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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
India and the Asia-Pacific Balance of Power
By G.V.C. Naidu
*
Abstract
Recent events suggest a mixed trend regarding regional security in the Asia-Pacific. There are distinct possibilities that a multipolar Asia-Pacific will see an inevitable clash of interests among the great powers. The ensuing uncertainty will have considerable implications for the region, and there is great need to ensure the smooth management of intra-great power relations, so that the Asia-Pacific region is not subjected to destabilising tendencies. A combination of balance of power and development of multilateral mechanisms is necessary as a simultaneous operation of these two is a better guarantee of stability in the Asia-Pacific. India can emerge as one of the important poles, provided it qualitatively improves its economic and strategic bonds with the region. India's interests in the Asia-Pacific are growing and that warrants greater attention being paid to developments in the region.
Recent events suggest a mixed trend as far as regional security in the Asia-Pacific is concerned. The post-Asian financial crisis era, on the one hand, has created enormous political volatility in some countries (the notable is Indonesia) with greater implications for the rest of the region, and also some positive developments, such as the thaw on the Korean Peninsula, on the other. The other major flashpoints, the Taiwan issue and the dispute for the islands in the South China Sea, though yet to be settled, have stopped grabbing the headlines. The region continues to have the largest and most dynamic economies and the competition among the great powers is more palpable today than ever before. The US is strengthening its alliance system; China, accompanied by its phenomenal growth, looms much larger today than at any time in the past; Japan continues to harp on its ambition to become a normal state and play a global role befitting the status of the second largest economic power in the world; and a more confident nuclear India (logging about six per cent growth rates annually) has set clear goals that go beyond the South Asian region.
There are distinct possibilities that a multipolar Asia will see an inevitable clash of interests among the great powers and the competition for influence is most likely to grow in the coming years. This is already visible among the US, China and Japan in Northeast Asia, and Japan, China and India in Southeast Asia. However, as Robert Ross suggests, "The great power rivalry is not necessarily characterised by heightened tensions, wars, and crises", 1 but the uncertainty that is generated will have considerable implications for the rest of the region. It appears that what is needed is the management of intra-great power relations so that the Asia-Pacific region is not subjected to destabilising tendencies.
The issue of Asia-Pacific security has once again preoccupied scholars as well as policy-makers as a consequence of the developments that followed the Asian financial crisis. A major upshot of this crisis is the severe setback the regional institutions have received. They are under fire because there is a growing feeling that they have failed to grapple with the issue they were created for. In particular, the AsEan Regional Forum (ARF), a broad-based framework to address regional security that came into being in 1993, is perceived to be beleaguered with too many contradictions. 2 There are also indications that the great power engagement through the ARF appears to be more to take advantage of the gains that might accrue than a genuine commitment to multilaterism. The issue of "who gains more," thus, has come to the fore clearly. Nor has the engagement of the great powers with each other and their seemingly active participation in the regional multilateral institutions completely dispelled their suspicions about each other.
Even as multilateralism struggles to take roots, it may be imperative to look at the issue of balance of power as a means to maintain regional stability. This is not to suggest that the balance of power approach would alone vouchsafe security in the region, but it is to simply reiterate that its utility has not diminished. It is possible that a combination of balance of power and development of multilateral mechanisms is necessary so that a simultaneous operation of these two would be a better a guarantee of stability in the Asia-Pacific-which seems to be the case at present. The US, in a major change of policy in the early 1990s, has openly come out in support of the creation of a regional institutional mechanism (without giving up its time-tested strategy of deterrence and forward deployment); Japan is the proponent and strongest supporter of such a move, despite initial reservations and scepticism; China has emerged as a strong supporter of the ARF in the recent past; 3 and India for the first time is willing to take an active part in a multilateral security arrangement such as the ARF. The ARF's success is hinged on the backing of these powers, but what is doubtful is whether they will be willing to support multilateralism even at the cost of their interests. Hence, a relook at the balance of power is warranted at this stage for two reasons. One, because of its continued validity and usefulness, and two, more importantly, because India's engagement with the Asia-Pacific is likely to be qualitatively different after the current refurbishment of its Look East policy.
Any discussion on balance of power per se presupposes two things. First, it definitely indicates that the framework of analysis is firmly rooted in the Realist paradigm; and second, it also suggests the marginal influence, if not inexorable irrelevance, of the other prominent perspective in International Relations, that is, the Liberal/Institutionalist perspective. A rider needs to be added that the institutional arrangements are a new phenomenon in Asia and given their nascent stage, it is too early to pass judgement on their ability to successfully manage regional security matters.
The following analysis on India and the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific is premised on three beliefs. One, notwithstanding the clamour for the creation of multilateral institutions in the Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold War era as mechanisms to achieve peace and stability, calculations based on emergent relative capabilities of the great powers and the likely balance among them persist in the academic discourses as well as the policy-making circles. Two, historically the great powers have been instrumental in shaping regional security in Asia. And three, India, given its geopolitical and economic importance as a power marginal and not central to the Asia-Pacific (unlike other great powers of the region), in order to make itself more relevant and significant, may find it has no option but to talk in terms of balance of power so that it figures more prominently. It may be mentioned, however, that the following analysis does not dismiss the salience of current dynamics by way of growing economic interdependence and the avowed faith in multilateral institutional arrangements by a large number of states in the region. Because of the inadequacy of these institutional frameworks as they exist now, they have either not lived up to expectations or are beset with serious shortcomings.
The security order that has dominated the Asia-Pacific region for the last five decades or so is one of bipolarity wherein the two superpowers overwhelmed and dominated the scene. Their all-pervasive nature, and military and economic might left the regional great powers relatively helpless, if not irrelevant, to the extent of their independence of action. A meek attempt by a few other countries that professed "dynamic neutralism" through a non-aligned posture (which manifested itself in a more prominent way at the Afro-Asian Relations or the Bandung Conference in April 1955) was a non-starter. Japan's strategic significance remained as long as it was aligned with the United States, China's with either the former Soviet Union or the US and India's with Moscow. In spite of occasional shifts and turns, the balance of power during the entire Cold War was firmly centred around the superpowers. Washington embarked on a costly intervention in Korea and Vietnam, and Moscow went all out in support of Communist movements, but there is no denying the fact that the Cold War witnessed a fairly stable regional order in the Asia-Pacific. More importantly, it was predictable and transparent. All that changed with the end of the Cold War and the fact that we still use terminology such as post-Cold War, though it has been more than a decade, is symptomatic of the political flux that has set in and the complexity that the region is beset with. Hence, considerable caution is warranted while attempting any analysis of Asia-Pacific security. A major reason that justifies looking at the region from the perspective of balance of power is that the most dominant power in the region, i.e., the US, continues to lay great faith in the bilateral alliance arrangements it had created during the Cold War and that there is no fundamental change in its policies toward the Asia-Pacific.
Balance of Power Theory and Practice
There are many definitions and explanations in the literature on international relations with regard to what exactly the balance of power is and how it operates. 4 While not attempting the seemingly impossible task of deciphering various definitions, meanings and dimensions of the balance of power in this paper, the concept is used in its simplest form: "The nation-states will ensure that no one power is in a position to determine the fate of others." 5 Theoretically, the concept is underpinned by the Realist school which contends that anarchy is the fundamental trait of international relations and that states are in relentless pursuit of the promotion of their national interests. Further, it is held that, come what may, the centrality of the state will not wither away. As opposed to the Institutionalists, so far there is little empirical evidence to suggest that regional institutions could either stop conflicts from breaking out or resolve them. The Realists also argue that such institutions are afflicted from the start by the question of who gains greater benefit from them, and eventually the very survival of a multilateral institution is wholly dependent on the support of the great powers, which generally act toward advancement of their own interests rather than for the common good. Finally, they point out that historically, deterrence and the balance of power approach have had a relatively good track record of maintaining peace and stability. In this view, the key determinants of regional security would be the balance of power and the nature of relations between the great powers, rather than any regional institution. In this perspective, bipolarity is certainly more stable than multipolarity. Hence, the greater need to resort to balance of power in order to bring about a stable order in an inherently unstable, multipolar environment. The principal objective of balance of power is not peace but stability and maintenance of equilibrium by ensuring that the ambitions of any one power or combination of powers are curbed by the combined efforts of others. It needs to be mentioned that the military is an important, but not the sole, instrument in the balance of power. And the attributes of power are not necessarily limited to military power. It fact, as history makes obvious, economic strength goes concomitantly with military strength in order to augment the power of a nation.
The Asia-Pacific Context
It has been argued that Europe's past is Asia's future because Asia has not had the experience of operating in a multipolar environment and, hence, would have to cope with destabilising tendencies for quite some time. In Asia, in the past, the interests of the great powers never really clashed. Nor has Asia developed the kind of mechanisms that evolved in Europe with the aim of ensuring regional stability. Historically, Japan primarily cocooned itself except for a brief period during the 1930s and 1940s when it resorted to military means to spread its influence; China's power did not spread beyond its borders (only Vietnam and Korea were tributaries for longer periods); and Indian civilisational linkages, which spread to much of Southeast Asia still about 13th century, were halted with the ascendance of Muslim rule. There was, moreover, hardly any interaction among the three great powers of Asia. As a result, many middle powers not only survived independently but also asserted themselves on many occasions. In the more recent times, the intra-great power interaction was marred by a clash of interests, wars, and animosity: the 1905 Russia-Japan War, the Japanese occupation of China (and Korea) earlier and of the Southeast Asian region during World War II, the Pacific War involving Japan, the US and Russia, Chinese and US involvement in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, China-India War, etc.
The advent of the Cold War, and that too by two external powers as chief protagonists, set in motion a new balance of power which lasted for more than five decades. The end of the Cold War has not just fundamentally altered this order, but more importantly, brought regional powers to the front in a big way. Unlike in the past, these powers have developed considerable stakes outsides their immediate vicinity and their interests are not necessarily congruous, nor do they have common stakes. Despite entrenched interests and deep involvement, the sole surviving superpower's strategic stakes are not as great as during the Cold War.
The Asian situation is particularly tricky because there is no single common unifying factor that binds the region together-culture, civilisation, religion, language, etc. There is no equitable distribution of wealth nor are the levels of economic development even. There is also no political system that is common to all, such as liberal democracy. In fact, most of the Communist regimes (four out of five) are still alive in Asia, some states are democratic, and many others are either authoritarian or military-ruled. The historical legacies and mutual suspicions about each other, particularly among the great powers, are too obvious to be ignored. This often expresses itself in the form of arms acquisition-though strictly it may not be dubbed as an arms race, a kind of action-reaction phenomenon is certainly evident-or in the rise of strong nationalist feelings. Probably no other region in the world has as many territorial and maritime boundary disputes as the Asia-Pacific. There are many small and weak states, which often tend to be very unstable domestically and vulnerable to external pressures. The level of economic bonds and economic interdependence, particularly among the great powers, is not very high. All these factors are not particularly conducive for the establishment of institutional mechanisms. On the contrary, the enormous, diversity that is the typical characteristic of the region makes it all the more difficult to build a stable regional order based on cooperative engagement.
At the same time, it should be mentioned that today the intra-Asia-Pacific economic interdependence is far greater than at any time in the past, and it continues to grow. The recently created regional institutions will not necessarily fail, but they have a long way to go before they can become effective instruments. Till such time, greater attention may need to be paid to aspects of power balancing as a way to bring about regional stability.
It is against the above backdrop that the Asia-Pacific security is analysed in terms of the dynamics of the emerging security situation. It has been broadly recognised that in Asia, a sub-system of multipolarity is in the making. 6 Thus, what one witnesses today is a quadrangle of great powers with varying degrees of influence, power and interests, and a sizeable number of middle powers. Most analysts contend that Russia, which may be down now, is certainly not out. With enormous conventional and nuclear capabilities and its natural resources, Russia's potential to emerge as a major actor on the Asian scene is undoubted. Moscow's strategic linkages with key Asian countries are strong and they are growing. Nonetheless, from a short to medium-term point of view, Russia's ability to either challenge the preeminent status of the US or considerably influence developments to its advantage is rather limited. That leaves primarily four great powers-the US, Japan, China and India-in the reckoning for analysis in this paper.
The United States
The US belongs to a different category and it is unlikely to be matched by any country in terms of its economic development, its military power, its financial reach, and its control of modern technologies. Given the American predominant position in the Asia-Pacific, its role and policies will, to a large extent, determine the future of Asia-Pacific security.
The American involvement in the Asia-Pacific began in 1853 when Commander Perry forced Japan to end its seclusion policy under the Tokugwa so that its market could be opened for others, which resulted in a radical transformation of Japan. The second incident that led to the American entrenchment was the 1898 America-Spain War and the consequent occupation of the Philippines (and Guam in the Central Pacific). The Pacific War with Japan brought the US closer to the region and the initiation of the Cold War made it the most dominant power, championing the cause of anti-Communism, and as a bulwark against the spread of Soviet influence.
As part of the containment strategy during the Cold War, the US evolved an elaborate strategy by establishing bilateral security alliances, called the San Francisco Alliance System, with a number of key countries of the Asia-Pacific-Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand-and a few other regional military arrangements. For a variety of reasons, the regional pacts such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), which was complemented by the British-led Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), had only limited impact and utility, whereas the bilateral arrangements played a pivotal role in the American policy and strategy. These bilateral arrangements enabled the US to establish base facilities and station a large number of troops in these countries. In fact, the largest overseas American bases were in the Philippines at the Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. Prolonged American involvement, first in Korea and later in Indochina, further bolstered the significance of these arrangements. The backbone of the American strategy, thus, has been forward deployment and bilateral arrangements. 7
With the demise of its principal rival, it appeared that the American presence in the region would face an uncertain future. However, it soon became clear that the American presence was indispensable for the maintenance of regional stability. After overcoming considerable domestic opposition to guaranteeing the security of other nations at enormous cost, a broad consensus was reached in the US that at least about 100,000 troops 8 need to be stationed in some form or the other in the Asia-Pacific in order to maintain regional stability.
By the time the Clinton Administration was voted into power in Washington in 1993, with its liberal image, it appeared that the US would take the process that began with the Nixon Doctrine of 1969 to its logical conclusion, i.e., further reduction of the US military profile in the region. Contrary to the Bush Administration, which castigated the attempts at multilateralism as "solutions in search of a problem", Clinton gave the green light to the formation of new region-wide security institutions, widely perceived to be a clear indication of reduced military presence. It could be surmised that, depending on the progress of multilateralism, America's reliance on its classic strategy of a forward deployed military and a network of bilateral arrangements will undergo a sea change and its strong presence will be transitional in nature. The geopolitical realities and its own interests, however, have compelled the US to remind the region that its presence will continue and its alliances will not be weakened. What needs to be underscored is the repeated reiteration by the US that multilateralism would supplement basic American policy of forward deployment and bilateral alliances but not supplant it. 9
However, recent events suggest that the new phenomenon of restrengthening of the US alliance system is taking place either because of a "hedging strategy" or because of growing scepticism about the effectiveness of multilateralism. It needs to be noted that the rationale for continuation and consolidation of the alliances is that, unlike in the Cold War era, these are no longer threat-based but interest-oriented. In other words, alliances promote bilateral as well as larger regional interests, and are not necessarily directed at anyone. This may be convenient for the sake of argument, but is not convincing otherwise because an alliance cannot survive unless it is based on a real or perceived external threat to the alliance partners.
Probably the most significant among the alliances that have been strengthened is the US-Japan one, in the Review of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation. Undertaken under the auspices of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee that was set up in 1996, the new Guidelines were formally adopted in a joint declaration in 1997. Unlike the 1978 revised Guidelines, the new ones not only encompass a much larger region, but also assign a greater security role for Japan. For instance, one of the aspects that was incorporated related to "cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security." 10 Though it was claimed that this is not "geographical but situational", 11 it has come in for sharp criticism from Beijing, raising doubts about whether these areas would include Taiwan, the South China Sea, etc. Moreover, in a conflict scenario, in addition to using the usual modes of cooperation, Japan's "rear area support" is not confined to Japanese territory, but would extend to the high seas and international air space.
The second pillar on which American's East Asian strategy rests is its alliance with South Korea, which also has been under intense focus, particularly since the historic Korean Summit in June 2000. Judged by the bonhomie that ensued, it appears that an eventual unification of the two Koreas is a distinct possibility. Now the question is, what happens to the 37,000 troops that are based in South Korea, guarding the Demilitarised Zone? There had always been a small vocal groups in South Korea that contended that the US presence was a major impediment in the reunification of the Koreas. Interestingly, contrary to the North Korean rhetoric about US troops in South Korea, there is a remarkable consensus on the desirabitity of their continued presence. 12 Recent reports suggest that North Korea has not only not set the precondition of withdrawal of the American troops preceding unification, but has, in fact, hinted that it would welcome the continued American presence. Reportedly, Kim Jong II told President Kim Dae Jung during the summit that it was "desirable" for US troops to stay on the Korean Peninsula and that he had sent a high level envoy several years ago to tell that to the US. Obviously, both the Koreans and the Americans do not want the Korean Peninsula to come under the influence of any of the regional great powers, China 13 or Japan. It may, thus, be assumed that the US' special relationship with the Korean Peninsula would continue in the foreseeable future.
There are other developments, relatively minor but significant, that further demonstrate that the US alliance system is being restrengthened. Notable among these are, first, the Sydney Statement also called the Joint Communique of Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations of July 31, 1998. Apart from the extension of the treaty governing the Joint Defence Facility at Pine Gap, Australia's crucial role (it is known as the US' southern anchor) in the American East Asian strategy was reiterated and close collaboration in security issues was underscored. 14 Second, is signing of the Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines in January 1998. 15 Though this agreement deals primarily with the legalities regarding the status of US troops while on official duty in the Philippines, its psychological import is much greater on the rest of the region, particularly in the light of the intensified contest for islands in the South China Sea where Manila too has claims. Third, Singapore in early 1998 announced its decision to build a new large naval base called Changi Naval Station which will be available to US naval combatants, and includes a pier which can accommodate American aircraft carriers. 16 Fourth, after the closure of its base facilities in the Philippines in 1992, the US has entered into a series of access agreements and other arrangements with countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. Finally, US plans to merge all four bilateral exercises in the Asia-Pacific into a larger regional one (to be called Team Challenge) starting from 2001, and initiation of a dialogue on Asian security with India (for the first time) are other indicators that further buttress the US alliance system. 17
Whatever justifications the US might give to strengthen its alliance system, seen from a balance of power perspective, it is obvious that there are concerns about the rise of China. No one questions the restraining influence that the American presence has on China, either with regard to the Taiwan issue or concerning the territorial claims in the strategically significant South China Sea. The American presence also ensures that Japan would not acquire undue offensive conventional capability or nuclear weapons, which would drastically shake the equilibrium.
China
As far as China is concerned, most of the analyses paint two scenarios. One, that China, given its vast size, serious ethnic problems in its periphery, and massive uneven economic development between the coastal regions and the hinterland, would invariably plunge into chaos and possibly even disintegrate if the current authoritarian political system continues. The second one gives a positive picture and an optimistic future: China's economic development will continue and the pressures of globalisation will force it to liberalise its economy further which will automatically bring about the necessary political changes. Further, even as China's economic interests grow, its stakes in regional stability will become all the more critical. It is pointed out that China's active participation in the ARF and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and its engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other nations in the region, and, more importantly, greater transparency in its defence and security assessments and outlooks (as manifested in the publication of Defence White Papers in the last few years) are examples that point to China emerging more as a responsible power than a destabiliser. Based on current indications, in all likelihood, China would follow the second scenario. It, however, needs to be recognised that the rise of a great power will have its consequences, and the Asia-Pacific is no exception.
Whichever way one looks at it, China occupies a central place. China is as much a maritime power as it is a continental one. It is a well-established nuclear power with small but proven missilery having short to inter-continental range. More recently, it has effected fundamental changes in its military doctrines and the modernisation of its armed forces is going on apace with generous help from Russia. The military modernisation would appear to be logical and reasonable to protect its growing vital interests but for the fact that China under Communist rule has a dubious history on its external front. China was the chief promoter of Communist insurgencies and movements all across Southeast Asia till the mid-Seventies. And it has been involved in the largest number of wars as well as border and territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific.
Contrary to the Cold War era, the recent times have seen growing differences between Washington and Beijing. The US needs to engage China because of strong economic linkages, trade in particular. Second, the Americans are well aware of China's ability to undermine American strategic interests worldwide: China can hit the US where it hurts the most, i.e., the non-proliferation agenda. Thanks to China, Pakistan today is a nuclear power, and China's ability to create more nuclear capable powers which can impinge on the US' interests the most (in West Asia, for instance) cannot be taken lightly. Third, China's pivotal role in the Asia-Pacific security complex cannot be emphasised enough.
What is more noticeable is the growing assertiveness of China vis-à-vis the Asia-Pacific. It has become more vociferous in denouncing the American dominant position and has been advocating for a multipolar world-meaning essentially the creation of a bipolar world in which China would be the second pole. China's political and economic interaction with Southeast Asia has witnessed spectacular growth. Given Korea's historical abhorrence of Japan, China is likely to gain more if and when the two Koreas are unified. China's credibility went up manifold in the wake of the financial crisis even as Beijing openly committed not to devalue its currency. Moreover, from total reluctance, China has emerged as a major supporter of the ASEAN-led ARF.
By any yardstick, China's diplomacy is a success story in the Asia-Pacific and all indications are that China would emerge as the most dominant and influential power of the region but for America's presence and recent policy of restrengthening of its alliance system. There are concerns that if the US goes ahead with plans to build the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system, it might trigger off an arms race in the region. 18 China has time and time again openly castigated the US for its "Cold War mentality" and asserted that "military alliances are the biggest obstacles to building a genuine cooperative security framework in a multipolar world." 19 At the 1999 ARF meeting, China's foreign minister explicitly stated: "The tendencies of strengthening military alliances and stressing intervention that go against the historical trends are growing... To strengthen military alliances and engage in armament expansion will only aggravate distrust among nations, bring about new instabilities, and even generate confrontation." 20 Notwithstanding these reservations, China is probably aiming to create a bipolar regional order in the Asia-Pacific in which Beijing and Washington would be dominant players. In the longer run, it will favour China because the chances of America gradually reducing its military profile appear to be far greater as the Koreas start interacting more closely, and as opposition to American forces grows in Japan.
American (and Japanese) concerns stem from the fact that China's strategic depth is considerable. China has begun to emerge not only as a continental power of Asia but as a maritime power too, for the American maritime interests in the region are crucial. Perhaps that is why the US' China policy is termed as "congagement"-a combination of containment and engagement. America would also have the crucial role of balancing Chinese and Japanese interests in the Asia-Pacific. Japan too is concerned because it would have to contend with China for influence in the region. India obviously would not want a China-dominated Asia-Pacific.
Japan
Unlike China, Japan lacks strategic autonomy. Its military is highly defensive oriented and the chances of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons are remote. The alliance partnership with the US is the cornerstone of the Japanese strategic outlook. That alliance, however, has been under considerable strain in the aftermath of the Cold War, as issues of trade have started influencing American policies. There are a number of reasons why Japan faces much greater strategic uncertainty today than at any time earlier. One, Japan would have to overcome enormous public opposition within the country to acquire the wherewithal to be able to project power. Given the turmoil that the domestic politics has been undergoing, this is not an easy proposition. Two, for the first time in several centuries, there is the rise of a regional great power in its neighbourhood. Three, despite its enormous contribution to the prosperity of the rest of the Asia-Pacific region, there are lingering suspicions about Japan's ambitions because of its historical baggage. Four, the post-Cold War strategic environment poses greater challenges to Japan than the fairly straightforward equations of the Cold War. China has emerged as a pivotal factor in the regional security and the developments on the Korean Peninsula with or without unification do not appear to be very favourable to Japan. Five, five decades of pacification under the American protective shelter may have deprived Japan of the will to acquire and exercise power. Six, continued depressive economic conditions might dampen its earlier enthusiasm to become a "normal" state and ascribe for itself a suitable place and role befitting its economic strength. Finally, Japanese policies appear to be slow, reactive, and narrowly confined. They have failed to look at, and explore, a number of other possibilities that would bolster its position. 21
Japan also has certain successes to its credit, and advantages to offset other shortcomings to an extent. It continues to be a major economic engine that powers the rest of the region, its economic presence is formidable, and its technological superiority is unparalled. Japan's attempts to play a bigger political role through the UN by way of participation in peace-keeping operations have been fairly successful in terms of its political objectives. It was originally Japan's idea to create a multilateral framework for security in the Asia-Pacific, which fructified in the form of the ARF. It has also shown signs of political assertiveness at times, such as warning China to end its repeated violations of Japan's maritime zone. There are also signs that Japan would bolster its military capabilities to guard its interests. Japan has approved to spend about 90 billion yen to acquire four in-flight refuelling aircraft, which will provide "its aircraft the ability to fight deep inside a neighbour's airspace." The five- year defence acquisition plans had also suggested that it "acquire advanced missile-defence systems, long-range transport aircraft and large helicopter carrying ships, as well as to form an air-transportable brigade. Each component would subtly shift Japan's military capability further from its purely 'defensive defence' posture to that of a more conventional national military force." 22
India
It may be useful to mention a few things on India's security practice. After Nehru's brief stint with his romantic notion of building an alternative paradigm of "dynamic neutralism" (which later became the so-called Non-Aligned Movement), India has been a quintessential practitioner of the balance of power, and the Realist thinking dominated its security and foreign policy-making. Most notable examples are India's attempt to get closer to the superpowers in the immediate aftermath of the war with China-though it was successful only with the former Soviet Union-the signing of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty, its intervention in East Pakistan, the dogged persistence with the nuclear programme, recognition of Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia (the only non-Communist country to do so), acquiescing to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, etc. Specifically with regard to the Asia-Pacific, India has made an about-turn in its policies. While earlier it vehemently opposed any multilateral effort in the security arena, India today is actively participating in the ARF and is striving hard to build strong strategic and economic linkages with a number of Southeast Asian countries, and with Japan to a limited extent. India's Look East policy is a diplomatic success story and India is likely to further strengthen its links with the Asia-Pacific.
India has certain disadvantages as well as advantages to be a power of consequence in the Asia-Pacific region. One, unlike the other three great powers, India's involvement in the region has been minimal. Two, geographically India is on the periphery. Three, India's political, economic and strategic linkages with the rest of the Asia-Pacific are weak. Four, India's Look East policy of engagement with the region has not been satisfactory-more often it appears tentative rather than rooted in long-term strategy and planning. Five, India has failed to spell out its interests, concerns and strategic stakes lucidly, which often results in considerable confusion, especially in Southeast Asia. Finally, India has failed to dispel the perception that it is obsessed with Pakistan.
India's advantageous position is because its involvement, however insignificant it may be, has always been benign. Unlike China and Japan, it does not have to worry about its past. Second, India has always supported any regional move that was aimed at peace and stability-ASEAN's creation, for instance-and opposed Cold War alliance politics. India never perceived a threat emanating from the Asia-Pacific (except China) nor did it ever pose a threat to any country. India's defence capabilities are formidable (its navy is the largest in the Indian Ocean littoral) and its economy is one of the fastest growing. It is the only country in the region that can match China in terms of size and military power. In a major shift, India acquiesced to support the ARF multilateral initiative. Because of these reasons, India is uniquely placed to play a significant role in the Asia-Pacific balance of power. The recent period has witnessed a rapid growth in Indian interests-economic, political, and strategic-and there is a growing realisation that developments in the Asia-Pacific do impinge on Indian interests. Hence, one can expect India to pay greater attention to this region in the coming years.
Some Scenarios
In view of the complexity that is endemic to the Asia-Pacific, a scenario-building exercise is fraught with problems. However, if an attempt were to be made, based on currently available indications, the following are some likely scenarios. First, the US will continue, and qualitatively improve, its commitment through its presence and by strengthening its alliance system continuously so that its dominant position remains unchallenged. The US would come up with something like the TMD to overcome domestic opposition to American troops' presence in countries such as Japan and South Korea, to further cement bilateral ties. This, however, would invariably result in China feeling encircled and constrained and, because of its inability to match the US and its allies, it would seek to build an alternative coalition of forces opposed to the US. Russia has already proposed a China-Russia-India strategic partnership and both China and India have not so far dismissed that idea outright, though New Delhi will continue to be wary of Beijing. Second, the US would gradually reduce its presence, essentially leaving Japan and China in the field. In this, the US (and possibly even India) would act as a balancing power. Third, increasing American reluctance to get involved in Asian conflicts will bring Japan and India closer as a countervailing force to the rise of China. Four, the Asia-Pacific region would become two broad spheres of influence: Northeast Asia under China, and Southeast Asia under India, in which Japan will become increasingly irrelevant because it will not be able to match China in nuclear, missile and conventional capability. Five, the ASEAN-led cooperative mechanism would accommodate the interests of the great powers in such a way that they would not end up in turf battles. In this scenario, it is not to suggest that a framework such as the ARF will become a genuine institutional mechanism, but that it would perforce undertake the task of power balancing under the guise of multilateralism.
Conclusion
The post-Cold War events are a mixed bag and the overall strategic uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific is unmistakable. The euphoria about the ARF-led multilateralism appears to be on the wane, thus, giving rise to rethinking about balance of power as a tool to analyse the security environment in the region. An obvious sign is the emergence of a quadrangular sub-system of multipolarity of great powers in the Asia-Pacific and its crucial role in shaping the regional security. Given the peculiarity of the region as the most diverse in the world, and an environment of a large number of small and medium powers, balance of power may help in the establishment of stability and equilibrium. It is likely that both traditional power balancing and development of cooperative multilateral security mechanisms would go hand in hand for quite some time till these mechanisms become either effective or totally redundant.
The US as the most important player has not shown any indication of a radical departure from its earlier strategy based on bilateral alliances and forward deployment. The support to the ARF is limited to the extent that it supplements, not supplants, the established policy. Evidence, in fact, suggests that American interests in the Asia-Pacific are growing more rapidly than in any other region, and the US alliance system is being strengthened. The US is seen as a major stabilising factor in the region's security due to its dominant position and its general reputation as a benign hegemon. At the same time, there is a big question mark on how long the US will be willing to extend its unequivocal commitment.
Within the region, China and Japan are the major contenders for the leadership role. China is the fastest growing power in the world and sees itself as a candidate for the position of a superpower. China looks at recent American policies, especially the Revised Defence Guidelines with Japan and plans to build a TMD system in Northeast Asia as attempts aimed at containment of China. Japan, on the other hand, not only lacks strategic autonomy (and strategic depth), but also has to live with the fact that there is the rise of a major power in its neighbourhood and the growth of that power's influence is at the cost of Japanese interests. In the light of the growing interests of these two powers in the Asia-Pacific, the US would have to play a delicate balancing role. India is the odd man out as far as the Asia-Pacific security is concerned. Its limited involvement and its geographic periphery offer a peculiar role for India. It can emerge as one of the important poles provided it qualitatively improves its economic and strategic bonds with the region. India's capability to counter-balance China is recognised, but its policies should not be centred on the narrow confines of this perception. India's interests are growing and that warrants greater attention to the developments in the Asia-Pacific.
Endnotes
Note *: G.V.C. Naidu, Research FellowBack
Note 1: Robert Ross, "The Geography of the Peace", International Security, vol. 23, no. 4, Spring 1999, p. 81. Back
Note 2: These are the continuation of bilateral alliances, especially between the US and a number of regional powers, the uncertainty about China's commitment to multilateralism, the tenuous nature of security issues between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, the dynamics of intra-great power relationship, ASEAN's leadership, and the tardy progress on confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy. These aspects have been dealt with in detail in G.V.C. Naidu, Multilateralism and Regional Security: Can the ASEAN Regional Forum Really Make a Difference? Analysis from East-West Centre 45 (Honolulu: East-West Centre, August 2000). Back
Note 3: Probably because of the ARF, China has started publishing Defence White Papers and has shown moderation in its attitude, especially toward the South China Sea dispute. Back
Note 4: For a comprehensive analysis of the concept from a historical viewpoint, see the chapter "The Meaning of the Balance of Power" in Michael Sheehan, Balance of Power: History and Theory (London: Routledge, 1996). Back
Note 5: Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (London: Macmillan Press, 1977) quoted in Paul Dibb, Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia, Adelhi Paper No 295 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995), p. 6. Back
Note 6: Thomas Berger, for instance, argues that, contrary to the general perception of the existence of a multipolar Asia, "in terms of the distribution of actual capabilities, it is decidedly unipolar." Thomas Berger, "Set for Stability? Prospects for Conflict and Cooperation in East Asia", Review of International Studies, vol. 26, no. 3, July 2000, p. 411. Back
Note 7: It is not that the US has had smooth sailing to pursue its strategy through the alliance system. SEATO had to be wound up after the Indochina victories in the mid-Seventies and with that the base facilities in Thailand were also closed down. After the end of the Cold War, the US firstly scaled down the scope of its arrangements with Australia, and the Australia New Zealand United States (ANZUS) pact faced its worst crisis when New Zealand virtually withdrew in 1984. The largest US bases outside its territory in the Philippines were vacated in the wake of strong nationalist sentiments in 1992. Back
Note 8: These troops are principally deployed in Japan, Korea, Guam, and Diego Garcia. These forces include the 7th Fleet, 8th US Army, III Marine Expeditionary Force, 5th Air Force, 7th Air Force, 13th Air Force, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) and other joint special operations forces, maritime prepositioned ships, and army and air force prepositioned stocks. Adm Joseph W. Prueher's CINCPAC Testimony on Pacific Security to the US Congressional Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, May 7, 1998. Back
Note 9: See, for instance, The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia and Pacific Region, 1998 (Washington: Department of Defence, 1998) Back
Note 10: See The Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation. Back
Note 11: Ibid., Section V of the Guidelines. Back
Note 12: "Pyongang Wants US Troops to Stay", International Herald Tribune, August 30, 2000. Back
Note 13: According to an Agence France Presse report, an editorial in the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) People Liberation Army Daily stated that the stationing of US troops in the Republic of Korea (ROK) is the biggest obstacle to the reunification of the Korean Peninsula, and the key to maintaining US hegemony in East Asia. The paper noted: "The Korean Peninsula is the heart of Northeast Asia and its strategic importance is obvious; to control the Korean Peninsula is to tightly grasp hold of Northeast Asia. With the end of the Cold War, and especially with the cooling down of the tense situation on the Korean Peninsula in recent years, the US military presence in South Korea is out of sync with the times." It continued that US interest in maintaining troops in the ROK is the key to the US' post-Cold War ambitions of strengthening its position as the world's only remaining superpower capable "of fighting two major regional wars at once." It added: "If the United States removes its troops from South Korea as relations between North and South Korea improve, then it would be even more difficult to find a reason to maintain troops in Japan and the so-called 'Europe-Asia strategy' would lose one of its wings. Because of this, and even though maintaining troops in South Korea is incompatible with the times, it is certain that the troops will not leave." The editorial was seen as the first article advocating the removal of US troops from the ROK since the inter-Korean Summit in June. http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/index.html, July 10, 2000. Back
Note 14: See Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations: Joint Communique. Back
Note 15: For the full text of the agreement, see http://www.usia.gov/abtusia/posts/RPI/wwwh 102.5.html Back
Note 16: See US Security Strategy for the East Asia and Pacific Region, 1998. Singapore also hosts about 200 US Marines on a rotation basis and offers its air facilities for the US aircraft. Back
Note 17: For instance, according to the joint US-India communique, issued at the end of the President Clinton's visit to India in March 2000, "a dialogue on Asian security will be conducted as part of the Foreign Office consultations." See US-India Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century. Back
Note 18: Michael Richardson, "Asia-Pacific Fears Arms Race From Bush Policies Toward China", International Herald Tribune, January 25, 2001. Back
Note 19: Zhu Liqun, "Cooperative Security and China's Stand", Foreign Affairs Journal, December 1999, pp. 33-43. Back
Note 20: See Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaduan's address to the ARF on July 26, 1999. Back
Note 21: One prominent example is its relations with India. In the absence of a clash of interests, Japan and India should have been friendlier than the current state of affairs indicates. Back
Note 22: Charles Bickers, "Extending Tokyo's Reach," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 18, 2001. Back