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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
Indian Air Force in the Years Ahead: An Army View
V.K. Shrivastava, Senior Fellow, IDSA
Abstract
Starting with a forceful beginning during the J&K operations in 1947-48, the Indian Air Force's (IAF) contributions in weathering varied and numerous challenges in the post-independence era have been considerable. Yet both the Army and the Air Force can be faulted for not having done enough to spell out vision statements setting course for the future. This article places before the reader a set of Army views. Admittedly these would need to be matched with the IAF's vision and professional aspirations to arrive at the right mix. The process has been overdue for long and must start.
In just about two decades, air power matured from infancy of the days of World War I to its high-profile presence in all theatres of operations throughout World War II, culminating in the US bombers dropping atom bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Over the years, air power has significantly influenced warfighting on the ground and on the high seas. Now no war may be prosecuted successfully without active air force participation.
In India, starting from April 1933, when the first flight was raised in Karachi, the Royal Indian Air Force grew in size during World War II to eventually have ten squadrons. With the proportionate division of the armed forces of undivided India subsequent to partition, the Indian Air Force (IAF) of post-independence India came into being with seven squadrons-six fighter squadrons and one transport squadron. By then the IAF had a well-established professional ethos and a reputation to live up to. The first challenge came soon after independence. From the first day of the operations in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), when an infantry battalion was airlifted from Delhi to Srinagar on 27 October 1947, the IAF supported the Army throughout the bloody fighting that lasted fourteen months. Reaction to an emergent situation, rather than any philosophical approach to air power, determined its use. 1 Nevertheless, the ingenuity and daredevilry displayed by the IAF, and its contribution in meeting the challenge, were noteworthy.
The decade of the 1950s saw induction of aircraft and support systems, both in high quantity and quality, into the IAF. The Vampires and the Canberras acquired by the IAF, for example, were state-of-the-art aircraft of the era. Their induction into service matched similar implementations in the UK. Delivery of Mysteres started in 1957 and an order for 160 Hawker Hunter ground-attack fighters was placed on UK firms at about the same time. In the late 1950s, the endeavours and aspirations of the IAF also got a helping hand from Krishna Menon, the then Defence Minister, who had a soft corner for the youngest of the three Services. To all intents and purposes, the IAF acquired capabilities beyond the limited scope of support role. Yet, despite a clear combat edge, the fighter component of the air force was not used during the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. A likely reason, in the view of one defence analyst, is that "the Army may have decided to sideline the Air Force as a way of downplaying the importance of air power during a period when the IAF as an institution was in the ascendancy." 2 A touchy surmise that-considering that the political control over the defence forces was firmly in place. To conclude that the services in India would carry the "turf battle"-the bane of services all across the world-to the extent of humiliation of the nation, needs more substantive proof.
Taken by surprise in 1965, the IAF nevertheless gave a good account in the skies and in support of ground operations. In a dogfight on 3 September 1965 Squadron Leader Trevor Keelor, flying a Gnat, shot down a Pak Sabre jet to record the first "kill", setting the pace for many more to follow. In Chhamb and elsewhere too, the IAF provided close air support to help the Army stem Pak armoured thrusts. Air superiority in specific terms was not contested by either side. The then Chief of Air Staff affirmed, "The task of the Air Force is to give effective support to (the) Army, and during the 1965 operations we were able largely to achieve that." 3 In the Indo-Pak conflict of 1971 total synergy in ground and air operations was achieved. The war was preceded by a long preparatory period of deliberations and joint planning. The IAF achieved air supremacy in the eastern theatre, participated in the airborne assault, and was spectacular in the west at Longewala. 1971 was the high noon of soldiering for both the Indian Army and the IAF.
The IAF has been part and parcel of most Indian ventures in the last three decades. During 1987-90 it established the "air bridge" between mainland India and Sri Lanka for the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), airlifted a battalion group in November 1988 to Male to crush a coup in the Maldives, has helped in sustaining the Siachen garrison as also in air-maintaining border outposts along our farflung frontiers. Recent happenings in Kargil demonstrated once again the impact of air power in support of ground troops. The intrusion was detected in the first week of May 1999; the Government's decision to use air power was taken on 25 May 1999. The intervening period gave the IAF enough time to train and prepare for the difficult task ahead. The IAF flew as many as 580 strike missions supported by 460 combat patrols and escorts. 4 The effect unnerved the intruders and sent strong signals of the Indian will to the Pakistanis, who had perhaps expected the opposite.
Against the background of the IAF's commendable contributions in the last five decades, in view of setting the vision for the IAF's role in the next two decades, the more salient shortfalls of the period may also be noted:
Having made a forceful beginning during the J&K operations in 1947-48, decision-makers have pussyfooted in their approach to the use of air power. The restraint of 1962 apparently set the trend.
In spite of the vast and varied experiences of five decades, a vision statement that could set the course for the future is non-existent. Both the Government and the Service Headquarters can be faulted on this score.
The IAF was not fully prepared for a Kargil-like situation, with the result that it had to innovate and change its tactics to deal with the situation within two days of mounting the air operations. Admittedly, not every type of situation can be visualized with total clarity, but the foresight in the case of Kargil could have been clearer.
Despite prolonged involvement of the Army in counter-insurgency (CI) operations, and the experiences of the IPKF, the IAF has figured inadequately in these commitments. Neither the Army nor the Air Force has pressed home the point forcefully.
Future Challenges
The international order has structurally changed in the last decade or so. The break-up of the USSR signalled the end of the Cold War and the demise of the bipolar system. There is emerging the "Age of Asia". The emerging polycentric world order is creating new power centres, economic groupings, regional alliances, and a new set of pressure points across the globe. Nation-states are quite prepared to put their differences aside for a while as they aspire for mutual economic betterment. The global security scenario has thus become exceedingly complex and fuzzy. Where India is concerned, long stretches of our borders with China and Pakistan are disputed and sizeable chunks of our territory are under their illegal occupation. At the same time, major powers often attempt to intervene in our national affairs on the pretext of upholding democratic values, human rights, and the like. In the near future, India will also have to cope with the multi-dimensional challenges of external debt, denial of technology, restrictive trade regimes, possible economic coercion, and so on.
Also, China and India, the Asian giants besides Japan, are destined to play important roles in the Asia-Pacific region. Backed by its forceful economic reforms, and the impressive rate of growth, China is steadily marching towards superpower status. On matters military, the Chinese leadership speaks with one voice. China considers its nuclear forces as an "important pillar" of its status and stability. China has initiated steps to establish new structures of joint command, and has set in motion a series of measures to turn its armed forces into a modern juggernaut. A doctrinal shift has been declared from "people's war under modern conditions" to "limited war under high-technology conditions". In 1991, General Qin Jiwei stated, "In the next ten years the international situation will be complicated and changeable. Although major war is unlikely to take place, limited local wars will be endless." 5 The concepts enunciated by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of "Gaining initiative by striking first" and "Winning victory through elite troops" indicate offensive intent. Simultaneously, the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is being transformed into a modern and more independent force capable of projecting force well beyond mainland China. Underpinning these developments is the fact that China is not known to be shy of using its military might to "Right the wrongs of History". The Rand Report for the United States Air Force concluded in October 1999, that "China is not a satisfied power ... refuses to abandon the principle of power". For India, notwithstanding the present confidence-building measures and the efforts to peacefully resolve the long-standing boundary dispute, China will therefore remain the primary strategic challenge in political, economic, and military terms.
Where Pakistan is concerned, the anti-India stance there cuts across all political and internal divides and remains an evergreen rallying point. As a well-deliberated strategy Pakistan should be expected to combine its war efforts with heightened insurgency in J&K and elsewhere in India. The Pak military junta would strive to keep the Indian Army heavily embroiled to create operational imbalances. With nuclear deterrence in place, Pakistan will make bold to embark on Kargil-like ventures in areas that would cause us serious concerns and where our own combat superiority cannot be fully brought to bear. With heavy defence spending, supported by drug money in a quantum that cannot even be guessed intelligently, Pakistan continues to modernize its armed forces. Fiza'ya, as the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) is known, with its motto "Lord of All I Survey", is held in high esteem in Pakistan.
Both China and Pakistan have boundary disputes with India and have fought wars over them. China wishes to keep India strictly confined to its periphery in South Asia, whereas Pakistan has kept India politically destabilized, militarily embroiled and economically burdened. With their anti-India strategic focus, both will, individually and jointly, continue to pose a military threat to India.
Of growing concern to India is safeguarding its maritime interests. India has island territories of Lakshadweep and Minicoy in the Arabian Sea, and Andaman and Nicobar in the Bay of Bengal. Its continental shelf has already yielded oil and gas, and the seabed is assessed to be rich in mineral deposits. Besides, there are a number of small island nations in the Indian Ocean which provide land bases and strategic ports astride the sea routes. In the recent past China has steadily increased its influence in the Bay of Bengal-the Chinese presence in the Great Coco Island off Myanmar coast is only twenty nautical miles from the Andamans. Thus, the Indian Ocean region has potential to become a source of strategic and economic rivalry. The projection of India's maritime power includes the Army component, the amphibious force.
India also faces many socio-political upheavals within as it strives to attain its rightful place in regional and world affairs. India's post-independence leadership has apparently failed in the arena of social engineering. The widening gap between the people's aspirations and the slow pace of progress has created conditions in many Indian states that go beyond the realms of mere law and order. Population growth and the unchecked in-migration from the adjoining countries dilute the impact of our modest development. Regional and communal tendencies, compounded by the rise of religious fundamentalism, are tearing apart our multi-religious national fabric. The ongoing proxy war in J&K and the insurgencies in the northeast need no elaboration. With two of the world's largest drug-producing areas on our immediate flanks, the threat of drug trafficking, narco-terrorism, and proliferation of small arms looms large. Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) zealously exploits the situation.
Internal unrest and tensions have led to increasing employment of the Army over the years. Starting from a solitary battalion in the 1950s, the Indian Army now usually has three to four Corps Headquarters, controlling many divisions, remaining continuously committed to keeping insurgency at bay. The situation demands an operational and attitudinal reorientation since the Army is essentially structured, equipped, and trained to ward off external threats.
Some Related Issues
With Pokhran II India has stepped into the exclusive nuclear club and has set in motion the process of defining its nuclear doctrine. Aware that the prevalent concepts of nuclear war are obsolete, India's nuclear doctrine rightly states, "India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence", and that "This policy of retaliation only ... is a dynamic concept." 6 It follows, therefore, that a future war will have to be prosecuted in a nuclear environment. Further, even prolonged conventional wars seem to have made way for limited wars, preceded, backed and followed by coercive diplomacy. Speaking at a national seminar on the Challenges of Limited War, India's Defence Minister, George Fernandes, said, "Hence, while war in our context was kept limited in the past by choice, our interests would require that it should be kept limited in future as a matter of necessity." 7 Existing tensions along our disturbed borders, particularly along the line of control (LoC) have the potential of erupting into, or being orchestrated into, a limited war. Its successful conduct throws up many challenges and demands a close examination of our doctrine and strategy.
The possibilities of armed aggression across the borders have yielded place to the low-cost options of transborder terrorism, engineered ethnic strife, and proxy wars. Such ventures can be sustained over long periods to slowly weaken an adversary. In our context the Army will remain more than fairly engaged in the complex task of combating such conventional wars where there is neither an enemy nor a front, and the rules of the game do not apply to the anti-national elements.
Technological advances have steadily been changing the trends and the very nature of waging war. Ground-, air- and space-based surveillance devices allow a fair degree of transparency. Increased mobility, enhanced reach and accuracy of firepower, and the vastly improved communication systems have contributed to enlarged areas of influence. A future battlefield will not have the time-honoured rigid form-front, flanks, and rear. Interoperability of systems is promoting all-arms concepts and a high degree of interservice cooperation. It emerges, therefore, that the aspects and the levels of interservice integration need to be enlarged gradually to ensure better professional understanding and trust. In short, the impact of technology demands innovative operational concepts to fight a high-tech knowledge-based war.
From the foregoing reflections the following specific inferences may be drawn:
Consequent to India's newly acquired nuclear status there is a necessity to interface nuclear capabilities with those of the conventional forces to deter or wage a war.
Both the ongoing and the visualized threats of the coming decades signify the centrality of ground operations and the primacy of Army in every single military venture.
In the foreseeable future the Army is sure to remain involved in the thick of insurgencies and proxy wars.
As in Kargil, Pakistan could well attempt to legitimize its covert military intervention under the guise of "providing assistance to the liberation struggle". Such situations could easily erupt into limited wars threatening to turn into full-fledged conventional ones-high in intensity and short in duration.
The changing nature of war, and the emerging battlefield scenarios, demand innovative concepts and synergy in operation for a favourable outcome in all our endeavours.
Manoeuvre by mechanized forces, to quickly cause crippling destruction of the enemy forces, would signify the Army's operational philosophy in the plains and the desert sectors. Battles in the mountains will be characterized by offensive defence and attrition. In both cases short-range vertical envelop-ment, as a decisive manoeuvre, would form part of the operational plans.
In consonance with the emergence of an economically and technologically stronger India, the Army will have to remain prepared for possible out-of-area (OOA) contingencies, coalition challenges and also for larger partici-pation in UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs).
Air Power in Furtherance of the Army's Role
As stated earlier, both the external and internal threats in our operational environment imply the primacy of ground operations. However, in the modern context no single service can win a war. Therefore, taking note of experience and present trends, the Army's expectations from the Air Force in the next two decades may be listed as follows:
First, in consonance with the Government's unambiguous stand, the Army's strategy aims at war prevention. Accordingly, the Army's strategic concepts include the policy of deterring an aggression through a strong dissuasive defence, making the cost of possible gains prohibitive enough for the aggressor to seem pointless. This defensive posture includes the threat of well-poised strike formations capable of instant and crushing reprisal. In that context, it would be advantageous for the Army and the nation that the IAF possesses well-balanced strategic and operational capabilities which, in concert with the Army (as indeed also the Navy) will ensure a credible conventional deterrence. This should include the aspects of threat in being, aggressive posturing and pre-emptive strikes to limit if not to prevent a war. The IAF's capabilities, backed by the political will, must be both visible and demonstrated.
Second, even during so-called normalcy and peace, the Army continues to face near-warlike situations along the LoC and on the glaciated Siachen. There is also the requirement of manning and patrolling the disputed Sino-Indian borders. In theory and in practice, therefore, the Army must pitch in for greater IAF participation for two specific advantages-greater all-weather surveillance and better operational intel-ligence. The presence of the IAF along the troubled borders must become a usual, and not a special, occurrence, to forestall Kargil-like surprises. Besides, such an arrangement would automatically attend to the operational orientation of IAF pilots.
Third, air space in the theatre of operations will be as important as the ground itself. Understandably, therefore, and to state the obvious, the Army would want the Air Force to achieve favourable air situation in the selected areas, and at the critical operational juncture, to develop own operations while denying similar opportunities to the enemy. More to the point, and often overlooked, is the fact that counter-air operations, both at the strategic and the operational levels, directly contribute to the furtherance of ground operations as also for the effective execution of offensive air-support tasks. Joint planning can smooth the creases of timing and execution.
Fourth, the Indian Army concentrates on linking successive battles into a cohesive operation. Kargil was the latest instance of this doctrine. Forceful participation of the IAF from the very opening stages of the conflict must help the Army to wrest the initiative and to carry the battle into enemy territory. Therein, the Air Force will have an important role to play. Synchronized combined effort must decisively out-escalate the adversary to compel him to limit the aim and scope of his military venture. While prosecuting the war the Army would do well to capitalize on the concept of integrated battle that "infuses the philosophies of land-air battle, deep attack, and the maneuver warfare..." 8 Thus, by exploiting the distinct pluses of the IAF, the Army would seek to force an early and a favourable conflict resolution.
Fifth, air power needs to be used far more effectively in J&K and in CI operations elsewhere. It must not only be for the occasional lifting of troops for interception but also to hound and pound the terrorists and the insurgents in their hideouts. Further, and more importantly, should the situation so demand, the Army would want the Air Force to stand ready to hit at the terrorist bases and launch-pads across the LoC. The aim must be to give a positively aggressive and proactive tilt to the ongoing endeavours.
Sixth, all these years the IAF has more than adequately met the Army's demands for supply and maintenance support. As to future operational transport requirements, airlift capability for a parachute brigade and helilift capacity for a battalion group is visualized. These would enhance the Army's strategic impact, operational reach and tactical punch. Also, these would effectively cater for OOA contingencies, coalition challenges and UNPKO missions.
Conclusion
The complexities of a modern war elude easy analysis. More so in our context, where the armed forces are expected to ward off a wide variety of external and internal threats. The spin-off of the ongoing revolution in military affairs adds to the complexity of planning. "The sheer number of ideas, concepts, opinions and differing points of view can be confusing." 9 Even so, this article has attempted to highlight how the IAF may play a more assertive role to further the Army's unending com-mitments. Admittedly, the views expressed herein will need to be matched with the IAF's vision and professional aspirations. But first, have the Indian Army and the IAF individually and jointly done enough on this count? Probably not. The process of vision mixing has been overdue for long and must start now in right earnest.
Endnotes
Note 1: Air Marshal B.D. Jayal, "Indian Air Power", Indian Defence Review, Jul-Sep 1999, p. 12. Back
Note 2: Chris Smith, India's Ad Hoc Arsenal: Direction or Drift in Defence Policy (SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 61. Back
Note 3: Ibid., p. 61. Back
Note 4: Kargil 1999, Jasjit Singh (ed.), (New Delhi: Knowledge World), p. 183. Back
Note 5: Shulong Chu, "China Strategy: The PRC Girds for Limited Hi-tech War," Orbis, Spring 1994, p. 188. Back
Note 6: National Security Board, Indian Nuclear Doctrine, p. 2. Back
Note 7: Inaugural Address, New Delhi, 5 January 2000, p. 4 of the script circulated. Back
Note 8: Note 1/1/96, Operational Art, Army Training Command, p. 18. Back
Note 9: Strategy and Force Planning, 2nd edn, edited by Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, Naval War College, Newport, RI, p. 2. Back