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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
Indian Army: The Challenge Ahead
By V.K. Shrivastava
*
Abstract
In the post-independence era, the Indian Army has won wars and has kept insurgency at bay. It needs to remain ready and relevant for the challenges ahead. China has only shelved, not renounced, its territorial claims. The ruling elite in Pakistan is unlikely to readjust its hostile attitudes or policies towards India. Both these countries will continue to pose external challenges to our army. On the internal front, the ongoing proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir, insurgencies in the northeast, and the activities of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence have kept India politically embroiled, economically burdened and militarily committed. The situation signifies operational and attitudinal challenges for an army orgnised and equipped to ward off external threats.
Remaining apolitical, and worthy of the people's respect, the army has been least demanding while bearing the hardships of its calling. In the changed socio-economic climate, it has also to cope with the organisational aspirations.
The Heritage
The recorded history of warfare in India spans thousands of years. The systematic process of evolution can be traced back to the Vedic period (around 1500 BC) when it was considered honourable-indeed, the sacred duty of the Kshatriyas, the warrior class-to take up arms against evil. A war could be waged only for a righteous cause and was appropriately called Dharma Yudha, implying a virtuous and just war. The rules of engagement were well defined to restrain the personal whims of the nobles and soldiers. The Arthashastra, a treatise written by Kautilya in the fourth century BC, went on to explain the unmistakable linkages between statecraft and warfare.
Despite such sound grounding, the armies of the numerous princely states dotting the Indian landmass lost some of their professional orientation with the passage of time. The growing state of weakness and the disarray did not go unnoticed. Not surprisingly, therefore, India went on to experience the thunderous march of many invading armies in the centuries that followed. Whereas some of the warlords went back after the loot and plunder, a few others stayed back to establish their dynastic rule in the promised land. All such forays and reigns influenced the art and science of war in India. Though the British rule in India lasted less than two centuries, they left behind lasting legacies and strong institutions-the Indian Army being amongst the most valuable ones. Well before, independence, Field Marshal Auchinleck, the then commander-in-chief (C-in-C), India, had issued his directions, stating, "Before we go, it is our bounden duty to do all we can to ensure continued wellbeing and efficiency of our men and the Army we loved as well as served so long". 1 By the time the British left, the Indian Army had a highly developed professional ethos and a reputation to live up to.
The first challenge after independence came right in its wake when Pakistan launched "Op Gulmarg" to annex Kashmir. At the peak of these operations, lasting over 14 months, the army had close to a hundred thousand officers and men fighting bloody battles in Srinagar Valley and in far off Ladakh. The ceasefire took effect when the army was on a winning streak. Regrettably, matters have remained unresolved ever since and the firing along the Line of Control (LoC) has actually never ceased. Alongside the operations in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), matters also came to a head in central India where the Nizam of Hyderabad wanted to remain an independent sovereign state. The Indian Army settled the issue in a matter of four days-September 13 to 17, 1948. Similarly, in December 1961, the government had to take recourse to an armed intervention in Goa, since the Portuguese declined to leave. Within a matter of two days, the Indian Army had wiped out the last vestiges of colonial rule in India.
The "Forward Policy" and the resultant tensions along the disputed Sino-Indian border finally led to a military debacle in 1962. It was followed by large-scale expansions and modernisations. The process was still going on when, in May 1965, there were rumblings yet again in the Rann of Kutch followed by a full scale war with Pakistan in September that year. The army was in its elements once again. Pakistani thrusts in J&K and Punjab were blunted decisively and own offensives were soon on the outskirts of Lahore. East Pakistan, which had remained quiet during the 1965 conflict, came alive in 1971 because of the turmoil within. Drawn into a war yet again, the Indian Army, in concert with the navy and air force, and rubbing shoulders with the Mukti Bahini, went on to liberate Bangladesh.
Skirmishes along the undemarcated and glaciated region-at altitudes between 15,000 to 20,000 feet-that commenced in 1984, finally resulted in the permanent deployment of the army on the Siachen Glacier. It is indeed the highest battlefield the world has ever known. The late Eighties found the Indian Army heavily committed in Sri Lanka. And the recent human efforts of the armymen, scripting a hard fought victory in the Kargil War, need no recounting.
As if all of the aforesaid was not enough, the Indian Army has remained committed even otherwise to man the vast stretches of our disputed borders, to counter the Pak-instigated proxy war in J&K, and to quell insurgencies in the northeastern states. Added to all these is the army's participation in nearly two dozen UN missions across the globe in quest of peace.
In short, therefore, in the post-independence era, the Indian Army has won wars, stemmed proxy wars, kept insurgency at bay, acquitted itself creditably in missions abroad and has unflinchingly risen to meet the demands made by the government of the day. It has scrupulously maintained its apolitical status, remained worthy of public respect, and has been least demanding while bearing the hardships of its calling. Lord Wavell, the then viceroy of India, in his farewell speech of March 21, 1947, had said, "I believe that the stability of the Indian Army may perhaps be the deciding factor in the future of India". 2 Events have proved him right.
Be that as it may, ours is perhaps the most bloodied army in the world and has overcome many challenges. What it more to the point is that it needs to remain ready and relevant for future ones. Therefore, the challenges to the army, in the time horizon of the next 20 years, have been discussed in this article in the following three parts:
In the text that follows, the focus has all along been kept on the military aspects. References to issues such as pressures of politico-diplomatic leverages, economic arm-twisting, denial of technology, and so on, have been made only where unavoidable.
The External Threats
The Setting
Consequent to the break up of the USSR, and the end of the Cold War, the search for a new world order commenced in the closing decade of the last century. We have thus entered the new millenium with a range of complexities that are likely to create new groupings, alliances and pressure points before a new arrangement stabilizes. The process is sure to create tensions and troubles in the coming decades. Admittedly, nation states are showing inclinations to put their differences on hold and work towards mutual economic betterment. Evan so, in the years ahead, India should be expected to cope with the challenges of energy security, technology denial regimes, trade wars and the threats of possible economic sanctions. Intervention in our national affairs is likely to be attempted by the major powers under the garb of human rights issues and the likes. Thus, the global security setting can be summed up as one that is full of uncertainties and which exposes India to multi-dimensional threats that cannot be visualised with any definitive clarity.
Aforesaid apart, there are also some historical and geopolitical factors that will continue to cause external threats to India. It must be recalled that long stretches of our borders with China and Pakistan are disputed and sizeable areas are under their illegal occupation. Further, our island territories need to be guarded-decades ago, Indonesia had laid claims to the Great Nicobar Island.
China
The present confidence building measures (CBMs) and the efforts to resolve the vexed boundary dispute notwithstanding, China will remain our primary strategic challenge in the political, economic and military terms. India and China, the two Asian giants, account for more than one-third of the world's population and, backed by their economic reforms, are well on their way to speed up and sustain the developmental processes. Admittedly, China's achievements on the economic front surpass Indian endeavours-particularly in the areas of direct investments and foreign trade. In the coming years, the two are destined to play significant roles in the Asian-Pacific region and the Indian Ocean. In that context, due attention must be given to the Chinese foreign minister's statement of some years ago: We cannot recognise the Indian Ocean as India's Ocean". Accordingly, China has steadily been increasing its presence in the Bay of Bengal.
As is well known, China is already a full-fledged nuclear power and its nuclear forces are considered an "Important Pillar" of the country. Given the impressive ongoing economic growth, it must be in China's scheme of things to enhance its nuclear and conventional capabilities in step with its march towards superpower status. Particularly so since the Chinese leadership is not divided on military matters. Even presently, defence analysts aptly observe that "the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is not a modern juggernaut but it is still the biggest guy on the block". The Central Military Commission has initiated many reformatory steps in the last one decade. Consequently, there are now only seven Military Regions as against the earlier 11. The PLA has been regrouped into 24 Army Groups of three divisions each. Structures for joint command and control have since been established. The doctrinal shift from "People's War Under Modern Conditions" to "Limited War Under High Technology Conditions" has been endorsed and adapted. General Qin Jiwei is reported to have stated in 1991, "In the next 10 years, the international situation will be complicated and changeable. Although major war is unlikely to take place, limited local wars will be endless". 3 Even so, the PLA has been directed to remain prepared for a possible conflict at the medium level and, of course, for a major war. Notably, the nuclear option has been retained in all the three variants. The concepts of "Gaining Initiative by Striking First" and "Winning Victory Through Elite Troops" signify the offensive contents of their "Active Defence". In consonance, therefore, Rapid Reaction Units have been raised. Raising of some more Special Forces has also been planned. Further, in 1993, the PLA planned and conducted its first major tri-Service exercise. 4 Even otherwise, the emphasis during the PLA exercises is on the all-arms concept. Lastly, to enhance the professional orientation of the PLA, it has slowly been eased out of its multifarious commercial undertakings. The core theme is to reduce the size of the PLA, streamline the procedures for modernisation, and evolve joint strategies.
Viewed in its totality, the PLA's structural upgradations and doctrinal precepts give clear indications of the nature of the possible military threats to us. Territorial claims have been shelved temporarily but have not been renounced by China. The "Grand Cause of Reunification" is one of China's stated national aims. Also, China is not known to be shy of using its armed forces to "Right the Wrongs of History." As recently as in October 1999, the Rand Report for the United States Air Force observed that "China is not a satisfied power-refuses to abandon the principle of power".
Pakistan
Flawed as it was, the religion based two-nation theory led to the partition of India. Even Mohammed Ali Jinnah, at the time of his death, is said to have confided in his doctor, "Pakistan has been the biggest blunder of my life". 5 Be that as it may, the partition was followed by the maharaja of J&K signing the Instrument of Accession in favour of India, which has been the cause of many wars-declared, undeclared and proxy-and sustained hostilities between the two countries. The Nehru-Liaqat Agreement, the Simla Agreement and the recent Lahore Declaration have not altered the status for the better. The anti-India stance, in general, and the Kashmir issue, in particular, is a great unifying factor in Pakistan and cuts across all internal divides. In a foreseeable future, the ruling elite in Pakistan is unlikely to readjust its basic attitudes and policies towards India. The tensions will continue if not mount. It must be observed here that Pakistan was under military rule during both the 1965 and 1971 conflicts. Similar was the case when the two countries came close to an outbreak of hostilities in the mid-Eighties. Presently, it is under military rule once again.
Because of the defeat suffered in 1971 the Pakistan Army will continue to strive to redeem its honour. As a well deliberated strategy, they combine their war efforts with heightened insurgency and upping the ante. Through a series of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) sustained subversive activities, Pakistan's military junta keeps the Indian Army heavily committed to create operational imbalances and, thus, reduce India's conventional edge. Further, as in Siachen, and more recently in Kargil, it would also be Pakistan's design to select areas of conflict where it hurts us the most and where own combat superiority cannot be brought to bear in full. It would be their effort to make it a localised border skirmish and to score a minor victory or force a draw. With the nuclear deterrence in place, and our track record of not having reacted too sternly, Pakistan will make bold to embark on such ventures in the years to come. With heavy defence spending, it continues to modernise and also strives to reduce the gap of conventional asymmetry with India.
Sino-Pak relations have been strong and steady all along. One helped the other, surreptitiously and over many years, to acquire nuclear capability. China sees India as a stumbling block and wishes to keep it confined to South Asia. Pakistan does its utmost not to let India attain preeminence in the region. Thus, individually and collectively, Pakistan will continue to pose military threats to our security. Without going into the options, and the countering strategies, the following facets of future challenges merit mention:
That last aspect of insurgency, the Indian Army's large-scale ongoing commitment, is the subject of analysis in the next part of this article.
Attending to the Threats Within
The Situation in a Nutshell
India's aspiration of attaining a rightful place in the region, and in the world, is also weighed down by her internal challenges. Growth of population and the high rate of illiteracy slow down the pace of development. The rise and the spread of fundamentalism in the immediate neighbourhood have made in-roads into our multi-religious society. Growing regional and communal tendencies have potentials to tear apart our national fabric. The rising expectations of our people, and the government's failure to deliver, have led to conditions in many states that go beyond the sphere of law and order situations. With two of the world's largest drug producing areas on our immediate flanks, the threat of drug trafficking, and all that goes with it, needs to be taken a serious note of.
It needs no elaboration that the turbulence within exposes India to the threats of subversion and is indeed being exploited-notably by Pakistan. Therefore, the text that follows selectively reflects upon such facets that have a bearing on the army's employment to quell internal unrest.
Demographic Aggression and the Border Management
Due to the porosity of the international borders in the northeast, India has been a victim of large scale in-migration from neighbouring Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar and, most of all, from Bangaldesh. The number of Bangaldeshis in India has been estimated to be as high as 1.8 crore. They have spilled over to far off destinations in the country. Their large numbers in Mumbai, for example, have led to demands by the Shiv Sena to push them back to their own country. However, all these illegal migrants have essentially swamped the northeastern states and have fuelled the existing contentious issues of "foreigners" and "outsiders", to further disturb the already fragile social structures.
The influx of population apart, unchecked cross-border movements give rise to many other ills-smuggling, gun running, drug trafficking, movement of insurgents, and the like. In essence, the remedy lies in the effective management of our borders. The situation along each of these borders differs vastly on many counts. So do our options and compulsions of dealing with different countries in the neighourhood. Be that as it may, the importance of all-encompassing and well-coordinated efforts towards better border management cannot be over-emphasised. It must be remembered that in the ultimate analysis, the ongoing laxities and shortfalls have finally led to the army's prolonged commitments.
Insurgency and Terrorism
It is not the purpose here to sequentially recall the events leading to the ongoing proxy war in J&K, or the spread of insurgencies in the northeastern states. As is well known, these have kept the country politically destablised, economically burdened, and militarily embroiled. Ongoing efforts for the resumption of the Indo-Pak peace talks do not hold much promise. In J&K, we should expect to experience increasing and more daring attacks on the security forces by the well-armed militants. Human bombs and suicide squads, having high destructive and publicity value, are likely to be seen in action more often. The Pakistan Army can be expected to exercise stricter control on its manifold cadres to ensure concentration of effect. The ISI is likely to play the communal card, targetting the Buddhists and the Muslims in Ladakh this time. In the northeast, ongoing secessionist movements apart, the situation appears to be poised to go even more critical. The aspect of "ethnic cleansing" should be expected to muscle its way into making the situation even more complicated. The highs and lows of narco-terrorism and the proliferation of small arms complete the northeastern picture imperfect.
Announcements of "packages" and the signing of "accords" notwithstanding, the government's policies have apparently been flawed and disjointed. How else does one account for the continuous and increasing employment of the army over the years-from one battalion in the mid-Fifties to a division in the late Sixties to the present state of many divisions. Besides, the counter-insurgency (CI) commitments differ vastly from the conventional settings. There is neither an enemy to destroy nor is there any territory to capture. Also, the conduct of CI operations demand application of minimum force. What signifies success is army's return to the barracks. Further, the army is one of the many player's in such situations and retains primacy only in critical periods. It must operate within the confines of the legal framework, the demands of the human rights, the glare of the media, and the tolerances of the society. The situation signifies operational and attitudinal challenges for an army organised and equipped to ward off external threats.
Rise of Religious Fundamentalism
Ever since independence, religious under-currents have generally been held in check by religious tolerance. However, attitudes have hardened in the recent past. The cause of Hindutva is being championed, "forced" conversions have caused violence, churches have been attacked, Buddhist monks have been killed and the mushrooming of madarssas is causing serious concern. Even our leaders have been faulted for making "intemperate utterances". And yet religious fundamentalism gets fanned by the politically motivated regional tendencies and casteism. Our present policies and concerns, if any, leave much to be desired. To quell the eruptions of frequent communal disturbances, the army is called out often enough. The demolition of the Babri Masjid, for example, "necessitated the deployment of 200 columns, comprising about 27,000 soldiers, in 13 states in the country". 6 On all such occasions, the army's unquestionable communal harmony and impartiality is on test and display.
Militarisation of Politics
Because of the prevailing situation, the army has remained deployed for long in many states. Even otherwise, it has often been employed to retrieve situations apparently fouled by the political masters-it got dragged into the Golden Temple and also remained entangled in the Sri Lanka ethnic strife for two long years. Elections too have been held in states where the army had already been called out, and then remained so deployed to ensure peaceful conduct of this democratic process. Even during and after the Kargil War, the political parties took positions to derive mileage from the episode in view of the general elections round the corner.
Easy recourse to using the sword arm of the state seems to have lulled the centre and the states into deeper complacency. The army's frequent and visible presence is not an indication of our national strength; quite to the contrary, it signifies failed policies, poor governance and paralysed institutions of the state machinery. Whereas most countries the world over worry about the politicisation of their military, we in India need to be cautious of a possible militarisation of politics. Against this backdrop, the army's requirements of unified commands for CI, and readiness to manage borders, also have wider ramifications.
Viewed in its totality, post-independence Indian polity has not been able to harmonise the process of development with the aspirations of the people. Lacunae in the arena of social engineering have created tensions that have turned violent, necessitating the army's assistance. Therefore, in the context of all the aforesaid socio-political upheavals, the army needs to:
Coping With the Organisational Aspirations
The Army as a Career
Nothing is more disgraceful to the officers and men of the army than to bring disrepute to their profession. Therefore, their sense of duty inspires them to do their Karma (righteous deeds) to uphold the tradition of the army. All these years, the rank and file have not complained about the privations and hardships of their calling. However, all is not well. Whereas the Indian citizens are ready to freely acknowledge the virtues and sacrifices of the armymen, the profession of arms ranks lowest in the preferences of our youth. There is a variety of reasons for this, the important ones being:
In the changed socio-economic climate, the terms and conditions of a career in the army do not attract the best talent. Not surprisingly, therefore, the deficiencies in the officer cadre have steadily grown, to hover at around 30 per cent presently. The army faces the dilemma of creating a first rate fighting force out of what is attracted by the second rate incentives.
Leadership Challenges
There are two facets of this all-important challenge. The first one identifies the exacting standards that the future leadership must attend to, and the second one addresses the existing weaknesses within.
To start with the first one, briefly stated, the complexities of a future battlefield will place greater demands on the officer cadre to carry out the tasks of the direct combat role, the administrative and organisational functions of a military manager and the desired skills of a military technologist. In specific terms, it means a higher degree of mental mobility, improved decision-making, better communication skills and greater ability to withstand combat stresses.
The second facet is equally important. More and more junior officers now expect their seniors to set higher standards of ethics and demonstrated leadership. They find lack of magnanimity, possible sycophancy, inaccessibility and opinionated behaviour not to their liking. Admittedly, to an extent, some of these impressions could well be due to ignorance, but then there is no smoke without fire. A micro level survey, carried out as part of a research project, revealed that the respondents' maximum concern was to "improve service culture". 7 Be that as it may, the aspects of future military leadership will continue to engage the attention of the army hierarchy.
Miscellany
There are a number of other issues of "housekeeping" seeking resolution in order to keep all ranks at the right pitch of morale and motivation. These relate to family accommodation, educational opportunities, and quality of medical facilities. Officers and men expect a general betterment in the quality of life-one of the few attractions of army service. There are also the war widows, disabled soldiers, and ex-servicemen who have expectations of rehabilitation and similar other assistance.
All in all, therefore, the army will have to grapple vigorously with these factors to attract the right people, groom them for the challenges ahead, and zealously attend to their justified aspirations.
Conclusion
Ours is one of the oldest civilisations. Yet, as a nation state, India is only 50 years old. We are still in the early stages of global learning and formulation of national policies to include military strategies. The necessity of a modern army will grow as an economically and technologically stronger India gets ready to play its part in the coming "Age of Asia". In the game of power play, nations know how to send and read signals. In that context, India's readiness, and its army's preparedness to respond decisively, will generate the right impulses for others to take a note of. The army, therefore, expects the government of the day to lay down policy parameters, as also to create dynamic structures and institutions to sustain all its endeavours.
The army has weathered many challenges in the years gone by. However, there appears to be a rather bad patch ahead. Further, the nature and the context of future military ventures are likely to be more diverse and unique. Therefore, the army must aspire to modernise and acquire the full range of capabilities to effectively deal with the visualised situations. Through its elan and ethos, its system of recognition and rewards, and with the government's help, the army will have to strive to attract the right material to ensure exceedingly demanding professional standards.
Ours has been an apolitical and righteous army. It has repeatedly warded off external threats and has ensured internal stability. It has shown tenacity in adversity and will have to continue to excel and prevail-every time and in every venture.
Endnotes
Note *: V.K. Shrivastava, Senior FellowBack
Note 1: Major K.C. Praval, Indian Army After Independence (New Delhi: Lancer Paperbacks, 1987), p. 5.Back
Note 2: Rajesh Kadian, India and its Army (New Delhi: Vision Books Pvt. Ltd., 1990), Foreword.Back
Note 3: Shulong Chu, "China Strategy: The PRC Girds for Limited Hi-Tech War," Orbis, Spring 1994, p. 188.Back
Note 4: Tai Ming Cheung, "Quick Response", Far Eastern Economic Review, January 1993, pp. 19-20.Back
Note 5: Time, December 23, 1996.Back
Note 6: The Times of India, January 24, 1993.Back
Note 7: Lt. Gen. R. N. Mahajan, "How to Make a Career in the Ahmed Forces Attractive", USI Journal, October-December 1999, p. 516.Back