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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
The Supporting Structures for Pakistan's Proxy War in Jammu & Kashmir
By Ajay Darshan Behra
*
Abstract
The Government of India (GOI) has declared a unilateral ceasefire with the Kashmiri militants in an effort to begin a negotiation process. Simultaneously, the GOI has also made it clear that it would be interested in a dialogue with Pakistan eventually, provided it curbs cross-border terrorism. This paper seeks to understand whether the ruling establishment in Pakistan is in a position to control the militant groups operating from Pakistan. Officially, Pakistan has been able to take the stance that it is providing only moral, political and diplomatic support to the militant groups in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), because of the emergence of some autonomous structures within Pakistan, which it is using to support the proxy war in J&K. These structures have emerged due to geo-political reasons and the political and socio-economic transformations that are going on in Pakistan. While Pakistan is using these structures to support the proxy war in J&K, it does not really have control over these structures.
In the past one year, the Government of India (GOI) has been involved in two ceasefire initiatives with the Kashmiri militants in an effort to begin a negotiation process with the aim of seeking a resolution to the Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) dispute. The first ceasefire, at the end of July 2000, was offered by the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, one of the prominent militant groups, operating in J&K. It was reciprocated by the GOI, but that ceasefire did not last long and broke down over the issue of involving Pakistan in the talks right from the beginning. The second ceasefire was a unilateral offer by the GOI at the end of November 2000. This offer was rejected by most of the militant groups and some of them, prominently the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, not only staged spectacular attacks like the one on the Red Fort in New Delhi but also adopted a threatening posture, including a direct threat to the prime minister of India.
Despite stepped up incidents of terrorist attacks since the unilateral ceasefire came into force, the GOI has extended it thrice, the last one at the end of February 2001 for a period of three months. Simultaneously, the GOI has also made it clear that it would be interested in a dialogue with Pakistan eventually, provided it curbs the levels of cross-border terrorism. This is the issue on which talks between India and Pakistan have broken down in the recent past. The GOI has specifically avoided any contacts with the new military regime which came to power on October 12, 1999, headed by Gen. Pervez Musharraf who is considered by the Indian establishment as the architect of the Kargil intrusions in the summer of 1999.
The GOI has tried to put pressure on the military regime in Pakistan, through statements and the international community, specifically the United States, to rein in the Islamic militants based in Pakistan who indulge in cross-border terrorism in J&K in the name of jehad. It is a fairly well known fact that most of the prominent and active militant groups in J&K are based in Pakistan. Their top leadership operates from Pakistan and most of these militant groups receive training and arms in Pakistan and, in some cases, Afghanistan as well. The contention in the Indian policy-making circles, backed by substantive evidence, is that these groups operate, train and raise resources and personnel in Pakistan with the knowledge of the Pakistani authorities. In fact, India has for many years argued that the militants operating in J&K, both Kashmiri and foreign mercenaries based in Pakistan, operate with the connivance of elements within the Pakistani establishment. Increasingly, the international community is taking note of the Indian position. US President Bill Clinton during his visit to South Asia in March 2000, not only openly said so, but for some time now, the Patterns of Global Terrorism, a report brought out by the State Department has highlighted that elements within Pakistan were supporting terrorism in J&K and elsewhere.
The Pakistani response to this charge has been ambivalent and it reiterates its long held position that it is only extending moral, diplomatic and political support to the "freedom fighters" in J&K. Despite sponsoring terrorism, the Pakistani ruling elites have sought to take a high moral ground on the J&K issue by invoking the right to self-determination, and alleged human rights violations in J&K. For all purposes, the support for terrorism within Pakistan has been privatised by the state. Because of this trend, Pakistan has taken recourse to the plea that it was not a direct sponsor of terrorism, when the US threatened to add it to the list of terrorism-sponsoring countries.
In response to the unilateral ceasefire or rather the suspension of combat operations by the GOI, Pakistan made the right noises and declared that it would withdraw troops from the Line of Control (LOC) to reduce tensions. The invitation extended to the executive of the All-Party Hurriyat Conference to visit Pakistan for talks, the observance of maximum restraint on the LOC and partial withdrawal of troops from the international border-on the basis of all this and other gestures like the sending of relief material for the Gujarat earthquake, one can sense a belligerence in Pakistan's demands on India to initiate talks, but it has not made any commitments as to whether it would rein in the militants operating from its territory. This has relevance to an important issue on which the process of dialogue between India and Pakistan hinges-whether Pakistan really controls the jehadi groups that operate from within Pakistan.
The answers to that question are really complex. Pakistan's stated position on jehadi militants groups cannot be taken at face value. Historical factors and Pakistan's strategic objectives vis-à-vis India point to the fact that since the late 1980s, Pakistan's ruling elites have engaged India militarily through a proxy war. The proxy war in J&K, which erupted in late 1988, has continued for more than a decade now. It was not very long after the eruption of the insurgency in the Kashmir Valley that it became clear that Pakistan had a significant role to play in the insurgency. Through the insurgency in J&K, the Pakistani ruling elites have engaged the Indian military through a low-cost option, without the Pakistani military getting directly involved. This proxy war appears to be a part of a long-term strategy to bleed India in J&K and keep it perpetually destabilised, or probably, in the long-term, is directed to change the status quo in J&K. The character of the militancy has over the years undergone a radical transformation from being initiated and waged by the Kashmiri militants to a large-scale takeover by foreign mercenaries. Throughout this period, the Pakistan Army was not directly involved in operations against India and relied on the militant outfits. However, the Kargil crisis in 1999 indicated that it was not averse to raising the stakes through its direct intervention in support of the militants, possibly in order to bring it to a logical conclusion. Gen. Musharraf's regime, notwithstanding its public stance of resolving the J&K issue through negotiations, has given no indication that its support for the proxy war has declined or will be curbed in the near future. President Bill Clinton's message to Pakistan to respect the LOC and end terrorism aimed at India has not acted as a restraining influence on Pakistan's proxy war in J&K.
So far, Pakistan, despite mounting evidence, has publicly denied its involvement in J&K. But obviously the organisation, planning, raising of resources, operations, etc. in the proxy war cannot be conducted without adequate logistical back up. Despite its precarious domestic social, political and economic situation, Pakistan has been fairly successful in this regard. Undoubtedly, Pakistan's ability to engage in this proxy war is conditioned by several factors and the regional and global strategic dynamics. The superpower involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan's role as a "frontline state" in the Afghan War and other regional developments since the Islamic Revolution in Iran have led to the emergence of certain structures in Pakistan that help support the proxy war in J&K.
The attempt of this paper is to understand the dynamics of the supporting structures-the socio-political and economic context in which they have emerged and operate. These structures specifically pertain to the logistical back-up in terms of weapons, resources and personnel that are required for the proxy war in J&K. It is argued in the paper that while the emergence of these structures suits Pakistan's strategic objectives in J&K, over a period of time these structures are also acquiring an autonomous character. The Pakistani state is able to use these structures in the conduct of the proxy war in J&K, but is increasingly losing control over them.
The Supporting Structures for the Proxy War
The nature of the structures is such that they are an outcome of the political and socio-economic transformations that are going on in Pakistan. These structures have not been built deliberately. They have grown over a period of time and developed their own dynamics. In a shortsighted way, they serve Pakistan's interest's vis-à-vis the insecurity against India. The emergence of these structures has allowed the Pakistani ruling regimes to juggle around the issue of their support for cross-border terrorism in J&K and deny their involvement. At the ideological level, these structures justify the jehad in J&K. At the material level, they help the ruling elites to raise resources and personnel. Procurement of weapons for the proxy war has not been a problem as the existing hidden stockpile of weapons siphoned off from the Afghan arms pipeline is immense. It is important to understand the dynamics of the supporting structures that Pakistan uses in its proxy war in J&K to understand whether the ruling elites really control them.
The Easy Availability of Weapons
Due to historical and geo-political reasons, today there prevails a situation in Pakistan where one finds an abundance of "light weapons," 1 opening up channels for any agency that wants to access them. The manner in which this has come about is ingrained in the state-formation processes. The peculiarities of the state-formation process in Pakistan had militarised the state since its inception. Conflict with India and long periods of military rule in Pakistan contributed to the high levels of militarisation in Pakistan. Military regimes in Pakistan, in the absence of popular support, militarised the state structures. However, the level of militarisation that took place under Gen. Zia in Pakistan was unprecedented and fundamentally different in character. In the absence of domestic popular support, Zia sought political, economic and military support from the United States. And, in return, he made Pakistan a "frontline state" in the US' Afghan War.
While the benefits to the military in shoring itself up with some of the state-of-the-art weapons against a formidable adversary were a major consideration, the indirect fallout of being a conduit in America's proxy war led to high levels of diffusion of light weapons not only in Pakistan but in the region as a whole. 2 Between 1977 and 1987, a large proportion of weapons meant for the Afghan guerillas filtered into the illegal arms market. A steady flow of Afghan refugees contributed to the large illegal arms market and a burgeoning heroin trade injected both weapons and syndicate organisations into the social life of the major urban centres in Pakistan. 3
During Gen. Zia's regime, with political parties banned and all avenues for protest through legal means closed, polarisation within civil society had intensified. 4 A lack of public confidence in the ability of the state to provide security of life to its citizens motivated more and more people to seek alternative support mechanisms in their communities to obtain security against physical threat. It was not difficult for such groups to acquire a high degree of firepower from the illegal arms market. 5 The arms market consists of some major towns like Darra, Landi Kotal, Zamrud and Barra Bazaar. Almost every variant of light weapons supplied through the pipeline to the Afghan rebels can be found in the arms black market, largely due to a considerable amount of leakage. The estimates of Pakistani intelligence agencies siphoning off from the US arms pipeline range from 30 to 60 per cent. Some estimates suggest that only 30 per cent of the supplies sent through the pipeline reached the front-line. 6 While others suggest that at least 20-30 per cent may have been skimmed off, with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) claiming a fair share. 7 Another estimate suggests that 40 per cent of weapons meant for Afghan Mujahideen may have leaked to Pakistan. 8 Pakistani Foreign Office personnel reportedly put this figure as high as 60 per cent. 9 Former Pakistani intelligence officials boast that they have access to stocks of three million AK series Kalashnikov rifles. 10
However, the Afghan War was not the only reason for the diffusion of small arms and light weapons in Pakistan. Indigenous production in small cottage industries has been carrying on for years in places like Darra Adam Khel in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). According to a study, the number of people involved in the illegal arms industry could be around 50,000. 11 Claims by local manufacturers suggest that Darra has the capacity to manufacture 100 light weapons per day. 12 The cost of a local AK-47 only four years ago was around $65 and one with a foreign made barrel $114 (at the exchange rate of Pakistani Rs. 30.80). 13 The NWFP market trade turnover could be worth nearly $1 billion. Almost any type of light weapon is available here for sale. Upon payment, delivery of weapons can be made anywhere in Pakistan and possibly further. The army's National Logistics Cell (NLC) is also deeply involved in the trade. NLC vehicles are rarely stopped at checkpoints because they are official carriers, and not subjected to the same degree of scrutiny as ordinary vehicles. 14
The residue of small arms from the Afghan War and their production in the unorganised sector in locations based in the NWFP has weaponised Pakistani society. Some estimates of the number of small arms in circulation in Pakistan are available from studies and news reports. In Punjab it is about 800,000, in Sindh 500,000, in Baluchistan about 250,000 15 and in the NWFP more than 500,000. 16 There are probably more than two million small arms circulating in Pakistan today and another three million in clandestine stockpiles, part of which goes to arm any militant group that is desirous of acquiring them.
Raising Resources From the Illicit Drug Trade
The illicit profits from the drug trade were used during the Cold War to pursue the proxy wars. The Afghan War against the Soviet Union was also funded by the drug money raised in the Golden Crescent region comprising Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, which have been major producers of opium. The conflict following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 facilitated the increase in opium production. Traffickers were allowed to exploit the support to the Mujahideen by Iran and Pakistan, by using those countries as transit routes. 17 The Mujahideen's involved in the drug trade was clandestinely aided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the ISI to procure more arms. Profits from the drug trade were ploughed back into buying more weapons. Drug production almost doubled between 1986-88 18 when Mujahideen leaders like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar turned to the systematic cultivation and refining of drugs, in league with Pakistani cartels during this period. 19 Pakistan itself had become a major opium producer during the 1980s, producing around 800 metric tonnes a year or 70 per cent of the world's supply of heroin until 1989. But, amazingly, that figure has gone down drastically. It was only after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan that US pressure began to mount on Islamabad to curtail the production of opium in Pakistan. Over the following decade (1989-99), some $100 million in Western aid to combat narcotics was made available to Pakistan. Poppy cultivation was drastically reduced from a high of 800 metric tonnes to 24 metric tonnes in 1997 and two metric tonnes by 1999. 20
Though drug production has declined in Pakistan, it has steadily increased in Afghanistan under the Taliban. 21 Even though the Taliban condemned illicit drug production and drug trafficking, there have been no serious efforts either to curb cultivation or to control trafficking of drugs. The Taliban claim to have taken some steps and are resisting illicit drug cultivation and trafficking since 1997. 22 But indirectly, they have been encouraging poppy cultivation and it remains an important source of revenue for the cash strapped Taliban regime which levies a 10 per cent tax on agricultural produce as the Islamic tax called ushr. But, on the other hand, they defend themselves by pointing out that in the war ravaged country, unless alternative means of income are generated, it will be difficult to ban poppy cultivation altogether.
While within Pakistan drug cultivation and production has gone down, its drug barons and the ISI control the drug trade in the region. The dealers and the transport mafia who had consolidated their operations during the Afghan War, in fact, received a major boost with the arrival of the Taliban and the subsequent increase in the Afghan heroin production. The same dealers, truck drivers, madrassa and government contacts, and the arms, fuel, and food supply chain that provided the Taliban with supplies also funnelled drugs-just as the arms pipeline for the Mujahideen had in the 1980s. While the opium cultivation in Afghanistan is largely in the hands of the Afghan farmers, Pakistani narcotics barons own most heroin refineries within Taliban territory. The tribal heroin cartels in Pakistan control more than half of the cultivation and marketing of opium in Afghanistan, and the refining into heroin of much of the opium produced in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan has become a major transport route for Taliban heroin exports. The drug barons comprise industrialists, politicians, businessmen and also military men. 23
Drug money has come to play an important role in the Pakistani society and economy. During the 1980s, its involvement in covert operations and corruption became intertwined to produce the prevailing situation today. 24 The nexus of the drug trade with the Pakistan Army was reinforced in the 1980s due to mutual needs. The easy money drug trafficking was used to pursue its security interests in Afghanistan and India. The drug mafia needed the support of the army for the safe passage of drugs. The heroin pipeline in the 1980s could not have operated without the knowledge, if not the connivance, of officials at the highest level of the army, the government and the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Obviously, these developments took place under the benign neglect of the US whose larger task was to defeat the Soviet Union. It is suspected that vehicles of the army-controlled NLC and those used to supply arms to Mujahideen groups have also been used as drug carriers. The Pakistan Narcotics Control Bureau (PNCB) and other agencies do not have the authority to check these vehicles and so they were the safest means for drug transportation. 25 The fact that during 1986 alone, nearly 16 army officials were arrested for drug trafficking even though most of them managed to escape detention, suggests the deep involvement of the army. 26 In one instance, a Pakistan Air Force officer, Squadron Leader Farooq, was arrested by the U.S. Drug Enforcing Agency in the US in April 1997, for carrying two kg of heroin in a Pakistan Air Force (PAF) flight that was to collect spare parts for F-16 fighter planes. The value of the seized heroin was estimated to be $ 2 million (Rs 8 crore). In 1983, the ISI Chief General Akhtar Abdur Rehman, had to remove the entire ISI staff in Quetta, because of their involvement in the drug trade and sale of CIA supplied weapons that were meant for the Mujahideen. 27 It was not until 1992, when Gen. Asif Nawaz Janjua became Pakistan's army chief that the military made some effort to root out the narcotics mafia that had developed in the Pakistani armed forces. Nevertheless, drug money had by then penetrated Pakistan's economy, politics and society without any evidence that concerted measures were being taken to root out the problem.
Since the early 1990s, there has been growing concern that elements within Pakistan have been able to generate considerable revenues from the drug trade. In the early 1990s, UN Drug Agency sources estimated that more than $ 30 billion worth of heroin produced in Afghanistan and Pakistan was entering European and American markets. 28 It was estimated in 1992, that illicit drug export earnings for Pakistan amounted to US$ 1.5 billion annually, which was about 20 per cent of total export earnings. 29 Other studies have estimated that the revenue generated by the export of heroin in Pakistan between 1988 and 1993 was between $800 million and $1.8 billion. 30 The UN International Drug Control Programme estimated in February 1994 that the Pakistani heroin industry had an annual turnover of $2.5 billion. 31 According to a report in a Pakistani newsmagazine, drug smuggling provided revenue worth $8 to 10 billion to drug dealers in Pakistan. 32 It is believed that 50 per cent of the total Pakistani economy is being heavily subsidised by drug money. 33
The narcotics trade that grew substantially under the legitimising umbrella of the CIA-ISI covert supply line to the Afghan Mujahideen has developed its own dynamics. Today it supplies much-needed oxygen to the asyphiaxted Pakistani economy and helps the Pakistani ruling elites to pursue their strategic objectives in the region. Despite the Pakistani economy being in dire straits, the ruling elites are able to generate economic resources to not only run their economy but fund the proxy war in J&K as well. In 1993, a CIA report published in a Pakistani newspaper had detailed the close nexus between the politicians, drug traffickers and intelligence agencies and the linkages to terrorism in J&K and Punjab. 34 Indian Army intelligence estimates that Pakistan is spending about $1.6 to 2 million annually in the proxy war in J&K. 35 If the revenues generated from the drug trade to Pakistan are what the UN and others estimate, then the amount that Pakistan is spending on the proxy war in J&K is less than one per cent of the illicit drug revenue accruing to it.
Availability of Manpower as a By-Product of Madrassa Education
The availability of manpower for the proxy war in J&K is linked to the decline in the education system and the rise of the madrassas. With the Pakistani economy in immense difficulties, development priorities have been completely distorted. Over the years, the decline in the social sector spending on public education has allowed the institution of the madrassa or religious school to fill the gap and also gain legitimacy within society. In the 1980s, the institution of the madrassa got intertwined with politics. Gen Zia promoted the madrassas as a way to garner the support of the religious parties for his rule and recruit troops for the anti-Soviet War in Afghanistan. General Zia's Islamist policies opened the floodgates for funding to come in for the madrassas. Saudi Arabia, which wants to promote its brand of Wahhabi Islam, is the main source of funding for the madrassas. Saudi funding, which earlier used to be for the Jama'at-i-Islami (JI), headed by Qazi Hussain Ahmed, shifted to the Deobandis represented by Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), headed by Maulana Fazlur Rehman. The Deobandis are inspired by the Wahhabi version of Islam enforced in Saudi Arabia. It may not be a coincidence that the rise of the offshoots of the JUI, the Harkat-ul-Ansar (now Harkat-ul-Mujahedin) in J&K and the Taliban in Afghanistan was around the same time. 36 Most of the madrassas where the Taliban grew up and received education are controlled and run by the JUI. 37
The madrassa is a traditional institution of learning. The curriculum offered here is rudimentary and pertains mostly to religious instruction. Not enough to fulfil the needs of a modern state and a modernising society. But it provides free education along with boarding and lodging. A good enough attraction for the poor who get not only free education but also are not burdened with financial liabilities. There are no exact figures on how many madrassas may be operating in Pakistan. According to some news reports there may be some one million students studying in 10,000 or so madrassas. 38 Some suggest a high figure of 40,000 to 50,000 madrassas in Pakistan. 39 According to a survey published in The Friday Times in 1996, there were 2,812 madrassas in Punjab alone, with 2,18,939 students. 40 The poverty-stricken areas of Punjab and the NWFP have the highest number of madrassas. 41
Most of the madrassas are used as centres for the recruitment of young soldiers to fight for the cause of Islam. 42 Pakistan's religious parties sponsor some of them and some are affiliated with the Mujahideen groups. Some of these madrassas preach an extremist ideology of jehad. The Markaz-ud-Dawa-Wal-Irshad runs about 2,200 madrassas across Pakistan where its students prepare for jehad. Hafiz Saeed, chief of the Markaz in an annual convention in November 1998 had stated that the goal of jehad was to turn the world into Darul-ul-Islam beginning with India, and made public their plans to capture J&K.
The current level of unemployment in Pakistan is estimated to be around 16 per cent of the working age population. 43 With almost six million people unemployed, this number is expected steadily to increase by 500,000 people each year. It would not be presumptuous to guess which schooling system most of the unemployed come from. For the students graduating from these madrassas, due to their lack of a modern liberal education, it is very difficult to compete in society and find meaningful jobs. After having been misled with a wrong interpretation of jehad, such boys are mobilised to fulfil spiritual obligations by joining the militants in J&K and other places. One observer comments, "...Pakistan's covert wars also tend to suck in and consume the bored, the curious, shiftless-youths in search of a purpose and allegiance." 44 Further, the youth in Pakistan has been mobilised by the flamboyant sermons of mullahs in mosques and madrassas. Inflow of literature on contemporary Islamic movements across the world, easy accessibility to arms, coupled with stories of war, adventure and heroism have filled the minds and imagination of thousands of Pakistani youth. On one side, jehad has become a means for some to make wealth or pursue strategic goals, and, on the other, for the poor it means gainful employment, however risky it maybe.
Privatisation of the Supporting Structures
The foregoing analysis suggests that the logistical back up that Pakistan uses in its proxy war in J&K has emerged due to the political and socio-economic transformations on going in Pakistan. However, there is a recognition of the advantages accruing from them. Pakistan has deliberately distanced itself from the supporting structures so that it is not seen to be associated and implicated in the terrorism in J&K. While the supporting structures are autonomous of the Pakistani ruling regimes, they still provide direction to it. This has been accomplished by supporting the Kashmiri insurgents and mercenaries through non-governmental organisations run by retired army and intelligence officials and private organisations. 45 For instance, Lt.Gen. Javed Nasir, who was director general-ISI and was sacked by Nawaz Sharif in early 1993, 46 is now a preacher of the Tablighi-Jamaat, ostensibly a humanitarian religious organisation but believed to be aiding other extremist Islamic organisations and unofficially aided by the ISI. 47 This strategy has been adopted to make non-state actors perform those tasks that the state for budgetary considerations or political sensitivities is not able to carry out itself. In a historical sense, this process has, of course, coincided with the US threat to put Pakistan on the list of terrorism-sponsoring countries. The US State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1995, referred to violence by Kashmiri groups and said that there are credible reports of official Pakistani support for militants fighting in J&K. President Clinton restated the US position during his visit to India when he said that elements within the Pakistan government are supporting terrorism in J&K.
The other development is that jehadi organisations in Pakistan are increasingly becoming self-sufficient and are now able to generate most of the funds required for their operations through private resources. 48 One major source is public donations; some of them have rich supporters and individual backers. According to the report in The Friday Times, about 906 madrassas received Rs. 59.8 million annually as financial assistance from Zakat funds. But only 26.07 per cent of the total number of madrassas were dependent on Zakat funds. A larger number of 63.93 per cent were self-sufficient and generated their own resources through donations received directly from foreign countries or through their alumni and sympathetic individuals at home and abroad. 49
The Army and Islam: Dilemmas of Defending Jehad
Strategically, Pakistan wants the Indian security forces to be trapped in the J&K quagmire. But, given other pressures and the growing challenges to its own viability, is the ruling establishment in Pakistan in a position to control the jehadi groups operating from Pakistan's soil, if it so desires? The answer to this question as stated earlier is complex. And one can only say with scepticism that recent developments within Pakistan that provide a sense of understanding to the relationship between the military regime and the religious parties and militant groups suggest that the hegemony of the Pakistani state over its civil society is eroding. The problem in Pakistan has been that the ruling establishment and the intellectual class have not given cognisance to this trend in Pakistani politics.
It is the abdication of the traditional developmental role by the corrupt and decaying state that has created the space for political Islam in Pakistan. 50 The strength of religious extremism in its initial stages had come from state patronage but increasingly popular support for it has increased in the civil society. The army could not have been insulated from the political and socio-economic transformations going on in the society. The army has increasingly got Islamised. There are fears in Pakistan that the fundamentalists have penetrated the army at every level. 51 The army has also been indoctrinated with the idea of jehad over the last two decades. 52 This recognition, though not publicly articulated, has seeped into the leadership. The inexplicable resignation of Gen. Jehangir Karamat in 1997 was over his fear of his own army that made him back down from a confrontation with Nawaz Sharif. 53 When Gen. Musharraf took over power, there was popular support for him amongst the jehadi groups, but he has not aligned the army openly with the Islamists as that could possibly imperil his own leadership in the GHQ. 54 Emerging trends suggest that there is a tenuous linkage between the army and the fundamentalist groups. What distinguishes the current crop of jehadi groups from the earlier religious groups is that they want to seize state power and for that they need the army. 55 Now that the army is in power, it needs to tread cautiously. The army needs the jehadi groups for its own strategic objectives. But, on the other hand, it seems that the government is under tremendous pressure to ease the tension in J&K by reining in the militants groups operating there. But J&K is the core of Gen. Musharraf's agenda and he does not want to take any risks in this regard.
Gen. Musharraf will find it difficult, even if he were to so desire, to detach himself from Pakistan's J&K policy, which has been assiduously built over the years. Even under democratic regimes, the dynamics of attaining and retaining political power has induced the ruling elites to champion the jehad in J&K. But, at the same time, one of the cornerstones of Pakistan's foreign policy is the deniability of its involvement in J&K. Its position has been that it only provides moral, political and diplomatic support but no military support to the Kashmiri militants. The international community had accepted this position for some time, but that situation has been changing. The consequences of the policy of deniability have led to two developments. First, Pakistan cannot acknowledge that it can control the militants in J&K, as that would be tantamount to admitting that it did have a role to play in the ongoing militancy and terrorism in J&K. In March 2000, Gen. Musharraf had stated that his army was unable to stop the militants from crossing the LOC with India. 56 Second, this position has allowed the civil society in Pakistan to get involved in the conduct of its foreign policy. And, therefore, we see a much more vociferous articulation of support by jehadi groups for self-determination in J&K, criticism of so-called human rights violations, etc which, of course, coincides with Pakistan's strategic game plan in J&K. 57 What we see today in Pakistan in the conduct of its foreign policy is that elements within the military, religious parties and organisations, and the militant groups all have an equal say on the J&K policy and the current military regime will not like to disturb the balance and get into trouble.
This trend of events in Pakistani politics has simply contributed to the growing power of the religious parties and militant groups-inside and outside the country. The Lashkar-e-Tayyeba has grown extraordinarily powerful within Pakistan. Relying on them to pursue Pakistan's security goals is an inherently dangerous strategy. One cannot be sure whether the jehadi groups eventually will make an assault on the army itself. The tensions between the military regime and the jehadi groups are out in the open. When Gen. Musharraf tried to term the struggle in J&K as not religious and Islamic, the Harkat-ul-Mujahedin took strong exception to it and its chief, Maulana Farooq Kashmiri, said that Gen. Musharraf should correct his thinking in that regard. 58 Simultaneously, Gen. Musharraf is under pressure from the religious parties to step down. 59
In the light of all these developments, the military regime's current policy seems to be to curb the Islamists' powers at home while supporting their activities in J&K. Within Pakistan, there is a search for ways and means to control the militant groups but at the ideological level there is also an effort to gain legitimacy for the concept of jehad. The military regime has announced some plans to reform the madrassa system as well as place some restrictions on militant groups. 60 Interior Minister Moinuddin Haider had indicated that they would like to place some controls on the unregulated fund raising activities and open display of weapons by the militant groups. There is recognition that the brand of Islam being preached in the madrassas is fanning sectarian violence in Pakistan but there is no mention that students from the madrassas are also involved in fighting in far off places. The government would like all the madrassas to register, expand their curricula and disclose their financial resources. But so far, there has been no great progress. Fundamentally, while it would be in the interest of Pakistan to place some curbs on the madrassas, at the same time, the madrassas have been performing a very important role in Pakistan's strategic objectives in J&K-providing recruits to a private army that the Pakistani state thinks it is in control of. However, the paradox is that if due to the policies of the government, there was a shrinking in this private army, then Pakistan would not have any leverages in J&K. Analysts in Pakistan agree that Pakistan cannot afford to clamp down on the militant organisations, which essentially provide the fighting force against Indian troops in J&K. 61
At the moment, it seems that the ruling regime does not want to take any extreme measures against the militant groups. While on several occasions it has expressed its inability to control the militants, the fact remains that the supporting structures breed due to the weaknesses in the state structure and the connivance of the state. There is obviously space for interventionist action and scope for incremental steps by the ruling regime. By way of example, one could suggest that it lies within the realm of the military regime to rein in the activities of the ISI for a beginning. Regarding the militant groups, it has been argued so far that they are increasingly becoming autonomous, but, at the same time, it has to be recognised that a large number of them survive and operate due to the patronage of the Pakistani state. The Pakistani state, if it so desires, could neutralise their ability to operate in J&K. However, it fears that the repercussions of that would be severe on the domestic front. It is this threat to the ruling regimes in Pakistan that has seen the expression of the policy that "we are not involved in J&K but we support jehad." There are also other extraneous factors that would impose limitations on the ability of the Pakistani state to act. One major setback to the effort to control jehadi groups has come from the judiciary. The Lahore High Court in a ruling declared that no one had the power to stop jehadi groups from raising funds. 62 Under these pressures and dilemmas, the efforts to control the jehadi groups would have to be calibrated without a clear approach at the outset. The progress of this reform process needs to be watched carefully.
The ruling regime is going to great lengths to make clear that its efforts to curb the power of Islamists at home is not a dilution of its support for jehad in J&K. Gen. Musharraf, right since the time he came to power, has been defending jehad. In June, in an interview to the New York Times magazine, he said that jehad is a tolerant concept-that jehad and terrorism are absolutely different concepts. 63 In a series of speeches and media interviews in January and February 2000, he defended the Mujahideen's right to wage jehad against India. He believes that Islam does not preach terrorism. He maintained that wherever Muslims are being victimised or killed, Islam asks all Muslims to come to their aid. The Islamic jehad had become dormant and was revived in Afghanistan with international support. That has now shifted to J&K. Gen Musharraf defended the jehadi groups, saying that several splinter groups may be involved in terrorism but the blame is put on all jehadi organisations to defame them: the ongoing jehad in J&K, is not government sponsored, but has its own dynamics. 64 He has also defended the role of the madrassas. "Very few of these schools are engaged in any kind of militancy. Most of them are humanitarian. They give food and lodging to the poor people," he said. 65 More recently, the military regime, under attack from the militant groups, has been much more vociferous in its support for jehad. The interior minister has said, "Our government is not against jehad in J&K but there should be a difference between jehad and terrorism, as was earlier stated by Chief Executive Gen. Musharraf." 66 He has further stated, "We respect jehadi outfits and we never called for giving up jehad in J&K. We do say that what is going on in J&K is indigenous Jihad and not terrorism." 67 The dilemmas of defending jehad are that it is contributing to the growing power of the Islamic groups within the country. At the same time, the military regime is caught in a Catch 22 situation where if they actually curb the militant groups in Pakistan they would have no leverages in J&K. In such a situation, the military regime itself has to defend jehad, despite the unfavourable reaction from the international community.
Autonomy of the Supporting Structures
On the basis of the above analysis, it seems that the supporting structures that Pakistan is using in its proxy war in J&K and tries to defend ideologically have actually become autonomous from the ruling regime. The emergence of the supporting structures have led to two developments:
On the financial side, the jehadi movement continues to acquire its own momentum and it will become increasingly difficult for Pakistan to curb it. As long as jehad remains profitable, those with financial interests in the war in J&K and elsewhere will work to prolong it. And the longer the war in J&K lasts, the more entrenched the interests will become. And if one were to take the statements of some militant groups at face value, then the war in J&K is not going to come to an end soon. The Harkat-ul-Mujahedin has said that it will end its jehad only on the day the Indian Army withdraws from J&K. 68 More recently, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen chief Syed Salahuddin said that they would accept the ceasefire only if the GOI moves a resolution in Parliament acknowledging J&K as disputed territory. 69 This position is at variance with the Harkat-ul-Mujahedin's who have reiterated their condiition of Indian troops completely withdrawing from J&K.
Conclusion
The conceptualisation of Pakistan's proxy war in J&K is rooted in the experiences, institutions and ideas that evolved during the proxy war carried out by the Western allies against the Soviet Union. Pakistan's vision and ability to engage India in a proxy war were developed during the Cold War as an ally of the US. It was as a "frontline state" that Pakistan learnt from the strategy applied by the Western alliance in Afghanistan that a powerful adversary could be defeated in a proxy war, how to support the proxy war clandestinely and, above all, if policy dictated, maintain deniability.
By identifying the proxy war in Afghanistan and J&K with jehad, Pakistan sought to project the conflict as a "just war" in order to gain legitimacy for violence within Pakistani society as well as in the Islamic world. This also ensured a mass base for recruitment of holy warriors from far-flung Islamic countries. The shortsighted policy of the US in supporting Islamic fundamentalists against the Soviet- backed regime, at the expense of Afghan moderates, left behind a vast army of Mujahideen wedded to the Islamic cause. The Pakistani state is using these Mujahideen as a private army in pursual of its own security and foreign policy objectives.
The supporting structures for the proxy war in J&K are much more complex and go beyond Pakistan's unstated policies or strategic objectives. Some of these structures have developed their own dynamics in conditions of Cold War politics. The immediate strategic interests of the US led alliance in Afghanistan created the basis for the autonomous development of these structures, which today have become serious challenges to international security. On the one hand, the rise of a group of committed Islamic guerillas and the expansion of the narcotics industry in the Golden Crescent had become instrumentalities in the fight against Communism; on the other, the spread of light weapons in the region took place due to the benign neglect of the Western allies. Since the end of the Cold War, these structures have embedded themselves deeply in the political economy of the region. The Pakistani state does not control them but merely exercises influence over them and is able to exploit them to serve its own strategic designs. It is due to the advantages accruing from these structures that Pakistan has been able to engage India militarily for more than a decade through a proxy war, with little cost to itself. Thus, there may be a grain of truth in Gen Musharraf's statement that the Pakistan Army is unable to stop militants from crossing the LOC. The Pakistani ruling elites are not in complete control of the supporting structures for terrorism, which they have been using for their proxy war in J&K. Because of the above factors, jehad and terrorism in J&K are likely to continue even if the Pakistani ruling elites give assurances about the withdrawal of their support.
Endnotes
Note *: Pascal Boniface, Director, IRIS (Paris)Back
Note 1: Light weapons refer to a category of weapons that are man-portable and capable of inflicting severe casualties and destruction. They include light-weight sophisticated assault rifles and a variety of explosive devices. They are low-tech, inexpensive, sturdy and easy-to-use weapons that do not require any complex organisational, logistical or training capacities to maintain and operate. Back
Note 2: For details, see Tara Kartha, Tools of Terror: Light Weapons and India's Security (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1999) and Chris Smith, The Diffusion of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Pakistan and Northern India (London: Brassey's, 1993). Back
Note 3: Akmal Hussain, "The Crisis of State Power in Pakistan: Militarisation and Dependence," in Ponna Wignaraja and Akmal Hussain, eds., The Challenge in South Asia: Development, Democracy and Regional Cooperation (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1989), p.231. Back
Note 4: Shireen M. Mazari, "Militarism and the Militarisation of Pakistan's Civil Society: 1977-1990," in Kumar Rupesinghe and Khawar Mumtaz, eds., Internal Conflicts in South Asia (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 1996), pp.102-3 Back
Note 5: Akmal Hussain, "The Crisis of State Power in Pakistan: Militarisation and Dependence," Wignaraja and Hussain, eds., n.3, p.231. Back
Note 6: Christopher Smith, "The International Trade in Small Arms," Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 7, no. 9, September 1995, p. 428; and also M. Yardley, "Afghanistan: A First Hand View," International Defence Review, vol. 20, no. 3, March 1987, p. 276. Back
Note 7: Marvin G. Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 31. Back
Note 8: See Mahnaz Isapahani, "Pakistan: Dimensions of Insecurity," Adelphi Papers, no.246, 1990, p. 27. Back
Note 9: This figure is cited by Christina Lamb, Waiting for Allah (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991), p. 223. Back
Note 10: Smith, n.6, p. 428 Back
Note 11: Light Weapons Manufacture in the Public and Private Sectors: A View from Pakistan, British American Security Information Council, Project on Light Weapons Working Paper 2, February 1996, p.4. Back
Note 12: Ibid., p.7. Back
Note 13: Ibid., p.15. Back
Note 14: Ibid., p.9. Back
Note 15: Ibid., p.6. Back
Note 16: Ahmed Rashid, "Drug Bazaars," The Herald, April 1990, p.68. Back
Note 17: Ivelaw L. Griffith, "From Cold War Geopolitics to Post-Cold War Geonarcotics," International Journal, vol.49, no.1, Winter 1993-94, pp.5-6. Back
Note 18: Figures from the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1986, 1990 (released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, US Department of State, Washington, DC.). Back
Note 19: Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 257. Back
Note 20: Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p.122. Back
Note 21: In 1997 alone, the opium gum production in Afghanistan was around 1,265 metric tonnes. See International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1997 (released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, US Department of State, Washington, DC, 1998). According to US government figures, opium production in 1996 was around 1,230 metric tonnes, which increased to 1,265 metric tonnes in 1997. According to the UNDCP report released in February 1999, the production of raw opium in Afghanistan in 1998 had gone up to 2,200 metric tonnes, making Afghanistan the single largest producer of opium, having overtaken Myanmar. See Rahimullah Yusufzai, "Taliban Need to do More to Curb Opium Production," The News, March 15, 1999. It has again doubled from 2,200 metric tonnes in 1998 to 4,500 metric tonnes in 1999. Back
Note 22: The Taliban had given assurances to the UNDCP that they would help reduce poppy cultivation and bring it down to zero level by the year 2000. There is little evidence in this regard, and the UNDCP is frustrated in its efforts. Back
Note 23: For a good exposition of these linkages, see Rashid, n.20. Back
Note 24: Drug money has become so powerful that it has left no institution untouched. Drug money is used to bribe the police and other drug enforcement agencies not to conduct raids or to make arrests; it is paid to the government prosecutors not to prosecute and. is used to finance political parties and politicians to buy protection and induce disinterest in controlling drug trafficking. Drug lords are believed to have funded candidates to high offices during the governments of Benazir Bhutto in 1988-90 and Nawaz Sharif in 1990-93. The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) founded by Pakistani national Agha Hassan Abedi, which collapsed in 1991 was believed to be heavily involved in laundering money and was used by arms dealers, drug traffickers and terrorists. See Jonathan Beatty and S.C Gwynne, The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride Into the Secret Heart of BCCI, 1993. Back
Note 25: Zahid Hussain, "Narco Power: Pakistan's Parallel Government," Newsline, December 1989. Back
Note 26: Ibid. Back
Note 27: See Rashid, n.20, p.120. Back
Note 28: Zahid Hussain, Newsline, May 1993. Back
Note 29: "The Illicit Opiate Industry of Pakistan," UNDCP, Islamabad, February 1994 and World Drug Report, UNDCP, New York, Oxford University Press, 1997, p.143. Back
Note 30: Douglas I. Keh, "Drug Money in a Changing World: Economic Reform and Criminal Finance," UNDCP, UNDCP Technical Series, no.4, p.2. Back
Note 31: n.29, p.5. Back
Note 32: Hussain, n.25, p.17. Back
Note 33: Rashid, n.20, p.121-22. Back
Note 34: "Sowing the Wind," Friday Times, September 3, 1993. Back
Note 35: Pakistan may be spending about Rs.60 to 80 crore a year in the conduct of the proxy war. Roughly translated at 1998 values, this translates to $1.6 to 2 million annually. See citation in Gurmeet Kanwal, "Proxy War in J&K: Jehad or State-Sponsored Terrorism?" Strategic Analysis, vol.23, no.1, April 1999, p.62. Back
Note 36: Khaled Ahmed, "A Frontline State Falls Apart," Friday Times, November 7-13, 1996. Back
Note 37: Rahimullah Yusufzai, "Here Come the Taliban," Newsline, February 1995, p.28. Back
Note 38: "Musharraf Defends `Jehad'", The Tribune, June 26, 2000. Back
Note 39: Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," Foreign Affairs, November-December 2000. Back
Note 40: Tanveer Kureshie, "Madarssas Fanning Sectarian Hatred," Friday Times, February 22-28, 1996, pp.6-7. Back
Note 41: Mazhar Zaidi, "Fettered Innocence," Newsline, February 1995, p.39. Back
Note 42: Hasan Mujtaba, "Young Guns," Newsline, September 1997, p.50. Back
Note 43: This estimate is by UN agencies. The Economic Survey for 1999-2000 says that only 6.12 per cent of the labour force is unemployed. Back
Note 44: Anthony Davis, "One Man's Holy War," Asiaweek, August 6, 1999, p.22. Back
Note 45: Stephanie Neuman, "The Arms Trade, Military Assistance, and Recent Wars: Change and Continuity," The Annals, AAPSS, vol. 541, September 1995, p.69. Back
Note 46: He was sacked on the demand of the US because of his involvement in training foreign terrorist groups and his non-cooperation with the CIA in buying back the unused Stinger missiles from the Afghan Mujahideen. Back
Note 47: Gen. Nasir is believed to be close to Gen. Musharraf. Back
Note 48: The Lashkar-e-Tayyeba apparently, generates crores of rupees every year by selling hides of sacrificial animals. See Zaigham Khan, "Inside the Mind of the Holy Warrior," The Herald, July 1999, p.43. Back
Note 49: Kureshie, n.40. Back
Note 50: Tariq Ali, "In the Doghouse," in On the Abyss: Pakistan After the Coup (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers India, 2000), p. 19. Back
Note 51: Ibid., p.26. Back
Note 52: Khaled Ahmed, "Fundamental Flaws," in On the Abyss: Pakistan After the Coup (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers India, 2000), p.81. Back
Note 53: Ibid., p.83. Back
Note 54: Ibid., p. 84. Back
Note 55: Ali, n.50, p.26. Back
Note 56: "`Not Possible to Stop Infiltration Into India,'" The Hindu, March 10, 2000. In a meeting with a US Congressional delegation, Musharraf had stated that he faced constraints in taking on the militant outfits and India must appreciate his difficulties. See report, "Another Bid to Mislead World Opinion, Says Pak" The Hindu, February 23, 2001. Back
Note 57: Khaled Ahmed, "A Foreign Policy That Can't be Changed," Friday Times, January 28-February 3, 2000. Back
Note 58: "Struggle in J&K not Religious: Musharraf," The Hindu, February 9, 2001 and "`Musharraf's Wrong,'" The Times of India, February 10, 2001. Back
Note 59: The Jamaat-i-Islami chief, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, has asked him to step down as army chief when his tenure ends at the end of the year. See "Step Down, Jamaat Chief Tells Musharraf," The Times of India, February 10, 2001. Back
Note 60: "Pakistan Threatens to Ban Militant Groups," Asian Age, April 14, 2000. Back
Note 61: Ismail Khan, "Terrorists or Crusaders," Newsline, February 2000, p.25. Back
Note 62: See reports, "Jihadis Cannot be Stopped from Raising Funds: Court," The Times of India, February 22, 2001 and "`Outfits Cannot be Stopped from Raising Funds for Jehad,'" The Hindu, February 22, 2001. Back
Note 63: n.38. Back
Note 64: "The Jehadi Organisations," The Nation, February 8, 2000. Also see "Pakistan at the Crossroads," The Nation, February 17, 2000. Back
Note 65: n.38. Back
Note 66: Cited from, "Closure Order to Militant Outfits in POK," The Times of India, February 20, 2001. Back
Note 67: Cited from, "Pak. Minister Mollifies Jihadi Outfits," The Hindu, February 24, 2001. Also see report, "Jihad will Continue: Pakistan," The Times of India, February 24, 2001. Back
Note 68: Harinder Baweja, "General in Trouble," India Today, April 10, 2000. Back
Note 69: "Ball in India's Court, Says Salahuddin," The Hindu, February 26, 2001. Back