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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
Prospect of a Nuclear Weapons Free World: Clutching at Straws in the Wind
By Manpreet Sethi
*
It is ironical indeed, that the decade of the 1990s that began with so much hope for nuclear disarmament should have ended as it has with the prospect of a world free of nuclear weapons hardly at all on the horizon. The contrast in moods between the one that existed at the beginning of the last decade and the one that prevails today is stark and glaring. An optimism that was so tangible then has virtually dissipated, leading several proponents of nuclear disarmament to despair. Much soul searching is going on at their end to once again bring nuclear abolition back onto national agendas.
This article attempts to examine the prospects of nuclear disarmament as they existed a decade ago and analyses why they have today been reduced so substantially. The first section highlights some of the major developments that took place between 1991 - 1996 which contributed to creating an atmosphere in which nuclear disarmament appeared not too impractical or Utopian. The phase, however, proved to be short lived.
In the present scenario, and especially from 1997 onwards, several developments have undermined the possibility of achieving an NWFW. In this context, the second section highlights some of the actions taken by the US, NATO, Russia, and China that seem to have given a new lease of life and relevance to nuclear weapons. And yet, there are a few bright spots in an otherwise dark picture. These inspire one to keep hope alive and continue clutching at straws in the wind in the hope that there will be enough to heap into a worthy haystack one day.
Nuclear Weapons 1991-96: A Phase of Diminishing Returns?
Ten years ago, when the Cold War ended, there was much optimism in the air on the imminent crystallisation of a new world order. It was being anticipated that the international community was on the threshold of an era in which inter-state relations would become less conflict ridden and more cooperative. In fact, the spirit of the changing times was aptly caught by an international analyst in these words, "These are the days of hope, not despair It is time to strip away the complex and arcane strategic theory of the Cold War and start from scratch". 1
Much of this optimism was emanating from a reassessment of threats on the part of US and Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The predominant view among American security analysts of the time was that Russia lacked the capacity or even the intention to threaten or attack Western territories. The CIA Director, Robert Gates even told the US Congress in 1992 that "the threat to the US of deliberate attack from the [former Soviet Union] has all but disappeared for the foreseeable future". 2 The then Russian Foreign Minister echoed the very same sentiments when he stated in the same year that his nation "no longer views the US as a foe." 3
These security reassessments were, in turn, expected to lead to a re-examination of the concepts of nuclear deterrence. With the USA and Russia beginning to talk about their relationship in terms of a partnership 4 it was becoming fashionable to dismiss any future role for nuclear weapons. For instance, the Stimson Centre came out with a publication in the mid-1990s that argued that the character of international relations "is undergoing an irreversible transformation that would eventually invalidate rationales for weapons of mass destruction". 5
Some of this new thinking was propelled by such initiatives as those put forth by President Bush in 199I. He announced an arms control package. It included hastening the process of elimination of strategic nuclear weapons covered by START-I, putting an end to the ground alert for nuclear laden bombers, removing ground lauched nuclear weapons from Europe and South Korea, and halting the development of mobile land-based and new air-launched missiles. This proposal was interpreted by some analysts as an acknowledgement of the fact that "the existence of nuclear weapons themselves was now the threat. They were the detritus of the Cold War." 6
Such thinking was further reinforced when the then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev responded a mere eight days later by proposing the elimination of all non-strategic nuclear weapons and ending nuclear testing and fissionable materials production. In 1993, President Clinton extended by 15 months an already existing US moratorium on nuclear testing. He also upheld the independent existence of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), thereby removing fears of its being absorbed into the State Department, a move that was feared to deprive the Agency of much of its independence of action and objectivity of thought. 7 More agreements with Russia on nuclear cut backs and other moves towards non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament followed. START-II was concluded in 1994 and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was given an unconditional extension in 1995. At the time, the Principles and Objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament that was adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference had stated :
"Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between states which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus be fulfilled with determination." 8
Indeed, such initiatives were both caused by and resulted in the emergence of a new breed of nuclear abolitionists. Apart from the voices of individuals such as those of General George Lee Butler, Paul Nitze and Fred Ikle, who were questioning the wisdom of retaining nuclear weapons, several groups of individuals, countries and non governmental organisation too had come to rally behind the call for a Nuclear Weapons Free World (NWFW). For instance, in 1995, at the NPT Extension Conference itself, a Study Group of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP), comprising 50 experts from 17 countries presented a report that outlined the transformation of the traditional non-proliferation regime into an NWFW regime. Also, more than 200 NGOs signed a statement that then became the basis for the founding of Abolition 2000 Global Network in the Hague in November 1995.
The same month, another initiative towards nuclear disarmament was taken when the Australian government instituted the Canberra Commission to propose practical steps towards an NWFW. Then in 1996, the International Court of Justice, in response to a request from the UN General Assembly, pronounced the use of nuclear weapons as unlawful and against the principles of humanitarian law except possibly in extreme cases of self defence where the survival of state is at stake. 9 While the judgement did not unambiguously outlaw nuclear weapons or their use, however, it did reiterate the obligation that exists on the part of the nuclear weapon states to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith.
A cumulative effect of all these developments was the creation of a largely favourable trend towards the realisation of an NWFW. Of course, contrary points of view existed. Yet, the prospects for undertaking nuclear disarmament were relatively bright and the political climate appeared to be conducive. However, the year 1997 can perhaps be taken as the one in which things began to fall out of favour with the concept of nuclear disarmament. And, since then, every year, the prospects have only gone on becoming dimmer. Pessimistic though this may sound, it is nevertheless a reality that an NWFW is nowhere within reach in the short or medium term. And, the following paragraphs recount the reasons why the paper believes so.
NWFW Post-1997: The Faraway Land
In 1995, as the major proponent for an indefinite extension of the NPT, the US had reaffirmed its commitment to the pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally. Nevertheless, less than a year after doing so, the US did not shy away from stating that "strategic nuclear deterrence remains a key US military priority". 10 A number of official pronouncements to this effect can be cited and most have echoed the sentiments as expressed on February 12, 1997, by Under Secretary Walter Slocombe in his testimony before the International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Sub-committee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. He said, "Nuclear deterrence, far from being made wholly obsolete, remains an essential, ultimate assurance against the gravest of threats." 11
A predominance of such thinking in the corridors of power naturally resulted in President Clinton issuing the Presidential Decision Directive 60 in November 1997 that affirmed a continued US reliance on nuclear arms as a cornerstone of its national security for the "indefinite future". The national security strategy put forth by the White House in October 1998 also explicitly stated that "nuclear weapons serve as a hedge against an uncertain future, a guarantee of our security commitments to allies and a disincentive to those who would contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons." 12 Recent planning documents of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff even contemplate nuclear retaliation against the use of chemical and biological weapons.
According such centrality to its nuclear arsenal, it is only natural that the US continues to maintain these weapons of mass destruction on hair trigger alert. At the same time, huge amounts of money are regularly earmarked for updating and maintaining the formidable arsenal through programmes dedicated to developing new and more lethal warheads, besides modifying those that already exist. In this context, it may be noted that the US has even ensured that an eventual entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty does not disrupt or endanger its lead in nuclear weapons research and development. In order to circumvent any limitations that the CTBT might impose in the future, the US has initiated a Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programme (SSMP). 13 It has been entrusted with the task of "guarantee[ing] the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty." And yet, despite all this, the US Senate did not deem it fit to ratify the treaty! Instead, after rejecting its ratification, several Republican Senators exhorted their country to concentrate on "strengthen(ing) nuclear deterrence". 14
Instead, the US is showing little respect for another treaty that has now existed for more than nearly three decades. US insistence on deploying a national missile defence inspite of objections from several countries threatens to vitiate the international environment. This is despite the US reaffirmation of its commitment to the ABM treaty at the Helsinki US-Russia summit in 1997. Nevertheless, soon thereafter, the US administration sought a budgetary allocation of nearly $ 4 billion to be spent on the research and development of an effective ballistic missile defence system. A BMD as and when it is deployed would definitely violate the ABM. Meanwhile, even now when it has not yet been deployed, it has already put Russia and some of the other nuclear weapon states, such as China and France on the defensive. They have criticised the proposed US endeavour as an unacceptable effort designed to achieve strategic superiority in the 21st century at the cost of disrupting global and regional strategic balances and stability, besides triggering off a new round of arms race. Besides, such treatment meted out to a long-standing treaty would obviously set a wrong precedent. The adverse implications of the move can well be fathomed, especially on the sanctity and credibility of any nuclear weapons abolition convention that may be negotiated in the future.
In the same context, it would be pertinent to examine the implications of another recently taken US decision. It has resolved to break the long-standing practice of not producing bomb material in civilian reactors. In December 1998, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson designated three Tennessee Valley Authority commercial nuclear reactors as the "preferred facilities" to produce tritium for nuclear weapons. Tritium enhances the yield of nuclear weapons and decays at the rate of about five per cent per year. So, the US is likely to need new tritium by 2005, if weapon stocks remain at START I levels. Even if they are reduced to START II levels, the US would still need tritium by 2011. While domestically this may be the cheapest option, it does not augur well for non-proliferation, considering that the US has always encouraged nations not to use civilian nuclear plants for military purposes. 15
Therefore, in the US, at least for the moment, focus has clearly shifted from any talk of nuclear arms control to a search for ways and means to fortify its own security. It is in this context that a momentum has built up in favour of deploying a national missile defence (NMD), in spite of objections from several countries that any such move would vitiate the international environment. However, not these objections, neither its commitment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, and nor its reaffirmation of that commitment at the Helsinki US-Russia summit in 1997, have been able to restrain the US resolve on the NMD. Instead, in what could turn out to be a dangerous precedent, 16 the US is trying to convince Russia to agree to an amendment to the ABM that would allow the NMD to be deployed. Russian reservations on this count are only to be expected. US moves have already put Russia and some of the other nuclear weapon states, such as China and France on the defensive. They have criticised the proposed US endeavour as an unacceptable effort designed to achieve strategic superiority in the 21st century at the cost of disrupting global and regional strategic balances and stability, besides triggering off a new round of arms race.
The prospects of an NWFW have been further eroded by NATO's new Strategic Concept put forth at its 50th anniversary Summit in April 1999. Emphasising the utility of nuclear weapons, it clearly states that "nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace". 17 In fact, in pronouncing this new Strategic Concept, NATO categorically rejected demands being made by Germany and Canada for a discussion on the Alliance's policy of first use of nuclear weapons. Its rejection of NFU and a simultaneous reaffirmation of the continued presence of US conventional and nuclear forces in Europe under NATO arrangements signifies adverse implications for an NWFW. Both these moves can hardly be expected to act as a disincentive to other countries that do not yet have a nuclear weapons capability, but are desirous of achieving it.
Several NNWS under the NPT have made their criticism of these moves clear at the three preparatory committee meetings held prior to the recent NPT Review Conference. At the 1998 Second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), Non Aligned Movement (NAM) countries had collectively opposed "nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements" and sought a change in NATO's stance on this issue. However, just a month before the convening of the Third PrepCom, NATO's new Strategic Concept ignored all such demands. Instead, it stated that "The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the US." 18 The Third PrepCom, therefore witnessed angry outbursts from a number of countries. Algeria criticised the Alliance for reaffirming the essential importance of nuclear weapons. Mongolia too cautioned that the NATO action would provoke other NWS to adopt similar policies and the NNWS to question the very utility of the NPT. 19
That this caveat was not unwarranted is borne out by the fact that other NWS have indeed been compelled to reassess the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies. For instance, in an examination of its threat perceptions late last year, Russia concluded "the level and scale of threats [to Russia] is growing". Consequently, the latest national security concept made public by the Russian government in March 2000 describes some of the external threats facing the country as arising from "attempts of other states to hinder the strengthening of Russia as a centre of influence in the multi-polar world, prevent the implementation of its national interests and weaken its position in Europe, the Middle East, the Trans-Caucasus, Central Asia and Asia-Pacific". 20
The Russian security concept has also reassessed the political and military capabilities available within the country to effectively deal with these challenges. This exercise has led to a tacit acknowledgement that the post-Soviet geopolitical reality as evident in the expansion of NATO, its differences with the US on issues such as the deployment of the NMD etc. is not essentially in Russia's favour. Besides, there has been a steady decline in Russian conventional military might. Consequently, Moscow has shifted to a policy allowing for the use of nuclear weapons first in an attack by a NWS or any country allied with a NWS. In 1997, Russia's nuclear doctrine had acquired a new dimension with the declaration that nuclear weapons could be used "when the country's national sovereignty and survival were at stake". 21 The concept put forth in 2000 further reiterates Russia's right to "use [of] all available means and forces, including nuclear weapons, in case of the need to repel an armed aggression when all other means of settling the crisis situation have been exhausted or proved ineffective". 22 Therefore, Russia envisages the use of nuclear weapons to oppose any attack on its territory, even conventional, if other military means at the country's disposal fail to repel the aggressor.
While there may be a distinct rationale behind the lowering of Russia's nuclear threshold, the paper only raises this point to highlight the adverse implications that it signifies for nuclear disarmament. In fact, these are best explained through these words of the Commander in Chief of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces, Col General Yakolev, "For Russia, at least for the next several decades, there will be no alternative to nuclear deterrence". 23 And why just for Russia? An increased salience of nuclear weapons in the national security strategy of any nation carries within it the seed of nuclear proliferation. Other countries too would be compelled to factor in the value of these weapons, for deterrence or for war making. And, in case a country sees merit in possessing a small nuclear arsenal, it might not be a difficult proposition given the relatively easy accessibility to nuclear materials and technology in the post-Cold War world.
In fact, the latter reality further dims the prospects of an NWFW. A wide scale dismantling of several categories of nuclear weapons in both the US and Russia have resulted in a surplus of weapons usable material. Given the lack of adequate storage safety requirements in Russia, there have been cases of the nuclear material being smuggled out. Besides, the transfer of expertise and knowledge through scientists who once worked in the formidable Soviet weapons complex also poses a real challenge. While attempts are being made to rehabilitate the unemployed or under employed scientists through Russian and joint US-Russian moves, the problem is serious and adds to an ease in nuclear proliferation.
The nuclear tests that India conducted in May 1998 were in response to the fast unfolding security conditions at the global and the regional levels. Pakistan followed suit leading strategic experts worldwide to accuse India of unleashing a potential chain of nuclear proliferation. Of course, it is not wrong to assume that more countries could go nuclear in the future. But they would do so not because India exercised its nuclear option, but because the existing nuclear weapons states (NWS) have done little to invalidate and delegitimise nuclear weapons over the last half a century. Instead, their recent actions have only reinforced the importance and benefits of the possession of nuclear weapons, for security and for status. In fact, the present day focus is not just on an increased reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent against other nuclear weapons, but also against chemical and biological weapons, as well as against conventional ones.
The developments that have been alluded to in the above paragraphs clearly indicate a much reduced interest in, and inclination for nuclear disarmament. All the major international players appear to be caught up in activities of their own that are only reinforcing their reliance on nuclear weapons. In such circumstances, can proliferation be stemmed? It seems highly unlikely. The NWS cannot hope to retain their nuclear arsenals in perpetuity because they provide "unique security benefits" to them, and at the same time deny those "benefits" to others. Even the Canberra Commission had cautioned that such a scenario is "highly discriminatory and thus unstable; it cannot be sustained". 24 But then what is the way out? One obvious answer lies in pressing for the realisation of universal nuclear disarmament. And, fortunately there still are some that have not given up their efforts for making it a reality.
The Straws
Firstly, while nuclear disarmament might not be politically feasible just yet, technologically, it has become relatively more attainable. Technology to safely dismantle, store and dispose off weapons grade material, as also to monitor compliance has advanced significantly over the last several years. This advancement, to a large extent, takes care of the argument that is often held out to dissuade attempts towards an NWFW by saying that it is a state of affairs that is practically unattainable. Several nuclear analysts have pointed to the practical complexities that would be involved in the dismantling of nuclear weapons, their safe storage, verification and phased disposition of nuclear material from disarmed warheads, and finally its destruction or conversion. Indeed, these are very difficult problems. But the present level of technological development does not make them unattainable. Given the developments over the last decades in the fields of satellite surveillance, sensor technology, communication and data processing, technical verification possibilities have been significantly enhanced. In fact, a scientific-technological guarantee that there is a technical way out, will make it a lot easier to change mindsets in favour of taking steps towards nuclear weapons abolition. A change in political conditions and mental make up would further add to the chances of realising a world free of nuclear weapons.
Secondly, it may be deduced by way of a certain convoluted logic that as existing NWS increase their reliance on nuclear weapons for security or to gain political leverage, other countries that are yet non-nuclear would see similar merit in acquiring a nuclear arsenal, however small or rudimentary. Consequently, the risks and dangers of nuclear proliferation would mount. And, as these increase, sanity would dawn on greater numbers and over time, enough pressure would be built up in favour of the concept.
To some extent, this might already be happening. The following paragraphs take a look at some of the more important initiatives taken in the recent times in this direction. Not surprisingly, the impetus for nuclear disarmament and the most practicable proposals have come from countries that do not own them themselves since those that do have them are so enamoured of them that it is virtually impossible for them to contemplate their security without nuclear weapons. NGOs too are playing an important role in this regard.
New Agenda Coalition
This grouping of 8 countries was brought into being in 1998 after the inability of the 2nd NPT PrepCom to make any progress on substantive issues. Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, then decided to pool their resources, ideas and capabilities to present workable solutions to issues deadlocking negotiations. In fact, in the same year, it had even presented a detailed road map to achieving an NWFW to the UN. The UNGA then adopted the resolution with 114 in favour, 18 against and 38 abstentions. 25
Pressing on with its efforts, at the 2000 NPT Review Conference the NAC presented a working paper, forcefully projecting their case for nuclear disarmament by :
Signs of Frustration at the CD
The Conference on Disarmament (CD) remains the main multilateral forum for negotiating arms control and disarmament measures. Its last major achievement was the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. Since then, however, it has made no headway on any of the issues on its agenda. Even though a negotiating mandate had been agreed upon on the issue of a ban on fissile material for nuclear weapons, negotiations have remained deadlocked by countries demanding simultaneous and parallel movement on nuclear disarmament, prevention of arms race in outer space and negative security assurances. This has been sought through the creation of ad hoc committees'a demand that the nuclear weapons states have been unwilling to agree to.
Owing to these differences, all of 1999, the CD could make no headway. 27 However, it need be mentioned that this did not prevent countries from putting forth proposals, particularly on the issue of nuclear disarmament. The G-21 countries, Canada, South Africa, Austria etc., continued to emphasise the need to "more firmly anchor" nuclear disarmament in the work of the CD. All through 1999, five proposals remained on the CD table :
While progress on these proposals has been nil, they can be expected to eventually build up some amount of pressure. Of course, it shall be a long haul.
Growing Disenchantment of NNWS with the NPT
In 1995, NNWS had been persuaded, cajoled and arm-twisted into granting an unconditional and indefinite extension to the NPT. An elaborate list of "Principles and Objectives" had then been agreed to with the intention that with each step the world would move a little closer to liberating itself from the hold of nuclear weapons. Progress on these issues however, remains highly debatable. Consequently, disenchantment within the NPT states parties has only grown over the last five years. So much so that in 1998, an article by Frank Blackaby published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists even advocated the possibility of an en masse withdrawal from the treaty in case the NWS do not show an inclination to respect their part of the obligations enshrined in it. 28
While this may presently seem like an exaggerated reaction, it cannot be denied that the frustration of the NNWS, especially the major states, is beginning to be aired openly. This was clearly evident at the recently concluded sixth quinquennial NPT Review Conference (RevCon). Divergences of opinion on the critical issue of nuclear disarmament were most palpable. On the one hand, were the NWS, taking recourse to recounting the progress already made in this direction by playing up the overall reduction in nuclear stockpiles from the Cold War years. In the other camp were the NNWS that wanted to pin down the NWS to more serious and time bound commitments to giving up their nuclear arsenals. However the intransigence of the NWS and the ambiguity in which they couched their statement on nuclear disarmament left a lot to be desired. It shall be worth watching the next series of PrepComs to see how the NNWS mount ever greater pressure on the NWS.
Rise in Public Opinion Support
It cannot be overlooked that in general, there is some sort of an apathy towards the issue of nuclear weapons. At the level of the common man, it is not a subject that generates much thought. Yet, public support for universal nuclear disarmament should not be discounted either. For instance, in the US and Britain 80 per cent have spoken in favour of nuclear disarmament. In Australia, Canada, Germany and Norway, the percentages are over 90 per cent.
At some levels, work is also on to increase public interest in nuclear weapon issues. For instance, at one of the Pugwash Workshops, one participant presented a computerised nuclear targetting analysis model intended for public use. With information stored on a CD-Rom, users could analyse the consequences of a nuclear war. Using data about existing arsenals, counter-force targets, population densities, effects of nuclear weapons, average wind conditions etc. they could graphically see the loss in human lives and damage to environment from nuclear conflicts. 29 This could go a long way in increasing public awareness about the risks from the continued existence of nuclear weapons and public opinion could then mount pressure on the decision-makers.
In the ultimate analysis it may be reiterated that nuclear disarmament is not going to be an easy or quick process. At the same time, it may not be assumed that it is impractical or impossible. The prospects might not be bright right now but things could begin to look up if international security is enhanced through more CBMs; if an effective and plausible verification mechanism is evolved to enforce disarmament and ensure compliance; if the risks of nuclear weapons possession outweigh the benefits they are supposed to render; and if enough moral pressure is mounted by the saner voices. All these conditions are not unattainable. But certainly, it shall be a long haul. In the meantime, while it would not be advisable to hold one's breath, it could be useful to clutch on to the straws! One, or all of them, may, at some time in the future, turn out to be the stick to drive away nuclear weapons with.
Endnotes
Note *: Research Officer, IDSABack.
Note 1: Lincoln Wolfenstein, "End Nuclear Addiction", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 47, no. 4, May 1991. Back.
Note 2: Tom A. Zamora, "Put A Safety Cap on Testing", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 48, no. 2, March 1992, p. 25. Back.
Note 4: Several Russian strategic thinkers and even government officials of the time have been quoted as saying that Russia was hoping to forge a partnership with the West. Some even ventured to suggest an eventual Russian integration with the West. Back.
Note 5: This report, prepared by Barry Blechman and Cathleen Fisher, is mentioned in Robert A. Manning, "The Nuclear Age: The Next Chapter", Foreign Policy, Winter 1997-98, p. 76. Back.
Note 6: William Arkin, Damian Durrant and Hans Kristensen, "Nuclear Weapons Headed for the Trash," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 47, no. 10, December 1991, p. 16. Back.
Note 7: For a comment on the implications of ACDA's merger into the US State Department see Manpreet Sethi, "ACDA Merges into the US State Department", Strategic Analysis, vol XXIII, no. 4, July 1999.Back.
Note 8: Decision from the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference" UNIDIR Newletter, no. 37. Back.
Note 9: Legality of the Threat of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, Communique No. 96/23, July 8, 1996, ICJ, The Hague. Back.
Note 10: Annual Report of the US Department of Defence as quoted in Office of the Secretary of Defence, Nuclear Weapons Systems Sustainment Programmes, (Washington DC: Department of Defence, May 1997). Back.
Note 12: "A National Security Strategy for a New Century", A White House document, October 1998, as reproduced in Strategic Digest, vol. XXIX, no. 4, April 1999. Back.
Note 13: It has been estimated that over the next decade, the US plans to invest $45 billion in this programme-an amount that in inflation adjusted terms is deemed to be well above the average Cold War annual spending for nuclear weapons research, development, testing and production. This information is derived from a presentation on Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) that was made in December 1996 at a conference and has been cited in a factsheet prepared by NGOs entitled, "US Commitment to Article VI-Myths and Realities", and presented at the third NPT PrepCom, May 1999. See <http//www.basicint.org> Back.
Note 14: For more on this line of argument see Daryl Kimball, "Holding the CTBT Hostage in the Senate: The 'Stealth' Strategy of Helms and Latt," Arms Control Today, June/July 1998. Back.
Note 15: Charles D. Ferguson, "TVA gets the nod", BAS, March/April 1999. Back.
Note 16: The adverse implications of any move towards an amendment can well be fathomed, especially on the sanctity and credibility of any nuclear weapons abolition convention that may be negotiated in the future. Back.
Note 17: "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," NATO Press Release, April 24, 1999. As reproduced in Strategic Digest, vol. XXIX, no. 6, June 1999, p. 938. Back.
Note 19: "NATO Nuclear Policies Slammed at Non-Proliferation Treaty PrepCom", PENN Presss Release, May 11, 1999 at <http//www.basicint.org> Back.
Note 20: "National Security Concept of the Russian Federation: January 2000," as reproduced in Strategic Digest, March 2000, p. 297. Back.
Note 21: Celeste A. Wallander, "Wary of the West Russian Security Policy at the Millenium," Arms Control Today, March 2000. Back.
Note 23: Michael Steen, "Russia Nuclear Chief Threatens US Treaty Sanctions" <http://dailynews.yahoo.com> Back.
Note 24: Report of the Canberra commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, August 1996. Back.
Note 25: Of the 16 NATO states, only the US, UK, France and Turkey voted against the resolution. The others abstained. Canada was even prepared to vote in favour of the resolution if another NATO country did likewise. But Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Belgium and Japan succumbed to domestic pressure and abstained. Also see William Epstein, "Voting by Abstention," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March-April 1999, p. 6 and Rebecca Johnson, "Troubled Treaties: Is the NPT Tottering?" Ibid., p. 17. Back.
Note 26: Such a call was made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Howeverr, it remained as ambiguous as similar calls made in the past, since it projected no time frames in which the NWS would implement measures towards nuclear disarmament. Rather, the countries, rather cleverly couched and premised all further progress in this direction on the continuance of the conditions of "strategic stability"-a phrase open to any number of interpretations. Back.
Note 27: For more information on the CD and its lack of progress in 1998-99 see Manpreet Sethi, "Conference on Disarmament: Groping its Way Around," Strategic Analysis, vol., no. , 1999. Back.
Note 28: Frank Blackaby, "Time for a Peasant's Revolt", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Back.
Note 29: Gunner Arbman, Report on the 28th Pugwash Workshop on Nuclear Forces, July 9-10, 1999, Como, Italy in the Pugwash Newsletter, vol. 36, no. 2, November 1999. Back.