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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
Operational Art in the Indian Context: An Open Sources Analysis
Brig. G.D. Bakshi, VSM
Abstract
The Indian Army can lay claim to a large repository of combat experience, having held its own against world class foes like the Germans, Japanese and Turks in the colonial wars of the British Empire and the two World Wars of the last century. This paper focusses on the performance of the Indian Army at the level of Operational Art, within the larger ambit of our post-independence military experience. We need to recognise the criticality of the level of Operational Art in the context of limited or unlimited wars in the subcontinent and the dire necessity of outgrowing an attrition mindset-a transition from attrition to manoeuvre warfare.
Background
The post-independence Indian Army can claim to be the one of the most combat tested military organisations in the world. It has, since 1947, fought four major short duration and high intensity conflicts (Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)-1947-48, 1962, 1965 and 1971). In addition, it has a wealth of experience in the genre of low intensity conflict. It has successfully managed insurgencies in the northeastern states, a vicious terrorist movement in the Punjab and has almost succeeded in taming a faultline jehad in Kashmir.
As a historical entity, the Indian Army can also lay claim to an even larger repository of combat experience of the colonial wars of the British Empire and the two major World Wars of the last century. It held its own against world class foes like the Germans, Japanese and Turks. However, the focus in this paper will largely be on analysing our post-independence military experience. This period alone can yield lessons that are relevant to our modern context. Within this larger ambit, the focus of this paper will be on examining our performance (or the absence of it) at the level of Operational Art. Operational Art has two basic styles-one based on attrition and the other on manoeuvre. It is the author's contention that an analysis of India's ancient and recent military history goes to show that Indian Operational Art has been based totally on an attrition mindset. This has led to a sub-optimal utilisation of our military resources. An analysis of our post-independence military campaigns betrays an overwhelming emphasis on the tactical level at the cost of the operational and strategic levels of war. There is a need to enhance the awareness and relevance of the operational level of war and transform our historical mindset from an attrition to a maneouvre oriented approach. That alone can ensure an optimal utilisation of our military resources.
Open Sources
This analysis is premised entirely on information available from open sources. We are fortunate that we now have a large number of combat memoirs of the various high intensity conflicts that India has fought since indepencence. The official history of the 1947-48 conflict in J&K has been published. Of the 1965 War, a large number of memoirs of senior generals from both sides is now available. In particular, we have the accounts of Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh (GOC-in-C Western Command) and Pakistan's Army Chief Gen Mohd Musa Khan and Lt Gen Gul Hasan Khan and Brig Gulzar Ahmed. The 1971 War has been very well documented and apart from personal memoirs, there is a large number of campaign histories. The important memoirs are by Lt Gen J.F.R. Jacob, Lt Gen Niazi and analytical studies by Maj Gen Palit and Maj. Gen. Sukhwant Singh. Brian Cloughley's History of the Pakistan Army is also a useful document. Another valuable piece of research is Maj K.C. Praval's Indian Army After Independence. This analysis is based entirely on these published accounts and memoirs which provide a wealth of data and insight into these wars. A methodical study of these open sources is long overdue and must be taken up as research assignments and theses, at both the College of Combat and the Defence Services Staff College, as also the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
Operational Art
The American author, William S. Lind, defines Operational Art as "the Art of using tactical events to strike directly at the enemy's strategic Centre of Gravity". 1 American Field Manual 100.5 (Operations) defines Operational Art as "the employment of military forces to attain goals in a theatre of war or theatre of operations through the design, organisation and conduct of campaigns and major operations". 2 It further states, "Operational Art involves the decision to accept or decline battle, and when and where to fight. The essence of Operational Art is to determine the enemy centre of gravity and develop a campaign plan to achieve decisive success."
The American author John F. Antal has listed the elements of conflict as under: 3
Historically, the Indian Army derives its organisational culture from the British Indian Army. Unlike the Continental Armies of Europe (in specific, the German and Russian Armies), the British Army (till recently) did not recognise the level of Operational Art as a distinct gradation in the functional hierarchy of combat. The British Army recognised no intermediate level between strategy and tactics. The entire post-independence generation of Indian military leaders, therefore, grew up on a schemata of the study of war which simply did NOT recognise the existence of the level of Operational Art between the ambit of strategy and tactics. Our early military experience, therefore, reflects a painful process of growth and maturation that was characterised by tactical excellence but a total lack of grasp of the levels of Operational Art and Strategy. This was acquired by slow degrees over the decades.
The causes are not far to seek. Indianisation of the officer cadre of the British Indian Army had been resisted tooth, nail and claw by the British Imperial set-up. It was only between the two World Wars that the far-sighted efforts of some Indian leaders of the freedom movement led to a partial Indianisation of the officer cadre. World War II, however, saw the British making a virtue of necessity and a large number of Indian officers gained valuable operational command experience at the company and battalion levels in Burma and North Africa.
The 1947-48 Conflict in Kashmir
Independence, therefore, unleashed a period of tremendous flux and change. The organisational entity of the British Indian Army had to be vivisected into the Indian and Pakistani Armies. These had to contend with the communal holocaust of partition. An entire generation of Indian officers found themselves catapulted from the command of companies and battalions to that of divisions and corps. There was, therefore, a painful lack of experience and understanding of the strategic and operational levels of war. It was in these circumstances that the Indian Army was pitchforked into the defence of Kashmir.
The campaign saw a series of good to excellent tactical battles at the company, battalion and brigade levels. However, the near total absence of any national or even campaign strategy was painfully evident. A series of good tactical level encounters had set the stage for an operational level campaign for the liberation of the whole of Kashmir from the raiders and their Pakistani mentors. We, however, took the case to the United Nations Organisation (UNO)! It was possibly a strategic blunder for which we are still paying a steep price.
On the whole, however, the fledgling Indian Army performed well at the tactical level. The actions in Kashmir unfolded along the Burma theatre format. The Indian Army sought to secure a series of air heads in Srinagar, Leh and Poonch. The Indian Air Force (IAF) flew in troops in a fire fighting mode that was able to stem the tide of the Pathan Lashkars intent on loot and mayhem. A series of operations to lift the seige of Poonch, Skardu and Leh was launched. The absence of an air head in the Skardu garrison led to its eventual capitulation after a six-month-long seige (the longest in recent military history). 4 Availability of air fields enabled the successful lifting of the seige at Leh and Poonch. The securing of the Zojila Pass by tanks of the 7th Cavalry was a brilliant tactical stroke by Gen Thimmayya. 5 However, at the end of the day, the glaring lack of any national strategy or operational level design was painfully evident in this campaign. We were then quite low on the learning curve. Our tactical performance had been good but our military leaders had yet a long way to grow and mature at the level of Operational Art.
The 1962 Sino-Indian War
This war was an unmitigated disaster. Our performance even at the tactical level proved to be dismal. Though the Ladakh Scouts and some regular infantry units had put up a good fight in a brigade level action in Ladakh, the performance in the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) was a dismal failure of command at the local level. Senior commanders pushed up a large number of disparate units (that had never functioned together as a formation). These were force-marched to the extremities of their operational and logistical reach in the mistaken belief that it was only a game of chess that the Chinese were playing. We just had to show the flag for them to back down. 6 This led to the disaster of Namka Chhu. Even here, a Rajput unit put up an excellent fight. 7 The subsequent disaster at Sela, however, was inexplicable and mortifying in the extreme. There was very little of actual fighting and Operational Art was only conspicuous by its absence.
Indo-Pak War, 1965
The 1962 humiliation was a national challenge that drew a magnificent response. It led to an unprecedented expansion of the Indian Army and the onset of real and hard training. Pakistan watched the reconstruction of the Indian Army with trepidation. Field Marshal Mohd Ayub Khan decided that 1965 was Pakistan's last chance to press its existing advantage in armour, artillery and air. The rapid expansion of the Indian Army had unleashed a lot of organisational turbulence. Older units had been milked of key personnel for new raisings. Pakistan assessed the Indian national and military morale to be at its nadir of despair. Gen Harbaksh Singh's account (War Despatches) gives us a graphic insight into Pakistan's motivations for conflict.
The subjectivity in the Pakistani military establishment has traditionally been very high. There has been a persistent tendency to over-estimate themselves as the Cubans (or Germans) of the East. In 1965, Pakistan actually had a clear edge in armour and artillery as under:
India Pakistan Remarks
Tanks 608 756 This included 352 Pattons compared to just 186 Centurions with India.
Artillery 628 552 Considering Indian artillery deployed against China, Pakistan had a clear edge, especially in medium and heavy calibre artillery on the Western Front.
Source: Lt Gen (Retd) Harbaksh Singh, VrC War Despatches (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1988), p. 7. 8
Pakistan sensed a historic opportunity to exploit India's weakened state and apparent demoralisation, and wrest Kashmir in a daring gamble that was premised on the thesis that India would localise any conflict to J&K alone. Maj Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik was the maverick Pakistani commander who conceived Operation Gibralter and sold it over the head of his army chief (Gen Mohd Musa Khan) 9 to Field Marshal Ayub Khan. The Pakistanis were working to a clear operational design centred on creating a rebellion in Kashmir with eight infiltrated columns of Mujahids with fancy Islamic names. 10 This was to be followed by a coup de main operation (Grand Slam) to cut the Indian jugular in Chamb-Jaurian. The entire operation in Kashmir was preceded by a deliberate strategic deception plan to divert attention towards Kutch. Operation Desert Hawk was launched for this purpose to suck in Indian reserves to the south. However, the Indian commanders refused to rise to this bait. The proactive strategy of responding at a place and time of our own choosing was crystallised in this period. This proved to be a boon in the subsequent conflict.
The Pak version of the "Foco" theory of fomenting a local rebellion purely with external intervention forces proved to be a dismal failure in J&K. India responded with a series of tactical operations along the ceasefire line. The most brilliant of these led to the capture of the Hajji Pir Pass and the heights overlooking Kargil. Pakistan now responded with Operation Grand Slam. Pakistan's 7th Infantry Division and an armoured brigade (minus) worth aimed at the Indian jugular in Chamb. They came close to severing it. India now flung in its air force to stem the tide in Chamb. 11
It was at this critical juncture that India wrested the initiative at the strategic level by its bold political decision to extend the conflict across the international border. A series of offensives against the Pakistani Punjab compelled it to recoil from Chamb, and Kashmir proved to be a 'brigade too far' for Pakistan.
Operational Art in 1965
A military historian, however, has called the 1965 War a "dismal landscape of lost opportunities". Gen Harbaksh Singh has clearly highlighted how we regained the initiative and gained total strategic surprise by deciding to extend the conflict to the Punjab. The entire build-up to the offensive launch pads was completed in total secrecy. Pakistan was shocked by the suddenness and scale of the Indian response at the strategic level. However, indifferent tactical execution soon diluted our response. 12 One Indian battalion had managed to cross the Ichhogil Canal on the first day of the war itself (September 6). An Israeli commander would perhaps have rapidly built up and exploited this tactical success. We recalled this unit to the Assembly Area and then spent the rest of the war inching our way back to the same Ichhogil Canal.
Did we have an operational design for the critical battles in Punjab? It is difficult to conclude that we had. Most of our offensives were straightforward and disjointed frontal pushes that were not related to one another by an overall operational design Lt Gen Harbaksh, however, has stated that he intended to employ the armoured division as reserve but that Army HQ decided to launch it as part of 1 Corps instead. 15
1 Corps: The newly raised 1 Corps struck two days later over a much narrower front of 35 km in the Sailkot sector with 1 Armoured Division as spearhead, supported by 6 and 26 Infantry Divisions. 16 In a typical Comte De St Germain format, we launched our sole armoured division to seek out and engage the Pakistani 1 Armoured Division in a classic tank versus tank battle format. This was an attrition oriented paradigm that negated any chance of effecting deep penetrations. The pace of our advance was sluggish and hamstrung by tactical rigidity and over-caution. Both we and the Pakistanis largely drifted into battle by troops and squadrons. Our biggest surprise, however, was that Pakistan had created two armoured divisions from the American equipment supplied for one. What we had slammed into was not Pakistan's 1 but the newly raised 6 Armoured Division. 17 A major tank versus tank battle developed at Chawinda in which a number of Indian and Pakistani tank regiments gave a good account of the themselves individually. However, once again, good tactical execution was not backed by any manifest operational design or competence. We still had a lot to learn at the level of Operational Art.
Pakistan's 1 Armoured Division Fiasco
Pakistan now sensed a great opportunity. Its 1 Armoured Division was poised south of both the offensives by India's 1 and 11 Corps. It was well disposed to deliver a powerful counter-stroke along the grain of the country towards the Beas that would put it behind India's 11 Corps offensive. It could wreak havoc in its rear and force it to recoil. 18 In theory, the Pakistani operational design was flawless and brilliant. In practice, it proved to be a damp squib. Pakistan's 1 Armoured Division's offensive was put off balance by the 'spoiling attack' of India's Fourth Red Eagle Infantry Division. (This had not really been intended). It was difficult to discern as to who was more surprised. After an initial period of great confusion, the situation was stabilised by the energetic intervention of the army commander. 19 The Red Eagle Division fell back and laid the horseshoe shaped trap at Asal Uttar. India then moved its only Centurion tank brigade (2(I) Armoured Brigade) down and flooded the area. The Pakistani Pattons groped their way forward hesitatingly, only to be bogged down and slaughtered. Pakistani boldness in planning was not matched by any comparable skill in execution. Timidity and over-caution turned a brilliant counter-stroke into an unmitigated disaster. The Pakistani 1 Armoured Division was slaughtered and over 100 Patton tanks were destroyed in one of the biggest tank battles after World War II.
Brian Cloughley has pointed out that there was no Corps HQ to coordinate the operations of Pakistan's 1 Armoured Division and 11 Infantry Division at Kasur. Plans were changed at the last minute and the Pakistani leading armoured brigade paused for two days (September 8 and 9), which gave India adequate time to regroup and lay the horseshoe trap at Asal Uttar. 20 Lt Gen Gul Hassan Khan (former vice chief of the Pakistan Army) has been scathing in this criticism of Maj Gen Nasir Ahmed Khan, the GOC of Pakistan's elite 1 Armoured Division and holds him primarily responsible for this fiasco. Nasir Ahmed Khan, he felt, had no clear grasp of mechanised operations and was ill suited for the job. 21 Brian Cloughley has rated tactical level actions at the battalion and regimental levels (by both armies in 1965) as good and fair, to poor at the brigade level and beyond.
Centre of Gravity
After the 1965 War, indifferent execution possibly led both armies to conclude that the Punjab terrain was not suited for armoured warfare, that the sub-soil had too much water, etc. This led to a drift towards the desert flanks. Both the tank fleets now sought the more open spaces of the semi-desert/desert terrains to seek avenues for the exploitation of their mobility in what was perceived to be more classic tank country. 22 This perceived shift may merit more debate and analysis. Possibly our basic flaw in 1965 was in our understanding (or the glaring lack of it) of the concept of centre of gravity. What is a centre of gravity? Was Pakistan's 1 Armoured Division (the one we had assessed to be in the Sialkot theatre) a key strength or a key vulnerability? Why were our corps-sized operations directed towards this key element of Pakistani strength? This made our operational design totally attrition oriented. Pitting strength against strength is the key feature of an attrition oriented military philosophy. Over three decades down the line, we have to ask ourselves, have we outgrown this mindset of attrition? Are we still wedded to an attrition as opposed to a manoeuvrist philosophy?
The 1971 War
The decade from 1962 to 1972 was the most challenging decade in the history of the post-independence Indian Army. It was the decade that witnessed the coming of age of this army. It was a period of tremendous growth and on the job learning of basic skills. It was a period of peak professionalism. Three wars in quick succession led to the rise of professionalism. These wars ended the era of peace-time soldiering and its deviations and brought senior commanders with excellent hands-on experience of combat at the company, battalion, brigade and divisional levels to the fore. The 1971 War saw a series of high profile corps and division commanders who made their mark in Bangladesh.
In the Western Theatre, our war aims were restricted to an offensive defence mould. The designated centre of gravity of our operations lay in Bangladesh. Within this offensive-defence format, however, there were a number of limited tactical thrusts. 23 We were preempted in Chamb once again. The Pakistani tank commander here showed good tactical flair by constantly shifting his point of attack. However, the Pakistanis' tendency to repeat themselves ad infinitum proved to be their undoing. The situation was restored and Pakistan's attack halted. We did launch a limited offensive in the Shakargarh Bulge. Our 1965 War experience had led us to lay more emphasis on independent armoured brigades as offensive instruments in 1971. 24 Once again, the rates of advance were slow and our operations seemed to be dogged with rigidity, over-caution and an obsessive concern for the security of our flanks. An armoured warfare enthusiast had once correctly remarked "The vulnerability of the flanks of the tank thrust is an optical illusion. Its safety lies in its speed and constant movement." However, at the tactical level, there were some good actions, especially in the Battle of Basantar, where gifted future armoured commanders like Lt Gen Hanut Singh earned their combat spurs. This was an excellent learning experience which helped Gen Hanut to crystallise his later thinking on tank warfare in the subcontinental setting and laid the basis for the post-1971 changes in operational doctrines and outlook. 25
The Pakistani tank thrust at Longewala was again brilliant in conception but seriously flawed in execution. The Achilles heel was its failure to ensure air cover and logistical backing. A single strand of barbed wire and two RCL guns of Maj Chandpuri's company were adequate to stall a Pakistani tank regiment for a whole night. The Hunters of the IAF made mincemeat of this regiment the next day. The rest is history. 26
The Renaissance of Indian Operational Art
Bangladesh, however, marks a renaissance of the Indian Army in more ways than one. It was a brilliant strategic and operational level victory. It was the first time after World War II that a new nation-state was created with the force of arms. Over 90,000 prisoners of war were taken and the Pakistani Army suffered a humiliating and decisive defeat. A series of historical accounts by Lt Gen J.F.R. Jacob, and Maj Gens D.K. Palit, Sukhwant Singh and Lachman Singh Lehel have thrown ample light on this campaign. The centre of gravity was correctly designated as the Dacca Triangle. There was considerable debate on this aspect. Gen Jacob has averred that Army HQ felt that the centre of gravity should be the entreports of Chittagong and Khulna. Gen Jacob, however, insisted that Dacca was the key stone whose fall would organisationally collapse the Pakistani Army in the East. 27 Serious operational risks were taken by denuding the Chinese front of a large number of formations. The area of operational focus was clearly designated. The IAF decimated Pakistan's air component in the East and won virtual air supremacy. This enabled a classic air-land campaign to develop in Bangladesh. The reverine terrain of Bangladesh presents a nightmare for any attacker. However, the Indian political and military leadership in this campaign was inspired. Field Marshal Manekshaw correctly insisted on going in after the monsoons when the Himalayan passes would be closed in winter and risks of Chinese intervention minimised. This gave time for a sustained and methodical, logistical and operational build-up which paid handsome dividends. Heliborne operations were used to effect major river crossings and speed up the tempo of operations. The Indian nation-state ensured that informational dominance was achieved and was able to shape the global and regional information environments by highlighting the atrocities of the Pakistani Army in Bangladesh. Lt Gen Jacob has also described how information dominance was achieved by pooling all wireless experimental units in the Eastern Theatre. 28 The air supremacy of the IAF also served to accentuate this information dominance. It was a just war in the classical sense. It was a brilliant text-book campaign that saw the corps and divisional commanders aggressively pursuing high tempo offensive operations in considerable depth. The expanding torrent concept of attack was effectively employed to bypass enemy centres of resistance and head for areas of operational depth. The race for, and the rapid capitulation of, Dacca, served to organisationally collapse the Pakistani Army in the East.
The Indian campaign in Bangladesh has close parallels with the German campaign against Poland in World War II. In both these campaigns, the defender had been convinced that the attacker would aim at only shallow penetration along the border to seize a swathe of territory. 29 In both these campaigns, the attacking armies, however, bypassed local centres of resistance and raced instead for the national capitals (both of which lay inside a river triangle). Indian military art had finally come of age in Bangladesh. 30
Centre of Gravity
The key element of our victory in Bangladesh in the 1971 War was an intuitive and correct assessment of the Pakistani centre of gravity in the East. It was the capital city of Dacca. In his 'hold everything stance', Niazi had neglected the defence of the Dacca triangle. Being the political and military nerve centre, this proved to be a critical vulnerability and, hence, the prime centre of gravity. All Indian efforts were focussed on this. The IAF carried out pin-point bombing of Hotel Hilton where the Pakistani command hierarchy was to meet. The paradrop at Tangnil speeded up the tempo of operations in Bangladesh and led to the organisational collapse of the Pakistani Army in the East as the centre of gravity was tackled decisively and directly. 31 It was the key command and control node and hub centre of the Pakistani infrastructure. Its fall led to the total psychological 'dislocation', of the Pakistani higher command. As Sadiq Salik has so graphically described, Lt Gen A.A.K. Niazi, the Pakistan Army commander in the East had broken down in tears. 32
Post-1971 Era
Mechanisation actually came to the Indian Army in a big way only after 1971 with the large scale induction of Soviet military equipment. Gen Sunderji has been hailed as the architect of Indian mechanised forces. Indian armoured commanders reflected upon their operational experience of the 1965 and 1971 Wars to devise workable techniques of operations and operational logistics for wars in the sub-continental context. Lt Gen Hanut Singh left his clear imprimatur on the post-1971 doctrines of mechanised warfare in the subcontinental setting. We have come a very long way since then. However, we still have miles to go before we can fully inculcate the tenets of Operational Art in our military doctrine and practice. By historical legacy, we are an attrition oriented army. This legacy goes back to the era of the Mahabharat War in 1200 BC. Today, we need to grow beyond tactical frontal pushes at the corps level. Our Operational Art must be enhanced in sophistication to include single and double envelopment pincer movements and turning movements. We need to consciously orchestrate air-land battles to bring about a systemic organisational collapse of the enemy formations. We must seek to enhance the pace and tempo of our operations, to get inside the OODA (Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action) Loop of our adversary and create situations for him faster than he can cope with them. We must seek to enhance our situational awareness even as we degrade his, and consciously seek to 'hard and soft' kill his information nodes. The essence of manoeuvre warfare is to organisationally collapse whole formations by attacking their headquarters, rears and logistical echelons. Speed and tempo are an inherent part of this destruction/disruption mechanism. This operational tempo can be built up only by a close integration of the air-land effort. 33 If the fire support to the mechanised columns is going to be confined to the pace of road-bound, wheeled artillery, we cannot hope to generate the requisite degree of pace and momentum that can 'dislocate' the adversary or get inside his OODA loop. Simultaniety is a cardinal principle of manoeuvre warfare. To actualise the tenets of Operational Art, we need to look more closely at the functioning of some continental European Armies. The Russian concept of an Operational Manoeuvre Group (OMG) may be one of the key tenets to tilting the scales in fluid, fast-moving and high tempo mechanised operations. Lt Gen V.K. Kapoor in his thought provoking article on the "Fundamentals of Operational Art" has highlighted the development of the Soviet deep operations theory. This theory was developed between 1920-1930. It highlighted that the paradigm of linear warfare was outdated and had been replaced by operational strike manoeuvre. Tukhachevski, the great Soviet scholar warrior, insisted that annhilation/destruction was not the aim and a more scientific approach to operational theory designed on systems logic was essential. With the advent of the Deep Operations theory by late 1937, Soviet Operational Art reached a high state of development and became a principle platform upon which military science developed. In fact, Gen Kapoor avers that the subsequent US "Air-Land Battle Concept" actually takes its roots from this Soviet theory. 34 What constitutes the true centre of gravity of our adversary and where it lies in practice, could be the key determinants of where and how we need to launch our mechanised operations. Should we continue to be predictable and stereotyped? Or do we need to break fresh ground and seek creative and innovative solutions to old problem? What we need to recognise is the critically of the level of Operational Art in the context of limited or unlimited wars in the subcontinent and the dire necessity of outgrowing an attrition mindset (which incidentally is a legacy of the Mahabharat War). What we need is a radical transition in our operational thinking from attrition to manoeuvre warfare.
Conclusion: Identifying the Centre of Gravity
In conclusion, it would do well to recount one of the definitions of Operational Art, cited at the beginning of this paper. "The essence of Operational Art is to determine the enemy Centre of Gravity and develop a campaign plan to achieve decisive success." In the context of any future war with Pakistan or China, we have, first and foremost, to correctly identify the correct centre of gravity and then develop plans to address this centre of gravity in a concerted fashion. In 1965, we possibly failed to accurately define this centre of gravity. Most foreign armies define it as a key vulnerability and not a key strength. Pakistan's lone armoured division was not a key vulnerability. Pitting strength against strength is the hallmark of the attrition style of war. In 1971, however, we had correctly identified Dacca as the centre of gravity of our operations and focussed all efforts and resources upon this criticality. The results speak for themselves. The essence of Operational Art, therefore, lies in identifying the enemy centre of gravity. This exercise must be given the importance that it truly deserves.
Above all, we must conciously cultivate and nurture expertise at the level of Operational Art and include this in our course curricula at the various schools of instruction. A first step towards this would be to encourage the study of the numerous campaign memoirs of the subcontinental wars. We now fortunately have a considerable body of open military literature pertaining to these campaigns. We now need to study them in depth and detail. These should be the subject of theses/dissertations for post-graduate studies at the College of Combat, the Defence Services Staff College and the National Defence College. Research assignments on this theme could also be taken up at the prestigious Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. One of the elective subjects at the Pakistani Staff College at Quetta, incidentally is the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War.
Endnotes
Note 1: William S. Lind. Quoted in a paper published in Richard D. Hooker, ed., Manoeuvre Warfare: An Anthology (New York: Pergemon (Brasseys), 1993). Back
Note 2: Definition cited from American Field Manual (FM 100: 5 Operations) in Lt Gen V.K. Kapoor's article on "Fundamentals of Operational Art: A Contextual Review", Combat Journal, March 2001, p. 9. This article is useful for the precise definition of various terms involved. Back
Note 3: John F. Antal, "The Elements of Conflict", quoted in n. 1. Back
Note 4: See Maj Dr. K. Brahma Singh, A History of the Jammu and Kashmir Rifles 1820-1956 (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1989), for an in-depth treatment of the 1947-48 Indo-Pak conflict. In particular, this book covers the lifting of the seige of Poonch and Leh and the failure to lift the seige of Skardu in fair detail. (Refer pp. 248, 260 and 264). Back
Note 5: See The Official History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir 1947-48. Ministry of Defence Publications (New Delhi: Controller Publication, Govt of India), for an official version of this campaign. Back
Note 6: Maj Gen D.K. Palit, VrC, War in the High Himalayas (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1990). This remains one of the most authoritative and objective accounts of the 1962 Sino-Indian War. These general comments are based on this basic source book as also on Maj Sita Ram Johri's Chinese Invasion of NEFA (Lucknow: Himalaya Publications, 1988). Back
Note 7: Brig (Retd) John P. Dhalvi, Himalayan Blunder (New Delhi: Vikas Publishers), for a graphic and excellent account of the 7 Infantry Brigade battle at Namkachhu. See also Maj Gen Kalyan Verma, The Rivers of Silence (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers), for an account of the battle of 2 Rajput. Back
Note 8: Lt Gen (retd) Harbaksh Singh, VrC, War Despatches, Indo-Pak Conflict 1965 (New Delh: Lancer Publishers, 1988). Table of comparative strength of Indian and Pakistani forces excerpted from p. 7. Back
Note 9: Gen (Retd) Mohd Musa Khan, My Version (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1983). The former Pakistani Chief of Army Staff (COAS) has given his detailed version of the evolution of the plan for Operation Gibraltor by Maj Gen A.H. Malik and how he bypassed him to sell the plan direct to Field Marshal Ayub, despite the army chief's reservations. Back
Note 10: Singh, n. 8. For a detailed account of the tasks and aims of the Pakistani infiltrating columns, refer to pp. 26, 27 and 44, and Appendix C (Chapter 2), pp. 74-79. Back
Note 11: Ibid. See pp. 47 and 66 for a detailed account of these actions. Back
Note 12: Ibid. Refer to Chapter 3 for details of the operations by India's XI Corps in the 1965 conflict. Back
Note 13: Ibid. For the Ichhogil Canal fixation, refer para 9 on p. 83. Back
Note 14: Ibid., pp. 84-86, for XI Corps plans. See pp. 90 and 91 for an estimate of 3 Jats' crossing of the Ichhogil Canal as a historic lost opportunity. Back
Note 15: Lt Gen (Retd) Harbaksh Singh, VrC, In the Line of Duty: A Soldier Remembers (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2000), p. 338, for his proposed employment of 1 Corps and the armoured division on the Lahore front. Back
Note 16: Singh, n. 8, Chapter 4 is devoted to the operations of I Corps. In specific, refer to pp. 134-135 for operational plans of 6 and 26 Infantry Divisions in the 1965 conflict. Back
Note 17: Maj Sita Ram Johri The Indo-Pak Conflict of 1965 (Lucknow: Himalaya Publishers 1967). This remains, to date, one of the most concise and clear expositions of the 1965 Indo-Pak War. The author's account of the tactical backdrop and battle of Asal Uttar is very useful for placing the battle in its correct operational perspective. This book cites our lack of intelligence about the existence of the Pak 6 Armoured Division. Back
Note 18: Singh, n. 8, has claimed that he had ab initio assessed that the Pak main offensive would come in the Khem Kharan Sector. Refer p. 83. Back
Note 19: Ibid. Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh has given a very graphic account of how he stabilised a very precarious situation at Khem Karan on September 8, 1965. Refer pp. 100-102 of Chapter 3. Back
Note 20: Brian Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections, 2nd Ed (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1999), pp. 127-130. In his chapters on the 1965 War, and lessons learnt (the last years of Ayub), Cloughley has carried out a clinical analysis of the reasons for the Pakistani failure at Asal Uttar. These have been summarised here. Back
Note 21: Lt Gen (Retd) Gul Hasan Khan, The Memoirs of Lt Gen Gul Hasan Khan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993). This book provides a graphic insight into the inter-arm rivalries in the Pakistan Army. Gul Hasan seems to attribute Pakistan's 1 Armoured Division's failure solely to the ineptitude of the GOC, Maj Gen Nasir Ahmad Khan, an artillery officer, who, he felt, lacked the competence to command an armoured formation. Back
Note 22: Based on Press statements by Gen (Retd) J.N. Chaudhuri in the immediate aftermath of the 1965 War. Back
Note 23: Maj Gen (Retd) Sukhwant Singh. The Liberation of Bangladesh (Volumes I and III) (New Delhi: Publishing House). This an excellent account of the strategic backdrop to the 1971 Indo-Pak War and an inter se prioritisation of operations in the Eastern and Western Theatres; it is useful for its clinical and objective assessments. Back
Note 24: Maj Gen (Retd) D.K. Palit, VrC, The Lightning Campaign (New Delhi: Thompson Press India Ltd, 1972). For an excellent introductory account of the post-1965 changes and reorientation in the Indian Army, see Chapter II of the book, pp. 40-45. Back
Note 25: Lt Gen (Retd) Hanut Singh, PVSM, MVC. Fakhar-e-Hind: The Story of the Poona Horse (Dehra Dun: Agrim Publishers, 1992). See Chapters 16 and 17 for an account of the 1965 Indo-Pak War and Chapters 18 and 19 for the 1971 War and the tank battle of Basantar. Back
Note 26: Maj K.C. Praval, A History of the Indian Army After Independence (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1989). This book contains a detailed account of this battle. Back
Note 27: Lt Gen (Retd) J.F.R. Jacob, Surrender at Dacca (Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1997). This book remains one of the most authoritative first-hand accounts of the 1971 Bangladesh campaign. It provides a wealth of useful insights-the most prominent one being regarding the selection of Dacca as the centre of gravity of the campaign. Back
Note 28: Ibid. Gen Jacob has described in detail how he bid for additional wireless experimental units and how these were employed to gain information dominance. Though the word "Info War" came into usage only after the Gulf War of 1991, the Bangladesh War of 1971 (that took place two decades earlier) remains one of the best examples of a successful information warfare campaign. India had (in the six months preceding the war) obtained total global and regional information dominance. Back
Note 29: The Hammudur Rehman Enquiry Committee Report. The Hammudur Rehman Enquiry Committee instituted by Z.A. Bhutto has highlighted the evolution of the "Fortress Concept" in erstwhile East Pakistan and clearly outlines the flawed Pakistani concept of a forward defence of the borders designed to safeguard almost every inch of territory as opposed to the core area of the Dacca triangle. Back
Note 30: See A. Chhibber, National Security Doctrine (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1990), for a comparative assessment of the Indian operational performance in the wars since independence. The book highlights the operational excellence displayed in the 1971 campaign. Back
Note 31: Sadiq Salik, Witness to Surrender (Karachi: Oxford University Press). This book provides a graphic first-hand account of the events leading to the fall of Dacca, by the Press/media advisor of Lt Gen A.A.K. Niazi. It graphically highlights the success of our psy-war campaign in 1971 and the pay-offs of attacking the critical command and control node of Dacca. Back
Note 32: Ibid. Sadiq Salik gives a graphic eyewitness account of this scene. Back
Note 33: See Maj G.D. Bakshi. "Air-Land Battle: Applications in the Indian Context" IDSA Quarterly 1988, for a fuller treatment of the application of the American air-land battle doctrine in the Indian context. Back
Note 34: Kapoor, n. 2, in which the author has highlighted the development of the Soviet deep operations theory, p. 5. Back