From the CIAO Atlas Map of Asia 

Strategic Analysis

Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA

May 2001 (Vol. XXV No. 2)


Prospects for Security Cooperation Between India and Japan
By Sanjana Joshi *



With the end of the Cold War, the strategic divide between India and Japan is also over. For the first time in the past five decades there is a convergence of interests between the two countries.

Japan is gradually shedding post-World War II constraints and engaging in a more activist foreign policy. India must take into account this changing reality. India is expanding its security perimeter to include the wider Asia-Pacific region, hence, the importance of political and strategic interaction between India and Japan becomes evident. A constructive engagement from both sides within this paradigm is what will provide the basis for future India-Japan relations.

Cooperation between India and Japan can be visualised at three levels-global, regional and bilateral. At the global level, both countries have a stake in maintaining international peace and security. Both want comprehensive reforms in the United Nations (UN) linked also to the issue of UN peace-keeping operations. At the regional level, given the complex security environment, India and Japan both have a stake in maintaining peace and stability in Asia. A convergence of interests lies in the maintenance of a stable maritime order as well as the issue of energy security. At the bilateral level, these two Asian nations with no past record of any significant clash of interests can work in a productive manner towards greater India-Japan cooperation.

As the nations of Asia grope for a new balance of power in the region, a crucial missing element has been the lack of a substantive political-strategic dialogue between India and Japan. During the Cold War, India and Japan went their different ways with very little common ground on international security and geopolitical issues. With the end of the Cold War, the strategic divide between the two countries is over. Probably for the first time in the past five decades, there is a convergence of interests in maintaining peace and stability in Asia. In addition to a shared vision on democracy and democratic institutions and the acceptance of the market economy as a facilitator for rapid economic growth, it is as two major Asian powers with a stake in shaping the Asian strategic environment that both countries must now initiate a comprehensive bilateral political-strategic discussion.

The aim of this paper is to present an understanding of how the Japanese view the international and regional environment now that the Cold War is over, and the need for India to take into account this changing reality. A constructive engagement from both sides within this paradigm is what will provide the basis for the future of India-Japan relations.

The hypothesis being that, gradually, Japan is shedding post-World War II constraints and engaging in a more activist foreign policy. Related to this is a growing Japanese consciousness of the importance of "re-association" with Asia not only in economic terms, but also increasingly in political and strategic terms.

With the end of the Cold War, both India and Japan made efforts to reappraise the potential of their relations. Prime Minister Kaifu's visit to India was part of his sojourn to the South Asian region as he projected a new vision of his country in this "period of rapid transformation in the world". Prime Minister Kaifu made a particular reference to the Kashmir issue and called upon both India and Pakistan to settle it bilaterally within the framework of the Shimla Agreement. He underlined the importance of cooperation within South Asia and considered the role of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as crucial for its realisation. His interest and efforts led to the promotion of a South Asia Forum within the Japanese Foreign Ministry with a view to promoting relations with South Asian countries.

The pace set by Prime Minister Kaifu was maintained by Indian Prime Minister Narsimha Rao who paid an official visit to Japan in June 1992 to commemorate the 40th anniversary of post-war bilateral relations. Narsimha Rao and his Japanese counterpart Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi talked of "a unique opportunity to add several new dimensions to our relationship". Both shared the view that the two countries must cooperate in restructuring international relations in a manner that permitted global and regional issues to be tackled effectively and in a more democratic international environment.

The process of exchange of views on security issues within an Asian framework also received an impetus at the Track II level. In this context the annual dialogue between the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) since the mid-1990s deserves mention.

The stagnancy which had been observed for many years in Indo-Japanese bilateral economic relations was also broken in the early 1990s when India undertook major economic reforms. India embarked on liberalisation of the country's economy and adopted an open door policy which led to a gradual activation of the business relationship. According to a survey conducted by the Exim Bank of Japan in early 1998, India was regarded as the third most attractive destination in the long-term perspective (10 years) and fifth most attractive destination in the medium-term perspective.

Since India's nuclear explosions in May 1998, however, Japan has taken an affirmative stand on the issue of proliferation, particularly nuclear proliferation. While it is too early to view this development as part of a Japanese grand strategy in foreign affairs, it does represent a substantial move toward both a more politicised and strategic use of Japanese foreign assistance and a more active role for Japan as an international security actor. What emerges is a picture of an evolving policy that increasingly asserts Japan's national interests.

What does this development-along with other foreign policy initiatives-signal about Japan's exercise of power in pursuit of its security interests at the start of a new century? It appears that Japan's use of foreign assistance for non-proliferation is an important step in using national power to set the agenda, shape international norms, define Japan's identity in the international system and condition the international environment so as to shape other states' preferences. 1 Indeed, when Japan's use of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for non-proliferation is considered along with other recent initiatives-Japan's participation in international peace-keeping operations and leadership on global environmental issues-the country can be said to be becoming a "normal" powerful state in the international system. Another recent example was Japan's decision to sign the international landmine convention and begin studies on the use of ODA to assist countries in landmine removal.

Japan's use of ODA for non-proliferation, particularly in the Indian case, holds an important clue to understanding Japan's emerging role in international relations. Japan is revealed as more assertive and autonomous in pursuing its foreign policy interests than conventional wisdom appreciates.

One aspect of Japan's policy that deserves special mention is the bid for a Security Council seat. While the Japanese government has worked since the 1960s to set in motion the revision of the United Nations (UN) Charter, renewed impetus for enlarging the Security Council has come from Japan since the end of the Cold War. Japan views the UN as an important conduit through which it can seek a greater political role for itself. The goal is all the stronger now that Japan is a major economic power and the second largest financial contributor to the UN.

Indeed the rationale heard most often concerns Japan's contribution to the UN budget. Japan's share was 17.98 per cent in 1998, and moved up to 20.57 per cent in the year 2000. Japanese officials, therefore, constantly question why their country remains outside the UN's most important policy body and speak of "no taxation without representation". In 1994, a senior Japanese diplomat was quoted as having said, "The UN question is basically one of money. We shall be raising our contribution soon and that should give us a right of entry".

However, this budgetary argument, along with the use of ODA to win support from the developing world has led to criticism that Japan is trying to "buy" the Security Council seat. It is this fact that can provide a clue to the intensity of Japan's reaction to the nuclear tests in South Asia and the subsequent Japanese approach to the region.

Reading through various government reports and official speeches, produced in the recent past, it is noticeable that the core points in Japan's bid to secure a permanent seat on the Security Council are : (1) Japan's non-nuclear status in order to balance the fact that all present members are nuclear powers. (2) Japan as a member would afford better regional representation of Asia in the Security Council. 2 It comes as no surprise, therefore, that Japan has consistently tried to exploit the nuclear tests in South Asia to establish itself as an important non-proliferation interlocutor on the international stage. This, it hopes, will submerge the fact of its nuclear status as a state protected by the United States.

Towards the end of May 1998 itself, the then Japanese Foreign Minister Obuchi said at a Press conference that Japan was exploring a leadership role to convene an international conference among "nuclear powers and economic powers" to discuss nuclear problems. He is reported to have commented, "The (five) declared nuclear powers and the countries which have a large responsibility in the world should gather to discuss the issue seriously." In the view of many commentators, Japan's image had suffered a serious blow in 1995 when it did not use its moral power as the world's only nuclear weapon victim state coupled with its economic clout to call for a time-bound elimination of nuclear weapons. Instead, Japan pressed for an indefinite extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), so much so that it did not want a secret ballot as the United States wanted to observe which states were for or against the indefinite extension.

Similarly, the Tokyo Forum Report released in August 1999 said, "India considers the possession of nuclear weapons an attribute of great power status". Seeking to debar India, the report further proposed, "All current and prospective members of the United Nations Security Council should have exemplary non-proliferation credentials." 3

Of particular concern to India is that after Pokhran II, Japan has sought to create a role for itself in promoting a dialogue between India and Pakistan and in facilitating international intervention on the Kashmir issue. There were reports in May 1998 that as an incentive not to conduct nuclear tests, the Hashimoto government had promised Pakistan that Japan as a sitting member of the UN Security Council would immediately get Kashmir on the agenda. In June-July 1998, two offers were made by Japan's designated Prime Minister Obuchi to mediate to resolve the stand-off between India and Pakistan. This prompted even US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot to remark, "Washington acknowledges that Japan has an important role to play in easing tension in South Asia." Reference also needs to be made to the statement made by Ambassador Hayashi, Japan's representative at the 54th session of the UN General Assembly on October 12, 1999. Hayashi stated, "The nuclear tests conducted in South Asia last year were a challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to the disarmament efforts made by the international community. . . events such as the recent armed conflict over Kashmir and the announcement of the draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine are sources of concern".

The keen interest with which Japan has sought to link the nuclear issue with the Kashmir question along with Tokyo's insistence on maintaining parity between New Delhi and Islamabad should make Indian policy planners realistic and practical in their approach to Japan.

The nuclear debate, though crucial, can form only part of the proposed strategic dialogue between the two countries. Post-Cold War themes in Japanese diplomacy that are of special interest to India are discussed below.

Proliferation Concerns Vis-à-Vis North Korea

North Korea's ability to produce missiles that can reach any part of Japan is a cause for extreme concern and an issue that directly affects Japanese security, as stated in the 1999 Japan Defence Agency White Paper. In a special chapter added to the 1999 report, the agency has examined North Korea's launch of a Taepodong ballistic missile in August 1998 as well as the intrusion by North Korean spy ships in Japanese waters in March 2000.

North Korea is reported to have completed the development of the 1,300 km range Rodong missiles and deployed them to put most of Japan within range. It has been noted that the Taepodong-1 combines a Rodong as its first stage and a Scud as its second stage, and its range is more than 1,500 km. North Korea is also believed to be developing the Taepodong-2, an advanced two stage missile with an estimated range of 3,500 to 6,000 km.

Japan also worries over the possibility of North Korea attacking it with high-explosive or chemically armed missiles. Further, North Korea's potential for involving other powers in its conflicts and for creating regional instability are seen in Japan as major threats to security over both the short and long terms. Japanese security analysts are aware that in the event of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, the nation's security could be disrupted easily even by a refugee crisis or as the Defence Agency has argued recently, by guerilla incursions from North Korea into Japan.


China poses a second source of anxiety for Japan's policy elite and opinion makers. China's nuclear tests, military threats against Taiwan and nationalist territorial claims have cast a suspicious light on its rapid economic growth. While there is still a strong consensus in Japan that maintaining friendly ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC) is essential, Japanese politicians, businessmen, academics and even government officials are increasingly arguing that Japan must be prepared for other scenarios. "Japanese thinking is shifting from commercial liberalism to reluctant realism". 4

The Japanese Defence Agency has grown particularly concerned about Chinese military capabilities in recent years. The fear is not of sudden or imminent danger, but of the longer-term potential for instability caused by seemingly irreversible trends in Chinese strategic requirements. As Toshiyuki Shikata, a former lieutenant-general and commentator on security issues, notes, "China will become increasingly dependent on oil supplies coming from the Middle East. To both effectively defend the sea lines of communication (SLOC) between China and the Middle East, as well as to enforce its claims in the South China Sea, China is determined to build up its blue-water naval force". 5

There is broad agreement within Japan that China's drive to build up its navy beyond the ordinary requirements of self-defence is evidence of a larger strategic design by Beijing to "convert the South China Sea into the All China Sea". It is widely assumed in Tokyo that China's perceived drive for regional hegemony through the build-up of air and naval assets will manifest itself concretely in a move by China to resolve territorial disputes in East Asia by the threat or use of force.

United States-Japan Security Alliance

Like all other Cold War alliances, the United States-Japan security relationship is also being refashioned to accord with new realities. In April 1996, Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and United States President Bill Clinton issued the "Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security : Alliance for the 21st Century" that stressed the importance of the bilateral security framework for the Asia-Pacific. Both countries called it a "reaffirmation" of the alliance. In reality, however, the statement was also a redefinition since it called for the bilateral relationship to now be considered from the broader perspective of security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Recently Japan has enacted legislation implementing the recommendations of a review of the 1978 guidelines for Japan-United States Defence Cooperation. A key feature of the new guidelines is that they cover the process for establishing a domestic security set-up that can deal with crises in the region that are likely to have profound repercussions on Japan's national security. The new guidelines differentiate between "bilateral defense planning" and "mutual cooperation planning". Bilateral defence planning, referring to the response to a direct attack on Japan, has been discussed to some extent earlier. What is new is "mutual cooperation planning", referring to the bilateral response to a crisis in the "areas surrounding Japan".

A holistic analysis of the relationship between the two countries, however, reveals that the United States today could be better defined as a major link connecting Japan to the international system. Japan is starting to establish an important presence of its own and has developed diversified links with the international system. The United States is still the most important reference point in the range of contacts, but no longer the only one.

Energy Security

Japan is a country plagued by a lack of natural energy resources. Japan's level of energy security can be measured by making use of four basic indicators: dependence on imported energy; dependence on oil as a primary energy source; dependence on the Middle East for oil imports; and the share of oil as a percentage of total imports. By all these measures, Japan compares unfavourably with other major industrialised nations like Britain, France, Germany and the United States. Japan also comes out very poorly in terms of its reliance on imports for its oil supply, which is virtually 100 per cent.

With accidents at the Monju facility and in Tokaimura in recent years having shaken public faith in the government's nuclear energy policy, the focus once again is on the logistical and strategic issues in increasing oil and gas imports. The Japanese government, for example, has moved to the frontline of the Afghan peace process. On March 19, 2000, in Tokyo, Japanese officials concluded separate meetings with representatives from Afghanistan's two warring factions, the ruling alliance and the Opposition Northern Alliance. Clearly, Japan's energy dependency is pressuring it to pursue all options-even the long shots. Playing a role in the Afghan peace process could help Japan ease its oil problem in two ways. First, Afghan peace might help make oil and gas rich Turkmenistan a feasible energy supplier for Japan. Since the country is completely landlocked, the Afghanistan-Pakistan transit route would not just benefit from peace-it requires peace. Second, playing a role in the Afghan peace process could strengthen relations with Iran, which supports the Northern Alliance and may secure a solid position for Japan in future oil and gas negotiations. Japan has also resumed financial assistance to Iran by providing a loan in 1999 to help build a hydroelectric plant.

The reliance on oil and gas imports also requires secure shipping lanes. Japan may have had this concern in mind when it increased its military readiness capability with the September 1999 purchase of four 10,000 ton flagships.

Indigenous Defence Capability

The 1990s have seen the emergence of Japan as a confident military power. Today, Japan's Self-Defence Forces (SDF) marshal substantial military capabilities. In the past, under the overall guidance of the National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO) adopted by Prime Minister Mikki's Cabinet in 1976, a series of four build-up programmes had been undertaken. In November 1995, the National Security Council and the Cabinet approved a new defence programme outline.

Current priorities for the SDF include enhancing military intelligence and analysis capabilities, improving coordination between the SDF's three branches of the Services and upgrading their logistic capabilities for rapid deployment. Particular importance is being attached to the capability of dealing with the following situations: interference in the safety of maritime traffic, violation of territorial air-space, limited missile attack, illegal occupation of a part of the country, terrorist attacks and the influx of refugees.

Japanese military forces will also acquire an impressive array of hardware.

Theatre Missile Defence

Japan's position is crucial to the development of the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system in East Asia. For years, the debate in Japan has revolved around the following concerns :

Consequently, Japan has appeared hesitant, and until recently, progress on the TMD system had stalled over feasibility studies and cost-benefit analyses. North Korea's launch of a rocket that overflew Japan in August 1998 was, however, a severe jolt.

Since then, as a first step towards attaining a TMD capability, Japan has decided to deploy four multi-purpose overhead reconnaissance satellites that would be used to gather intelligence. The satellites would orbit at 500 km above the earth. Two of the satellites would have optical sensors able to deliver even extremely small images and the other two would have synthetic aperture radars able to see regardless of weather or brightness.

Japan has also officially agreed to begin a joint research project with the US to develop the sea-based component of the TMD.

Peace-Keeping Operations

In June 1992, the Japanese government adopted a law enabling the SDF to participate in United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO).

The significance of this step in the evolution of Japan as an international power requires careful evaluation. To date, the conventions of Japan's international behaviour had adhered closely to the Yoshida Doctrine and its derivations-dependence on the Japan-US security alliance; Japan's reactive mode of international behaviour; and Japan's basic preference for using its economic power in international relations.

With the PKO legislation, the Japanese government appears to have reinterpreted the role of the SDF, giving it a new mission and releasing it from some of the restrictions that have governed its activities in the past. In deploying the SDF in the name of international cooperation, the Japanese government has also found for the SDF a more acceptable functional rationale, both domestically and internationally, in the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. And, in this way, Japan has tapped a potent source of legitimacy for the SDF.

Moreover, the role of Japan's SDF has changed in a very real sense that goes beyond mere rhetoric; it has been given a new mission. The goals of the SDF are no longer just the defence of Japan. 6 They have been transformed "from forces devoted strictly to assuring Japan's own defense. . . to forces that could share the tasks of assuring international security". This represents the establishment of an entirely new category of functioning, opening the door to a whole new sphere of international activity, that of international contribution and cooperation.

Involvement in peace-keeping, therefore, has significance in the evolution of Japan's international security role. Peace-keeping provides a pathway for the progressive involvement of the Japanese military forces in international relations. Of all the possible avenues of development for the SDF, this is the option that most closely approximates the pacifist tradition in Japan and also accords with the post-Cold War multilateral approach to solving international disputes.

This last distinction will be crucial to domestic debates about the future role of the Japanese military, particularly the issue of harmonising overseas military-related activity with the long standing interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution. It has been argued that peace-keeping operations belong in the international security category and not in the traditional category of military contributions.

The UNPKO decision is also an act that reflects Japan's prominent world view and the way it customarily perceives and relates to the international community. This is described as "situational accommodation" i.e. a desire to assess correctly the trend of the times and make the required adjustments in order to facilitate international acceptance. 7

Regional Confidence-Building

In the post-Cold War era, there has been a transformation in Japan's regional security folio, and it has been seen to take the lead in promoting multilateral security dialogue. The decision to institutionalise the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) as a forum to discuss regional security issues was partly prompted by the unexpected suggestion of the then Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama. At the 1991 ASEAN-PMC, he suggested that in future the meeting should become "a forum for political dialogue" and "a process of political dialogue designed to improve the sense of security" among Asian nations.

Later, Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa made a speech in the United States in October 1992, calling upon the US to cooperate with Japan in establishing an encompassing security framework in the Asia Pacific. In Bangkok in January 1993, he announced the so-called "Miyazawa Doctrine" which talked of the need for Japan-ASEAN dialogue to promote regional stability. Japan also took a leading role in establishing a multilateral dialogue in the region and preempted US foreign policy for perhaps the first time since World War II. Since then it has actively promoted multilateral security dialogue in the region, as typified by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

Policy makers in both Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence Agency are now actively advocating both the greater regional and sub-regional approaches to security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region. The Defence Agency even announced in March 1995 its "Basic Policy" on security dialogue and defence exchange. The "Basic Policy" argues for the maintenance of existing security relations with the US, but at the same time stresses the need to diversify security dialogue in the post-Cold War period through increased contacts with South Korea, China, Russia and the ASEAN countries. It further emphasises the importance of transparency in defence matters and proposes that Japan should promote security dialogue with other countries by exchange of government officials, military personnel, education and training, warship visits, observation of military exercises, and cooperation in UN peace-keeping operations.

An important example here is Myanmar, a nation that sits on the edge of Southeast Asia, making it a key foothold in the region. Importantly, its southern coast opens both to the Bay of Bengal and the western end of the Straits of Malacca, the region's most important trade route. Japan has courted Myanmar actively during the past year. Among other diplomatic initiatives, Keizo Obuchi in November 1999 became the first Japanese prime minister in 15 years to meet with his Myanmar counterpart.

India-Japan Cooperation

In the light of the above analysis, one can visualise cooperation between India and Japan at three levels-global, regional and bilateral.

At the global level, both countries have a stake in maintaining international peace and security. Both want comprehensive reforms in the United Nations. Related is the issue of UN peace-keeping operations. While Japan is a new entrant, India has considerable experience in this field and the two countries can coordinate individual contributions towards global security.

At the regional level, given the extremely complex security environment, there exists a considerable convergence of interests. To take just a couple of examples-the maintenance of a stable maritime order and the issue of energy security.

It is also possible to structure productive post-Cold War bilateral cooperation. Regular high-level visits, exchange of views at various levels, and a regular bilateral strategic dialogue should pave the way for greater India-Japan interaction.

With the end of the Cold War, the strategic divide between India and Japan is also over. Rather, probably for the first time there is a convergence of interests between India and Japan in maintaining peace and stability in Asia. It is time that in combination with economic interests, politico-strategic issues are brought centre-stage.

From the Indian point of view, extremely welcome are signs that Japan is interested in constructive engagement with India wherein differences on one issue would not be allowed to derail the overall relationship. Hints of the rethinking in the Japanese government emerged during "meaningful meetings" between Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh and Japanese Foreign Minister Komura in Singapore in July 1999 on the sidelines of the ASEAN meeting. With Jaswant Singh's subsequent visit to Tokyo in November 1999, Indo-Japanese relations have acquired a wider amplitude.

Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes also travelled to Japan in January this year and initiated greater contact between the security establishments in the two countries. Fernandes and Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Mikio Aoki, reportedly, shared their respective concerns over terrorism and proposed closer bilateral cooperation to fight terrorism.


In February 2001, Japan's Foreign Ministry announced that Tokyo is considering deploying vessels to patrol the Straits of Malacca where shipping has been plagued by piracy. 8 But there is a much larger context here than merely the control of piracy. Tokyo's proposal to join forces from Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea and China to patrol the waterways comes during a growing debate over the possible revision of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. This is a sea change in Japanese thinking.

Japan appears to be beginning to come to grips with a reality it has tried hard to deny since the end of World War II-that it is a major power with strategic interests as pressing as its economic ones. Until now, Japan has relied on another player, the United States, to guarantee fundamental national interests. But now, from the Japanese standpoint, it is simply not certain that the US is prepared, under any and all circumstances, to secure Japan's national interest. Rather, in recent years, Japan has come under growing pressure from the United States to assume a greater security profile. Japan's progress toward an active military role in Asia may be only years away.

As India too expands its security perimeter to include the wider Asia-Pacific, the importance of political and strategic interaction between India and Japan becomes self-evident. As two major Asian nations with no past record of hostility, no direct clash of interests and a common desire for peace and stability in Asia, it will be unfortunate if India and Japan are unable to evolve a new relationship.

The meaning of a possible "strategic relationship" was made clear by Japan's Foreign Minister Ikeda, during his visit to India in 1997: "A strategic relationship should not be construed as defense relationship, which in turn, is a narrow way of looking at the things . . . For me, strategic discussions mean facilitating a common diplomatic and economic response towards stability in the region and the world".

The bilateral dialogue is only at its beginning. There is a need to be realistic and accept that the two countries are still a long way from cooperative and concerted action. The security communities in India and Japan are still in the process of getting to know each other. Compared to the past of almost complete mutual ignorance, this is positive evolution.


Note *: Research Officer Back.

Note 1: William J. Long, "Nonproliferation as a Goal of Japanese Foreign Assistance", Asian Survey, vol.XXXIX, no.2, March-April 1999, p.344. Back.

Note 2: Reinhard Drifte, "Japan's Quest for a Permanent Seat on the Security Council", Asia-Pacific Review, vol.5, no.2, 1998, p.92. Back.

Note 3: Quoted in Brahma Chellany, "Who's Afraid of Disarmament?" The Japan Times International, August 16-31, 1999, p.19. Back.

Note 4: Michael J. Green and Benjamin L. Self, "Japan's Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism" Survival, vol.38, no.2, p.36. Back.

Note 5: Toshiyaki Shikata, "Japan's Security Strategy: Meeting the Needs of a New Era" Policy Paper 145E, Tokyo Institute for International Policy Studies, November 1995. Back.

Note 6: Japan's Defence White Paper 1992 features a new chapter "International Contributions and the Self-Defence Forces". Back.

Note 7: Gerald Curtis, "The United States and Japan: Trade and All That", East Asia Institute, Columbia University, 1992, p.8. Back.

Note 8: "Japan Proposes to Patrol the Strait of Malacca" <> February 18, 2000. Back.