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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
Indo-US Relations in the Bush White House
By Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
*
Abstract
This paper aims to look at the prospects for improvement in Indo-US ties under the Bush Administration. The principal argument is that the bilateral relations, even if they do not improve dramatically, are not likely to move back to the pre-Clinton visit situation. US-India relations are examined from two angles: one, India's role in Bush's foreign policy prism, particularly India's role in America's emerging Asia policy; and second, from a bilateral point of view. While looking at India's place in Bush's Asia framework, one has to also consider the relations of the United States with Japan, and with China. The bilateral framework will deal with issues such as nuclear proliferation, economics and trade, international terrorism, and Pakistan. Though it is difficult to predict the future of the relationship, one can identify the issues and factors that will affect it.
The Evolution of Indo-US Relations
As many scholars have noted, throughout the Cold War, Indo-US relations were marked by missed opportunities 1 despite many shared interests and political values. 2 Nevertheless, the US and India found themselves in opposing camps during the Cold War years, each unable to understand the logic of the other's alliances.
The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union altered much of the international alliance structures of the Cold War period. The disappearance of the Soviet Union from the global strategic framework created the necessity for India to engage with the West and the US in a more effective manner. Additional factors helped India make the painful transition, such as the dire economic situation the country found itself in the early 1990s. The economic liberalisation that followed, and the opening of the market in India allowed great interaction between the Indian and US business communities, and this became a critical cementing factor in the bilateral relations. Other factors helped coax the US into paying India greater attention-India's rapidly expanding economy, which was beginning to rival China's, the concurrent growth of India's military capability (especially in the strategic arena), and the emergence of an increasingly vocal Indian diaspora in the US.
All these changes came to a sudden halt in May 1998 when India conducted its Pokhran II nuclear tests. These tests caused a major setback in India's bilateral relations with many countries, particularly the US' allies, as the US led many countries in imposing sanctions against India. But the nadir that the relationship reached after Pokhran II also provided the base from which rapid improvement in the relationship occurred over the last two years. The extended dialogue between Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh and US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott helped both sides to better understand each other's security concerns and perspectives in a manner and form that was unprecedented.
These improvements culminated in President Clinton's visit to India in March 2000. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and US President Clinton signed the Vision Statement that has outlined the future of Indo-US relations. The highlights of the Vision Statement are:
Though all these proposed points lay a strong foundation for enhanced bilateral relations between India and the US, the Clinton Administration appeared unable or unwilling to make the final break with its failed non-proliferation policy in the region. As long as non-proliferation remained the benchmark, there were strict limits beyond which the relationship could not improve. Nevertheless, the Clinton Administration's policies have provided the base on which the new Bush Administration can build.
India in Bush's Asia Policy
South Asia may not have figured very high during the election campaign, but whatever little Bush had to say on India was quite positive. For instance, during the foreign policy speech made on November 19, 1999, he said:
Often overlooked in our strategic calculations is that great land that rests at the south of Eurasia. This coming century will see democratic India's arrival as a force in the world. A vast population, before long the world's most populous nation. A changing economy, in which 3 of its 5 wealthiest citizens are software entrepreneurs. India is now debating its future and strategic path, and the United States must pay it more attention. We should establish more trade and investment with India as it opens to the world. And we should work with the Indian government, ensuring it is a force for stability and security in Asia. This should not undermine our longstanding relationship with Pakistan, which remains crucial to the peace of the region. 3
Also, US Secretary of State Colin Powell made some significant remarks on India: "ÖIndia has the potential to keep the peace in the vast Indian Ocean area and its periphery. We need to work harder and more consistently to assist India in this endeavour, while not neglecting our friends in Pakistan." 4 Hence, one can say that Bush is likely to pursue a more intense level of cooperation between India and the US. One possible pointer to the status of Indo-US relations for the future is the very successful visit of Minister of External Affairs and Defence Jaswant Singh to Washington in April 2001. The future of Indo-US relations is likely to be shaped by how the US' relations with the other two Asian giants-China and Japan-proceed. The US-Japan alliance is facing a rough patch. Japanese Prime Minister Yashiro Mori was in Washington recently to take up President Bush on his promise to give Japan its "rightly deserved" place in the US foreign policy in Asia. Bush, during the election campaign and debates, had stated that he intended to undertake a major overhaul of US foreign policy towards Asia. He wanted to elevate the role of Japan as the principal ally in the region and abandon Clinton's "strategic partnership" with China. Bush sees China more as an emerging threat and has coined the phrase "strategic competitor" to replace "strategic partner". He visualised Japan as the lynchpin in East Asia. Bush's foreign policy advisor and current US trade representative, Robert Zoellick has said that after 50 years of a "peace constitution" barring military involvement, Japan is ready to take on a greater security role corresponding to its economic power.
Much of the discussions between Bush and Mori apparently focussed on areas of disagreement, such as how to revive the declining Japanese economy, local resentment to the US troops stationed in Japan, and the deaths of nine Japanese after a US submarine collision off Hawaii. How serious these differences are in the longer term perspective, and how the US and Japan propose to overcome the current difficulties will be of considerable importance to the rest of Asia. Though it might be too early for it to materialise, some scholars have suggested a trilateral alliance among India, Japan and the US. 5
However, Indo-US relations are more likely to be affected by how US-China ties progress. China has been a country of concern for the US and the Republicans in particular. China, obviously, is an area of concern for India too. In recent years, India and the US appear to have developed some common interests vis-à-vis China. India sees China as a major strategic challenge, whereas Washington considers China as the principal potential strategic competitor to the US in Asia and worldwide. 6 Bush appears to be more realistic about China than either President Clinton or even President George Bush Sr., and less influenced by the large multinational corporations that played such an important role in shaping Clinton's China policy.
The crisis regarding the US spy plane EP-3E-Aries II has only increased mutual suspicions. The 24 crew members were released on April 12, but a host of issues regarding this crisis are yet to be resolved.
China has been cashing in on this incident as a bargaining point in the US-Taiwan weapons deal. The Administration has warned that the Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China will be under threat if the crisis does not end soon. Senior officials in the Administration have stated that this incident could have grave consequences, damaging even the trade relations.
Even after the spy plane crisis is settled, the bilateral relations between the US and China are not going to be smooth. The Republicans have been harder on China, compared to the Democrats. Irrespective of how the spy plane issue is resolved, US-China relations are unlikely to completely recover from the effects of the incident.
However, it is not very clear whether the US would follow a policy of engagement or a policy of containment or a mix of both-"congagement", as a RAND study has described it. Probably the economic realities of China cannot be completely ignored, and the US and China may continue commercial and economic cooperation. However, in order to curtail China's growth as a comprehensive regional or world power, the US could take several steps. It may promote regional security cooperation, strengthen ties with regional countries, or support a regional security framework which, in the face of a more powerful and hostile China, could grow into a defence alliance. India's role in such a framework would be a bit difficult to predict, simply because it will be difficult for it to take sides in case such a situation arises.
Two issues will be crucial in determining the relations between the US and China: the Taiwan issue and the US National Missile Defence (NMD). Most Republicans are of the view that the US must extend overt support to Taiwan and take a more active role in backing its defence. The recently proposed US sale of Aegis-equipped guided missile destroyers to Taiwan, the first in a long list of advanced, sophisticated weapons to be procured from the US, is of major concern to Beijing. The strength of the feelings in Beijing can be gauged from the fact that senior Chinese officials consider the transfer of the Aegis system tantamount to a military alliance between Washington and Taiwan. Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen, during his recent visit, reiterated Beijing's opposition to the sale, and warned of grave consequences if the sale went through. 7
However, US policy towards Taiwan is becoming less complex than it was under Clinton because the Republicans appear more convinced of the need for active US defence of Taiwan. A recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report has recommended that Taiwan urgently needs to bolster its defence, in terms of both weaponry and intelligence, and that the US should establish closer links with Taiwan's military. The US decision to help Taiwan in upgrading its military command-and-control infrastructure, and potentially providing the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) 8 for the island would bring the bilateral relations with China to an all-time low. The US has stated that there must be no use of force by China against Taiwan. And all issues regarding Taiwan's future must be resolved peacefully and must be acceptable to the people of Taiwan. In case of a violation by China on any of these, the United States has stated that it will respond appropriately in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act. This issue is unlikely to be resolved soon.
The other issue is Bush's plan for a missile defence system. Bush appears intent on pursuing these plans despite sharp reactions from Russia, China, and even Europe. China, fearing that even a minimally effective missile shield would degrade its missile force, is vehemently opposed to the programme. China has warned that it will increase its nuclear arsenal at least ten-fold, from its current 16-20 intercontinental ballistic missiles to 200-250, if the US proceeds with even the most minimal variant of NMD. 9 Many in the Bush camp have suported a boost-phase missile defence system, which would catch intercontinental ballistic missiles on their way up. That would enable the US to deploy sea-based defence systems capable of stopping missiles from North Korea or Iraq, without threatening the nuclear forces-or nuclear deterrent-of Russia and China. Many see this as a virtue because it would avoid diplomatic strains with Moscow and Beijing. 10 But there is also an opposing view that a missile defence system should guard against China as it is feared that China might try to blackmail the US in the case of Taiwan.
Nevertheless, compromises might be possible-a report by the Republican National Committee has suggested that the US will seek a negotiated change in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that allows the US to develop all technologies and experiments to carry through its robust missile defences. Similarly, Donald Rumsfeld had suggested in recent meetings in Munich that negotiated changes to the ABM Treaty might allow the US to continue with its NMD plans.
How will US-China relations affect Indo-US relations? Does India want friendly US-China relations or hostile ones? Both have pitfalls. Very close US-China relations, such as under the Clinton Administration, could see South Asia being jointly 'managed' by the US and China, an unappealing thought. But a serious dispute, or a US-China clash will have wider security consequences throughout Asia and will affect India.
The Bilateral Policy Calculus
With regard to relations with India, Bush was quite vocal in putting forward the view that the US must pay more attention to this emerging partner in South Asia, establish more trade and investment with India, and work with the Indian government, ensuring that it is a force of stability and security in Asia. 11 India matters to the US not merely as a large market and a provider of information age goods and services, but also because important US strategic and political interests coincide with those of India such as countering terrorism, managing nuclear proliferation, and containing China. 12 However, Bush has stated that this process should not undermine the longstanding relationship with Pakistan, as he feels that Pakistan remains crucial to the peace of the region. 13
On US relations with India, a recently published RAND report titled, "Taking Charge: A Bipartisan Report to the President Elect on Foreign Policy and National Security" stated clearly that US policy should decouple India and Pakistan in the US calculus. The report elaborated on the important role India could play, principally because of its economic and technological capabilities and potentialities. It said that India is becoming a major Asian power and, therefore, warrants an increased level of engagement beyond the canvas of South Asia.
What are the key issues in the bilateral relations?
The Nuclear Issue: Bush has stated that the US is not going to put pressure on India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which had been an important objective for the Clinton Administration. India can only hope that Bush does not change his position on this issue because the US has been at the forefront in the nuclear non-proliferation efforts, and because the CTBT seems so obviously in American national interests. Some members of the US Congressional Caucus on India who were visiting New Delhi in mid-January 2001, also echoed their concerns about India's signing the CTBT. But, on the other hand, the Republicans have been opposed to the CTBT and it was the Republican-controlled Senate that was responsible for the rejection of the CTBT in the Senate. Hence, Delhi's hopes for relief on the CTBT might not be overly optimistic.
The nuclear issue, of course, goes well beyond the CTBT alone. The US has to come to terms with India's nuclear status. As of now at least, the US appears convinced that there will be no rollback in India's nuclear status to the pre-1998 situation. But the US nevertheless appears unwilling to help meet India's nuclear energy needs. India's energy scenario requires India to proceed with the development of nuclear energy. But the US appears unwilling to drop its insistence on full-scope safeguards, and has objected to third countries such as France and Russia supplying civilian nuclear power reactors to India. Where India faces a major problem with the US is regarding its (India's) status on the nuclear front. India has never been a proliferationist and has a track record better than most other nuclear-armed states. Countries like China that have been nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatories, have worse records, transferring nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan.
The non-proliferationist posture of India should enable an enhanced level of cooperation between India and the United States. Lifting of sanctions may further enable a certain amount of technology transfer as well. Nevertheless, the nuclear issue is likely to remain a sticking point in the relations.
On sanctions, India can be hopeful of the US removing all of those imposed after the 1998 nuclear tests. A Bill has been introduced in the House of Representatives calling for the lifting of sanctions. The legislation, introduced by the co-chairs of the India Caucus, Jim McDermott and Ed Royce, stated that sanctions are counter-productive to US efforts to engage India. Moreover, the Republicans have repeatedly expressed discomfort with the entire sanctions issue, and Secretary of State Powell has undertaken to review the sanctions policy. The sanctions were partially waived on October 21, 1998, when Congress passed the Brownback Amendment, giving the president the power to waive sanctions against India and resume economic interaction with it. If the president works to remove these sanctions, a major hurdle in Indo-US relations can be removed.
Economics, Trade and WTO: Economics and trade are other significant issues for the new US Administration. Last year, the American trade deficit with India was $7 billion-an increase of $1.6 billion from 1999. Exports from the United States totalled $3.7 billion-a decrease of $45 million over 1999; while imports from India totalled $10.7 billion, or a 17 per cent increase in 2000 over the 1999 figures. India was the United States' 31st largest export market in 2000. 14 Bush intends to open the gates of trade from traditional goods of agriculture to the virtual links of e-commerce, and a further cut in the tariffs. 15 However, issues pertaining to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and intellectual property rights will not be taken lightly by India and this could create conflicts in Indo-US economic relations. India has opened up its market since the early 1990s, but is unlikely to be able to open up its economy to completely free trade, given its current state of economic and industrial development.
Issues relating to quantitative restrictions have created problems in Indo-US economic relations. An agreement was reached in December 1999 on a timetable to lift India's quantitative restrictions on imports of over 1,400 agricultural, textile and other consumer products. 16 But India is likely to use other barriers to keep out cheap imports, thus, continuing the friction with the US for some time.
Bush also proposes to ease labour and environmental restrictions in trade pacts that could boost Indo-US cooperation, particularly in textiles and handicrafts. The US trade representative Robert Zoellick, said in a statement after the release of the Annual Review of Trade and Trading Barriers, "We need to build support for open trade. That means publicising the existence of trade barriers in foreign markets and working with our trading partners to eliminate them". 17 Zoellick has said that the Democrats' insistence on adding labour, environment and human rights rules to trade pacts is an insurmountable obstacle. He feels that after what happened in Seattle, there will be no new round of world trade talks and that the Asians are against it; the Asians fear that the additional rules will make their exports less competitive and delay their economic development.
Hence, a Republican Administration is not likely to insist on such inter-linkages, which should lead India and the US to trade with each other much more easily. The environment, unlike in the Clinton Administration, is going to be alloted a low priority by the Bush government, as indicated by Bush's rejection of the Kyoto Protocols.
International Terrorism: International terrorism has been an issue of importance to the United States and the world at large. The present Administration endorses the four principles of the US counter-terrorism policy that were laid down originally by George Bush's Commission on Combatting Terrorism. They are:
In January 2000, the United States and India agreed to establish a Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism. 19 The agreement was announced following meetings between then Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott and Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh in London. Inter-agency teams from the two countries also agreed on a range of measures to enhance cooperation between the two countries to combat international terrorism. The two sides realised the necessity to share experiences, exchange information, and coordinate approaches and actions. The Indian government agreed to the US offer of anti-terrorism assistance programmes. Intelligence gathering and sharing of vital information between India and the United States should be important components in their efforts in counter-terrorism. India and the United States have a shared interest in strengthening a regime to counter international terrorism. This mutual interest in countering terrorism should be the ideal platform for, enhanced cooperation between India and the United States. The Bush Administration has also expressed the desire to improve international cooperation against all forms of cross-border criminality, especially the burgeoning threat of cyber-crime that threatens the vitality of American industries as well as American society and the world at large.
There are differences between the US and India on addressing terrorism, which have to do with the differing specificity of their respective concerns. India's concern is essentially Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, while the US appears to see Pakistan still as a source of asssistance, a "moderate" Islamic state that can help tackle some of the US' problems (such as Osama bin Laden). Nevertheless, there is now greater confluence between the Indian and American positions on terrorism than at any point in the past, and this can continue to be a useful glue to the relationship.
Energy and Environment: Clean energy and environment were the other great concerns for the US and India, and several agreements and contracts were singed at the meeting of the US-India Commercial Dialogue during Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to the US. The Department of Energy has signed an agreement with the Indian Power Ministry, resuming bilateral discussions on energy. The US Agency for International Aid (AID) has also signed several agreements, and the Export-Import Bank has signed three agreements, including a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for financing of small and medium-sized enterprises. Though this is a relatively uncontroversial area, and a minor one, it could help improve the overall ambience of the relationship.
US-Pakistan Ties: US-Pakistan relations also form a major component in the US' South Asia policy. On Pakistan, one infers that a Republican Administration would be soft on Pakistan since it has been a Cold War ally. The Republicans have been generally positive towards old allies-this was quite clear when Bush made a point about Indonesia. He said that the Clinton Administration was too critical of Indonesia over the military-backed violence in East Timor and the Moluccas. If Bush goes soft on Pakistan, it will keep India at a distance from the US. Thus, there are certain contradictions in Bush's foreign policy calculus as it relates to South Asia and India's national interest.
However, Bush may not follow an altogether soft policy towards Pakistan. For example, it was another Republican President, George Bush Sr, who had stopped aid and such other facilities to Pakistan in 1990 when he certified that Pakistan was building a nuclear bomb, and invoked the Pressler Amendment. 20 Moreover, Colin Powell, who headed the American military under Bush Sr. during the Gulf War, had felt that Pakistan had let down the coalition mounted against Iraq and was not supportive of US objectives in the Gulf. 21 Also Vice President Dick Cheney who was the defence secretary to then President Bush Sr. notes that Pakistan was at best lukewarm to Operation Desert Storm. Though Pakistan had sent two brigades to Saudi Arabia, it was primarily for the "protection of the holy places". 22 There are, therefore, reasons to doubt the impact of the closeness that the Republicans might feel towards Pakistan.
The latest RAND Report has made some observations about the domestic situation in Pakistan, with its crippling economy and its pursuing policies that are counter to many of the US' principal interests. The report states that the US should adopt a strict policy in order to stop Pakistan's support to the Taliban as well as their cooperation with terrorists fighting in Kashmir and elsewhere in Central Asia. The report recommends increased pressure-including using the leverage of international financial assistance-to curb Islamabad's sponsorship of extremist groups and to gain Pakistan's cooperation in the fight against international terrorism.
Also of interest is the United States' concern about China and Afghanistan in the region-countries which are Pakistan's favourites in more than one sense. Some Pakistani scholars have suggested that Pakistan should distance itself from the United States because the two countries have opposing interests in the region, particularly on China and Afghanistan. 23 This aspect is likely to create strains in the US-Pakistan bilateral relationship. The RAND Report further states that the US should "extend assistance in strengthening the institutions in civil society with the objective of helping Pakistan become a modern Muslim republic." 24 But the report expresses grave doubts about how a president who has little understanding of foreign policy issues and their complexities can manage to evolve a balance in dealing with India and Pakistan and other vital issues of the region. However, this should not really be a hindrance in formulating effective foreign policies because many presidents in the past too did not have much experience and expertise in foreign policy issues. Even avowedly domestic policy oriented presidents-Clinton is a good example-learned that they could not ignore foreign policy for very long.
Finally, the anti-interventionist sentiment in the Bush camp is an indirect positive aspect for Indo-US relations. The quasi-isolationist form of foreign policy under Bush could ease India's concerns regarding American interests in some subcontinental issues such as the Kashmir dispute. This tendency can be seen as positive in the context of the Indo-Pak conflict and the Kashmir issue and it should be a relief for the Indian government that the US will not attempt to interfere or mediate in this region. Not only that, the US has been supportive of all recent Indian efforts to solve the Kashmir issue.
What of the Future?
The future Indo-US relationship could be a mature, normal, friendly one, and may include defence cooperation between the two countries. Jaswant Singh and Donald Rumsfeld had agreed upon the following as possible areas for cooperation: first, that there would be a dialogue between the US defence secretary and the Indian defence minister similar to the one between the US State Department and the Indian External Affairs Ministry. Second, there would also be exchange of visits between the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff of the US and the chiefs of staff of India. Other agreements have also been worked out between the two countries. India's positive response to President Bush's NMD programme has added to the increasing goodwill for India. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's unprecedented visit to India for consultations on the NMD issue signified the increasing importance of India in the US' strategic framework in Asia
A lot depends on what the US and India expect from each other and what they can give to each other. There is a certain amount of ambiguity on both sides regarding this. On India's part, it knows that it has to improve its relations with the US. One can talk about multipolarity, or a polycentric world, but the fact remains that for at least the next 15 years, if not more, the US is going to be unrivalled.
The US will be a significant player in dealing with China as well as Pakistan. This will have a positive impact on India, certainly in the case of US-China relations. India would not like to see a very friendly relationship between the US and China, such as during the Clinton Administration. For instance, there was concern in New Delhi when Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton issued a Joint Statement in 1998 that clearly outlined a joint US-China strategy for South Asia, raising specific concerns about the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan. At the same time, India does not wish to see a hostile relationship between the US and China, with destabilising consequences for the continent.
And in the case of the US-Pakistan relationship, it may not be too satisfactory to New Delhi, as the US may still have some sympathy towards its Cold War ally. However, the US-Pak equations have changed after the end of the Cold War. India is no longer viewed at par with Pakistan rather, it is seen and compared with China.
Endnotes
Note *: Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Research OfficerBack
Note 1: See the various essays in Harold A. Gould and Sumit Ganguly, The Hope and the Reality: US-Indian Relations From Roosevelt to Reagan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992). Back
Note 2: This sense is captured in, among other works, Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies (Washington: National Defence University Press, 1992). Back
Note 3: George W. Bush, "A Distinctly American Internationalism", foreign policy speech at the Reagan Library, November 19, 1999. Back
Note 4: Colin Powell, Opening Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 17, 2001. Back
Note 5: The idea was originally mooted by Mohammed Ayoob in his article "South Asia's Dangers and US Foreign Policy," Orbis, Winter 2001. He foresees this arrangement as a possibility since China's long-term interests appear to run contrary to those of the United States, as well as to those of India and Japan, in fundamental ways. The idea is quite agreeable to the author but the issue of whether it would in the interest of India to take such strong sides or not, is not seriously given a thought. China being India's neighbour, it may not be ideal to take strong positions against China. It is not that India cannot agree with the US on this arrangement. Japan possibly does not need to worry as it has an alliance relationship with the US. Back
Note 6: Ayoob, Ibid., p. 133. Back
Note 7: "Powell, Qian Optimistic About Differences", Washington Times, March 22, 2001. Back
Note 8: David Shambaugh, "Facing Reality in China Policy", Foreign Affairs, January-February 2001, p. 51. Back
Note 9: Ibid., p. 52. Back
Note 10: "In GOP, A Simmering Struggle on China Policy", Washington Post, August 22, 2000. Back
Note 11: Bush, n. 3. Back
Note 12: Mohammed Ayoob, "India Matters", Washington Quarterly, Winter 2000, pp. 27-39. Back
Note 13: "Bush Sees India As A Major Force", The Hindustan Times, November 21, 1999. Back
Note 14: "US to Work Towards Lowering Trade Barriers", The Hindu, April 1, 2001. The data was brought out in the Annual Review of Trade and Trading Barriers. Back
Note 15: Republican National Committee, "Principled American Leadership", at www.rnc.org/2000. Back
Note 16: US State Department, Fact Sheet, "US Economic Relations with India", March 2000. Back
Note 17: n. 14. Back
Note 18: n. 15. Back
Note 19: US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Press statement by James P. Rubin, "Joint US-India Statement on Counter-Terrorism Working Group," February 8, 2000. Back
Note 20: The amendment was invoked by President George Bush in 1990. In keeping with the Pressler Amendment, the US stopped military and economic assistance to Pakistan. Back
Note 21: RAND Report, "Taking Charge: A Bipartisan Report to the President Elect on Foreign Policy and National Security," January 2001. Back
Note 22: Ibid. Back
Note 23: "India, Pakistan Remain US Concern", New York Times, December 19, 2000. Back
Note 24: n. 21. Back