Strategic Analysis

Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA

October 2000 (Vol. XXIV No. 7)

Humanitarian Intervention and the Changing Role of the UN
By Kapil Kak *

Introduction

The end of the Cold War has witnessed an increasing trend towards willingness of states to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of other states, ostensibly in response to civil war conditions, gross human rights violations or ethnic cleansing. For months during 1999, international news headlines were aflame with dramatic details on NATO cruise missiles raining down in Kosovo. The intervention in East Timor, with the reluctant acquiescence of the government, was perceived as the resolve of the international community to uphold the internationally -mandated expression of self-determination. Instances of use of force in violation of the well-founded principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in a State's domestic affairs, laid down under Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter, have raised many questions on the legitimacy and viability of the so-called humanitarian interventions.

The UN's ability to authorise interventions and whether and when sovereignty and its corollary of non-intervention ought to be overruled in a humanitarian crisis has also come in for a spirited debate. The reasons for the dilemma are not far to seek primarily because non-intervention, the cardinal principle of international order and behavioural standard of nations, is sought to be upheld by the UN. Yet in terms of the current situation and evolving patterns of intervention, there seem to be two separate but related measures: a narrowly focussed norm on the fundamental unacceptability of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and a broader norm stressing the importance of the non-use of force to settle disputes internally. 1

This paper aims to briefly examine the nature of interventions in terms of global legal framework, dynamics of the underlying strategic and political compulsions and the changing role of the UN.

Interventions and Global Legal Framework

The UN Charter enshrines the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of a state, even as customary law underscores protection of the individual in safety, security and well being. A question that needs to be raised is: are there any legal, ethical and security considerations that impel the international community (a euphemism for the United States and the advanced countries of the West) to undertake interventions? Defining such criteria could bridge the gap between varying perspectives on relative weightage that is accorded to sovereignty and intervention more so because the UN organisation is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its members. Under its Charter, and in terms of the past practices of the UN Security Council (UNSC), it cannot authorise a military action purely on grounds of human rights violations. To act under Chapter VII, its action must be premised on a formal determination of the existence of threat to international peace and security. The more important point is who decides when the criteria have been met or a certain expected threshold of behaviour has been breached so that the intervention has a wider ranging international support. Progressive marginalisation of UN, as evidenced by the NATO air strikes Yugoslavia in 1999, lends further weight to this argument. The prohibition of military incursions into states without the consent of the government is often criticised as a principle based more on order than justice, but it does have a serious moral basis. It provides clear guidelines for limiting uses of armed forces and reducing the risk of war between armies of different states. It involves respect for different societies, with varying religions, cultures, economic systems and political arrangements. It acts as a brake on the crusading, territorial and imperial ambitions of states. Ultimately, we have a rule of non-intervention because unilateral intervention threatens the harmony and concord of the security of sovereign states. 2

Four possible criteria that could be considered justifying intervention are: 3

  1. Gross and systematic human rights abuses, including genocide.

  2. The suppression of the clearly demonstrated will of the majority such as the overthrow of a democratically elected government.

  3. Clear cases of failed states where central authority is non-functioning and the civilian population is at the mercy of militias, warlords, criminal gangs etc.

  4. The illegal and inhumane use of power by one side or the other during a civil war, encompassing an attempt at secession and or ethnic/religious self determination.

An analysis of interventions in the light of the above-mentioned broad criteria reveal the sheer complexities involved in such courses of action. Intervention could be defined as an action undertaken on the territory, air space or territorial waters of a state against the wishes of its legitimate government. It would be useful to recall that the bulk of interventions have taken place in the post-Cold War period and these have been humanitarian only to the extent of providing a degree of legitimacy to the initiative. "In interventions, what does the word 'humanitarian' mean, and does it accurately describe anything beyond the original motive?".Does it make sense to call an intervention 'humanitarian' when the troops involved may have to fight and kill those who, for whatever reasons, seek to obstruct them? Or when the troops involved fail to provide what the inhabitants most desperately need-including security?" 4 Thus, while human rights abuses invited intervention in Cambodia and Rwanda, Afghanistan, though now under economic sanctions, has been left to be ravaged by its Pakistan-supported Taliban government, recognised only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The grossest human rights violations continue to take place in that hapless country at the hands of an extremist-religious, medieval-oriented and drug-financed repressive regime. In the same vein, overthrow of a democratically elected government in Haiti invites an intervention but not so Pakistan which met the same fate on October 12, 1999 when a democratically elected government with a two-thirds majority was overthrown by the Army. In Sierra Leone, the UN allows its peacekeeping troops to be hostages for months. Ambiguities and contradictions abound, primarily because major powers decide the 'when' of interventions, and undertake these in pursuit of their strategic and geo-political interests. After all had not Morgenthau, the paragon of realism, defined national interests in terms of 'power' and established the concept of peace through strength?

There is also concern about what appear to be double standards that are applied depending upon the strategic importance of rogue regimes. "East Timor is an example...The consent of the Indonesian government had to be obtained before the UNSC authorised a force to go into East Timor. Why? In the case of Serbia, it was easier. It is not a powerful nation, not a populous nation. Indonesia has an importance that Serbia does not have." 5 Analysts have noted with concern that the intervention in East Timor, ostensibly to obviate suppression of the internationally mandated expression of self-determination, could open many cans of worms in pluralist and democratic developing countries. It needs to be recalled that the parameters of self-determination were to apply to countries formerly ruled by external powers as colonies. Thus from 1945 onwards it became both a principle and a right. In the contemporary political sense, self determination is sought to be conceived more flexibly as the right of participation of citizens, assurance of human rights, grant of far greater levels of internal autonomy et al. Today every state has a right to evolve its own socio-political system and move along the chosen path. Fast-paced export of democracy–the lifeblood of any civil society and state–indiscriminately to every state could create problems in its wake, more so when the country in question is not internally configured for such a political system. The strictly controlled monarchical regimes in West Asian countries provide a case in point.

The Strategy and Politics of Intervention

In the post-Cold War paradigm of comprehensive and inclusive security, the threat agenda is now perceived to increasingly encompass human rights, social injustices, economic deprivation et al to impart to the international security order a more humanistic orientation. It is argued that " understanding social injustice and human rights violations as security threats means little if the state still remains the primary referent object for security". 6 Many have averred that Kosovo was the result of accumulated tensions, with a window of opportunity provided by the support of the Islamic community world wide. This was perhaps the first case of regional employment of force to resolve inter-ethnic tensions. Thus while Albanian-Kosovars were sought to be the primary referent for emancipation by the intervenors, the strategic dictates were to provide a raison d'être for NATO, keep it bound together for the envisaged out of area operations and take the first steps towards its eastward expansion.

Kosovo may remain engulfed in tension and violence for some time in a situation in which inter-ethnic tensions have got severely exacerbated. In a holistic sense, the best way to prevent intra-state conflict is to promote a balanced and equitable economic development with human rights, minority rights and a political dispensation in which all groups are well represented. Thus indiscriminate application of force through interventions for multi-ethnic and multi-cultural states that seek to transform themselves from agrarian-industrial economics to modern nations could be fraught with major upheavals. Barry Buzan justifiably argues that the "international and sub-state levels (of security) are actually mediated through the state and it must remain the conceptual focus of security." 7 At the same time there are many states , particularly in Africa, where highly repressive dictatorial leaders and their supporting elite employ the very apparatus of the State for gross human rights violations, which in turn lead to aggravation of suppressed tensions, ethnic crises and internal turbulence all of which do not lend themselves to easy solutions. What level of human rights violations should trigger intervention? Who should be making the intervention? Is there an international organisation that can intervene credibly? In the light of the experience in Kosovo, it could be averred that military interventions in the context of asymmetrical warfare forced by the adversary may not be the success these are made to be. The eventual political solution may not be easily forthcoming. In the end these generally bring about greater damage to inter ethnic peace and stability, the cause that is sought to be served and upheld in the first place.

Any erosion in a state's sovereign rights has two other negative impulses attached to it, of which not expectedly but significantly, a perceived weakening of the role of the UN and the Security Council is the prime one. This issue is addressed in the following section of the article, with the focus here being retained on state sovereignty. In this context, the second adverse aspect is the extant near unipolar international dispensation that reflects the reality of the powerful doing what comes naturally to them and the weak having to put up with actions that serve to advance the interests of the strong. Hubert Vedrine, the French Foreign Minister, put it so aptly in November, 1999 "Many countries respond that their hard-won sovereignty is their ultimate protection and they ask who shall intervene in whose country and by what right". It need hardly be emphasised that the US, China, Russia and India are some of the countries, which greatly value and cherish their sovereignty and are loathe to see any erosion in the concept.

On the other side stand the so called 'post-modern' societies who tend to be far less defensive about the concept of sovereignty and are more prepared to pool sovereignty in alliances or unions in the expectation of receiving a whole that is more than the sum of the parts 8 . In a different category are states that form multilateral groupings to reduce their vulnerability to intervention. Small states are particularly susceptible and seek protection either through being part of a regional grouping or pin their hopes on the UN. There is merit in the view that the UN by definition is a state-centred organisation and its role in maintaining international peace and security will have to remain anchored within this framework.

However, there is one other point here: is interventionism justified if it is to take place in the territory of a major power or a permanent member of the Security Council or one possessing nuclear weapons? Should the international community intervene only when the prospects for success are great? What are the yardsticks for measuring success? Attainment of the political objectives set forth through a successful politico-military campaign would be one primary measure.

Role of the United Nations

The primary function of the UN, as laid down in Article 1 of its Charter, is "to maintain international peace and security". It was structured on modifications to the collective security framework to rely more on preventive diplomacy to address pacific settlement of disputes under Chapter VI. Resort to force was to be regulated by an executive component in the shape of the UN Security Council operating under Chapter VII. The elaborate provisions of Chapters VI and VII of the Charter have produced mixed results during the last 55 years. 9 Peacekeeping has been an invention of the UN and is often perceived to be undertaken under the so-called Chapter VI and a half, and reflects its place between preventive diplomacy /conflict prevention and use of force. Great powers that undertake interventions invariably follow these up with induction of peacekeeping forces, under the auspices of the UN, to provide their actions a measure of legitimacy. Peacekeeping then acquires a certain international respect. Cases of Kosovo and Sierra Leone are instances in point. Although not specifically envisaged in the charter, peacekeeping operations have over the years become an important activity of the UN in maintaining international peace and security. India has made a distinguished contribution to UN peace keeping and its soldiers and their officers have earned a fine reputation for their objectivity, discipline and professionalism 10 . There is obviously a case for change at the higher decision-making levels of the UN, particularly the UN Security Council (UNSC). Also, interventions must not only flow from a wide-ranging consensus but be made with the consent of the countries concerned under a dedicated substructure of the UN so as to eliminate any scope for arbitrary action. Otherwise inconsistent actions like the operations in Iraq being by and large under the UN, with Kosovo being completely outside it would become an international norm.

The UN's low success rate in the resolution of disputes and reservations on its ability to take an objective position shorn of strategic and geopolitical interests of the major powers have combined to provide a major disincentive to states seeking pacific settlement of disputes. In the last ten years, internal wars have claimed more than 5 million lives and driven away many times that number of people from their homes. In the intra-state conflicts, the UN's record has been extremely disappointing perhaps more because, earlier, the superpowers, during the Cold War, intervened in quite a few of them directly. Superpower intervention prolonged and vitiated the intra-state conflicts in Vietnam, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa. The UN failed to prevent genocide in Rwanda (1994) and to protect the inhabitants of Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina) in 1995. Only in the Congo in 1960-61 did the UN play a positive role. The UN would require to pay far greater attention to conflict prevention rather than post facto actions, discourage ethno-nationalism and be less permissive in providing legitimacy to separatism and secessionism. 11 While the UN has recognised the destabilising influence of ethno-nationalism, it has not come to grips with the problem of political exploitation of religion. Moreover, the serious threat to international peace and security caused by the spread of small and highly lethal weaponry across the globe and their ready availability–which has increased the frequency of UN peacekeeping missions–is another area that needs to be seriously addressed. Perhaps the Secretary General could set up a high level body to evolve ways and means to tackle the turbulence in states arising out of spread of millions of Kalashnikov type assault rifles, hundreds of thousands of other automatic weapons, sophisticated explosives and the much-dreaded shoulder -fired Stinger surface to air missiles. An early establishment of a register of small arms by the UN, on the lines of the Register for Conventional Arms could further enhance transparency.

Socio-economic inequities are central to the mission of the UN because these are the root cause of societal turbulence in nations of the developing world in Asia, Africa and Latin America. However, it was felt in certain quarters that in the report entitled "We the Peoples: the Role of United Nations in the 21st Century" prepared by the Secretary General for the millennium summit in September 2000, many issues of concern did not find mention. "The analysis in the report of changes in the world situation does not bring out such adverse consequences of globalisation as accentuation of inequalities, growing marginalisation of the poorest and the disadvantaged, and increasing homogenisation of culture, consumption patterns and production structures. These lead to social tensions and conflicts and pose a threat to global peace and stability". 12

Given the present international scenario, intra-state tensions are unlikely to get attenuated in the near future; if anything, these may be exacerbated. On the other hand, the reform calls from the West are replete with demands for whittling away the socio-economic mandate of the UN which they would like to see being the exclusive domain of Brettonwood institutions and the WTO. 13 This could, nevertheless have adverse implications for issues that rightly fall under the UN agenda. And, hence, in the report setting the agenda for the millennium assembly in New York, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan did reiterate the importance of the advocacy of poverty alleviation, population planning, environmental protection and elimination of the West's trade barriers against exports from developing countries. His call for revitalising the UN to help it assist in meeting these challenges is perhaps justified in the context of comprehensive security for the future.

Building an international system on a new paradigm strongly backed by the UN, whose new rules would have to be redefined, is an idea whose time has come. While total restructuring of the world body would not be a practicable proposition, the trend of drift towards unilateralism can only be obviated by a strengthened UN. Initiatives would have to be taken to arrest the UN's near bankruptcy, the trend of erosion in its peacekeeping mandate and the increasing temptation to transfer its tasks in the economic field to the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO.

Looking at restructuring of the UN in tune with the mutations in challenges, of all organs, none has shown a greater discrepancy between promise and performance than the UNSC. This is largely because the Council is not the accurate reflection of UN membership, nor even an accurate reflection of the current distribution of power between states. Perhaps the strongest argument for its reform is that any change, which better reflects the political realities of 2000 rather than of 1945, will enhance the legitimacy of council decisions. 14 It is obvious that countries like India, Germany and Japan, as also key countries from Africa and Latin America have to be included among the permanent members. Significantly, even when the UNSC membership increases from five to ten, Europe with nine percent of the world population would have four representatives (France, Germany, Russia and UK). In contrast, Asia with sixty percent of world population, may have no more than three seats (China, Japan and possibly India).Even in terms of economic growth trajectory of the future, Asia would be far more important and must consequently receive commensurate weightage. The restructuring of the Council should thus be based on objective criteria. Even the veto power which reinforces the anachronistic nature of the Council would warrant a review to ensure a more representative and equitable environment for its exercise.

It is in the peace operations of the UN that its changing role must get increasingly reflected. More effective conflict prevention strategies and improved wherewithal for peacekeeping, including the troops' capabilities to defend themselves along with robust rules of engagement, would prevent failures as in Rwanda and Srebrenica from taking place. Perhaps a Peacekeeping Council under the UN Secretary General comprising middle powers–India, Germany, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria etc–would not only be in tune with the imperative for democratisation of the UN, but also enhance operational effectiveness on the ground. Delegation of responsibility and authority would then be a logical outcome.

The Panel on Peace Operations set up by the Secretary General in March 2000 has also recommended major reforms in peacekeeping. These include the longstanding need for extensive restructuring of the Department of peacekeeping operations; a new information and strategic analysis unit to support all UN departments concerned with peace and security, and an integrated task force at UNHQ to plan and support each peacekeeping mission from its inception. The suggestion that Security Council not finalise resolutions authorising large-scale peacekeeping missions until member states have pledged the necessary troops and resources is eminently desirable. Any major changes in the peacekeeping role of the UN would need detailed examination by the member states from the political, financial and operational angle. It is to be hoped that the peacekeeping panel report, released on August 23, 2000, would receive the attention of world leaders so that interventions become a rarity and peacekeeping operations, whenever undertaken, attain the success they are set out to achieve.

Conclusion

Interventionary employment of force in violation of the principles of national sovereignty laid down in the UN Charter have been on the rise since the end of the Cold War. On the other hand unacceptability of genocide, war-crimes and gross human rights violations in states are the ostensible compulsions for the international community to endorse and undertake such interventions. Defining legal, ethical and security criteria to bridge the gap between these two perspectives on relative weightage to be accorded to sovereignty and intervention could constitute an important step forward.

Interventions by great powers in pursuit of their strategic and geo-political interests tend to generate major security vulnerabilities, particularly in developing countries and small states. Notwithstanding human rights violations, social injustices and economic deprivation, interventions in disregard of sovereignty may not be advisable options, more so when undertaken unilaterally and outside the UN dispensation. Some of the major powers greatly value their sovereignty, even as others pool their sovereignty for greater national advantage. Interventions should thus be rare exceptions and that only when widely supported, and under the auspices of UN Security Council.

The effectiveness of the UN in its charter of maintaining international peace and security has been long questioned, with the elaborate provisions of Chapters VI and VII of the Charter producing mixed results during the last 55 years. There is obviously a case for change at the higher decision-making levels of the UN, particularly the UN Security Council. The UN would require paying far greater attention to conflict prevention rather than post facto actions. The serious threat to international peace and security caused by the spread of small and highly lethal weapons across the globe is another area that needs to be addressed seriously.

Lastly, it must be accepted that the UN Security Council is not an accurate reflection of UN membership on current distribution of power between states. Based on objective criteria, more countries would need to be included among permanent members. It is also in the peacekeeping operations that the UN's changing role must get increasingly reflected. There is need to monitor and assess UN Security Council mandated interventions so that countries taking such initiatives do not abuse their power. In fact, it shall be worthwhile considering the establishment of a Peacekeeping Council comprising middle powers–India, Germany, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria–under UN Secretary General. The United Nations must get a wider representation for it to play a more effective role in this important segment of international security, along with non-governmental human rights groups and communications media. Also, since intervention is an exercise of military force, norms governing such force-use must not be violated. It must remain a temporary force for an emergency situation to stabilise the same so that parties affected can live together in a harmonious manner. It is to be hoped that the recently-released peacekeeping panel report, set up by the Secretary General in March 2000, would receive the close attention of world leaders so that peacekeeping operations whenever undertaken attain the success they set out to achieve.


Endnotes

Note *: Deputy Director, IDSA Back.

Note 1: Jeffrey Boutwell, Intervention, Sovereignty and International Security-Report of Pugwash Study Group Meeting held at Venice, December 9-12, 1999. <www.pugwash.org> Back.

Note 2: Adam Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War, Adelphi Paper 305 (London: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 26. Back.

Note 3: See n. 1 above. Jeffrey Boutwell lists these broad criteria in the order from the easiest to the most difficult. Back.

Note 4: See Roberts, n. 2, p. 19. Back.

Note 5: Richard J. Goldstone, Kosovo: An Assessment in the Context of International Law (New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 2000) p. 22 Back.

Note 6: Carrie Booth, "Intervention, Emancipation and Kosovo", Civil Wars, Autumn 1999. Back.

Note 7: Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (London: Harvester Wheatshell, 1999),pp 328-9, as quoted by Carrie Booth. Back.

Note 8: R. Cooper, The Post-Modern State and the World Order (London: Demos, 1996) quoted by Gywn Prins in "The Politics of Intervention", Pugwash Occasional Papers, February, 2000 <www.pugwash.org> Back.

Note 9: For a comprehensive coverage of UN's responsibilities see Jasjit Singh," International Peace and Security: UN's Primary Responsibility" in Satish Kumar (ed) The UN at 50: An Indian View (New Delhi: UBSD, 1995). Back.

Note 10: C V Narasimhan, "India and the Security Council", The Hindu, May 27, 2000. Back.

Note 11: Ibid. Back.

Note 12: Muchkund Dubey, " The UN Chief's Formulations", The Hindu, August 29,2000. Back.

Note 13: S Faizi, "Shaping a Shared Future", The Indian Express, October 24, 1998. Back.

Note 14: Satyabrata Rai Chowdhuri, "Security Council Today", The Tribune, May 10, 2000 Back.