Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA November 2001 (Vol. XXV No. 8)

 

Naval NMD: The Concept of Expanding NMD* Seawards
P.K. Ghosh, Research Fellow, IDSA

 

Abstract

The aims of the land-based National Missile Defence (NMD) have grown over the years. The requirement for additional flexibility and robustness for the system has led to the realization that these problems could be partially tackled by the introduction of additional mobile sea-based elements (and certain space-based components, to be added much later with the system. The precise architecture of such a system will be decided later, depending on the threat perception, technological advance and variables like the use of Navy-backed, upgraded versions of NTW Block II along with the Aegis-class ships, for integration with the land-based NMD.

The addition of boost phase interception capability to the Naval NMD sea-based component-the Aegis class, is fraught with numerous problems both operational and technological. Some studies have estimated that the deployment of such a sea-based NMD system could be achieved at a low cost and within a short period of time. The reality is that such a system development is not going to be "fast or cheap" and will definitely not be very "easy", considering the various technological challenges that need to be overcome.

Given the Bush Administration's determination to overcome the ABM Treaty problem and deploy some sort of a viable and enlarged NMD by the end of its tenure, it is a foregone conclusion that the Naval NMD gets the go-ahead for its development and deployment. This system is the missile shield of the future and will gradually evolve into a "globo-shield" or configure itself into something of a "global security architecture".

"I think there is a general consensus growing that a sea-based activity would be very valuable to us (in NMD). The only question is the time-frame."

- Lt. General Ronald Kadish, USAF

Director, Ballistic Missile Defence Organization

Few technological developments in modern history have received such singular attention and media hype and borne the cross of international politicization, as has NMD (National Missile Defence) in recent times. The steadily evolving set of aims and objectives for the system has altered it from one that sought to protect the entire Continent of United States (CONUS) from ballistic missile threats in a limited way from "rogue nations" (more recently referred to as "states of concern"), to President George W. Bush's enlarged concept of protection of US forces deployed overseas and allies ₁ as well as protection for "friendly countries". ₂

Postures both for and against the concept have hardened. The opponents who consider the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to be the cornerstone of strategic stability have been quite vocal. The politically conservative supporters of the system, on the other hand have also increased the pressure in favour of an early deployment of the system. Delays in structured deployment plans, mainly owing to well-publicized test failures (rather than successes), opponents questioning the technical validity, as well as the requirement of introducing additional technologies like "Boost Phase Interception" (BPI) have led to numerous concepts being advanced to increase the reliability as well as the flexibility of the NMD system.

The Bush administration has been exploring numerous architectural options and concepts in an overview of the entire Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) programmes of the Department of Defence (DoD). For NMD, the concept of a "layered architecture" comprising major sea-based components and some space-based components (to be introduced later) seems to have found favour. ₃ The addition of naval component to the baseline architecture of the land-based NMD system has found growing support from diverse quarters and the momentum for approval of its research and deployment has seen a steady upswing. Many opponents of the original NMD baseline architecture consider this expanded system along with BPI capability to be more technologically viable, deployable more expeditiously and more cost effective than the original land-based NMD.

This article intends to explore the concept of "sea-based NMD" or Naval NMD, as it is sometimes called, its architecture, viability and feasibility for an early deployment.

Background: Various Studies and US Naval Proposals

Heritage Foundation Study: The concept of expanding land-based NMD architecture started early. In 1995 the Heritage Foundation instituted a study group of experts, known as Team 'B', under Ambassador Henry Cooper (former Director of Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO)) to develop an alternative to the Administration's ground-based missile defence and review the growing threat of ballistic missiles. ₄ In 1995, followed by an update in 1996, the team proposed that the US Navy, having invested around $50 billion on the Aegis cruisers, should begin deploying missile defences on these ships by the end of the decade of the 1990s. The study opined that with an investment of $2-3 billion, 650 defensive interceptors on 22 of these cruisers could be at sea by 2001, achieving a limited global missile capability. ₅

The BMDO Report: In 1998 the Ballistic Missile Defence Organization (BMDO) undertook a two-part study that probed into complementing the land-and space- based NMD system with the sea-based defence missile system. Undertaken at the requirement of the Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, the report, titled "Utility of Sea Based Assets to National Missile Defense" was presented to Congress. The report gave due weightage to the earlier Heritage Foundation study and found that such an eventuality would not only bestow the land-based NMD with considerable advantages, but also raise technical concerns and impose a new set of requirement standard for stationing of designated naval ships. Amongst others, many design changes were necessitated in the Navy Theatre Wide system (NTW), that had already been under development.

The BMDO CDS Report Part I: In a follow-up to its earlier study the BMDO subsequently initiated a two-part, two-year, Concept Definition Study (CDS) on the Naval NMD, named "National Missile Defense: A Potential Expansion of the Land Based NMD Architecture to Extend Protection". The impetus for this study was provided by The Conference Report that accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. ₆ Part I of the study dealt with the preliminary Concept of Operations (CONOPS), its development, assessment, integration pattern with NMD along with rough cost and scheduling estimates. The Part II of the study that is yet to be published, however is expected to elaborate upon the threat perceptions, policy requirements, technological assessment, conceptual baseline, cost effectiveness, schedule, mission role and force structure along with the CONOPS.

Other Studies: Studies carried out by independent organisations such as The Council for a Livable World Education Fund, etc, subsequent to the Heritage Foundation study, have come to the conclusion that the development of a sea based NMD would neither be cheap nor quick. In addition since ships were to be used in their NMD role/duties the system would restrict the scope of routine naval operations and compete with other naval requirements. ₇ These issues have been the rallying point of most opponents of the system.

Options Forwarded by the US Navy: Since the Bush Administration is perceived to be in a hurry to deploy some sort of a NMD, however imperfect, in its first term, accordingly, the Navy has been quietly advocating four different options as a sort of "cheap quick-fix" solutions to the NMD or till the system fructifies.

(a)As the most immediate and fastest solution, the Navy has advanced the Enhanced Air Defence Plan option, that proposes the use of Japan (Yokosuka) based Aegis class destroyers to intercept North Korean ICBM launches while being stationed 12-30 nm off the North Korean coast. Deployable within 12-18 months, the estimated cost as forwarded by the Navy is $150-200 million. ₈

(b)The second option revolves around enhancing the Navy Theatre Wide (NTW). The NTW is an "upper tier" missile defence system with an exo-atmospheric role, being developed by the Navy to intercept medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles using a Lightweight Exo-atmospheric Projectile (LEAP) as a kill vehicle (KV) with a Standard Missile(SM 3) interceptor. The system has begun flight-testing, but in its original format is not designed to intercept ICBMs. Termed as the Enhanced Air Defense and deployable within four to five years with an expenditure of $1.4-1.8 billion, it would involve two Aegis class cruisers with fifty SM 3 interceptors that would destroy enemy missiles in space using kinetic energy, and not blast fragmentation. However, in a report to Congress the Pentagon testers have said that they do not consider it to be a technically viable option.

(c)The third option called the Enhanced Theatre Wide Tactical again revolves around enhancing the NTW. It would take six years to deploy, with the cost in the range of $3.5-4.5 billion. The system would employ about sixty SM 3s and would possess limited boost phase interception capability. ₉

(d)Finally, the fourth option called the Navy Regional Defence has been advocated by the Navy as a long-term solution. The system is designed to be a sort of an adjunct to the land based NMD. Unlikely to be at sea before 2010-12 it would cost at least $8-12 billion just for the technology, while each new ship dedicated to the NMD would require another $1.6 billion. (The number of ships required is not stated). The ships would carry 27-inch interceptors capable of a 6-8 km/sec velocity burnout (Vbo) for BPI or ascent phase interception (API). The interceptors are likely to be equipped with the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) or its follow-on, the Advanced Technology Kill Vehicle (ATKV). ₁₀

The BMDO, in its report to Congress has considered a concept very similar to the fourth option, though its rough cost estimate for the system is around $14-18 billion. This BMDO system concept is the one discussed in this article.

Overview of Conceptual and Architectural Considerations

The CDS, carried out by the BMDO, focused on how the Naval NMD could enhance the operational capability and flexibility of the land-based system architecture that had been conceived to defend only fifty states of the US. At the threshold level the land-based system was required to meet the various threshold specifications as specified in the Capstone Requirement Document (CRD), for attacks by unauthorized warheads or accidental attack. ₁₁ Thus, the main aim of the integration was to expand the battle space as well as the defensive coverage beyond the fifty states. ₁₂ (The idea of having a "layered defence" as is common currency now, evolved subsequently).

The concept of the intended integration is to have naval ships adequately equipped with NMD components, such as sensors or weapons complementing the land-based architecture. Thus, within the context of NMD mission, the National Command Authority (NCA) could take advantage of the Navy's inherent mobility, sovereignty, freedom of movement, survivability and operational reach. These factors could enable the NCA to predispose components of the Naval NMD against a developing missile threat or a designated potential adversary to achieve a higher level of defence and earlier threat warning for appropriate countermeasures for missile/s (threat) destruction. This would provide the NCA with an additional hedge against unanticipated adversarial missile tactics.

While a varied lot of different combinations of architectures were explored, but the BMDO, in its report to the Congress gave serious consideration to the recommendations of the Heritage Foundation Study Report titled "Defending America: A Plan to Meet the Urgent Missile Threat". This study advocated a combined sea, space and land-based architecture, with the initial defence based on twenty-two Aegis carrying the NTW Block II interceptor missiles. This would be supported by a constellation of low orbit Space Based Infrared Satellites (SBIRS) for launch detection, tracking and engagement control. ₁₃

New sea-based elements that would have to be added in conjunction to the land- based system (the combinations of which, would give differing architectures) were essentially:

Sensor Suites (in addition to Defence Support Programme -DSP or SBIRS High)

(a)Sea-based radars that would include Upgraded Ship Borne Radars, new X band radars.
(b)NMD Capability 1 sensor suite (Upgraded Early Warning Radars- UEWR and Forward X Band Radars).
(c)NMD Capability 2 sensor suite ( Cap 1 sensor suite plus SBIRS Low with UEWR optional contingent on Cap1 deployment decision).

Interceptors

(a)Kill Vehicles ranging from LEAP upgrades to maritime EKV.
(b)Kill Vehicle hardness to nuclear weapon effects.
(c)Enhanced burnout velocities Vbo

Battle Management Command Control and Communication Element (BMC3)

(a)Communication uplink to sea-based interceptors from Aegis platforms directly or via In Flight Communication System (IFICS)
(b)Battle planning and execution distribution. ₁₄

The entire architecture that was considered and conceptualised was based, in part or in whole, on the NTW system (Block II). The options ranged from stand- alone sea assets to combinations of sea land or appropriate sea land and space-based assets in coherent amalgamation. The various combinations in focus are briefly discussed below.

Unmodified NTW System: Non upgraded NTW Block II has no useful capability against ICBMs and SLBMs, but it does have a capability against shorter-range threats arising from tactical and intermediate range ballistic missiles attacking US coastal targets provided the NTW ships are given sufficient warning to deploy within a radius of a few hundred kilometers of launch or target location.

NTW Block II Interceptors Supported by External Sensors: Locating marine interceptor platforms downrange of the committed sensor platforms of the NMD, close to the points where intercepts will occur, will enhance the efficiency of the entire NMD and the interceptor coverage. The employment of suitable external sensors to the NTW Block II interceptors would make it capable of using early commit quality tracks of the SLBM and the ICBM boosters. Thus, theoretically this modified configuration would be capable of providing protection against attacks from North Korea and other "Rest of the World" (ROW) threats, depending on the attack scenario and the type of enemy. It has been calculated that NMD modified ships may be needed in just three different locations at sea to thirteen different locations to provide protection against one country or some "probable adversaries" simultaneously.

This particular combination can provide protection against, contact or salvaged fused nuclear warheads of a yield typical of Third World nations. Its ability to protect against nuclear warheads targeted in line at the same aim point is otherwise limited by the nuclear yields of the threat warheads and the intrinsic nuclear hardness of the kill vehicle.

The level of protection can be substantially enhanced and the required number of deployed ships reduced by increasing the hardness of the NTW Block II KV preferably to the designed level of the EKV. However it must also be stated that, overall, even if the KV is hardened and the NTW Block II system integrated with the land-based NMD sensors and BMC3 architecture, it will be unable to provide protection against all nuclear states. It has been estimated that with the enhanced hardness and a large number of ships it could provide protection only against the CONUS, Hawaii and some portions of Alaska (the burnout velocity Vbo not being high enough for all of Alaska). ₁₅

NTW Block II Integrated into NMD (Land-based): This architectural combination can be expected to provide a far superior protection to the US than that can be provided by the NTW alone, or its combination with external NMD sensors, or land based NMD alone. This fully integrated architecture could add to the robustness of the system, help in program risk reduction and also contribute to defence against ship-based ballistic missile threats to the US. Additionally it would increase the battle space and protect against a broader range of countermeasures like depressed trajectories. If there is an advance strategic warning of an attack, a ship modified for the system could be placed along the threat trajectory to increase the shot opportunities and confidence of kill.

In addition to the above if one or two adequately positioned ships could expand the battle space, with the Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) being slower, its seeker head design details would no longer be critical. Thus from the technological context this would result in programme risk reduction that could result in redesigning the interceptor to make the overall configuration easier to manufacture. ₁₆

Finally, this system would be expandable. The addition of an enhanced number of adequately modified ships appropriately positioned could cater to the enlarging the geographical coverage of the land-based NMD to include "allies and friends" under the protection umbrella.

Major Upgradation of NTW Block II: The requirement to provide adequate protection against sophisticated threats would necessitate major upgrades well beyond the NTW Block II capability. The capability of the sea-based interceptors and the Vbo would have to be increased and the KVs upgraded. With these upgrades, it may be technically feasible to have sea-based defences fulfilling the required CRD standards for Capability 1 and 2 of NMD missions.

The upgraded NTW Block II basic architecture in turn reveals the options of having various combinations of technically feasible system architectures. They include a stand-alone sea-based architecture, which would require Cap 1 sensors to be effective against Cap 1 threats. The level of countermeasures to be overcome will largely depend on the type of KV. Also, with out the help of SBIRS Low it would not be possible to protect large areas. Hence this combination may not be very feasible in practical terms.

On the other hand a more acceptable option will be an integrated sea and land-based architecture with a sea-based high Vbo interceptor that would make the system highly flexible. For example the land-based GBI could be deployed at Grand Forks while the Navy defends other areas.Another option could be where both land and sea-based interceptors are the same design. With the EKVs being common to both, it will be capable against Cap 2 type of threat and offer programmatic benefits. ₁₇

Thus it is evident that the upgraded NTW systems would require NMD architectural support to enhance the NMD performance. In addition the system would require the use of EVK like KVs for sophisticated threats. For use of sea-based interceptors dedicated ships appropriately modified would be required which in turn will increase the technological challenges to be faced by the system. Table 1 summarizes the architectural options.

Table 1. Architectural Options of Sea-based NMD

Interceptors Sensors Utility Against

Sea-based Land-based Limited Attacks

NTW Block II None Current shipborne radars None against ICBMs, SLBMs

Defend coast line cities against threats of TBM to intermediate range

NTW Block II NoneNMD sensors* Defend CONUS against unsophisticated ICBM, SLBM attack by ROW

NTW Block II GBINMD sensors* Defend US against sophisticated ballistic missiles

Upgraded beyond None NMD sensors with Defend US against

NTW Block II SBIRS Low* sophisticated ballistic missiles

Upgraded beyond GBI NMD sensors with Defend US against

NTW Block II SBIRS Low* sophisticated ballistic missiles* NMD Sensor: UEWR, Forward Based Radars and/or SBIRS Low.

Source:BMDO Study "Summary of Report to Congress on Utility of Sea Based Assets to National Missile Defense," 1 June, 1999.

Though one is able to get a fairly comprehensive look at the various combinations of basic architectural types that may be chosen for the sea-based system it is unlikely that a precise structure will emerge in the immediate future without an in depth technical/cost evaluation. With flexibility towards the evolving threat being the key component in any system, it is most likely that slightly differing forms of architectural combinations be evolved to challenge a changing threat scenario.

Naval NMD roles:

The BMDO in its December 2000 study conceives of three potential roles for ships on NMD missions. However if these ships are multi-mission platforms then they will be capable of performing other missions as well as NMD "surge" missions with little Operational and Support (O&S) costs. Thus they could be used for :

(a)Typical peacetime deployments for relevant ship types.

(b)In other theatre warfare missions.

(c)Ship employment areas identified for Naval NMD support using either continuously employed ships or multi-mission ships capable of "surging" to designated patrol area during an NMD crisis.

The roles that the study conceives are that of: ₁₈

(a)Strategic Radar Picket: In this role, the modified ship serving as a NMD radar source would add to the robustness of the system by:

Extending the GBI capability
Enhancing early detection time.
Enabling a longer tracking time thus increasing decision-formulating time.
Enabling improved discrimination owing to increased tracking time along with different sensor viewing angles.
Contributing to an overall increase in flexibility of operations and engagement.

(b)Strategic Missile Trap: The modified ship would serve as a NMD missile engagement source. In this role it would enhance the system robustness by:

Enabling earlier intercepts by extending the engagement capability forward along the threat of the missile trajectory.
Increase operational flexibility due to different intercept geometries.
Increase number of defensive interceptor missiles to counter larger raids.
Increase reengagement opportunities by having ships close to the threat axis of attack.

(c)Strategic Defence: In this role the modified ship would serve both as NMD radar and a missile source. It would be capable of :

Possessing all the features of a Strategic Missile Trap and a Strategic Radar Picket.
Be capable of defending not only US but forward locations as well.
Possessing employment flexibility.

Constraints of Upgrading Naval NTW to NMD

In trying to achieve an upgraded Naval NTW that will adequately integrate with the land-based NMD system to produce an expanded system, numerous constraints are expected to arise. These constraints will essentially be contextual to three aspects that include ABM Treaty considerations, technological restraints and those of ship deployment and operations.

ABM Treaty Considerations: The US Navy has been committed to the development and deployment of the Naval Area Defense (NAD) and the NTW programmes. These programmes were originally designed to be ABM Treaty compliant in that they were projected as being incapable of providing any meaningful defence against strategic missiles. The naval interceptors were expected to be consistent with the criteria laid down in the "demarcation" agreement signed between the US and Russia in New York in September 1997. ₁₉ In contrast, the NMD proposals for the "upper tier" programmes involved higher interceptor velocities and unconstrained external sensor support in contravention to the "demarcation agreement". In this context, the Naval "upper tier" programmes were simply based on "mid course" intercept design while the "lower tier" ones were geared towards "terminal phase" interception. With the enhancement of intercept velocities, along with unconstrained external sensor support from NMD sensors, the Navy does not rule out introducing "ascent phase interception" (API) when it becomes feasible to do so. ₂₀

Technological Constraints: The technological constraints seem many. To begin with, the Vertical Launch System (VLS) on the Aegis platform places various engineering constraints on the size of the interceptor that can be housed and used. Presently there are eight-pack VLS modules on Aegis Mk 41 ships with rectangular missile cells, each 21 inches wide. These can barely accommodate an SM-3 NTW interceptor equipped with LEAP kinetic warhead with velocities in the range of 3-4.5 km/sec. To make the system NMD capable, the Navy has been reportedly studying, 26 inch wide six-pack missile cell modules for the VLS. This, they say would permit larger interceptors with velocities in excess of 5 km/sec to be housed and would be sufficient to accommodate the EKV that the BMDO has been developing for the NMD. However integrating BPI capability on to the VLS may prove to be a much bigger challenge in the present maritime scenario since BPI interceptors call for nearly double Vbo and a much larger missile. ₂₁ Apart from this, the outgoing missiles generate enormous thrust that has to be withstood by the holding plates on the deck and the entire ship's framework. Thus, beyond a certain level it is not only the question of mere accommodation and firing of interceptor missiles but also the ability to withstand enormous thrust pressures from an outgoing missile.

Richard Garwin and Theodore Postol have argued, that off the shelf interceptor warheads capable of BPI of long range ballistic missiles, have necessarily to be large and heavy. This is due to the requirement of achieving the last second KV acceleration and axial divert movements that is needed to catch the target missile that is still in the process of rapid acceleration in the final stages of its burn. To provide a rough indication of how big a BPI interceptor will be, the notional interceptors used in their analysis resembles a Spartan Missile weighing 25,000-29,000 pounds with a height of more than 51 feet. This being in comparison to the largest Naval NTW interceptor currently under development, the SM -3/ Block I that weighs only 3,100 pounds and is only about 26 ft high. ₂₂ Special cargo ships will have to be designed for carrying such interceptors that possibly cannot be carried on the present generation of Aegis class of ships.

The acceleration and the Vbo of an interceptor is not only a function of the fuel type, fuel volume and the design characteristics of the missile but is equally dependent on the payload weight. This is probably one of the factors that led Navy to think of LEAP, a lightweight KV (under testing from FY 99) to go with the SM missiles needed for the exo-atmospheric midcourse intercept. The increase in VLS size from 21 to 26 inches, along with the length may considerably enhance the range and flyout velocity of the NMD capable Modified SM-3 Block II missile. This will be further enhanced if it is coupled to the LEAP, but it is unlikely that the needed acceleration required for BPI could be mustered. In addition, the LEAP itself suffers from certain design limitations that are a prerequisite for mid course interception of strategic missiles by a KV that the NMD hopes to target. On the other hand a better equipped but heavier land-based EKV attached to the Modified SM-3 Block II missile would only ensure that velocities increase to a nominal 4.5 km/sec. ₂₃

Also, the basic requirements of a KV for BPI use are quite different from those used for mid course interception. While the KV for BPI has sensors to distinguish between a hot plume and a booster body (which is one of the major technological challenges that is currently being faced by designers and is called "plume to hard body handover" problem) the latter has sensors to distinguish the colder re-entry vehicle from the warhead. At present there is no major program existing that seeks to develop a sea-based BPI interceptor to be placed exclusively on the Aegis. ₂₄

Deployment Constraints: The Navy has proclaimed various figures as the requirement of ships for NMD assignments, depending on the type of " quick fix solution" the government was seeking. The fact remains that the total number of ships required would remain a function of the of the potential number of threat areas rather than "threat nations" as one nation may be "covered" by more than one threat area.

It is inevitable that a few important patrol areas will need to be manned continuously (or nearly in a continuous manner) calling for a dedicated number of ships to patrol these areas. These ships may not be available for other role operations and would need to be rotated for maintenance, rest and recuperation of the crew. Since these dedicated ships would not be available for other operational missions of the Navy, the Navy would definitely ask for additional assets to fulfil its additional naval obligations. Thus if new Aegis are to be built, the cost saving would fall through, since they would cost about $1 billion each with $20 million per year needed to operate them. ₂₅ Conversely, if the ships are to be multiple-mission types with their availability restricted to NMD "surge missions," then the problem that they may be too far away to return in time for the NMD "surge mission" is always a danger, especially with lead times for reaction always being short. ₂₆ This is what has prompted the BMDO to acknowledge that "ship locations and load-outs for NMD tend to conflict with those for theatre missions." ₂₇

In addition to the above constraints, if the Aegis class are to deployed in patrol areas near enemy coast, additional ships will have to be deployed for their defence as they may not be able to defend themselves adequately at all times.

Cost Factor

Assessing the cost factor of a concept that is to be married to another concept, variations of which are individually under nascent development and both being excessively politicised with vested interests, is indeed a complex and daunting task. To add to the problem is that various in-depth studies, have used differing yardsticks of comparison to buttress their point of view or leaning.

The BMDO in their unclassified Executive Summary of the first part of their report to the Congress titled "National Missile Defence: A Potential Expansion of the Land Based NMD Architecture to Extend Protection", states that a detailed cost analysis has not been carried out. This is since the Naval NMD is not mature enough for the conduct of the traditional Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to determine the most cost-effective approach for supplementing the land-based NMD. ₂₈ However despite the initial costing done in the preliminary study, the costing problem is expected to be dealt with in a more detailed fashion in the second part of its study that has yet to be completed

The BMDO in its preliminary report, stated that post FY 97, a stand-alone sea-based architecture would cost $16-19 billion just to protect the fifty states of US. The estimate was based on the corollary that all costs prior to FY 97 were sunk and not included. The price of 3-6 Aegis class of ships was included but not that of the NTW Block II design, programme, procurement and O&S costs. The study further stated that the stand-alone architecture would require the NMD sensor suite, BMC3 system and EKV currently under development, thus, in effect ignoring their costs too. It projected that the system would use more than 80-100 sea-based interceptors, planned initially for the land-based NMD. ₂₉

Slightly modifying its earlier rough estimation, the BMDO stated in its later study, that a squadron of six Aegis class ships, (fitted with appropriate NMD sensors and 100 interceptor missiles) on a Strategic Defence mission would have an acquisition cost of $ 8-12 billion. Six totally new ships for the same Strategic Defense mission, along with their associated NMD systems (as modification) would have an estimated cost of $14-18 billion. ₃₀ This was almost the same cost estimation of $16-19 billion stated in the earlier study except that in the latter case the number of ships had been quantified to six. In a dedicated role these ships would have an annual O&S cost of $30 million each (totalling $3.6 billion over twenty years) that was considerably higher and in contrast to the $20 million each per year propounded by the CATO study. ₃₁

On the other hand, the estimates forwarded by the Heritage Foundation were in sharp divergence with the BMDO estimates both on budgetary terms and on the projection of deployment timing. (See Table 2) While in March 1999 the Heritage spoke of deploying a global sea-based NMD with a mere $2-3 billion with an initial deployment by 2004 and finally by 2009, the BMDO in contrast was more conservative. In 1999 they had estimated that a Naval NMD system on a stand- alone architecture meeting the Cap 2 requirements (that was a magnitude higher than the one foreseen by Heritage) would cost $ 16-19 billion. The initial deployment of the system would begin at about FY2014 with the system finally getting deployed not earlier than FY2020. In their 2000 study they however left the time frame issue open-ended in that that it was stated that the Naval NMD concept as a supplement to the land-based one would be developed, tested and deployed in the post 2010 period. While the Strategic Trap capability could be adequately deployed in the same post 2010 period the other role being that of Strategic Radar Picket could be developed with adequate funding and an early go ahead within the same time frame. ₃₂

The Heritage Foundation had considered the present inventory of Aegis ships to be sufficient. However the BMDO in 1999 had considered 3-6 Aegis ships as adequate, trimming the figure to six ships in its December 2000 study. Thus, even if one was to subtract $6 billion from the BMDO "rough order of magnitude" (ROM) estimates, there is still a difference of four to five times between the Heritage and the BMDO estimate.

Rodney Jones, in his study however has estimated that a more realistic cost would be $30-36 billion (in FY 1997 dollar terms) for achieving a sea NMD equivalent to the still limited Cap-3 threshold and not counting the NTW Block II developmental costs as in the BMDO estimate. Rodney Jones arrived at this estimate by "equivalent or analogical interpolation" of figures. His study states that in the case of land-based NMD the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) concluded that the Pentagon estimates of $26 billion (for the 'expanded C-1' through 2015) were far below the more realistic figure of $49 billion that the CBO arrived at. By analogy the study chose to raise the BMDO Estimate (of 1998) for sea-based NMD for a sum of $16-19 billion by the same equivalent amount i.e. 85.5% and arrive at the figure of $30-$36 billion. ₃₃

It is extremely circumspect whether the yardstick for cost estimation of one concept can be analogically applicable for direct interpolation to another concept that is originally independent of each other in more ways than one. This being against a background that the BMDO has not considered the design and developmental costs of the land-based NMD. Thus the estimation put forward by Jones seems improbable.

Table 2. Comparison of Cost Estimates for Sea-based NMD ₃₄

BMDO Estimates (1998) (ROM)

Defence SystemCost of Full Initial Final

DeploymentDeploymentDeployment

Naval NMD in $ 16-19 billionFY 2011-FY 2014FY 2020

'stand alone mode'

(with 3-6 or more

Aegis class)*

BMDO Estimates(2000) (ROM)

Naval NMD $ 14-18 billion with Post FY 2010

(with 6 new modified O&S cost $3.6

Aegis class)billion over 20 years

Heritage Foundation Estimates

NMD capable NTW $2-3 billion20032009

(650 SM 3

Interceptors)

SBIRS Low$5 billion

SBIs (Brilliant $12-15 billion

Pebbles)

SBIs$15-18 billion

Total Naval and $34-41 billion

Space (NTW/SBIRS
ow/ SBIs)

Council for a Livable World Education Fund

Defence SystemCost of Full Cumulative Costs

Deployment

BMDO Baseline $16-19 billion

CBO NMD DifferentialBMDO Estimate + 88.5%$30-36 billion

7 more Aegis class ships$7 million$37-43 billion

Mission trade offs Not calculated

CBO SBIRS Low estimate**$10.5 billion$47.5-53.5 billion

* Does not include the cost of SBIRS or SBIs.

**The BMDO and CBO estimates did not include the cost of SBIRS Low (that has been separately estimated by CBO to be around $10.5 billion) and the cost of space based interceptors in their assessments.

Hidden Costs: It is worth noting that calculation of all the above estimates involved only the direct cost with in the perimeter specified, while the large hidden and associated costs, though mentioned at times remained essentially outside the cost estimation. To take the studies individually, while in the case of the Heritage study, the hidden costs had been overlooked, in the BMDO study these were mentioned but not incorporated in a systematic manner. In the Council for a Livable World Education Fund study these costs were mentioned but remained uncalculated due to the practicalities involved in their calculation.

It is felt that one of the main hidden costs is that of continuous cost escalation in the face of delayed deployment of the system due to its inability to technologically validate itself, appropriately, within the given time frame. With the land-based system the costs escalated when it was unable to comply with the Cap-1 threshold as per the originally scheduled time programme mainly due to technological hitches and political issues. ₃₅ The visible side of lack of technological validity being the numerous failed Integrated Flight Tests (IFTs) from time to time. This may be evidenced again with the sea-based NMD system, that in any case will be based on the unproven cutting-edge technology.

The other aspect that may increase the hidden costs is that the EVK (prototypes of which are currently under live flight testing, with mixed results) has not been known to be very discriminative against countermeasures and warheads of different types. As Theodore Postol commented "there is no science behind what they are doing... they have demonstrated that they can hit an object but they cannot find the right object".

Continually evolving countermeasures will undoubtedly further degrade the effectiveness of the shield unless a steady developmental process ensures that intercept technologies are a step ahead of the countermeasures. Thus the sequential upgradation of the system will undoubtedly have a large bearing on the cost that cannot be measured in advance but is likely to be substantial. This, incidentally, is a common problem that is faced by any weapon system of this nature.

"Mission creep" will be another factor in escalating hidden costs if the missile shield is extended to protect "friends and allies" with the need to fill in the additional geographical and effectiveness gaps. Thus enlarging the constituency of protection would be a sort of "mission creep" and would involve enhancing costs of a creeping nature. These could be offset to an extent if the US were to "charge" the respective nations for this "protection".

Present Scenario

The BMDO on directions from the Secretary of Defence seems to have considerably modified its approach towards development and implementation of the NMD programme and indeed the entire BMD programme, in an effort to make it much more flexible and the goals achievable within the shortest period of time.

Firstly, the distinction between the theatre and national missile defence that had been blurring practically on ground has ceased to exist officially. The broad new thrust will concentrate on integrating the technologies involving land, sea, air and space-based platforms to counter ballistic missiles in all phases of their flight. The difficult stated goal being to provide multiple engagement opportunities along the entire flight path of the ballistic missile in a layered defence approach. ₃₆ This might mean the same system having the capability to intercept the target missiles in different phases, thus technically speaking, involving different interceptors with different KVs at different times of engagement. With a uniform BMC3 component for the entire system this may well be possible.

The BMDO has not yet specified any particular architecture for development and is unlikely to commit to any single architecture in the immediate future. Rather, it is most likely to test and deploy different combinations of sensors and weapons to figure out the most effective architecture that suits their national strategic objective.

The clearly marked programme activities, with fixed milestones and demarcated phases showing the road to production have been left flexible erasing the time bound schedule. Thus, reducing the pressure on the programme developers to produce technological results within fixed time frames.

The BMDO in the meantime have plans of allocating different nomenclature to its BMD programmes, but since the earlier parameters of the existing programmes continue, the nomenclature that has been in usage till date may undergo little change. Essentially, the BMDO plans to breakup its programme into nine Program Elements (PE) mainly comprising of the BMD System; the Terminal, Midcourse and Boost Defence Segments; ₃₇

The Terminal Defence Segment will deal with the projects of THAAD, Arrow Deployability Program (ADP), and the Arrow System Improvement Program (ASIP).

The Midcourse and Boost Defence Segment (MDS) has been divided into multiple elements. The land-based NMD has been termed as "Ground Based Mid-course System" while the Navy Theatre Wide has been termed as "Sea Based Mid course." ₃₈ The aim being to demonstrate an integrated system, the only difference in the new arrangement, being the new thrust in API for the sea-based system.

The Boost Defence Segment on the other hand is mainly to develop the BPI missile defence capabilities. Its four main objectives being to develop the Air Borne Laser (ABL) for an initial capability by 2008. A sea-based BPI using high speed KVs, the "hot fire" test of which is planned by FY 2002. The third being the Space Based Interceptor Experiment (SBX) while the fourth being the development of the Space Based Laser (SBL) for flight experiment by 2012.

Analytical Remarks:

Gathering from the various strands of thought, and somewhat sketchy data publicly available, a few major points of analytical convergence emerge. These are attributable to the conceptual scenario of the entire Naval NMD, its architectural aspects, cost estimates, technological aspects, present scenario and associated general issues. These broad points have been enumerated below with the minor detailed aspects of analysis being enmeshed with the appropriate section earlier.

Conceptual Aspects

It is evident that there exists a creeping realisation, that along with the background of expanding aims the necessity exists of providing the land-based NMD with the flexibility, enhanced operational capability to fill in the strategic gaps coupled with the ability to expand for "taking in" additional roles. Thus the need for expanding the battle space and the additional mobile layer to the "layered defence" concept. All these can be achieved to an extent by the integration of the sea-based components capable of ascent phase, mid course and descent type engagement (along with the space-based elements) integrated with the architecture of the land-based NMD.
This technological /strategic flexibility and expanded battle space that the Naval NMD can provide is due to the inherent mobility of ships and their ability for "strategic reach". Hence the ships that have been adequately modified with NMD sensors/interceptors can detect, track and engage ICBMs earlier than the land-based system, enhancing the warning time, engagement opportunities and capabilities manifold. Tracking of targets during boost phase and early deployment of interceptors could improve discrimination against advanced threats capable of taking countermeasures.
The additional flexible and mobile layer of defence in form of the Naval NMD would permit the tailoring of NMD posture to fit the threat environment and most importantly, adjust to the changing national defence priorities.

Architectural Aspects

The NTW Block II system, currently under development, would be incapable against ICBMs and SLBMs without substantial upgrades. However, the unmodified system could be used against shorter-range missiles of tactical and intermediate range.
While different architectural concepts that marry both the land-based (NMD) with the sea-based systems in various combinations, have been forwarded keeping in view the role envisaged for the sea-based components, the precise architecture that will finally evolve is unclear at present. However, it will depend, to a large extent on the national policy goals, deployment strategy, developmental costs, life cycle costs, perceived force structure, technological benefits of additional add-on aspects such as BPI and time delay involved.
Whatever architecture is chosen, the sea-based system would be a supplement or an adjunct to the land-based NMD to provide the latter with the desired robustness and desired flexibility. Obviously such architecture cannot be developed and deployed within the propagated schedule and funding for the land-based NMD. Both these factors need to be re-worked and re-drawn keeping the changing technological challenges in view.
In all likelihood, the most important sea-based component of the integrated system-the NMD modified Aegis class ships would be multi-mission type of platforms that would be capable of discharging other missions with equal ease. This is based on the assumption that their standard capability will not be reduced due to the fitment of specialized NMD equipment in lieu of regular ones. Other than a few dedicated ships deployed as Strategic Defence Cruisers in two or three NMD patrol areas, the others are likely to perform their NMD tasks on response to a crisis as "surge missions". This means that their "deployment circle" for associated missions would perforce be restricted to a radius that would depend on the admissible "time late" for such tasks. Subject to these restrictions, the "shoot and move" tactics could also be used to move from one patrol area to another but understandably these will be entirely dependent on the "time late" factor and the size of patrol areas. One of the main advantages of having multi-mission platforms is that it will not only reduce exclusive O&S costs but also reduce the constraints on the deployment of the ships for naval missions.

Aspects of Cost Estimates:

Taking the overall perspective of the various cost estimates that have emerged due to the numerous studies on the subject, the picture gets somewhat blurred. The pendulum seems to swing from the relatively low cost ($2-3 billion) figures provided by the Heritage Foundation, to many times the sum estimated by the Council for a Livable World Education Fund study with the BMDO's ROM costs in between. In the absence of a rigourous AoA being carried out by the BMDO, it is extremely difficult to gauge the more precise version of how much it would actually cost. To be on the unbiased conservative side, it may be safe to presume that the BMDO figures of $14-18 billion up front cost, propounded in 2000 are much more near the real figures than any other study.

In any case, whatever be the precise figures in the eventual run up, the following facts will remain:

The Naval NMD is definitely not going to be cheap as thought of earlier by its proponents.
The hidden costs of the project, none of which are calculable at the moment, will increase the estimates manifold. But such a rise is likely to be expected keeping in view the multi-hued dynamics of research development and deployment of the system.

Aspects of Scheduling:

The estimates on the time factor is another area that has received considerable focus in the absence of a precisely formatted schedule. As in the case of cost estimates, the estimates have swung from one end of the spectrum to the other. Since the system will involve the cutting edge technology that will require vigourous sequential testing to prove its validity ₃₉ (especially with a formidable pressure group of renowned scientists doubting the technological veracity, in part or as a whole) time over runs are bound to take place. They have occurred with the land-based NMD and will occur again with the integration. Nevertheless, it may be safe to assume that an initial system might be deployed between 2011 to 2014, while the final system of Cap 3 (or Cap 3+ as is being propounded now) specifications is unlikely to be deployed before 2020.

Technological Aspects:

Apart from its overall veracity, there has been considerable speculation on the introduction of the BPI facility on to this system. Various ideas and concepts have been forwarded that seek to introduce this capability on it or its modified version. ₄₀ However, as of now, introduction of such a capability on to sea-based component of the Naval NMD-the Aegis class of ships will involve considerable technological challenges since it would involve getting the large sized BPI interceptors (with Vbo more than 7 km/sec) on to these ships. This would necessarily require newer constructions or extensive modifications.

Even if the BPI capability was to be introduced, deployment problems are expected to arise. The requirement of positioning such ships with in a relatively short radius from the launch point of the enemy missile, will make these ships vulnerable to enemy attack as they would come within the ambit of the enemy systems. Thus, additional safety escorts would be required for the self-defence of these ships.

An additional operational problem could arise. Given the exceedingly short response time window (between 100-300 seconds approximately) required for engaging a potential threat in its boost phase, the theatre commander would have to respond for interception almost immediately. This action would probably have to be taken without adequate knowledge of the destination of the missile, since that would be exceedingly difficult to assess at this initial stage missile flight. Thus, in effect, a non-threatening missile meant for scientific or commercial purposes may well be shot down, creating an internationally explosive situation that can spark off an overt conflict.

The Present Scenario:

Recent efforts and plans of the BMDO in reorganisation of the entire BMD program and introduction of certain nomenclature, are basically aimed at introducing additional flexibility, achievable aims and a dose of realism into the entire gamut. On ground, while the approach of the programme may be seen as an alteration, the essential technological ingredients will remain the same, with a multi-dimensional integrated NMD enveloping other programmes to evolve into a global security architecture.

The overall Concept:

Overall, while encompassing the larger sea-based NMD, the NMD seems to be dispensing with its "national" characteristics and developing into a global missile defence shield. The BMDO's plans for reorganisation in this respect, seems to be the first step in the direction towards development of a ballistic missile "globo-shield" that will envelope not only the CONUS and US troops deployed overseas but also "allies and friends". Systems like the developing Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) are most likely to be enveloped and merged with the Naval NMD that will evolve into a multi-layered global shield. Finally, the Naval NMD has the potential to evolve from the ballistic missile "globo-shield" to that of a "global security architecture" with the "ins" and the "outs" signifying the chosen allies and friends who would be covered by its protection and others who would be out of it. However, this development is unlikely to be before the end of the next decade by which time the true potential of the enlarged system (or the lack of it) would have been realised.

Conclusion

The enlarging aims of the land-based NMD as well as the requirement for additional flexibility and robustness for the system seems to have led to a growing realisation that these problems could be partially tackled by the concept of introducing additional sea-based elements (and space-based components like the Air borne Laser (ABL) or air borne BPI much later) along with the system.

The precise architecture of such a system will be decided at a later stage. This decision will largely depend on the prevailing threat perception, national security policy of US, technological capability and variables like the use of the Navy backed, upgraded version of NTW Block II along with the Aegis class ships for integration with the land-based NMD. ₄₁

The addition of the BPI to the Naval NMD sea-based component - the Aegis class has raised considerable interest amongst the opponents and proponents of the system. However the introduction of BPI is fraught with numerous problems both operational and technological and will have to be rigorously weighed against the perceived pros and cons.

The die-hard proponents of the system have estimated that the deployment of such a sea-based NMD system could be achieved at a low cost and within a short period of time. The reality is that, such a system deployment is not going to be "fast or cheap" and it definitely is not going to be very "easy" keeping in mind the various technological challenges that need to be overcome.

Given the Bush Administration's determination to overcome the ABM Treaty problem and deploy some sort of a viable and enlarged NMD by the end of its tenure, it is a foregone conclusion that the Naval NMD gets the go-ahead for its development and deployment. This system is the missile shield of the future and with passing time is bound to enlarge itself into a "globo-shield" or configure itself into somewhat of a "global security architecture".

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Endnotes

Note 1: This was clearly outlined by George W. Bush in "Missile Defense Now", The Washington Post, 25 May, 2000 and his presidential address to the students and faculty of the National Defense University on 1 May 2001. Back

Note 2: John Bolton, the US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security speaking on NMD, told reporters that it was not inconceivable that missile defence cooperation for thwarting nuclear missile attacks be extended to include Russia and countries with whom no formal military alliance exists. See Chidanand Rajghatta, "NMD for friends , not just allies", Times of India, 26 July, 2001. Back

Note 3: See Michael Sirak, "BMD Takes Shape", Jane's Defence Weekly, April 18, 2001,Vol 35, p. 29. Back

Note 4: Baker Spring and James Anderson, "Missile Defense: Ending America's Vulnerability"(Washington DC, The Heritage Foundation ,2000) p 546 and Missile Defense Study Team, "Defending America: Ending America's Vulnerability to Ballistic Missiles. An update by the Missile Defense Study Team"(Washington DC, The Heritage Foundation, 15 March 1996) p. 1. Back

Note 5: Ibid. Missile Defense Study Team, p.3. The study contained many other recommendations like accelerating Brilliant Eyes Space Sensor System for deployment by 1999,revivng the space based defence programs then cancelled by the Clinton Administration and considered the ABM Treaty as outdated and a hindrance on the defence of US. Back

Note 6: While the study itself was classified, an unclassified thirteen page Executive Summary that provided broad outlines was released to the public and has been cited in this article. Termed as an "interim report" the follow-on second part of the study that is yet to be completed is expected to be detailed and is to contain cost effectiveness, assessment of technologies, conceptual base line, trade space, Concept of Operations (CONOPS) ,Mission role and Force structure. Back

Note 7: Rodney W. Jones, "Taking National Missile Defense to Sea: A Critique of Sea Based and Boost Phase Proposals", released by The Council for a Livable World Education Fund, October 2000, p.v. Back

Note 8: Ann Roosevelt, "Navy Offers Fast ,If Fragile NMD Fix", Defense Week, 2 April 2001. Back

Note 9: Ibid. Back

Note 10: Michael Sirak , n.3, p.30. Back

Note 11: The land-based system was required to develop the programme through the evolution of three levels of capability. While the precise technical specifications CRD threshold levels are classified and hence unavailable but it is generally believed that Capability 1 level implies defence against a "few simple" missiles. This could mean an attack from five single warhead missiles with unsophisticated decoys that could be discriminated plus chaff and other countermeasures. The systems should have achieved this status by 2003. Cap 2 (or C2) implies defence against " a few complex" missiles. This has been interpreted as an attack of five single warhead missile with complex decoys (upto four) with numerous other counter measures. Cap 3 (or C3) satisfies the entire CRD objective. It implies defence against "many complex" missiles which has been understood as defence against twenty single warhead missiles equipped with up to five credible decoys each a host of other countermeasures. See "National Missile Defense", at < http:/ www.fas.org.htm>. Back

Note 12: BMDO, "National Missile Defense: A Potential Expansion of the Land Based NMD Architecture to Extend Protection" , Executive Summary(U), 8 December, 2000, p.1.3. Back

Note 13: BMDO, "Summary of Report to Congress on Utility of Sea Based Assets to National Missile Defense," 1 June, 1999, p.2. Back

Note 14: Ibid. p. 8. Back

Note 15: Ibid. pp. 15-16. Back

Note 16: Ibid. p. 17. Back

Note 17: Ibid. p. 17-18. Back

Note 18: BMDO n. 12, p. 1.10-1.11 Back

Note 19: The demarcation accord excludes "theatre" (non-strategic) anti ballistic missile interceptor systems from the definition of ABM Systems (and therefore from the ABM Treaty) as long as those interceptors (and the systems of which they are a part) have (a) been developed and declared for non strategic missile defence purposes (b) the interceptors and their target vehicles (used during flight tests) do not exceed specified velocity and range limits. The "demarcation" also prohibits space-based interceptors. For full text and details see texts of "agreed statements" reprinted in "New START II and ABM Treaty Documents" Arms Control Today, September 1997, pp21-22. Back

Note 20: Rodney W Jones, n. 7, p. 13. Back

Note 21: Ibid. p. 14. Back

Note 22: Theodore Postol in a letter the Editor, Foreign Policy, Sept - Oct 2000, p 8, notes that interceptor missiles optimised for BPI of strategic missiles would need velocities over 6 km/sec and booster rockets ten times heavier than the THAAD booster. Back

Note 23: Rodney W Jones, n. 7, pp. 14-15. Back

Note 24: Charles V Pena, "From The Sea: National Missile Defense is Neither Cheap Nor Easy," CATO Institute Foreign Policy Briefing, No. 60, 6 September 2000, p. 3. Back

Note 25: Christopher Hellman, "Fiscal Year 2001 Request for Selected Weapons", Centre for Defense Information, 7 February 2000, at <www. cdi.org/issues/usmi/fy01/weapons.html> and also US Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) Report cited by Federation of American Scientists at <www. fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/vamosc.html>. Back

Note 26: The Aegis are normally deployed for air and cruise missile defence and strike missions using Tomahawks that deploy the ships as near as 100-200 km from shore however for a BPI intercept the ships may have to be positioned more than 600 km off the coast of the enemy. Back

Note 27: BMDO n.13 p. 2, as cited by Charles V Pena, n. 24, p.5. Back

Note 28: BMDO, n.12, p.1.1. Back

Note 29: BMDO, n.13, p. 5. Back

Note 30: BMDO, n.12, p.1.5 Back

Note 31: Charles V. Pena, n.24, p.4. Back

Note 32: BMDO, n.12, p.1.3. Back

Note 33: Rodney W Jones, n.7, pp. 19-20. Back

Note 34: See BMDO, n.12, pp1.3,1.5; BMDO, n.13, p 5, and Rodney W Jones, n.7, pp. 19-20. Back

Note 35: It may be argued that the decision to delay deployment of the land-based NMD (and leave the same to his successor) by President Clinton in September 2000 had its roots in the political undertones in that there was considerable international pressure against the abrogation of the 1972 ABM Treaty and also due to the lack of ability to validate the technological character of the system that was expected to be developed and deployed under the 3+3 program. Back

Note 36: Unclassified released transcript of the deposition of the Director BMDO Lt. Gen. Ronald T Kadish USAF, before the House Armed Services Committee on 19 July, 2001. Back

Note 37: The nine PE comprise of the BMD System; the Terminal, Midcourse and Boost Defence Segments; Sensors; Technology; Pentagon Reservation Maintenance Fund; Small Business Innovation Research; and Headquarters. Back

Note 38: Lt. Gen. Ronald T. Kadish, n.36 Back

Note 39: The BMDO n.13, p.4 states that "the deployment of sea-based NMD while feasible , has technical risks and engineering challenges that have not yet been proven or demonstrate". Back

Note 40: Like the Garwin and Postol Boost Phase Proposal that seeks to have sea-based interceptors on cargo ships rather than on the Aegis class for localised boost phase interception that would require the political cooperation of the Russians. (For details see Garwin's "National Missile Defense", Testimony to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4 May, 1999 and Postol's "A Russian-US Boost Phase Defense to Defend Russia and the US from Postulated Rogue State ICBMs", (Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 12 October, 1999). Back

Note 41: There is however another view held by some theorists who opine that the entire concept of integrating the sea-based component into the land-based NMD using the Aegis Class is a scam by the Navy/ Heritage Foundation. The Navy just wants to acquire newer and more Aegis under the garb of NMD and that neither these ships nor the SM interceptors are capable of defending against ICBMs. For details, see Carlton Meyer, "Navy NMD Scam" at<html.www.g2mn.com> and editor@G2mil.com. Back