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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
Revitalizing the United Nations: Anticipation and Prevention as Primary Goals
Alexandra Novosseloff, University of Paris II Pantheon-Assas
Abstract
Given the profound global changes during 1989-92 and the fact that the international system is increasingly becoming transnational, it is imperative for the UN, an intergovernmental organization, to accord adequate attention to the structure of the UN and the wide-ranging problems facing it. This would be needed to help it appropriately face the current challenges. This article critically looks into the UN's constraints and radically suggests a course of action so as to make the organization credible and efficient.
The dramatic changes in international relations that have been occurring since the mid-1980s have placed the issue of United Nations reform at the centre of the international agenda. How should it adapt to a new international context characterized by globalization and fragmentation? One has the strong feeling that the organization has not anticipated, or even accompanied, in its structures or in its working methods, the evolution of the international system. It seems to have satisfied itself following and implementing the agenda which prevailed during the Cold War. The massive, and sometimes excessive recourse to expensive peacekeeping operations without appropriate political strategy and means has strengthened the arguments of critics of the system, accusing it of giving the same answers to problems that have changed both in their nature and origins.
The fiftieth anniversary of the UNO constituted an ideal window of opportunity, in the words of former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to effect the transition from "the old to the new UN". But member states missed this opportunity to discuss, seriously and resolutely, the issue of reform, and to set up a precise agenda for its implementation. 1 Paradoxically, it was after the fiftieth UN anniversary that interest in reform was renewed among member states. In 1996, the United States took the lead, 2 accompanied by the G7/G8, and followed by a precise timetable for implementing the reforms by the new Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. 3
Today, the "Millennium Summit" (held between 6 and 11 September 2000) and the "Millennium Assembly" give member states a second chance to think about perspectives for the UN system. At stake is not only the future of the organization but its very existence. These meetings aimed at rethinking, at a high level, the future of the UN, its adaptation to the world realities and to its new mission. How can the organization adapt itself to the evolving international system in order to "give the twenty-first century a well-equipped, financed and structured UN that would efficiently serve the peoples it was created for"? 4 How can it prepare for the twenty-first century in order "to better manage the unpredictable", 5 and attune itself to meet tomorrow's challenges? 6
A Priority: Anticipate to Adapt
An effective reform of the United Nations cannot avoid "rethinking" the post-Cold War period. Yet no international political conference had been organized in order to mull over changes that occurred between 1989 and 1992, as was done after World War I and II. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the "Iron Curtain", the dismemberment of the Soviet empire, and the speeding up of globalization, have together brought changes as profound as those generated by the two world wars. The changes include:
"To stand still while the world moves forward is to slide helplessly backward." 9 The whole international system has metamorphosed in recent years, becoming less interstate and more transnational. Its centre of gravity has moved from Europe to Asia-Pacific. The power of finance and economics and the power of influence, have overtaken the power of politics and command. Balance of power has become obsolete because American influence and power do not have any counterbalance. According to some observers, the United States now exerts an "authoritarian multilateralism" 10 or a "new unilateralism", 11 managing world affairs to suit its exclusive interests, agenda and objectives, perceiving the UN itself as an instrument.
The rapid growth of interdependencies and means of communication makes world problems a shared concern not reducible to a single cause or monolithic perception. These problems do not necessarily require a global solution. More important is to find "a relevant level of decision and action." 12
Finally, the disappearance of the "threat", of the logic of adversity in the post-Cold War international system has brought about an "empty system of reference", 13 a loss of meaning. 14 "Small ideologies" (individualism, narcissism, concern for oneself) have replaced "great ideologies" carrying project, hopes and alternatives. 15 The lack of a federative project on the global scale has generated numerous "micro-meanings" that induce "the spreading of a mosaic of (neither accepted nor unifying) 'codes' and 'rules' that nobody will respect". Fragmentation of the world leads to an "increasing atomization of society" giving greater place to "individual dynamics rather than to collective situations." 16 Several authors have called this cumulus of complexities a "crisis of civilization", engendering a three-dimensional crisis-the nation-state crisis, the societal crisis (which is also the crisis of communication and intelligibility), and the crisis of the human being. 17
The drafters of the UN Charter could not have foreseen these developments. "The words 'population', 'migration', 'famine', 'poverty' and 'environment' do not appear in the 1945 Charter", 18 nor "development", even though the Charter mentions the need "to promote social progress", 19 and creates an Economic and Social Council. "Diplomats, researchers, and strategists must from now on analyse a long list of concrete situations in which the question is not to find 'Moscow's hand' or 'CIA's agents', but rather to understand societies in decay, breaking up of territories, and failed States". 20 They need "to grasp the multidimensionality of realities" 21 and gain "intelligibility of complex situations". 22 Solutions to specific problems can no longer be segmented to the political level, because the political, economic and social spheres are intertwined. One needs to "question the causes as well as the interconnections between the different actors that are politics, war, law, economy, culture, moral ... and embrace the whole with a single and simple look." 23
The 1945 Charter did not envisage intra-state or infra-state conflicts. Article 2(7) expressly interdicted intervention saying, "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter." For forty years, such conflicts were seen in terms of East-West confrontation and ideological wars. The current prevalence of intra-state or civil wars and forms of diffuse violence-militia proliferation (leading to the privatization of violence), criminalization of politics, slaughter of civilians, terrorism, genocide 24 -confounds all analytical schemes and interstate relations. These "decomposing", "degenerate", or "anarchical" conflicts, manifesting themselves as scttered violence, are subject to no rules, throwing up, for the rest of the world, the dilemma of respecting national sovereignty and ensuring respect for human rights. The "humanitarian intervention" led by NATO in Kosovo seemed to undermine the sacrosanct principle of national sovereignty. Also uniform criteria are not adopted for intervention in every conflict or crisis in the world; in East Timor, for example, the "international community" intervened too late, after massacres had occurred.
States jealously hold on to their narrow conception of sovereignty, although the notion itself has evolved considerably. State sovereignty is today questioned by numerous actors (supranational, transnational, or subnational) and forces (economics, commercial, technological, and cultural). Moreover, states are more and more challenged by the increasing role of individuals, leading to a popular sovereignty. The trend also exists towards ceding or relaxing the traditional sovereignty prerogatives of nation-states through regional organizations (as in Europe) or through the ever-growing body of international laws, conventions and treaties covering a wide range of fields. Furthermore, as Samuel A. Makinda points out, the idea of sovereignty no longer refers to State sovereignty alone but also to popular sovereignty, 25 and international security goes hand in hand with "human security". For several years now, the Security Council has implicitly extended the notion of international security by recognizing that "non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security". 26 The application of this realization, however, is not yet systematic but rather occurs selectively, conditioned by the contradictory interests of the permanent members of the Security Council or of the regional groups. Such "excessive flexibility, indifference to categorization and a 'pragmatic' case by case approach can lead to 'operational uncertainty' and non-compliance", 27 risking a departure from the principles on which the UN is based.
This leads us to question the initial objectives of the Charter: do they aim at the protection of states or of their citizens? 28 Selective application of evolving concepts can lead to the suspicion that the UN acts on double standards. "By being too selective in the choice of its missions, the Security Council might become-if it is not already-an interstitial organ that deals with world gaps considered as minor by great powers." 29 The point should not be missed, however, that Security Council decisions only reflect the will or lack of will, the interest or lack of interest of its member states, and not basically those of an organ created for the implementation of cooperative policies for the common benefit.
The effective exercise of popular sovereignty at the international level-multilaterally or even regionally-requires the building of an "international civil society" better organized and structured than the existing one. An embryo of international civil society has emerged during the major UN conferences (especially during the City Summit in Istanbul), 30 in which NGOs participated, as also several associations, the private sector, representatives of local communities, the scientific community and experts. Again in May 2000 the "Millennium Forum" brought together NGOs' representatives and other civil society groups, who drew up proposals for the "Millennium Summit" and tried to create an organizational structure whereby peoples of the world can participate effectively in global decision-making. The World Trade Organization conference, held in Seattle, also showed the power potential of an organized international civil society.
The pertinent question is whether such a civil society is able to efficiently and consistently weigh up states' decisions and actions. One can only say that the involvement of civil soceity actors in the UN debates and work can, to a certain extent, help to contain the power of major states and reduce the tensions between universality and national sovereignty. The problem is that the integration of non-State actors remains imperfect, uneven, and in submission to states' good will, especially in its major organs. 31 What is true of NGOs is also true of the role of small states. For example, are the provisions of articles 31 and 32-regarding the participation of non-member states of the Security Council in its debates-always respected? Even if their participation is real, do the ideas submitted by them really influence the "pre-decisions", taken most of the time behind closed doors by the permanent members? In this case, as in many others, the strict enforcement of the Charter articles would already be a substantial improvement, curtailing the instrumental approach used by major powers towards the UN.
These international changes generate tensions difficult to manage. They also constitute key challenges to be met at the dawn of the twenty-first century. In addition, they bring out the diversity of forces and actors involved at the international level and the structural paradoxes they engender. Tensions exist at various layers: between the transnational and the interstate; between sovereignty and interference; between contradictory interests; between the slowness of states and the quickness of the other actors; between practicality, and vision and hopes; between strength and power on the one hand, and justice and equality on the other; between universality and individualism or particularisms; and between intervention, neutrality, and impartiality. 32 It is within this context of tensions and adaptation that the role and the usefulness of the United Nations is questioned. The world organization should be able to facilitate this adaptation by exerting its mediatory and regulatory role, and by providing a link between all actors of the international system. It should stimulate a "social mediation" that expresses the "universal Us" and "dissolves the 'I' at the international scale". 33 The reform of the world organization therefore requires both a structural adaptation that gives a wider efficiency and a better rationality, and a conceptual adaptation that provides a meaning to a collective project.
Structural Reform
Since the early days, three major trends of thought have prevailed: a reformist advocacy of a "revitalization", a "rationalization" of the organization within the framework of the Charter; a more hostile advocacy of the UN reduced to the bare minimum (nowadays represented by the anti-UN side of the US Republican Party, and in particular the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Senator Jesse Helms); 34 and a radical advocacy of the replacement of the current UN with a "Third Generation Organization." 35 These trends have varying impact, but all address the problem of the adaptation of the organization to new global challenges and the international context. How can the UN renew itself, attuned to the aspirations of the world's peoples and the possibilities of action? For answer, we need to realistically assess the nature and the achievements of the UN system.
Those who think that the UN is useless, need to be reminded that it has accom-plished a great deal. Suffice to note its action for the extension of international law, the delegitimization of war between states, better interstate relationships through multilateral diplomacy, and its record regarding the rights of the poorest and human rights in general (understood in their broad meaning: the promotion of children, women, minorities, indigenous, and refugees rights). Clearly, the organization cannot be responsible for the indecision, lack of political will or mistakes of its member states.
Besides, the UN is not an autonomous actor on par with states: its supranationality remains, in fact, theoretical. The United Nations is not a world government but only a system of cooperation between states. Its decision-making power lies with its member states, mostly the most powerful. Its budget is composed by the contributions of its member states. Its head, the Secretary-General, is nominated by the Security Council and then appointed by the General Assembly. Ghassan Salamé bluntly and succinctly summarizes the reality:
The UN is the states' daughter, but an unloved one. Provided with instruments for action, it is thought underserving of their use. Entrusted with maintaining peace, it must act within strict compliance of the "national competence" of its member states. It is accused of being passive, inefficient, or counter-productive, but it is deprived of financial means to fulfil its mission. Worse: major powers consider it as being universal, but forbid it to deal with problems that concern them closely and that are threatening international security. That is why the critics of the UN do not sound true ...: they come less from an objective statement than from the indictment of an organ that does not want to-or cannot-accomplish the primary task that the powerful assigned to it: to hide the hesitations, the contradictions or simply the cowardice of governments. 36
One must distinguish the nature of the organization from its functions. Its functions can sometimes make it appear to be a simple addition of its national components, playing a "semi-autonomous" role, depending on the field in which it operates and the interests it disturbs. States add to these functions from time to time: an instrument of foreign policy, a negotiating forum, a scapegoat, an organ of legitimization. In any case, the UNO's independence is relative, limited by states' sovereignty and national interests. Its decisions, actions, or inertia emanate from the power struggles and conflict of interests within the international system that are played out in the UN forum. A reform process that has to take into account the opinions, interests and proposals of all the member states (189) and regional groupings cannot but be slow. 37
Regarding a structural transformation of the UN, the reformist trend currently prevails, the two other trends being too radical. In theory, a fourth trend would exist, supported by some NGOs, in favour of the effective supranationality of the United Nations, but states are unprepared for a genuinely autonomous supranational actor. Change can occur without revolution, through evolution and adaption. 38 Member states have expressed their preference for rationalizing the organization, to renovate it without changing its foundations. Unable to achieve consensus on the future of the United Nations and the role of an international organization, states have, for four years now, settled a number of priorities that should inspire the reform process. This process should mainly consist of a "cleaning up" of the system, centred on the identification of its comparative advantages, a better inter-agency coordination, and the will to do better with less. At the "Millennium Summit", the five permanent members of the Security Council identified the following "priority fields": strengthening the leading role of the United Nations in peace and security; strengthening peacekeeping; revitalizing management; completing human resources; reaffirming financial commitment. 39
According to G7 member states, the UN must, in order to be more efficient, "clarify its role and its comparative advantages. It must enhance the efficiency of its Secretariat and operational framework, make them more coherent and ensure genuine coordination at all levels." 40 They also expected the UN to concentrate on its deve-lopmental activities. They realize now that the UN cannot give up its peacekeeping activities. The Brahimi report, while outlining these orientations, urges reforms in peacekpeeing. 41 After the UN "failures" in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda (mainly for lack of political will and strategy of major UN member states), states did not trust the UN anymore and preferred to act through multinational coalitions or regional organizations. Between 1995 and 2000, the UN has become an organization that maintains order, rather than peace, and "peacekeeping operations" became in fact police missions or administrative ones to rebuild the administrative structures of a state. Today, cognizant of the shortcomings of UN peacekeeping in Sierra Leone and Congo, states seem willing to rationalize peacekeeping activities and to restructure the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). In particular, improvements have to be made in planning, rapid deployment, rules of engagement, troops equipment, and analysis of the situation on the ground. In these matters, the implementation of most recommendations in the Brahimi report would improve peacekeeping manage-ment at the headquarters. However, states need to go further and adapt peacekeeping to new forms of conflicts. More thought needs to be given to use of force, coercion, and peace enforcement: all these issues are at stake in current peace operations.
Aiming at rationalizing the actions of the UN system, member states wish for a better coordination between its components, strengthening their cooperation and a "wider coherence in their policies [...] in order to follow a coordinated path towards peace and development issues". 42 In times of financial stringency states want the UN to do better with less. This means downsizing, remedying incompetence, overlapping and duplication, and eliminating or "merging" funds and programmes that are redundant among themselves or with the specialized agencies. 43 Here the role and competence of specialized agencies seem to be recognized. It is indispensable that the different specialized agencies regain full authority on the funds and programmes that encroach on their competence, bloating the whole UN system. Nevertheless, the role of the specialized agencies is, since the G8 Summit in Denver, more or less questioned by the call for a "thorough and urgent review of the UN's funds and programmes, as well as a system-wide review of the roles and mandates of specialized agencies and commissions". The Secretary-General responded in July 1997 by recommending the establishment of a "Special Commission" for this purpose, which is still to be created. In any case, states did not specify the direction this "review" should take: a recentralization of the system under the UNDP and Bretton Woods institutions, or a division of labour and a real distribution of tasks? 44 But to be really efficient and complete, this reform should also concern the Bretton Woods institutions, which should focus their work on the financial aspects of development aid, and stop encroaching on the fields of substance of the specialized institutions of the UN system.
An efficient mechanism of coordination should harmonize the activities of all components of the UN system, which should avoid adopting contradictory policies or programmes, as occurred in the past. 45 This would imply a radical change in the structure of the system and innovations in the relationships between different agencies, considering that the drawbacks of the UN system result "from deep political disagreements among its members and between other contending forces." 46 However, this coordination can succeed only if coordination exists at the State level, because "micro-coordination" will fail in the absence of a grand-scale coordination and consensus on the objectives to be pursued. This coordination must take place upstream, before the decision-making, and at three different levels: between states, between states and the institutions of the system, and within states, between their different governmental bodies.
Finally, particular emphasis is put on financial reform, 47 modifying states' contributions and reducing the UN budget. In particular, the United States wishes to obtain, during the fifty-fifth session of the UN General Assembly, a reduction of its contribution to peacekeeping budget from 31 to 25 per cent and from 25 to 22 per cent (if possible 20 per cent) to the general budget. Serious cuts have already been made in most agencies, funds and programmes of the UN system (especially at UNCTAD and UNIDO). Since 1995, the UN budget is regularly cut. The United States opposes any increase in the UN budget, ignoring the fact that sometimes the implementation of reforms requires funding.
The non-payment of contributions is entirely a political problem, not financial. The ordinary UN budget is $1.3 billion and peacekeeping budget is $3 billion. The latter represents 1.1 per cent of the US military budget, equivalent to two days of Operation "Desert Storm". The UN ordinary budget represents about 4 per cent of the annual budget of New York City. 48 The current US contribution to the UN ordinary budget costs each American $1.2 per year, and the peacekeeping budget about $7. However, perhaps more meaningful is the $5 billion spent by the UN system in the economic and social field, which is equivalent to 88 cents spent for each inhabitant of this planet; although at the same time states are spending about $767 billion per year in military materiel, which is equivalent to $134 per inhabitant. 49 In comparison, according to Wally N'Dow, Secretary-General of the City Summit in Istanbul, less than $100 per person is needed to "put a roof over the head and bring safe water and sanitation, to every man, woman and child on this planet". 50
Micro-reforms are no doubt useful, making the extremely decentralized UN system more "compact", more rational with clear lines of authority. They would also bring about a better balance between its components. But here, as anywhere else, states still have to prove their determination and good will to implement those proposals that need some changes of behaviour and that call into question some interests. The several working groups still have not reached consensus on concrete proposals, and on precise timetable and measures. Even if justified, these proposals cannot constitute a real project for the future. One-off or organizational reforms cannot substitute for thorough ones that combine vision and project, or long-term strategy, to restore the credibility of UN actions and decisions. One should not only ask "how", but also "what to do" and "which missions for the UN".
Conceptual Reform
More and more it seems that, in order to be efficient and credible, the UN must focus on what it does best and can actually do-in other words, make the most of the interstice left by member states. It is indeed "within the interstices of the interstate, dominated, as ever, by inequities and rivalries, that elements of universal, or at least universalistic, awareness, competence and solidarity are timidly dawning". 51 The UN must regain a coherent and coordinated action, method of functioning and leadership, that would have anticipation and prevention as a common denominator. These two missions should not lead the UN to give up its peacekeeping activities, but rather strengthen them. 52 Three directions for a reform of the United Nations are here proposed, so that the organization accompanies international evolutions and becomes proactive: (a) a reinforced action aiming at exploiting the comparative advantages of the UN system; (b) a renewed management centred on a working ethics pointing to the fulfilment of a collective project; and (c) a strong leadership for the common benefit of the international community. These are the orientations of reform modestly proposed here.
Reinforced Action
The action of the UN should be governed by the following triptych: sustainable development / prevention / culture of peace. This triptych should be inserted into a broad conception of international security and into a long-term outlook. As Boutros Boutros-Ghali said, the UN must develop "a preventive action to better control the present, and a prospective action to better take on the future." 53
Development is the most secure basis for peace; it is also "the most important task that mankind is facing today". 54 Sustainable development is "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs". 55 This development should first be centred on the human being. It must also respect the environment, and be recognized as a fundamental human right. Therefore it should be assured by a broader intellectual understanding, of a deeper moral commitment, and of more efficient political measures. Governments of the wealthiest countries are discovering that the "all economic" is not the solution 56 and that some efforts should be made for the poor countries, as also the poorest regions or social classes within a country.
The G8 Summit at Cologne expressed the will to "deepen the development partnership" between developing countries, developed countries and multilateral institutions, that would aim at sustainable development and the eradication of poverty, and that would be based on the spirit of solidarity, because "peace at home necessitates pace abroad and cooperation among nations". 57 However, much needs still to be done so that the public development aid of industrialized countries reaches 0.7 per cent of their GNP. 58 One must strongly emphasize the fact that a developed economy gains more advantage and benefits in case of a partnership, of commercial relationships and economic (and thus political) stability than does a developing economy. Public aid for development cannot entirely be replaced with private investment that is too selective and too demanding.
Development does not only mean a better economic and technological compe-titiveness, but also, and mostly, a better well-being for populations, e.g. better living conditions, education, sanitary conditions, and a greater respect for the environment. Therefore, the UN system should implement a coherent development strategy for better inter-agency coordination-in this aim, the Economic and Social Council should be revitalized by way of being an Economic Security Council dealing with all development issues and facilitating cooperation-as well as a better coordination between these institutions and states or actors in the field (NGOs, associations, regional organizations), and then favour a better outcome of the projects. Indeed, "sustainable development requires a firm partnership between the authorities and the civil society". 59 These projects should, above all, take into account the desires of the local populations and help them carry out and favour the emergence of a civil society. At the same time, these populations should receive everything they may need in terms of technological advance. Their development should also integrate environment-related restraints (e.g. water problem, desertification, soil fertilization, and urbanization). The northern countries must share their technological progress, their experience and their "expertise", which by the way may stop or reduce the brain drain of citizens of the South. In short, it is of primary importance that the wealthiest countries help poor countries to develop their own economic, technological and human potential. Jean-Paul Marthoz has said, "the world needs less humanitarian interference than worldwide sharing". 60
The second pillar of UN action must be crisis and conflict prevention. Development is in itself a form of prevention. Preventive diplomacy (through fact-finding missions, preventive deployment, good offices and mediation) is another set of methods of prevention. Both take place in a broad conception of international security. As Boutros-Ghali has said, "We can prevent new emerging conflicts only if we have much wider and global conception of the very notion of security." 61 Indeed, prevention is not restricted to arms control, pacific settlement of disputes, disarmament (especially through banning the use and manufacture of landmines), but also concerns economic security, social security, and cultural security. 62 The Brahimi report emphasized the need for the UN to improve its crisis prevention strategy.
Prevention is linked to holding and analysis of independent and interdisciplinary information, 63 to a radical change in the way of adjusting the occurrences, crises, and problems. One must, on one hand, favour the long-term in opposition to the emergency, and, on the other, find again "the capacity to give answers to warnings" 64 and learn to "invest in the intangible". 65 Information is crucial for the UN, because information is at the heart of any action, and because data analysis governs its processing. Information should not only be independent, but also as precise, detailed, and undivided between several services, as possible; and should constantly be updated. To remain objective, the UN cannot just rely on official data from member states. 66 Its analysis must take into account all aspects of a problem, detect all its root causes, and avoid stereotypes, value judgements or ethnocentrism. 67 This is fundamental to securing objectivity, developing expertise, and giving the decisive impetus for the creation of an early warning system. Gathering of diversified information from several sources and leading many field missions facilitates grasping of complex situations, understanding societies, and acting before a conflict breaks out. This method, based on proximity, would also empower the feeling of security of populations, as also enhance the credibility of the work of UN institutions by bringing them closer to the preoccupations and the history of those populations.
This preventive action is carried out in the long run, by anticipation; it is never ending, but constantly evaluated and innovative. It must both "conciliate universal values and the respect of particularisms," 68 as also promote the idea of progress, combining tradition and modernity.
If prevention is the second aspect of peace-building, the enhancement of a "culture of peace" is its third, and also the most efficient means to fight the surrounding "culture of violence" though perhaps the most difficult to implement. The culture of peace deals with behaviour, prejudice, lack of communication, and intolerance. To refute the "culture of violence" is to invalidate power struggles, the use of force to settle disputes, and violent behaviours. The "culture of peace" is the non-violent management of crises and conflicts; it is the implementation of democratic procedures and the respect of fundamental human rights; it is the participation of all layers of society in a constructive dialogue. In short, "it is the building of a framework of justice, dignity, equality and solidarity." 69 This "transnational challenge" also takes into account the place of individuals in day-to-day peace-building. 70
For all these actions, the UN must become an international regulatory driving force, focalizing the energies around clearly set economic, social, cultural aspirations, and managed at a reasonable pace. Within this perspective, globalization of commercial, financial, technological, or cultural exchanges is not an obstacle or an exclusion factor anymore, but rather an asset shared by everyone. This coordination of the forces of globalization must go hand in hand with the protection of the cultural and world human heritage, and with the preservation of its diversity for greater tolerance and better integration. These actions must be generated by an adequate functioning of the UN's administration and a more autonomous leadership. They contribute to strengthening peace-building in all its aspects.
Renewed Management
The management of the UN system must be in tune with its culture of negotiation and consensus. Dialogue, consultations and ways of communication should, therefore, be established at all levels, between all services, departments, and actors (civil servants, representatives, delegates, observers). Turf wars, rivalries between insti-tutions, services, or persons should give way to cooperation beneficial to the whole system. Efficiency also requires that results are evaluated to improve programmes, projects, or current actions. Recruitment should be based on the competence of candidates and not on the basis of pressures from member states.
The UN system needs to be managed on the three criteria of expertise, training, and long-term planning. Each UN civil servant should be considered an expert in his field of study, and his scientific and independent conclusions respected by states or other actors. He should be allowed to exert leadership in matters of orienting or choosing policies. Secondly, the UN should be a centre of thought, a training school for teaching non-violence, intercultural and intersociety dialogue, and respect of differences. This teaching would take the shape of micro-projects run in partnership with NGOs or any associations, or through the cooperation of the specialized institutions of the UN system.
Finally, the UN should stop being a firefighter, merely responding to emergencies. 71 Its action should take place in the long term, "to protect future generations from the scourge of war". 72 It should be able to anticipate human needs, the negative consequences of the deterioration of the environment, and the problems generated by the uneven distribution of wealth and of natural resources. This agenda would be facilitated by establishing a prospective unit attached to the Executive Office of the Secretary-General on the lines of similar international institutions-the Analysis and Forecasting Office at UNESCO, the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission, and the "Study Programme on the Long-Term Future" at OECD. This unit could alert public opinion to the coming challenges and the means to resolve them upstream, and not downstream. Three years ago, the UN Secretary-General created a Strategic Planning Unit; this needs to be strengthened and given better attention. Moreover, as the Brahimi report has recommended, an Information and Strategic Analysis Unit should be created at the level of the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in order to alert to early signs of a crisis. Only thus will the world organization be able to regain an innovative approach, an initial, even forewarning role, and assert itself as a peace-oriented and regulatory institution. It is this role that the UN Secretary-General should embody.
Recognized Leadership
Recently, many member states wished to restrict the Secretary-General to the role of a simple administrative manager. But according to the provisions of articles 97, 98 and 99 of the Charter, the Secretary-General is not only the "chief administrative officer" of the organization, but also, and mostly, a political player who possesses a real power of initiative.
Article 98 gives him the right to attend "all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council", to participate in the work of other organs, and the power to influence their agenda by putting on them all the questions he thinks should be submitted. Article 99 gives him the power of diplomatic initiative and the discretion to weigh whether to bring a matter in front of the Security Council. These provisions require personal judgement and a political choice. 73 The phrases "in his opinion" and "may threaten" of article 99 allow the Secretary-General to lead preventive or anticipatory actions. The recent crisis between Iraq and the United States showed that the Secretary-General can constitute a "third way", a successful intermediary or moderator.
This is where the role and function of the Secretary-General should stand out: to anticipate, to denounce, to alert. Indeed, one expects him to stand against violations of human rights in any country (whatever the reprobation or pressures might be), to warn against the consequences of particular policies, to denounce and forewarn of emerging conflicts, and to point out the inadequacies of particular actions. In short, as Javier Perez de Cuellar rightly stated, the Secretary-General is and should be the "conscience" of the whole of mankind: "it is in the name of peoples that the Secretary-General must plead for disarmament, tolerance, and solidarity". 74 In this sense, it is up to him to promote some kind of ethics at the international level and to be the protector of the most powerless. By being a moral authority, the Secretary-General can have a better influence on states' behaviour, so as to encourage them to respect adherence to the principles of the UN Charter (even if the result of this influence is not always seen in a short-term perspective). Kofi Annan said: "If we do not speak out, individually or collectively, today and everyday when our conscience is challenged by inhumanity and intolerance, we will not have done our duty-to ourselves, or to succeeding generations." 75 In this matter, the Secretary-General's function of information is vital. The information he possesses allows him, independently, to anticipate events, to "mediatize" a problem, or to suggest solutions.
Conclusion
Despite a world in perpetual evolution, transformed by globalization and fragmentation, even "fractalization", 76 the principles and purposes stated in the preamble and article 1 of the UN Charter are still valid. Multilateralism or the collective management of world affairs is still relevant for the kaleidoscopic needs of the present and in today's plural, complex, and interdependent world. The missions and actions of the United Nations should convince the several actors of the international system that "the very power lies in collective action", 77 but these principles and purposes must also be adapted to today's world through revitalized structures such as a reformed and more representative Security Council, a stronger partnership between the UN and regional organizations, through setting up a stronger and better organized international civil society that would act as a safeguard to immoderate consequences of globalization. The UN must also be endowed with structures that help the Security Council to decide and act by anticipation and preventively. Therefore, a centre for analysis and forecasting, as also a centre for conflict prevention should be established and attached to the Security Council. The UN must also take into account more regularly "new" international values: rights of human beings, ethics, democracy, a renewed social contract. 78
The UNO remains the best instrument of multilateral diplomacy and an essential mechanism of "global governance" built for states and at their permanent disposal. 79 However, a positive reform of the organization will come up against two main problems: the uneven investment of states and the perception of national interests. In a globalized world, national interest cannot be restricted to the limits of a territory anymore. National problems also can have worldwide repercussion. For example, the control of water needs to be dealt with in a regional framework. States should reinforce their cooperation and trust. The conclusion of the process of UN reform (the structural as also the conceptual) will come up against the will of each member state seeking to maximize its interests or positions within each working group, organ, institution, or programme. Such a limitation should be overcome by the adoption of a common global vision on problems of the world and through the recognition that the UN does not stand, nor act on, the same level as states. Above all, the United Nations does not act against states, but for the benefit of their populations. This complementary action of the UN needs to be underlined. It can, more than states do, act as an arbiter, an initiator, a stabilizing and regulatory power within the international system. What is needed is less to change the institution, or to fundamentally modify the texts (even if some "cleaning up" of certain articles seems necessary), but rather to strictly apply, along with a broader interpretation, the articles of the Charter. The links between peace, development, and human security are already written between the lines in the Charter.
Finally, the UN must regain its relevance on the more general point of view of values. Far from depreciating individual values (but only the ones that concern the withdrawal into oneself and the intolerance), the UN's action allows everybody to become aware of the necessary acceptance of universal and common values, the single purpose of which is to protect the planet and the heritage inherited by several generations and civilizations. As Edgar Morin said, "just as a living communication must be established between the past, the present and the future, just as well a living and permanent communication should be established between cultural, ethnic, national singularities, and the concrete universe of a Mother-Earth for all." 80 Therefore, "the adoption of a global-scale way of looking at things is the primary condition of our survival." 81
Many ways exist to give greater authority, credibility, and efficiency to the United Nations Organization, its system and actions. This is indispensable for improving the living conditions of this world and understanding the actors evolving on the international scene. In order to counter the lack of political courage and will (which sometimes reflects states' lack of godwill), a thorough reflection should be led within centres or structures dedicated to prospective studies, to prevention of crises and to the observation of the functioning of our societies. This reflection on the reform of the UN system actually goes beyond it: it also concerns the redefinition of our relationship with time, to make, evolve or to change the way democracy functions (in the direction to a wider participation of all), the awareness of the planet's unity of destiny, and to find again the sense of the common interest. The UN can be strong again if international actors manage to meet "the challenge ... to refashion the ideal without losing the reality". 83
Endnotes
Note 1: The General Assembly established one committee and five working groups assigned to study the future of the UN system and its actions: Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization; High-Level Open-ended Working Group on the Strengthening of the United Nations; Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on the Increase in Membership of the Security Council; Open-ended Working Group on the Agenda for Peace; Ad-hoc Open-ended Working Group on the Agenda for Development; High-Level Open-ended Working Group on the Financial Situation of United Nations. External studies have also been done. Among others: the Ramphal/Carlsson Report (Our Global Neighborhood), the Qureshi/Weizsäcker Report (The United Nations in its Second-Half Century: A Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations), the Ogata/Volker Report (Financing an Effective United Nations: A Report of the Independent Working Advisory Group on UN Financing), and the South Centre Report (For a Strong and Democratic United Nations: A South Perspective on UN Reform), and a special issue of Futures (27(2)), March 1995) on The United Nations at Fifty: Policy and Financing Alternatives edited by Harlan Cleveland, Hazel Henderson and Inge Kaul. Back
Note 2: The United States published in February and April two documents of detailed proposals on the topic of UN reform: US Views on Reform Measures Necessary for Strengthening the United Nations System (February 1996), and Preparing the United Nations for its Second Fifty Years (April 1996). Back
Note 3: Documents "Track I" (A/51/829) of 17 March 1997 and "Track II" (A/51/950) of 14 July 1997. Back
Note 4: The UN Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration, 24 October 1995. Back
Note 5: To quote Jacques Lesourne, Les mille sentiers de l'avenir, 1981, Paris. Back
Note 6: Interview with Jerome Binde, Director of the Analysis and Forecasting Office at UNESCO in Paris. Back
Note 7: According to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, there is not just one process of globalization, but many forms of globalization, each having its own specificity and pace. See "21st Century Talks", UNESCO, Le Monde, 28 April 1998. Back
Note 8: See Chapters 2 and 3 of the Human Development Report 1994, UNDP. Back
Note 9: Kofi Annan, "Peace Operations and the United Nations: Preparing for the Next Century", February 1996. Back
Note 10: Irnerio Seminatore, "Les relations internationales de l'après-guerre froide: une mutation globale", Etudes internationales 27(3), September 1996, p. 605. Back
Note 11: G. Achcar (Le Monde diplomatique, October 1995, p. 9) quoting an article published in the International Herald Tribune, "Going It Alone and Multilateralism Aren't Leadership", 4-5 February 1995. Back
Note 12: Zaki Laïdi, "Le rite mèdiatique du G7", Libération, 15 June 1996. Back
Note 13: Seminatore, n. 10, p. 611. Back
Note 14: See Zaki Laïdi, Un monde privè de sens, 1994, Paris, Fayard. Back
Note 15: Even if this alternative has ended up with authoritarian régimes as well as with human and humanitarian disasters! Also note that the "decline of great narratives" actually preceded the end of the Cold War, and was announced, for example, as early as 1979 in a prophetic essay by the philosopher Jean-François Lyotard, La condition post-moderne, 1979, Paris, Éditions de Minuit. Back
Note 16: Zaki Laïdi, "L'urgence est mauvaise conseillère du prince", Libération, 11 October 1996. Back
Note 17: See on this topic the remarkable analysis of Éric de la Maisonneuve (La violence qui vient, 1997, Arléa) and Edgar Morin and Sami Nair, Une politique de civilisation, 1997, Arléa. Back
Note 18: Richard J. Poncio, "Beyond 1995: Negotiating a New UN through Article 109", Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 20(1), Winter/Spring 1996, p. 152. Back
Note 19: Article 1, paragraph 3 expresses the need "to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character". Back
Note 20: Ghassan Salamé, Appels d'empire: ingérence et résistance à l'âge de l'âge de la mondialisation, 1996, p. 87. Back
Note 21: Morin and Nair, n. 17, p. 25. Back
Note 22: De la Maisonnneuve, n. 17, p. 19. Back
Note 23: Ibid., p. 215, quoting Jean Guitton, La pensée et la guerre, 1969. Back
Note 24: Pierre Hassner, "Par delà la guerre et la paix: violence et intervention après la guerre froide", Etudes, 1996. Back
Note 25: Samuel A. Makinda, "Sovereignty and International Security: Challenges for the United Nations", Global Governance 2(2), May-August 1996, pp. 149-68. Back
Note 26: Declaration of the President of the UN Security Council, 31 January 1992. Back
Note 27: Stanley Hoffmann, "Thoughts on the UN at Fifty", European Journal of International Law 6(3), 1995, p. 321. Back
Note 28: Georges Kiejman, mentioning the "Algerian tragedy" considers that "the very grounds for existence of the United Nations Organization" are not to protect nations, but "men, women, and children that constitute them". "Le drame algérien et la Charte des Nations Unies", Le Monde, 13 January 1998. Back
Note 29: Salamé, n. 20, p. 150. Back
Note 30: During this summit, a series of consultative forums were established by local authorities, NGOs, representatives of the private sector, "whose conclusions (were) the subject of reports and recommendations likely to have a direct effect on negotiations". See article of Jérôme Bindé, "The City Summit: The Lessons of Istanbul," Futures 29(3), 1997, p. 218. Back
Note 31: For example, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities (subsidiary organ of the Commission on Human Rights) gives, during its annual debate, the floor first to NGOs. Back
Note 32: Bruce Russett, "Ten Balances for Weighing UN Reform Proposals", Political Science Quarterly 111(2), Summer 1996, pp. 259-69. Back
Note 33: Zaki Laïdi, "La mondialisation tue-t-elle l'universal?", Sources UNESCO, no. 79, May 1996. Back
Note 34: See his article: "Saving the UN: A Challenge to the Next Secretary-General", Foreign Affairs 75(5), September/October 1996, pp. 2-7. Back
Note 35: See Maurice Bertrand and Daniel Warner (eds.), A New Charter for a Worldwide Organization, 1996, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff. Back
Note 36: Salamé, n. 20, pp. 137-8. Back
Note 37: As James Paul summarized, "People disagree sharply on what kind of reform is needed and for what purpose. NGO leaders aim for a more democratic UN, with greater openness and accountability. Technocrats seek more productivity and efficiency from the UN's staff. Delegates favor reforms that confrom to national interests and promote national power. Idealists offer plans for a greatly expanded body, that would reduce states' sovereignty. While conservatives push for a downsized UN with sharply reduced powers. Agreement is exceedingly hard to come by". In, "UN Reform: An Analysis", Global Policy Froum, http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/analysis.htm, 1 April 1998. Back
Note 38: Keith Krause and Andy Knight ("Evolution and Change in the UN System", p. 12), think that the evolution of the international society can be thought of as a dialectical process, in, State Society, and the UN System: Changing perspectives on multilateralism, 1995, UNU Press. Back
Note 39: Déclaration du Sommet du Counseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, 7 September 2000. Back
Note 40: Paragraph 42 of the G7 Economic Communiqué at Lyons, June 1996. Back
Note 41: Report of the Study Group on UN Peace Operations, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria, A/55/305-S/2000/809 (21 August 2000). Back
Note 42: Declaration of the Millennium, 8 September 2000. Back
Note 43: For example, the World Food Program and the Intergovernmental Fund for Agricultural Development are in competition with the FAO; the Commission for Sustainable Development is in competition with the UN Environment Program; UNICEF, the World Bank and UNDP are in competition with UNESCO in the field of education. Back
Note 44: In any case, such a reform might be very difficult to implement, because the heads of the specialized agencies are not deputies of the UN Secretary-General, but heads of independent bodies. Back
Note 45: For example, the policies of structural adjustment imposed by the IMF and the World Bank did not for a long time take into account the social policies recommended by the ILO, UNICEF, FAO or UNESCO. This is also due to the "verticality" of the system which makes every institution independent. See the relevant article of Alain Destexhe, "L'ONU au chevet du monde," Politique internationale, été 1993, no. 60, pp. 195-208. Back
Note 46: James Paul, n. 37. S. Cortembert underlines, "By means of wanting a decentralized system, a new organ has been created each time a new international question was coming up. International responsibilities have thus been spread among numerous important organs." Workshop at the University of Besancon, L'ONU, 50 ans après: bilan et perspectives, 29-30 March, 1995, p. 44. Back
Note 47: The proposals aiming at providing the organization with independent financial resources have been kept off the negotiating agenda. For example, the "Tobin Tax" (tax on international transactions currencies), see Human Development Report 1994, p. 75. Other proposals were made in Chapter 5 of the Ramphal/Carlsson Report (tax on plane tickets, on sea traffic, etc.). Back
Note 48: Information given by the Bulletin du Centre d'information des Nations Unies à Paris, no. 19, May 1996, p. 38. Back
Note 49: Figures given by the UN Department of Information, March 1996, DPI/1753/Rev.3. Back
Note 50: Quoted by Bindé, n. 30, p. 226. Back
Note 51: Hassner, n. 24. Back
Note 52: Nevertheless, in these matters, any reform of methods of action should be preceded by a reflection on the use of force by the UN on the field, in case of non-cooperation of the parties. See the author's Ph.D dissertation, "Ability and Inability of the UN Security Council to Use Force-Bases, Practice, Perspectives", December 1999, Université Pantheon-Assas. Back
Note 53: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies: entre l'urgence et la durée", Politique étrangère, Summer 1996, p. 411. Back
Note 54: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Development, 1995, S1. Back
Note 55: Words of Gro Harlem Brundtland, former chairman of the World Commission on Environment and Development. Quoted by Brian Urquhart ("Learning from the Gulf", New York Review of Books 38(5), 7 March 1991, p. 36) who adds that "one of the most important questions of our time is whether sustainable development on a worldwide scale is attainable". Back
Note 56: As Burhan Ghalioun said, "Economic competition cannot constitute a raison d'être for a society, neither can it give a meaning to human existence", in, "La déstabilisation du monde", Défense nationale, April 1996. Back
Note 57: Agenda for Peace, 1992, paragraph 80. Back
Note 58: With $44 billion in 1997, public development aid provided by rich countries counted for only 0.2 per cent of their GNP, which is the lowest figure since the 1950s. Back
Note 59: A/49/665, 11 November 1994, S17. Back
Note 60: Jean-Paul Marthoz, "Everything has Changed, Except Ourselves," GRIP, October 1995, p. 174. Back
Note 61: Boutros-Ghali, n. 53, p. 412. Back
Note 62: Ambassador Hector Gross Espiell, who adds that "Without this global conception of security, we will remain within a narrow framework that is not compatible with the current reality." Conference at UNESCO, 25 January 1996. Back
Note 63: See Maurice Bertrand's article, "Vers une stratégie de prévention des confits", Politique étrangère, Spring 1997, pp. 111-23. Back
Note 64: Zaki Laïdi, "Le rite médiatique du G7", Liberation, 15 June 1996. Back
Note 65: Federico Mayor, "A New Beginning", UNESCO Courier, November 1995, p. 7. Back
Note 66: See article of Francois Moricuoi-Ebrard, "Explosion urbaine, le sens de la démesure", Le Monde diplomatique, July 1996, p. 13. Back
Note 67: For a relevant analysis of these problems, see Gérard Prunier, "Manipulation humanitaire", Le Monde des débats, no. 21, July-August 1994, p. 5. Back
Note 68: Michael Wievoirka, Le Monde, 8 October 1996. Back
Note 69: Federico Mayor, "Fifty Years on", The UNESCO Courier, October 1995, p. 6. Back
Note 70: Norbert Ropers, "The culture of peace and the promotion of a culture of constructive conflict management", July 1994. Back
Note 71: This does not mean the UN should neglect the situations that require urgent action (epidemics, population displacements ...). In these cases, the organization should also have a rapid reaction capacity, especially in the humanitarian field. However, anticipation and preventive actions should limit those actions in emergency. Back
Note 72: Quote from UNESCO's Constitution. Back
Note 73: Article 99 was formally invoked three times: during the Congo crisis in July 1960 (Dag Hammarskjöld), during the episode of the American hostages in Teheran in November 1979 (Kurt Waldheim), and in relation with the situation in Lebanon in 1989 (Javier Pérez de Cuellar). Back
Note 74: Javier Pérez de Cuellar, "Le rôle du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies", Revue générale de droit international public, 1985, no. 2. Back
Note 75: Statement at the opening of the 44th session of the Commission on Human Rights, 16 March 1998, Geneva, SG/SM/98/53. Back
Note 76: The "fractalization" concept indicates the multidimensionality, the fragmentation of today's polycentric world. See article of Jean de Maillard, "Le crime à venir: vers une société fractale", Le débat, no. 94, March-April 1997. Back
Note 77: "Mythes et réalités de la mondialisation," Ésprit, November 1996. Back
Note 78: See Federico Mayor (in collaboration with Jérôme Bindé), Un monde nouveau, 1999, Paris, éditions Odile Jacob. See also Federico Mayor and Jérôme Bindé, "The 21st Century: A Better World or a Brave New World", Foresight 1(5), October 1999, pp. 389-91. Back
Note 79: A mechanism that can be improved through a better integration of numerous and new actors in the UN methods of decision-making, through a greater degree of democracy within the system, and through the settlement of the existing tensions between human and institutional values. See A.J.R. Groom, "Global Governance and the United Nations", in The United Nations at Fifty: Prospects and Retrospect, 1996, New Zealand, p. 297. Back
Note 80: Edgar Morin, "Our Common Home", The UNESCO Courier, November 1995. Back
Note 81: Federico Mayor, "The Price of Peace", The UNESCO Courier, November 1995. Back
Note 82: David Caron, in Proceedings of the 87th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 1993, Washington DC, p. 310. Back