this behalf could fly to Delhi for negotiating Standstill Agreement between Kashmir Government and Indian Dominion. Early action desirable to maintain intact existing agreements and administrative arrangements." The representative of Kashmir did not visit Delhi and no Standstill Agreement was concluded between the State and the Dominion of India, Verinder Grover and Ranjana Arora, 50 Years of Indo-Pak Relations (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publishers, 1998), p. 173. Back
Note 3: Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1966), pp. 123-124. Back
Note 4: Grover and Arora, n. 2, pp. 226-227. Back
Note 5: Narendra Singh Sarila, "Kashmir and the Great Game: Pawn in West's Anti-Soviet Strategy," The Times of India, August 14, 2000. Back
Note 6: Ibid. Back
Note 7: Text in Government of Pakistan, Kashmir Documents. Text of the Main Resolutions Adopted by the Security Council and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan from January 17, 1948, to December 2, 1957, Karachi 1962; as cited in Lamb, n. 1, 8. Back
Note 8: As in n. 5. Back
Note 9: Sir Owen Dixon, the Australian jurist, was appointed the UN representative on April 4, 1950. He had remarked, "I have formed the opinion that if there is any chance of settling the dispute over Kashmir by agreement between India and Pakistan, it now lies in partition and in some means of allocating the valley rather than an overall plebiscite." The reasons for rejecting overall plebiscite were: Kashmir was not a single economic, geographical, or demographic entity, and any attempt to allocate the whole of it to either country would create serious problems of refugee movements and dislocation. See Gupta, n. 3, pp. 220-221. (Dixon had come up with a number of proposals for solving the Kashmir dispute. One, he tried to ascertain the views of both government on taking a plebiscite region by region, allocating each to Pakistan or India according to the result of voting. He also asked Pakistan to withdraw its troops because he considered incursion an act contrary to international law. This was followed by a request to both to demilitarise the territory to a minimum of forces (Azad, state troops, Indian Army, local militia consistent with law and order). For details, see Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954) pp. 171-173. Back
Dixon's proposal of 'partition' and 'allocating the valley' was rejected by India because according to V.K. Krishna Menon who was the Indian representative to the UN then, India took pride in being a secular state and it claimed Islam as one of its religion. There were at any rate, more Muslims in India than in West Pakistan. As cited by Gupta, n. 3, p. 314.
Note 10: Robert J. Mcmahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 36-79. Back
Note 11: Rajesh Rajagopalan, "US Policy Towards South Asia: The Relevance of Structural Explanation, Strategic Analysis, vol. XXIII, no. 12, March 2000, pp. 1999-2001. Back
Note 12: Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies (New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 1993), p. 68. Back
Note 13: New York Times, June 10, 1956, See Kux, Ibid., p. 128. Back
Note 14: Harold A. Gould and Sumit Ganguli, The Hope and The Reality: US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992), p. 36. Back
Note 15: Eisenhower's India trip occurred in December 1959. Back
Note 16: India made elaborate comparisons between the attitude of the UN towards Korea and toward Kashmir. If the North Korean Communists had invaded South Korea, they argued, so had the Pakistanis invaded Kashmir. Why, then, were they not condemned, as were the North Koreans? Why had the UN failed to take action against Pakistan? See Korbel, n. 9, p. 171. Later in 1951, V.K. Krishna Menon drew attention to this point in a different way. In 1957, the Indian representative pleaded for "actions consistent with the crime of invasion". The Kashmir problem was not a territorial dispute but a question of aggression. See Gupta, n. 3, p. 313. Back
Note 17: n. 5. Back
Note 18: "Notes of Karachi-New Delhi Visit," undated memorandum drafted by Dean Rusk; see Kux, n. 12, p. 211. Back
Note 19: Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 664; see Kux, n. 12, p. 211. Back
Note 20: Report of the Secretary-General S/66651, September 3, 1965; UN Resolution of the Security Council, September 4, 6, 20, 1965; as cited in Rehmatullah Khan Kashmir and the United Nations (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1969) (Appendix XIV). Back
Note 21: Kux, n. 12, p. 238. Back
Note 22: P.N. Dhar, Indira Gandhi: The 'Emergency' and Indian Democracy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 210. Back
Note 23: The key documentation of the visit can be found in the US Department of State Bulletin, 71:1848, (November 25, 1974), pp. 704-714. Back
Note 24: n. 14, p. 77. Back
Note 25: Kux, n. 12, p. 413. Back
Note 26: George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 238. Back
Note 27: Interview by author, January 26, 1998, as cited by Perkovich, Ibid., p. 238. Back
Note 28: Stephen Philip Cohen, "The Reagan Administration and India" in Gould and Ganguly, eds., n. 14, p. 143, as cited by Perkovich, n. 26, p. 266. Back
Note 29: Kux, n. 12, p. 266. Back
Note 30: B.K. Shrivastava, "Indo-American Relations: Search for a New Equation", International Studies, vol. 30, no. 2, April-June 1993, p. 221. Back
Note 31: The Pioneer, July 10, 1993. Back
Note 32: The Times of India, September 28, 1993. Back
Note 33: The Times of India, November 7, 1993. Back
Note 34: With the coming in of Ron Brown, commercial deals worth US $7 billion between the US and Indian industries materialised. See www.expressindia.com, March 27, 2000. Also, with respect to defence, there were discussions on Indo-US defence cooperation and ways to "cooperate in reducing the dangers of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Southern Asia." See Military and Arms Transfer News, Issue 94/13, November 18, 1994. Back
Note 35: US Department of Commerce, December 8, 1997; Remarks of US Secretary of Commerce William M. Daley, "United States, India and the Challenge of the Global Economy", World Economic Forum, New Delhi, India. Back
Note 36: US Under-Secretary of State Thomas Pickering's statement made during his visit to India in October 1997; as cited in P.M. Kamath, Indo-US Relations During the Clinton Administration: Upward Trends and Uphill Tasks Ahead, www.idsa-india.org/an-Feb2html/ Back
Note 37: C. Uday Bhaskar, "Recent Developments in Indo-US Relations," Strategic Analysis, vol. XXI, no. 9, December 1997, p. 383. Back
Note 38: Ibid., p. 384. Back
Note 39: Jagdish P. Sharma, "Afghanistan and Socio-Economic Political Stability in Asia," Journal of Peace Studies, vol. 7, Issue 1, January-February 2000. Back
Note 40: Ibid. Back
Note 41: Prime Minister's Statement in Rajya Sabha regarding UN Security Resolution on June 8, 1998. For the text of the UN Resolution, see After the Tests: US Policy Towards India and Pakistan. A Report of the Independent Task Force, co-sponsored by the Brookings Institution, Washington DC and the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1998, pp. 57-60. Back
Note 42: The Lahore Declaration, Documentation 3, Agni, Studies in International Strategic Issues, vol. 4, no. 1, September 1998-January 1999, pp. 63-64. Back
Note 43: Ashok K. Behuria, "Clinton Visit and After: Kashmir Reports," Journal of Peace Studies, 7(2), March-April 2000, pp. 50-68. Back
Note 44: Joint Press Statement by President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee, March 21, 2000, release issued by the Embassy of India, Washington. Back
Note 45: Behuria, n. 43, pp. 50-68. Back
Note 46: India and the US decided to set up a Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism on January 19, 2000. The first meeting of the group took place in Washington in February 2000, and the second was held in New Delhi in September 2000. Press Release by Indian Embassy, Washington; The Tribune, January 20, 2000; India World, September 27, 2000. Back
Note 47: "Indo-US Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century", Press release by the Press Information Bureau, March 23, 2000. Back
Note 48: Reference to President Clinton's address on Pakistan Television, as cited in Pickering's (US under-secretary of state for political affairs) remarks at John Hopkins on US policy in South Asia, April 5, 2000, Washington File, Press and culture section, US Embassy, Bucharest. Back
Note 49: The Hindustan Times, March 12, 2001. Back
Note 50: www.ipcs.org, June 25, 2001, Article no. 511. Back
Note 51: The Times of India, July 25, 2001. Back
Note 52: http://usinfo.state.gov, Transcript: Christina Rocca's interview with Washington File, July 19, 2001. Back
Note 53: The Hindustan Times, August 12, 1997. Back
Note 54: New York Times, January 7, 1948. Back
Note 55: Baren Ray, "The Autonomy Question", Journal of Peace Studies, vol. 7, Issue 4, July-August 2000. Back
Note 56: n. 48. Back
Note 57: Mohammed Ayoob, "South Asia's Dangers and US Foreign Policy," Orbis, vol. 45, no. 1, Winter 2001, p. 130. Back
Note 58: The Times of India, March 11, 2000. Back
Note 59: Ibid. Back
Note 60: Behuria, n. 45, pp. 50-68. Back
Note 61: McMahon, n. 10, pp. 42-44. Back
Note 62: The then Indian Defence Secretary Ajit Kumar, called off his scheduled visit to the US for attending the meeting of the Defence Policy Group in the first week of November 1997 in Washington DC on the grounds that his US counterpart at the meeting, Frank Kramer, the assistant secretary of defence, was an official of much lower rank. In the past, however, other Indian defence secretaries had attended such meetings with officials of similar rank as their counterparts. See P.M. Kamath, "Indo-US Relations During the Clinton Administration: Upward Trends and Uphill Tasks Ahead", Strategic Analysis, vol. XXI, no. 11, February 1998, p. 1617. Back
Note 63: http://www.nasscom.org/template/itindia.htm, In 1999-2000, total Indian exports of software and services amounted to US $4 billion. Out of this, almost 62 per cent was exported to North America (more than US $2.4 billion). Back
Note 64: The NRIs instrumental behind setting up the Caucus targetted those Congress representatives whose election constituencies or districts had large Indian populations. They identified Frank Pallone (first chaiman of the India Caucus), Robert Andrews and Bob Menendez as the initial Congress representatives. They also criticised Robin Raphael, who was seen as a 'cowboy' who lectured senior Indian ministers on Kashmir policy and criticised the Indian posture on Kashmir at random. See www.rediff.com, September 18, 2000. Back
Note 65: Ibid. Back
Note 66: Ayoob, n. 57, p. 133. Back