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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
The Highway Beyond Agra
Shri Jaswant Singh, External Affairs & Defence Minister in Discussion with IDSA*
Introduction
The summit talks between Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and President Pervez Musharraf during July 14-16 2001, in Agra, have variously been described as 'disappointing' or 'inconclusive'. However, both sides are convinced of the need and have indicated the desire to continue the dialogue process.
Senior strategic analysts from (IDSA) drew up a list of questions for discussion with Shri Jaswant Singh, on August 4 2001, in New Delhi, to get his views on "The Highway Beyond Agra". IDSA presents the transcript of these discussions to promote mature appreciation of difficult bilateral issues.
For ease of understanding, and for ready reference, a set of 11 documents has been appended to this interview with the Minister.
Discussion
IDSA: Minister, you have had considerable experience in interacting with a number of interlocutors in the recent past. We would like you to share your personnel views and experience of the Agra Summit.
What kind of insights have you gained in the process of negotiations during the historic meeting? In what ways has the Agra experience enriched you as a strategic thinker and as a practitioner of international affairs?
Jaswant Singh: Yes, indeed, I have been enriched through this experience of the past years in interacting with a number of very serious and well-informed interlocutors, each of whom has revealed great depth of understanding of issues, as also concern for the larger global issues.
As far as Abdul Sattar Saheb, my counterpart, is concerned, he is more realistic and has great understanding of the complexities of this relationship between India and Pakistan. His Excellency, President Pervez Musharraf, is essentially a soldier. He speaks clearly and approaches the task forthrightly. But as with any other such complex issue military sense has inevitably and necessarily to be tempered with the realism of the very complexities of the issues. Yet, the Agra experience, in many ways, stands on its own. Even though it was one in a sequence of Summit-level meetings between India and Pakistan, it was still significant for seeking to move forward with the Lahore process after the unwarranted Kargil interruption. The fact that our prime minister decided to invite Gen Musharraf, held by many in India to be the architect of Kargil, reflected great statesmanship on the part of the prime minister.
In fact, through his letter of May 24 2001, to the chief executive of Pakistan, our PM invited him to walk the 'high road of peace' for the welfare for our peoples, to pursue the path of reconciliation, to engage in a productive dialogue, to build trust and confidence, and to establish a relationship of durable peace and cooperative friendship. We would in this manner be able to tackle, more effectively, our common enemy - poverty.
We were realistically mindful of the difficulties that lay ahead. Yet, we were not keeping ourselves divorced from the hope that the larger interests of the peoples of our two countries would influence deliberations. Agra was, in that context, a reminder that the Pakistani leadership, particularly the military leadership, has not quite been able to rid itself of an attitude of compulsive hostility and an approach of short term one-upmanship in its dealings with India.
In his letter of May 28 2001 in response to our PM's letter, the Pakistani President had also expressed the desire to establish tension-free and cooperative relations; and to overcome the legacy of distrust and hostility. He had also expressed readiness to discuss all other outstanding issues in addition to the Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) issue.
In his telephone conversation with our PM on June 20 2001, President Musharraf had also suggested the desirability of toning down of rhetoric on both sides to create a conducive atmosphere for the Summit. Our PM had welcomed this proposal. Accordingly, we made conscious efforts to avoid any steps that could negate the historic process of Lahore, then sought to be revived.
As the date of the Summit approached, however, there was a continuous and perceptible increase in the stridency of statements from Pakistan and in the projection that, for Pakistan, J&K was the central issue and that this was the only subject they were interested in discussing.
Nevertheless the Summit at Agra was useful. It brought about a better understanding of the current leadership of Pakistan and also the dynamics of its motivation and decision-making. At the same time, it also revealed that the current leadership of Pakistan is not yet fully prepared to see reality, to accommodate other perspectives and, thus arrive at a common ground in the search for peace, cooperation and development.
IDSA: Are there lessons, both of theory and practice, which our strategic community of scholars ought to learn?
Jaswant Singh: I have learnt from Agra that, at certain times, it is necessary to clarify in no uncertain terms that India's expressed desire for peace and reconciliation is not a sign of any weakness or fatigue. In fact, our PM did tell President Musharraf at Agra that India had the resolve, strength and the stamina to deal with terrorism and violence.
Agra showed the importance of confidence and trust as the means to solve problems between countries. India has always favoured a "confidence building" approach, as opposed to a "conflict resolution approach". The former may be slow but it certainly has much greater possibility of yielding lasting solutions, especially when complex issues, emotions of people and historical legacies are involved.
There is a very fine book, Negotiating Across Cultures, which I gave as a gift to the present High Commissioner of Pakistan, HE Ashraf Jehangir Qazi. I had inscribed on the book: "It does not apply to us because we do not actually negotiate across cultures." My ministry may not agree with this comment but I, personally, believe that the fundamental requirement in meeting the challenges of international negotiations is to first establish trust. Of course, negotiating countries will not abandon their respective national interests. That simply cannot be the starting point. Yet, unless you are able to talk on issues, how will you negotiate complex and intricate problems; and how can any substantial talk take place without basic trust?
IDSA: India is currently engaged in what can be called 'The New Diplomacy' of engagements, overtures and processes with a number of countries and country groupings. Could you compare and contrast this diplomacy with policies and practices of the past?
Jaswant Singh: Indeed, we have made a determined effort to fashion a new diplomacy for India in keeping with the new post-Cold War world and as also India's status derived from the events of May 1998. The strengths of India's economy, its technological capabilities, including in information technology, and the quality of its skilled manpower are now globally recognised.
The post-Cold War setting is still in the process of defining itself. This move from bipolarity to multipolarity is still constrained by huge chasms in technology, military and economic strengths. In this process, it is quite evident that India's growing diverse potential will generate interest in other parts of the emerging world order. People have noted and commented on our growing interactions with China, Europe and the US even as we have consolidated our traditional relations with Russia and the countries of the developing world.
This new diplomacy is a requirement of our times. Our earlier diplomacy, in which we had contributed to the evolution of the Non-Aligned Movement, the South-South, as well as the Group of 77, was a response to the international situation then prevalent; and to India's own emergence from its colonial past.
IDSA: In this new diplomacy for the post-Cold War era, the government does not appear to have a Pakistan fixation. As a neighbour with whom we have had a difficult relationship for decades, the government surely has an overview of the desirable pattern of relations in the years ahead. Could you sketch your perspective of Indo-Pak relations as part of the new diplomacy?
Jaswant Singh: You are right in saying that the government does not have a Pakistan fixation. India does not use Pakistan as a benchmark for how to conduct itself. But the government is clear in its mind that Pakistan has adopted, continues to pursue and practice a position of compulsive and perpetual hostility towards India because India's concept of nationhood is the very antithesis of Pakistan's. India exemplifies civic nationalism and it inspires our nationalism. Secularism is at the root of it. On the other hand, Pakistan pursues hostility because it has adopted the "two-nation theory", the separation of Hindus and Muslims as a means to building and keeping its nationhood alive.
I have often told them that your claim to the valley of Srinagar because the majority there subscribes to the noble faith of Islam is untenable. There are many districts in India, where too, my citizens have similar population ratios with Muslims in a majority; whether it is in Rampur or in Tamil Nadu or in Kerala or in Bihar. What am I to do? And I have said this at Agra. What should I do with these districts? Should I put all of them on a railway track and send them by train to Pakistan? How can I accept such a proposition?
I am very clear about two aspects, both of which the government has adopted. If Pakistan challenges India militarily, then that challenge will not only be met but shall be defeated. But we bear no enmity to the people of Pakistan. What do we desire? We covet not one inch of Pakistan's territory. We do not want issues to be exported from Pakistan. We do aspire to see Pakistan politically at ease as much as we like it to be democratic. An economically viable Pakistan is good for Indo-Pak relations and is good for the region as a whole.
As I mentioned earlier, our PM, in keeping with his abiding notion of good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan, invited President Musharraf to walk the path of peace and reconciliation. Our commitment to that noble objective, which was demonstrated at Simla and Lahore, guided us in the extensive discussions that were held during the visit. Significant Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) were announced by the Government on the July 4, 6 and 9, of July 2001, prior to President Musharraf's visit. It is our conviction that, when put in place, they will make an important contribution to our relations.
The announcement on July 4 2001 related substantially to aspects of enabling people-to-people contacts, trade and commerce. So we said students can come and we offered scholarships. Visa facilities were to be simplified. Fifty lines were to be identified and liberalised/removed by the Ministry of Commerce. Transgressing fishermen were to be released; also, in future, the Coast Guard would have instructions, when fishermen so transgress. On July 6 2001, we announced that the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) would seek the convenience of his counterpart and visit Pakistan so that we can move forward on the gains that have been made as far as relative stability on the Line of Control (LoC) is concerned. On July 9 2001, it was the opening of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad road. And also the one at Munabao (in Rajasthan) for better people-to-people contact.
Despite the fact that our basic approaches to bilateral relations are very different, we remain committed to continuing the dialogue. Our focus will remain on the totality of our relationship, and we shall endeavour to build trust and confidence. When the PM went to Lahore, he used a phrase that is etched in my memory: "Yeh bus lohe aur ispat ki bus nahin hai, yeh jazbat ki bus hai." (This bus is not made of iron and steel, but of understanding and feelings). We shall endeavour to build a mutually beneficial relationship even as we address and move forward on all outstanding issues, including J&K. And, to build upon the existing compacts of Simla and Lahore. India remains convinced that narrow, segmented or unifocal approaches will not work.
IDSA: On third-party mediation, you have said in your Agra Press conference that "Three is a crowd". On returning from Agra, President Musharraf referred to "the wishes of the Kashmiri people". Could you amplify your remark? Could this be a paver of the way or a road block in the journey ahead?
Jaswant Singh: Our position on this subject has been clear and con-sistent. We believe that all differences between India and Pakistan must be resolved bilaterally. This is also enshrined in the Simla Agreement. In fact, the two countries have experienced mediation efforts for two decades or so after their independence. Most of these efforts proved to be futile and were often conditioned by the interests and motivation of the mediator.
The 1965 Tashkent talks is a case in point. It was for the first time, when the then ruling Party (Congress) accepted a third-party for mediation. The event, the whole question, the issue, the problem, or whatever you wish to call it, of J&K was discussed not in India, not bilaterally; but at Tashkent. In Tashkent, what did those great 'preparations' achieve for India? It certainly did achieve among other things, the handing back of the Haji Pir Pass.
Let me stress: J&K is not a territorial dispute. It involves complex sentiments of the people and we have to address the complexities of the mistakes of history. As far as Pakistan's references to the wishes of the Kashmiri people are concerned, I am certain that the primary wish of every single Kashmiri, whether from the Kashmir Valley or Jammu, Ladakh, Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), the Northern Areas or the Shaksgam Valley, is to live in peace, security and freedom so that he/she can make economic progress. We should strive constantly to provide them with this fundamental right. In any event, all citizens of J&K do already have their elected representatives, through whom they express their legitimate aspirations. We are also willing to listen to all other streams of Kashmiri opinion, however small a minority they represent, as long as they abjure violence. It is in this spirit that we had offered to talk to representatives of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) too.
IDSA: India has followed both multilateralism (meaning the UN) and bilateralism for resolving the J&K issue. Are there other options of persuasion or compellence available to India?
Jaswant Singh: India has always taken the lead to move Indo-Pak relations in the desired direction of peace, friendship and cooperation. The initiative to invite President Musharraf was part of this. In the recent past, India has similarly taken the lead, for instance, while initiating the Composite Dialogue in 1998 and the Prime Minister's visit to Lahore in 1999. This does not, however, imply that we are soft on terrorism or intrusions.
It was in fact, on June 11 1999, on the eve of the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan's visit to India that I, in a Press conference, said: "Aggression must be vacated." I also said many other things because we had then six of our soldiers' bodies being returned, mutilated. I had said that the validity of the LoC must be reaffirmed and I had said, quite clearly, that cross-border terrorism must be rejected and stopped. That was the first time India placed cross-border terrorism squarely and firmly as an issue to be addressed by Pakistan. In reaffirming the validity of the LoC, we were re-emphasising one of the principal attainments of the Simla Agreement, because that is a treaty document. It is the Simla Agreement that saw the conversion of the Ceasefire Line established on December 17 1971 into the LoC.
Experience has taught us that good policy towards Pakistan must necessarily involve elements that promote friendship and cooperation, while at the same time India must have the capability to defend itself effectively.
IDSA: Indian diplomacy towards Pakistan is perceived as following a "pragmatic" approach. Has this approach worked? Is there a need to try other approaches such as 'liberal' or the 'act tough'?
Jaswant Singh: We cannot ignore the fact that terrorism and violence in the state of J&K and other parts of India is exported from across our western border. We cannot accept that insurgency in J&K today, with its foreign mercenaries and generous assistance from abroad, is anything but terrorism. The daily killing of innocent men, women and children can simply not be glorified as any kind of political movement. Please reflect that soon after the Agra Summit had concluded, our pilgrims on their way to the holy shrine of Amarnath were killed. And soon thereafter, another massacre of members of one community occurred at the hands of terrorists. Pakistan's refusal to end cross-border terrorism is the main hurdle in the creation of a conducive atmosphere.
I have, in my responses to your questions, repeatedly outlined our approach to relations with Pakistan. I would call it essentially a pragmatic approach, based on reality and aimed at promoting good neighbourly relations.What we call a liberal approach, sometimes could be misunderstood for weakness. An unnecessarily tough approach could generate resentment in a smaller neighbour which already suffers from the psychological consequences of its relative size.
IDSA: Ambassador Dennis Kux has said in his new book that the US Administration was very close to declaring Pakistan as a terrorism-sponsoring state. Guided by its own compulsions the US chose not to undertake such labelling. Could not the Government of India on its own declare Pakistan as such a state?
Jaswant Singh: We are aware of the measures that Pakistan has taken from time to time to evade international scrutiny and concern, even while its involvement with terrorism has continued. Declaring a country a terrorist state is a legal device that exists in the US legal system and is a recourse as seen from the prism of US interests.
We do not have an equivalent legal mechanism. We are clear that we have to defeat cross-border terrorism, and we have the necessary resolve, capability and stamina to do so.
I am really not in this game of getting any country labelled by another in one form or another. This is not my approach to Pakistan. I do often tell my friends in Pakistan that please forget who labels you what. Please, for heaven's sake, wake up to your own reality.
The Government has taken upon itself the endeavour to create an international atmosphere about terrorism, as not simply a challenge that India is facing but as something that affects the entire international community. We have, therefore, been making efforts to strengthen international cooperation and international regimes against terrorism. We have bilateral Joint Working Groups (JWGs) on this and related subjects, inter alia, with the US, UK, Germany, Russia and the EU. We are also pursuing a Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism at the UN which has received wide-spread support.
IDSA: Minister, what are your views on the tools and techniques used in the Agra Summit by India and Pakistan? At your Press conference in Agra on July 17 2001 you seemed to highlight a major difference in approach; India believing in quiet diplomacy and Pakistan choosing to invoke media as a visible part of contemporary diplomacy. Is the government having a re-look into this difference in approach which has cast a shadow over the substance of the negotiations? If yes, could you give outlines of the government's shift in the approach to information management as part of diplomatic negotiations?
Jaswant Singh: We are aware of the important role that the media plays today. As a ruling party politician, I am wary of the term 'information management' given the authoritarian connotations such terms often carry with them. We are, however, aware that real time reporting by the electronic media poses certain especial challenges.
I continue to hold, however, that issues of importance can simply not be discussed through the media, no matter how much the media may like to play a role in formulating and influencing policy outcomes of complex negotiations. It is simply not possible to do so.
I have also been reinforced in my belief in the value of serious diplomacy, rather than a game of one-upmanship. I must confess that initially many had the perception that Pakistan had gained in media terms at Agra. That is a short-lived perception. Truth and reality will always, eventually, emerge. That is why Pakistani strategy is seen for what it is and for its long-term failure.
Please understand that the nature of the Agra Summit was a 'Retreat'. Normally, 'Retreat' by its very implication, is described as a meeting where the visiting and the receiving heads of state meet quietly, away from the Press and all publicity, so that complex issues are addressed in privacy and the confidentiality of their dialogue is maintained.
IDSA: IDSA is firmly convinced that the 1971 War was not because of the Kashmir issue. There is a deliberate distortion on the part of Pakistan in equating the situation in Kashmir with that in East Pakistan during 1970-71. What are your views on this attempted parallel? Would not an Indian campaign to similarly liberate "repressed Kashmiris" in the POK be justified?
Jaswant Singh: There are no parallels between the two issues. It is quite clear that the essential problem in J&K is that of cross-border terrorism. At the same time, media and official comments in Pakistan have projected a desire for revenge, for what they would like to attribute to India, for their own internal failings leading to the events of 1971.
It has to be made clear to Pakistan that any policy held hostage to seeking some kind of redress for mythical wrongs or injustices, and which does not address either current realities or to the demands of the future, is bound to find itself overtaken by events.
IDSA: There are issues like Sir Creek, Wullar Barrage and Siachen which appear to lend themselves to easier resolution. These might promote trust and pave the way for the more difficult ones. We would like you to comment on this 'core' obsession of Pakistan in contrast with the 'step-by-step' approach of successful bilateral diplomacy in recent times.
Jaswant Singh: Experiences around the world have shown that while dealing with old and complicated issues, a Confidence Building approach is far better than a simplistic Conflict Resolution approach.
We have clearly told Pakistan that its insistence upon the settlement of the J&K issue, as a precondition, for any normalisation of our bilateral relations would be like overturning the cart even before a horse is hitched to it. It is important to create an atmosphere of trust, as the foundation of progress on all outstanding issues, including J&K. This is the approach that we have been recommending to Pakistan. This is the only approach that can work. We are confident that eventually Pakistan would recognise the logic of this approach.
Ever since the Pokhran nuclear tests in May 1998, I was assigned the responsibility of negotiating with not only the US but with the Republic of China, Australia, Japan, Canada, France, Russia and Germany, each of whom had very strong views regarding India's nuclear tests. It has been my endeavour to move them away from a certain inherited 'fixity', an approach to international negotiations that starts from specifics and, only thereafter, proceeds to the general. This may well apply to Western countries. I continue to believe, especially in the context of negotiations with Pakistan, that we need to move away from this Western, classical style of diplomatic conduct of negotiations. It is, therefore, much better to start with the general, ie, harmonising certain commitments or values. If trust and harmony is established, then it becomes much simpler, thereafter, to deal with details. In this light, Indo-Pak approach to diplomacy cannot be separated from its cultural roots. I am not here being an obscurantist in any fashion. I am really reaffirming that it is not necessary for India or for Indian diplomats to always pursue the occidental mode.
IDSA: In any bilateral negotiations there would be mutual adjustments to reach an agreement. However, domestic compulsions may force the hands of the leaders of both the countries. How should India and Pakistan attend to these domestic factors?
Jaswant Singh: This can only be encouraged through enhanced people-to-people contact and avoidance of negative propaganda. As I mentioned earlier, to promote a congenial environment and build confidence in advance of the visit, the Government announced some significant decisions relating to peace and security, nuclear and non-nuclear CBMs, people-to-people contacts, humanitarian issues, education, youth exchanges and trade. We believe these decisions have been well received by the people of India and Pakistan. The Government remains committed to implementing them.
This 'fracture' can be repaired only if we enable the people of India and the people of Pakistan to engage with one another. I do believe, I have often said so, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are born of the same womb. How much closer can you be? We simply must not be enemies.
IDSA: In the complex process of restoring peace and normalcy in J&K, the views of the three Services have also to be factored in. Were these inputs satisfactorily covered in the preparations for the Agra Summit?
Jaswant Singh: We have taken all aspects of the situation into account in the context of the Agra Summit. In fact, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) had several informal meetings to guide the preparations and the conduct of the Agra Summit. For example, all measures that were announced on the of July 4, 6, and 9 were discussed not only in the CCS but separately with the three Chiefs of Staff also.
We, unfortunately, have not earlier involved sufficiently the military in our diplomacy, not up till now. It really goes to the total credit of my very good friend and esteemed colleague, George Fernandes, that we jointly took upon ourselves this involving of the military. It is a wrong notion that the military must be kept away from diplomacy. Why? I simply cannot understand this.
IDSA: There is a school of thought among the Services personnel that what was won at high cost on the battlefield has been bartered away at the negotiating table without matching security accruals. What is your view?
Jaswant Singh: This is obviously not correct. Many have, for instance, been critical of the Simla Agreement for not having resulted in a final settlement of J&K, even though it provided for it. At the same time, the Simla Agreement has provided a framework for relations between the two countries, since 1972, which did maintain essential peace and stability. Certainly till 1989, with Kargil 1999, of course, being the great departure.
IDSA: India's strategic analysts have raised doubts about the effectiveness of successive Pakistani governments in reining in the jehadis/'freedom fighters' involved in committing terrorist acts in J&K. Given this experience, how should the Government of India promote and ensure Pakistan's adherence to agreements/treaties?
Jaswant Singh: Pakistan must reflect upon the likely consequences of what may follow if successive Pakistani governments consistently violate sovereign commitments. It is for this reason that we have been reiterating the importance and the continuing sanctity of the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration. Governments may change but a nation cannot disown its commitments, voluntarily undertaken. There would otherwise be no trust and sanctity of pacts. At the same time, we also have serious concern at the spread of what is being referred to as the phenomenon of 'Talibanisation'.
IDSA: Pakistan has been echoing the Western perception that Kashmir is a nuclear flashpoint. Do you agree? Given the doctrinal gulf between India's No-First Use (NFU) and Pakistan's firm refusal to subscribe to it, would nuclear CBMs suffice? What other CBMs have been proposed?
Jaswant Singh: You would recall that the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan, at Lahore, had identified a framework for discussions related to CBMs. Before the Agra Summit, at the instruction of the Prime Minister, we had proposed an expert-level dialogue with Pakistan on this issue. Pakistan's response is still awaited. But we intend to follow up on this.
IDSA: Economic relations are generally replacing ideological ones and are perceived as cementing factors in the overall edifice of bilateral ties. In the follow-up talks, would economic diplomacy with Pakistan be promoted more strongly to mutual benefit? What are the prospects of realising the gas-route from Iran to India via Pakistan?
Jaswant Singh: India has always believed that mutually beneficial cooperation, particularly in the economic field, will contribute to our objective of normalising relations between India and Pakistan. We have, therefore, always welcomed the promotion of economic ties with Pakistan. It was with this in mind that, in order to encourage Pakistani imports into India, our PM instructed the Ministry of Commerce to reduce/eliminate 50 tariff lines.
As far as the Indo-Iran gas pipeline is concerned, we are currently examining different options and all aspects would be taken into account before a decision is taken.
IDSA: Apart from territory ceded unilaterally by Pakistan to China, the dimensions of Sino-Pak strategic cooperation covers the military, nuclear and missile areas. Clearly, China has an important ally in Pakistan. Would this relationship have an impact on the follow-up meetings?
Jaswant Singh: We have conveyed to China our concern related to its nuclear and missile cooperation with Pakistan, as this has a bearing on our security. At the same time, we are continuing with our sincere and consistent efforts at improving relations with China. We look forward to the visit of the Chinese Prime Minister later this year.
IDSA: Minister, to travel hopefully is to arrive and every journey begins with the first step. What visions do you have of the Highway beyond Agra?
Jaswant Singh: We will continue with the dialogue process. Our PM has accepted the invitation to visit Pakistan extended by President Musharraf. I have also accepted the invitation from the Pakistan Foreign Minister. We will work out dates for the visits, taking into account mutual convenience. On our part, we will make unrelenting efforts to make the visits productive. The path ahead will also be influenced by the responses we receive.
Our commitment to peace, dialogue and amity between the two countries remains. The caravan of peace will continue on its journey and will reach its destination. To cite a Shakespearean phrase, "the dogs of war" cannot deviate this caravan from its path.
I say, as an observation and as a reality, that India is on the move. India will not be thwarted, will not be deflected, leave alone stopped. It will be good if Pakistan joins. Therefore, as I have often said, it is not so much what India wants to do in regard to our bilateral relationship, it is really Pakistan that has to address itself and to answer what kind of long-term relationship it wants with India.
List of Documents Appended
1 Standstill Agreement with India and Pakistan, August 12 1947
2 Instrument of Accession October 27 1947
3 UNCIP Resolution of January 5 1949
4 Agreement Between Military Representatives of India and Pakistan Regarding the Establishment of a Cease-fire Line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir July 27 1949
5 Water Agreements
(a) Agreement on Punjab Canal Waters May 7 1948
(b) Text of India-Pakistan Transitional Ad Hoc Agreement on Canal Waters April 17 1959
(c)Indus Water Treaty September 19 1960
6 Tashkent Declaration January 10 1966
7 Simla Agreement July 2 1972
8 Indo-Pak Statement on the Line of Control (LoC) August 29 1972
9 Text of the Agreement between Pakistan and India on Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troop Movements April 6 1991
10 Proposals for Normalising Relations and CBMs sent by Pakistan January 18 1994
11 Lahore Declaration, February 21 1999