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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
Vajpayee's Visit to Iran: Indo-Iranian Relations and Prospects of Bilateral Cooperation
Mohd. Naseem Khan, Researcher, IDSA
Abstract
India and Iran have enjoyed close and cordial relations since the distant past. The colonial rule in the Indian subcontinent had reduced the cultural and trade exchanges, but the traditional ties were revived after India gained independence. In the post-independence period, their relations have gone through many ups and downs. For several years after the Iranian revolution in 1979, Indo-Iranian relations were not smooth and cordial. Between 1978, when the Shah of Iran visited New Delhi, and 1993, there were no heads of government or heads of state visits between the two countries. However, in the last few years, both countries have started the process of setting their differences aside and moving towards greater understanding and cooperation in their bilateral relationship. High level visits at the prime ministerial level resumed after a long break in 1993 with the visits by Narasimha Rao (1993) and Hashemi Rafsanjani (1995). But this was followed by another gap till this year.
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit in April 2001 to Iran has provided a major boost to Indo-Iranian bilateral ties. The visit was also aimed at creating political understanding regarding common threats to their security. There are security concerns in West Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia over rising cross-border and state-sponsored terrorism, extremism, ethnic unrest and trafficking of drugs and arms out of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Vajpayee's visit to Tehran added new dimensions to the growing relations between India and Iran. It is expected to play an important role in the unfolding of new vistas of cooperation between the two countries. It will also have a healthy political and economic impact on the region.
India and Iran have interacted with each other since the distant past. The ancient ties and cultural exchanges between the two nations were given a boost with the advent of Islam in both Iran and India. In the post-independence period, their relations have gone through many ups and downs. Iran's alignment with the West and India's non-alignment policy prevented the two countries from closely interacting with each other. Since the end of the Cold War, the emergence of the American presence in the West Asian region, and common security perceptions have increasingly brought India and Iran closer.
Since the Iranian revolution in 1979, and Iran's diplomatic isolation, India's relations with Iran have attracted a great deal of attention. Over the past decades, Indo-Iranian relations have not been smooth and cordial. However, in the last few years, India and Iran have embarked upon a process of setting their differences aside and imparting greater understanding to their bilateral relationship. Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's visit to Iran in September 1993 was the first significant effort to bring back on track the bilateral relations which had been affected by the demolition of the Babri Masjid in December 1992. On the other hand, Iran had made an extra effort to move the relationship forward. It was an opportunity to remove all prior misperceptions between the two sides. President Rafsanjani paid an offical visit to India in April 1995. His visit generated a deep understanding between the two sides on a number of issues. This was reflected in his efforts to forge closer relations with India.
Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Iran on April 10-13, 2001, was the first since Prime Minister Rao's visit in 1993, and has provided a major boost to the multifaceted Indo-Iranian bilateral ties. The trip helped efforts for a close relationship between the two countries, which is based on mutual interests defining the future. The geopolitical realities emanating from the Talibanisation of Afghanistan, the emergence of the Central Asian Republics as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the enormous economic opportunities for export of natural gas to India, and of science based services and products from India provide the imperatives for a strategic relationship between the two countries. New Delhi and Tehran have explored the promising potential for a long-term, strategic partnership, especially in energy, petrochemicals, fertilisers, information technology and other key fields. 1 A number of agreements have been signed between the two countries on energy, trade, information technology and customs.
Besides economic cooperation, the visit sought to enhance political understanding to counter common threats to the security of the two countries. Today, there are grave security concerns in West Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia over the rising cross-border and state-sponsored terrorism, extremism, ethnic unrest, and trafficking of drugs and arms radiating out of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The two sides also discussed other vital issues related to regional peace and stability, including Indo-Pak relations and the issue of Kashmir. The aim of this paper is to highlight and address some of these vital issues, which have been of concern to both countries, and the growing cooperation between them.
India's Energy Calculus with Iran
On the energy front, Iran has always been a major source of oil for India. The two countries are now looking at the prospects of a long-term energy relationship. During Vajpayee's visit to Iran in April 2001, they signed an agreement for cooperation in the oil and gas sector. Moreover, Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh called for bolstering New Delhi-Tehran cooperation in the energy sector. 2 Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh described Tehran-New Delhi cooperation in the energy sector as a new chapter in bilateral relations between the two countries. 3 The supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that "building a gas pipeline from Iran to India would be one of the several beneficial projects that would cement bilateral ties." 4 In this regard, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said that laying down of the Iran-India gas pipeline across Pakistani territory will contribute greatly to regional peace and stability. 5
Iran has 5 per cent of the world's crude oil and 14 per cent of natural gas reserves. Oil reserves in Iran are estimated at 88,200 million barrels. 6 After Russia, Iran has the second largest natural gas reserves in the world, estimated at 23 trillion cubic metres. 7 Such vast amounts of reserves have enhanced its position in the world energy market. It will be the main gas exporter in the coming years. But in order to export gas, a pipeline network is essential. Iran also needs to find export markets, and India has emerged as the world's fifth largest petroleum consuming and an increasingly important gas consuming country. 8 Since India's domestic production is unable to meet its requirements, and with the demand for energy expected to rise rapidly in the coming years, India is expected to purchase 20 million cubic metres of gas from Iran annually, and of this, about 5 million cubic metres will be in liquid form. 9 The proposed gas pipeline 10 from Iran to India has become the main focus of the relationship and is expected to provide long-lasting mutual benefits to both countries.
In 1989, Indian and Iranian officials had developed a proposal for a pipeline to transport gas from Iran to India. Initially, the proposal did not make an impact but over the last few years, it has become an important part of India's energy strategy. Iran and India are currently engaged in finalising the gas pipeline project for the transportation of natural gas to India. In 1993, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the, project. 11 However, the project was put on hold for several years because of Pakistan's inability to take a decision to allow the pipeline to pass through its territory. 12 Tehran, however, believes that an overland pipeline would also provide a viable means of transport for the natural gas resources of Central Asia to the Indian subcontinent through an interconnected pipeline grid via Iran.
Soon after the military takeover, Pakistan sent a green signal to Iran for the pipeline proposal, and it was revived in December 1999. 13 The announcement of support to the pipeline project came during the conclusion of the technical level talks between Pakistani and Iranian Petroleum Ministry officials. The Pakistani delegation assured the Iranians of their support to the pipeline traversing the Pakistani territory to India. 14
Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh visited Iran in May 2000. His energy diplomacy was aimed at leveraging India's huge dependence on petroleum products to consolidate the relations with the oil rich nations. The setting up of the Indo-Iranian joint working group (JWG) was part of this diplomacy. The objective of the JWG would be to explore all aspects of energy supplies from Iran to India. Since Pakistan is the main reason for the many difficulties in the overland pipeline project, the JWG would study the political and technical aspects of transporting gas to India.. 15 Iran conveyed to India that a deep-sea pipeline for transportation of Iranian gas to India was not viable, commercially and technically, and the only viable option was an overland route running through Pakistani territory. In this regard, the former Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Jasjit Singh, has stated, "An overland pipeline would be secure and less expensive than a deep-sea one". 16 Consequently, India asked Iran to ensure the commitment of Pakistan for security of the project, and this assurance has been given by Gen. Pervez Musharraf to the Iranian government. Pakistani Minister of Petroleum and Natural Resources Usman Aminuddin also has assured that "Pakistan was prepared to address all concerns of the Indian government in this regard and extends all guarantees they required". 17 He emphasised that Pakistan is committed to an India-Iran gas pipeline to run through Pakistani territory, and it would provide all the required security to the project. In an interview with the Iranian News Agency (IRNA), he said, "We have provided full guarantee to Iran.Whatever the security concern India has, we will address it." 18 The President of Pakistan, Mohammad Rafiq Tarrar, had assured Pakistan's commitment to ensure the safe supply of natural gas to India from Iran. 19
The Indian foreign minister expressed India's readiness for implementation of the India-Iran gas pipeline project and told Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs Mohammad Hossain Adeli, in New Delhi, on November 24, 2000, "Regarding India's dire and rapidly increasing need for natural gas and Iran's rich gas resources, we appreciate the laying of the India-Iran gas pipeline ... I will spare no effort for the expansion of relations with Iran to this end " 20 . Adeli's response was well in tune with the Indian stance. 21
For India, the gas pipeline passing through Pakistani land has major security implications. The Indian government is deeply apprehensive that Pakistan might disrupt the supply of gas during military or diplomatic tension between the two countries. To overcome this concern, Iran has agreed to provide a sovereign guarantee for the supply of gas. The Iranian government has also promised to give an undertaking to the Indian government, that if Pakistan at any point of time cuts off gas supplies to India, Iran will supply an equal amount of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to India at the same pri????? of the overland gas pipeline via Pakistan, Prime Minister Vajpayee said, "If our relations with Pakistan were good, it would have been fairly simple to build an overland pipeline." 23 Iran is aware of the difficulties in Indo-Pak relations. Therefore, New Delhi and Tehran are trying to explore all options to ensure safe and cost effective transportation of Iran's gas resources to India as soon as possible
On the pipeline issue, the Indian prime minister said that there is no disagreement between India and Iran on laying down the pipeline to supply natural gas because of the debate over choosing either the deep-sea or land route. The overland pipeline will be more cost-effective compared to the other options-a pipeline in the shallow sea, a pipeline in the deep sea, and transportation by special tankers of liquefied gas. 24 The on-shore pipeline, however, will need to transit through Pakistani territory and because of this, it is not an easy option for India. Considering the present state of relationship with Pakistan, which is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, India could not but take into account the various contingencies, especially the risk of disruption of supplies in the event of hostilities, or of sabotage and damage even in the absence of an armed conflict. 25
Several means could be adopted by India and Iran in pursuing the overland option through Pakistan which could minimise the risk of any misadventure by Pakistan and ensure security of supply. The involvement of the international private sector, and financial institutions (in both India and Pakistan) is recommended as a viable proposition. India's line is clear: it wants a long-term partnership, with security of supplies as the main consideration.
Undoubtedly, the underwater option would be far more expensive than the overland arrangement involving Pakistan. Iran is keen on Pakistan's involvement in the project. The economic benefits to the two countries would be huge. The overland pipeline project could provide Pakistan as much as $700-800 million annually as transit fees, which will be steady income that will help its economy. However, India has reservations regarding the security of an overland pipeline, although Pakistan is ready to give guarantees. 26
Referring to the pipeline issue in his speech, Vajpayee repeated that the project must be cost effective and secure. 27 The Farsi paper Afarinesh said that though the pipeline project was one of the economic contracts Iran had hoped to sign, the two countries had still not been able to resolve their differences on the mode of transportation. 28
The latest round of consultation between India and Iran, however, has helped to improve the prospects of transporting the natural gas resources of the Persian Gulf to India through Pakistan. An eventual decision to build such an overland pipeline will be taken after the detailed joint project report is completed in the next few months. In a policy shift, External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh suggested that the Government of India may not object to energy supplies coming through Pakistan, if Iran undertakes the responsibility to deliver the natural gas to India. The pipeline through Pakistan may be possible if Islamabad is kept out of the energy calculus between New Delhi and Tehran.. 29 India considers the pipeline a bilateral issue with Iran, and has ruled out Pakistan's involvement in the agreement. It is entirely up to Tehran and its international partner to negotiate with Pakistan all the legal and security arrangements, and offer a reliable line of gas supplies to India.
The two countries have also agreed to study both options (overland and under water) in detail. India is no longer hostile to the overland pipeline and Iran is not dismissing the deep-sea option as too expensive. The two leaders gave a mandate to the joint committee of experts to come up with final set of recommendations. The committee comprises K.V. Rajan, adviser to the Ministry of External Affairs and S.M.H Adeli, deputy minister of economic relations in the Iranian Foreign Office. The committee will examine all the possibilities, including the overland and under-water routes. The Indo-Iranian joint working group on the gas pipeline has decided to conduct a feasibility study on both onshore and offshore pipelines from Iran to India. 30 The two studies will be completed by next year. The option they choose will mark the beginning of a new relationship between India and Iran, built on the solid foundation of energy cooperation, and may prove to be a long-lasting bilateral economic relationship.
The Afghanistan Issue
The changing geopolitics of the region gave the impetus to Vajpayee's visit to Iran. India's opposition to the Taliban militia, more forthright since the hijacking of the Indian Airlines IC-814 to Kandahar and the involvement of Afghan mercenaries in Kargil, as also the increase in militancy in Jammu and Kashmir, provided the backdrop. 31 India and Iran have condemned terrorism and the Taliban for its brand of religious fundamentalism. Pakistan's active support to the Taliban had upset Iran, which has supported Afghanistan's Opposition Northern Alliance and its leader, Ahmad Shah Masood.
For India and Iran, combatting trans-border terrorism is a priority area for cooperation and joint action. The fountainheads of international terrorism, religious fanaticism, and drug and arms trafficking are Pakistan and Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. India and Iran have common security interests in ensuring peace, stability and tolerant political order between the borders of India and Iran. India has vital interests in the security and political stability of this region, especially since Afghanistan, a traditional geostrategic gateway to the Indian subcontinent, has over the past decade largely been under the control of forces unfriendly to India.
The emergence and rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s brought India and Iran closer. Both countries realised that the growing influence of the fundamentalist Taliban poses a serious threat to the entire region. The situation in Afghanistan was among the various issues of mutual interest that Jaswant Singh discussed with his Iranian counterpart during his visit to Iran in May 2000. Iranian President Mohammed Khatami emphasised that greater attention and interaction between the two sides is important for peace and stability in the region. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi issued a statement in which he stressed that his country is interested in initiating a dialogue, aimed at restoring peace in the country, with all the factions fighting each other in Afghanistan. 32 The Taliban's diplomatic mission has issued an official statement in Islamabad, urging Iran to reciprocate its goodwill gesture for resolving the Afghan crisis. In response, in an editorial on October 28, 2000 , the Tehran Times observed that "if the Taliban militia are really sincere to resolve the crisis, Iran should invite all the ethnic and religious groups in Afghnistan to the negotiating table and prepare the ground for the formation of a broad-based government in that country". 33 Moreover, Kamal Kharrazi stated that "the crisis in Afghanistan can only be resolved through peaceful negotiation aimed with the purpose of forming a broad-based government in which representatives of all Afghan ethnic and religious groups may take part." 34 India and Iran have the common objective of restricting consolidation of the Taliban, and the forces of destabilisation spreading out of Afghanistan, and in ensuring peace and stability in that country. Both India and Iran want to expedite, and contribute to, international efforts to establish a government in Kabul which represents all the ethnic and cultural groups of Afghnistan.
Embarking on a strategic partnership, India and Iran signed the historic Tehran Declaration on April 10, 2001, for the enhancement of bilateral cooperation, establishment of a broad-based government in Afghanistan, and shared concern over international terrorism. The declaration envisages that the two nations would cooperate to fight the menace of terrorism and respect each other's national security interests.. 35 There was complete convergence of views on combatting terrorism. The two countries showed deep concern over the situation in Afghanistan where the Taliban-controlled areas have become a breeding ground of religious extremism and international terrorism. The declaration also stressed the importance of a comprehensive convention against international terrorism at the UN, an initiative taken by New Delhi. It will guide the future ties between the two countries.
India and Iran have decided to intensify mutual cooperation to effectively tackle the growing menace of extremism and terrorism in the region. Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Khatami agreed that regional stability, security , welfare and progress could be achieved only through cooperation of all countries of the region. The two countries showed their readiness to enhance mutual cooperation against the rise of extremist forces, terrorism and an enhanced flow of illicit drugs and arms. 36
Tehran is deeply concerned over the drug and security issues which stem from the Afghan crisis, and since it appears to have no military solution, the warring sides should sit down at the negotiating table. Iran is currently chalking out a plan of action with other countries such as Saudi Arabia and India to curb the Afghan menace. Afghanistan comprises one of the key areas of future India-Iran cooperation. Neither country has recognised the Taliban extremist militia in Afghanistan, which wiped out the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani. India and Iran would like to see a peaceful solution of the conflict in Afghanistan. Both nations are also urging negotiations among the warring Afghan factions and the creation of a regime in Afghanistan representing all the ethnic and religious groups in that country. 37 Moreover, sharing India's deep concern over the threat to regional security, Iran has asked Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban, in order to restore peace in Afghanistan. In this regard, Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi said, "We will speak to our friends in Pakistan. There is need to change the policies towards Afghanistan and they must encourage Afghan groups to sit down and negotiate." 38 As regards Indo-Pak relations, Iran can play a crucial role in bridging the gap between New Delhi and Islamabad. The Secretary General of Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Hasan Rowbani has said that Iran is ready to help both states set up a good relationship, and that the laying down of a gas pipeline through Iran, Pakistan and India is a significant step which will contribute to the friendly relations between India and Pakistan. 39
In the Tehran Declaration, Vajpayee and Khatami together denounced international terrorism in all its forms and castigated those nations which aid and abet terrorism. 40 The two sides also endorsed the importance of strengthening the international legal regime against terrorism. The declaration underlined the cooperative agenda between the two nations. The agenda is rooted in the common commitment to a dialogue among civilisations, an idea promoted by Khatami, and their shared opposition to the forces of extremism. 41 India has strongly supported the call for a dialogue among civilisations to foster greater understanding and tolerance among nations. 42
The Tehran Declaration and various other agreements point to mutual gains for both countries. Tehran, for reasons of strategy, politics, religion and security, has in the past been closer to Pakistan. But Iran today is deeply troubled by Kabul's role in drug trafficking and its harsh treatment of the Shia community which is a minority in Afghanistan. Islamabad's patronage of the anti-Shia Taliban has provided an opportunity for India to forge closer relations with Iran. The joint agreements on terrorism, extremism and drug- trafficking institutionalise a shared threat perception of an Islamabad-Kandahar axis. 43 India has made it clear that the Pakistan-Afghanistan (Taliban) nexus is behind the so-called Kashmir militancy.
There has been complete convergence of views on the unfolding situation in Afghanistan between the two countries. Vajpayee stressed that India and Iran will work together closely in all international fora to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. 44 The Indo-Iranian strategic convergence on Afghanistan is part of a wider international coalition that is emerging against Talibanisation, extremism and terrorism in the region. This comprises, apart from New Delhi and Tehran, the US, Russia and Saudi Arabia, and their concerns are equally strong about the direction the Taliban has set for Afghanistan. 45 India has reasons to support the Saudi- Iranian efforts to combat terrorism. The consolidation and widening of the regional coalition against the forces of extremism and narco-terrorism radiating out of Pakistan and Afghanistan is expected to propel New Delhi closer to Iran.
India is trying to discover common ground with the key nations of the Islamic world. On the political front, it seeks support for political moderation and opposition to religious extremism. This has provided a huge opportunity for India to make common cause with a wide range of Islamic countries to support political moderation, and counter international terrorism. The rise of the Taliban since the 1990s has sharpened the prospects for a new political convergence between India and a group of Islamic countries like Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia.
The Kashmir Issue
The Kashmir problem had been the main point of difference between India and Iran, as Tehran actively supported Pakistan, both within and outside the UN, throughout the period 1950-65. Iran also supported Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan Wars of 1965 and 1971. In the aftermath of the 1990-91 Iraq-Kuwait crisis, and due to Western pressure, Iran was compelled to normalise its relations with regional countries, including India. In 1991, during discussions between leaders of the two countries, Iran conceded that Kashmir was an integral part of India. 46 However, during his visit to Pakistan in September 1992, President Rafsanjani expressed support for the right of self-determination of the Kashmiri Muslims. In July 1993, then Indian Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit was told by Velayati that Iran would not give any help to separatists in Kashmir and expressed full support for the territorial integrity of India. 47 Iran assured Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, during his visit to Iran in 1993, that it had no intention of interfering in India's internal affairs, including in Jammu and Kashmir. 48 During his visit to India, President Rafsanjani pleaded for a peaceful solution of the Kashmir issue through bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan. 49 Thus, Iran has followed a dual policy regarding the Kashmir issue. Sometimes it has supported the Pakistani perspective on the Kashmir issues, and at other times, it has adopted another policy in favour of India.
At the 9th summit of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) at Doha, in November 2000, the member countries, including Iran, agreed not only to include the Kashmir issue in its resolution but also to impress upon India that the Islamic world cannot ignore the fate of the Kashmiri Muslims. The OIC in its resolution called upon its member states, "to take all necessary measures to persuade India to put an immediate end to the violence in Kashmir''. 50 It was emphasised that the international community must also intervene in the Kashmir issue. On November 15, 2000, India rejected the OIC's demand to end violence in Kashmir, emphasising that it was India's internal matter. 51
As far as India is concerned, the problem of terrorism in Kashmir has to be dealt with at the local, regional and international levels. By teaming up with like-minded countries, it may be possible to expose the elements behind the terrorist menace and evolve a framework of cooperation to curb the terrorist activities in the highly vulnerable province of India. 52 This view has also been expressed by President Mohammed Khatami, who stressed that there is need for both India and Iran to work together to counter the threats emanating from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. He gave a call for putting an end to external interference (implying Pakistan) in Afghanistan and also emphasised that both countries should coordinate efforts to control these threats.
The Kashmir dispute with Pakistan figured in Vajpayee's talks with the Iranian leaders. The prime minister explained India's position on Kashmir: it is committed to resolving all contentious sectarian issues through dialogue. Unlike most of the other Muslim countries, Iran has generally taken a neutral stand on Kashmir. Tehran welcomed and endorsed India's recent peace initiative in the most troubled province of India. The Iranian leaders are aware of the fact that India has tried to restore peace in Jammu and Kashmir, and had warmly endorsed Prime Minister Vajpayee's peace initiative in Kashmir which began with the unilateral ceasefire in the month of Ramazan last year. 53 Iran's supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, appreciated the move for bringing about peace in Kashmir. He urged Vajpayee to seek a peaceful settlement to the Kashmir dispute. He stated, "We hope a solution can be reached, which will guarantee the rights of the Kashmiri residents and provide them with peace and tranquillity." 54 Tehran's main suggestion in this regard appears to be the establishment of an autonomous Kashmir. In his reply to Khamenei, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee assured that he would make all efforts to solve the Kashmir problem. For India, the security implications are also negative, as the consolidation of extremist and radical forces in Afghanistan will harden pressures on Kashmir.
Vajpayee has succeeded in establishing a strategic partnership with a leading Islamic nation, Iran. He said that his visit to Iran was not aimed at sidelining Pakistan, and that India wants to improve its relations with Iran, but not at the expense of any third country. 55 While he ruled out an India-Iran axis against Pakistan, the two countries will jointly act-diplomatically and politically-to contain the menace of trans-national terrorism. Vajpayee said that India and Iran have taken the initiative to improve and strengthen their bilateral relationship for mutual benefit and "not to harm or cause loss to any country." 56
In his historic address to the Iranian Majlis (Iranian Parliament) on April 11, 2001, the Indian prime minister expressed his commitment to the principle of secularism. He declared that Islam had been an integral part of Indian national and social life for a thousand years, and assured that secularism in India would remain a basic feature of the country. He emphasised the importance of secularism as an inherent part of the Indian ethos. 57 He underscored India's commitment to secularism and said that "neither the state nor civil society would ever weaken its bonds with secular values which are inherent in our civilisation and cultural inheritance." 58 Iranian President Mohammed Khatami, in his interaction with Vajpayee, hailed India's secular traditions and declared that he held these in high esteem. He also told Vajpayee that he was in favour of India and Pakistan finding a solution to bilateral issues through dialogue. The Iranian side feels that the continuing tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad are detrimental to the economic development of the region. 59 Vajpayee stressed that India would never allow any external force to cast a shadow on the country's secular fabric by seeking to damage its unity and integrity. Reiterating his willingness to engage Pakistan, the Indian prime minister invited Pakistan's chief executive Gen. Pervez Musharraf for a dialogue, deviating from his earlier stand that "dialogue and violence cannot go hand in hand." 60
Vajpayee, during his address, again drew the attention of the Iranian leadership to the newly emerging threats to India and Iran. He expressed deep concern about the Taliban, and said that the dark forces of violence, terrorism and obscurantist ideologies have again emerged in our neighbourhood. The nexus of these forces with violence and terror presents a challenge to all societies that aspire to harmony and peace; he made an indirect reference to the Taliban, as a threat to the region. 61 He also lamented the emergence of these forces and their regressive ways. The destruction of the Buddha statues at Bamiyan in Afghanistan was condemned by India. Iran also was one of the countries which strongly opposed the vandalisation of the Bamiyan statues. President Khatami strongly condemned this act of the Taliban and regretted the use of Islam, not merely in connection with the Buddha statues but in the overall context of Talibanisation. He said that he was deeply regretful that such crimes are committed in the name of Islam. 62
Trade and Commerce
On economic cooperation, India seems to be inclined to give importance to foreign trade, transfer of technology, and export, and is interested in expansion of economic relations, particularly in the energy field. The public and private sectors in India are interested in investing in Iran. Therefore, New Delhi and Tehran are examining the prospects of a long-term tie-up in the energy sector and in other areas of cooperation. The two countries have signed a few accords, including an MoU for setting up a JWG to identify areas of cooperation in information and technology. Another MoU was signed to set up a framework for India to meet the training needs of Iran in professional and technical areas. A trade and economic cooperation agreement was signed between the two countries followed by an accord for cooperation in customs.
By signing these agreements, India and Iran showed their readiness to promote trade and commerce between the two countries. In order to encourage trade and economic cooperation, the two sides decided to expeditiously work towards protection and promotion of investment, and avoidance of double taxation. Prime Minister Vajpayee told the IRNA that both countries need to finalise a mechanism that would enable the participation of the private and public sectors in economic development projects in the two countries.
In a significant move to add economic substance to the incipient strategic partnership with Iran, Prime Minister Vajpayee announced that his government had offered a $200 billion line of credit 63 to support India's participation in Iran's third economic plan for economic development. He termed the offer a powerful signal of the earnest desire to improve commercial ties between the two countries. He said that financing was the key to expanding commercial ties between the two nations. The offer gives credibility to Vajpayee's proposal for trebling the bilateral trade in the next three years. The present figure of joint annual trade stands at about $1.1 billion. He also called for reciprocal banking arrangements and the negotiation of preferential trading arrangements between the two nations. The Indian businessmen hope that the $200 million credit line will be an appropriate step towards a strategic perspective on commercial relations with Iran. All these incentives for improving bilateral trade 64 could further promote political and economic ties between India and Iran.
India and Iran also have common concerns regarding the stability of Central Asia where both countries have developed strong political interests. Having no direct access to the Central Asian Republics, India sees Iran as the gateway to the markets and natural resources of that region. The construction of transport links among Iran, Russia and India will play a crucial role in the context of trade cooperation. It has been suggested by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) that India requires a North-South trade corridor running from Iran to Southern Russia and Central Asia, instead of via Pakistan, for surface transportation of goods. The corridor, originating from Bandar Abbas, extending to the Caspian Sea, and eventually ending up in Russia, has been described by India as an excellent outlet for its goods to the region. 65 Both sides have agreed to encourage businessmen to make better use of the transit corridors through India, Iran, Turkmenistan and Russia. 66 This will expand the role of Iran as a transit route for exporting Indian goods to Central Asia, the Caucasus and Russia. 67 This point has really pleased Iran, which is trying to develop its potential as a regional hub and a link between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. India had earlier signed a tripartite agreement with Iran and Turkmenistan. For India, such treaties are providing a land trade route into Central Asia, the lack of which has long constricted India's influence in that region.
Conclusion
Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to Iran has been described as most successful in terms of the expansion of bilateral relations and promotion of peace and stability in the region. The visit will pave the way for better Tehran-New Delhi relations in all known areas of cooperation. This will cultivate a healthy political and economic atmosphere in the region, based on mutual understanding. There is no doubt that the India-Iran relationship, through bilateral or multilateral cooperation, can bring peace, stability and prosperity to the entire region. The gas pipeline, if it materialises, would contribute to generation of confidence and trust among the countries involved in the project, which would subsequently promote peace and stability in the West Asian region and the Indian subcontinent. There has been complete convergence of views between the two countries on matters like the threat to the region posed by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Given the excellent rapport that Vajpayee has established with Khatami, the chances of close mutual strategic cooperation between the two countries appear extremely bright. The promotion of political and economic ties with Iran is likely to encourage the two sides to seek security ties, that would subsequently play a crucial role in curbing the menace of terrorism .The joint call for a global mechanism to combat international terrorism is a clear manifestation that both Iran and India are firmly committed to upholding international peace and security. The Tehran Declaration and other agreements are manifestations of a timely strategic handshake between the two ancient civilisations.
The visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee is expected to not only increase India's influence in West Asia , but also in the entire Islamic world that for long had been associated with the policy of insularity. India's efforts to forge closer ties with Iran are part of its moves to establish closer links with the Islamic world. The visits of Vajpayee and Jaswant Singh to some of the Muslim countries are part of this move. Despite Pakistan's endless efforts to turn the Islamic world against India, Vajpayee made it clear that India does not want to improve its relations at the cost of any other country, underlining the positive element of India's quest to reach out to new friends and allies in an increasingly complex and competitive international system.
Endnotes
Note 1: The Tribune, April 11, 2001. Back
Note 2: Public Opinion Trends (POT) (Iran Series), vol.6, no.46, June 1,2001,p.320. Back
Note 3: Ibid. Back
Note 4: The Asian Age, April 13,2001. Back
Note 5: POT (Iran Series) vol.6, no.33, April 13, 2001, p.237. Back
Note 6: International Energy Statistics Sourcebook, Oil and Gas Journal,1999. Back
Note 7: Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran External Service, Tehran, November 19,2000, cited in BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), Third Series, MEW/0668, November 25, 2000. Back
Note 8: The Pioneer, April 13, 2001. Back
Note 9: POT (Iran Series), vol. 6, no. 47, June 6, 2001, p. 326. Back
Note 10: The overland route will entail constructing a 2,670 km pipeline at a cost of around $3.5 billion, while the cost for the underwater pipeline could be between $10-12 billion. The largest section-1,100 km-of the overland route will be in Iran. The money to be shelled out by Tehran would be $1.8 billion. Some 707 km of the pipeline would run through Pakistan. The cost to Islamabad would be around $1.2 billion. India will have 850 km of the pipeline and will have to put in just $650 million. For India, the cost of the deep-sea pipeline would be far more as a major portion of the pipeline would be in Indian waters. The pipeline will originate in Southern Iran, pass by Pakistan's Multan city and terminate at Bhuj in Gujarat (India). The capacity of the pipeline will be 3,260 million cubic feet per day. The Times of India, July 12, 2001. Back
Note 11: The Economic Times, May 22, 2001. Back
Note 12: The Times of India, June 14, 2001. Back
Note 13: "India-Iran Gas Pipeline May Soon Be a Reality", POT (Pakistan Series), vol. 29, no. 42, February 19, 2001; The Hindu, June, 22,2001. Back
Note 14: Business Recorder, March 21, 2000. Back
Note 15: The Economic Times, May 24, 2000; The Hindu, May 24, 2000. Back
Note 16: The Economic Times, April 5, 2001. Back
Note 17: Shamim Ahmed Rizvi, "$3 Billion Project of Iran , Pakistan and India Gas Pipeline", Pakistan and Gulf Economist, December 25-31, 2000, p.39. Back
Note 18: Energy Review, IDSA, vol. 6, no.12, June 2001; see also, Dawn, May 22,2001. Back
Note 19: Rizvi, n.17, p.3. Back
Note 20: "India Pleased with Gas Pipeline From Iran: Jaswant Singh", POT (Iran Series), vol.6, no.9, January 29,2001. p.68 Back
Note 21: Ibid. Back
Note 22: POT (Pakistan Series), vol.29, no.42, February 19, 2001, p.693. Back
Note 23: The Times of India, April 14, 2001; The Hindu, April 14, 2001. Back
Note 24: The Hindu, April 10, 2001. Back
Note 25: Ibid . Back
Note 26: The Tribune, April 20,2001. Back
Note 27: The Times of India, April 13, 2001. Back
Note 28: The Times of India, April 13, 2001. Back
Note 29: The Hindu, June 13, 2001. Back
Note 30: The Economic Times, June 13, 2001 Back
Note 31: "India-Iran Relations: Pragmatic Turn", Economic and Political Weekly, vol. XXXVI, no.16,April 21, 2001. Back
Note 32: The Nation, January 18, 2001. Back
Note 33: POT (Iran Series), vol.6, no.3, January 6, 2001,p.20. Back
Note 34: Ibid. Back
Note 35: The Hindu, April 11,2001. Back
Note 36: The Times of India, April 14, 2001. Back
Note 37: The Times of India, May 18, 2000; The Hindu, March 30, 2001. Back
Note 38: The Times of India, April 11,2001. Back
Note 39: POT (Iran Series) vol.6, no.46, June 1, 2001, p.323. Back
Note 40: The Times of India, April 11, 2001. Back
Note 41: Ibid. Back
Note 42: Ibid. Back
Note 43: The Hindustan Times, April 16, 2001. Back
Note 44: The Pioneer, April 16,2001. Back
Note 45: The Hindu, April 11,2001. Back
Note 46: A. K. Pasha, " Indo-Iranian Relations : The Kashmir Issue", in A.K. Pasha, ed., India, Iran and GCC States: Political Strategy and Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2000), p.267. Back
Note 47: National Herald, July 15,1993. Back
Note 48: Pasha, n.46, pp.269-271; National Herald, July 15, 1993. Back
Note 49: Farah Naaz, " Indo-Iranian Relations: Vital Factors in the 1990s", Strategic Analysis, vol. XXV, no.2, May 2001, p.338. Back
Note 50: POT (Iran Series), vol.6, no.6, January 22,2001, pp.52-53. Back
Note 51: Ibid., p.46. Back
Note 52: Poonam Mann, " Fighting Terrorism: India and Central Asia," Strategic Analysis, vol. XXIV, no.11, February 2001, p.2047. Back
Note 53: The Hindustan Times, April 14,2001. Back
Note 54: John Cherian, "Mixed Singals in Tehran", Frontline , vol.18,no.9, April 28-May 11,2001, p.50. Back
Note 55: The Times of India, April 14,2001. Back
Note 56: The Hindustan Times, April 14, 2001. Back
Note 57: Cherian, n.54, p.49. Back
Note 58: Ibid. Back
Note 59: Ibid, p.50. Back
Note 60: The Times of India, April 12,2001. Back
Note 61: Ibid. Back
Note 62: Ibid. Back
Note 63: The Hindu, April 13,2001. Back
Note 64: Iran's exports to India, which consist mainly of shipment of crude oil reached close to $1billion last year. Iran imported about $165 million worth of goods including tea, iron ore, chemicals and textiles during the same period. See Iran Focus, vol. 14, no. 4, April 1, 2001 and POT (Iran Series) vol.6, no.46, June 1,2001. p.320. Back
Note 65: POT (Iran Series), vol. 6, no. 46, June 1, 2001,p. 319. Back
Note 66: Cherian, n.54, p.50. Back
Note 67: Iran Focus, vol.14, no.4, April 1, 2001. Back