Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA

July 2001 (Vol. XXV No. 4)

 

Light Weapons Diffusion and Security:
Towards a Conceptual Understanding
By Ajay Darshan Behera _*

 

Abstract

The diffusion of light weapons in the post-Cold War period has become an important issue in the study of the security of the developing countries. The dominant security dilemma for the developing countries still constitutes their incipient stages of nation and state building, but for some it has been heightened by the emergence of new factors like the diffusion of light weapons since the end of the Cold War. These weapons are playing an increasingly important role in destabilising states and endangering civil society; they have the potential to fuel conflicts or even promote the process of state breakdown. Superpower policies of pouring arms into fragmented polities during the Cold War years has, thus, become a major source of insecurity for a large number of developing countries in the post-Cold War period.

The problem of the uncontrolled spread of light weapons and the security dimensions arising therefrom have come to receive considerable attention in the post-Cold War era. However, does this issue constitute an independent subject of inquiry in insecurity analysis? There are certain complexities in understanding this question. The primary problem has been that the issue of light weapons cannot be completely delinked from an understanding of armed conflicts and terrorism. These are major causes for instability and disorder in large parts of the developing world. Light weapons are merely tools in such complex societal processes.

The end of the Cold War has removed the dominant overlay of global rivalries from Third World conflicts, but, at the same time, this fundamental change in the world order does not seem to have had much of an impact on a large number of regional and intra-state conflicts. The détente at the global level is paralleled by intense violent conflicts at the domestic level in many parts of the developing world. Ethnic and civil strife threatens stability in many regions of the world and still constitutes the dominant security dilemma of most developing states. Some of these conflicts have developed an autonomy of their own, and continue to simmer, if not intensify. Obviously, a plethora of new factors seems to impact on, and determine, the course of conflicts in the developing world. Amongst these, one of the important factors that feeds and fuels these conflicts is not major weapon systems but the category of weapons known as light weapons.

This paper argues that the issue of light weapons cannot be understood without a corresponding understanding of armed conflicts and terrorism in general. While most conflicts in the developing world have domestic roots, during the Cold War, their course and intensity were determined by superpower rivalry and big power confrontation. Today, bereft of the ideological support, conflicts and terrorism have found new motivations and supporting structures. The security dilemma of the Third World nations still comes about from their incipient stages of state and nation building, but has been further complicated by the emergence of new factors that have been confronting them since the end of the Cold War. The disintegration of ideological blocs and the rampaging forces of globalisation have presented new security threats, enabled by the emergence of de-ideologised supporting structures. The easy availability of light weapons and their illegal trade that is often linked to contraband-specifically narcotics trafficking, organised crime, and the emergence of reactionary religious extremist ideologies-pose serious security challenges to the developing world. The issue of light weapons is only one amongst a host of new threats, but its potential to cause instability and disintegration of states and civil society is enormous. Therefore, it is important that a discourse is built around the issue of light weapons and security in all its facets.

The uncontrolled spread and the associated illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons is not a new phenomenon in itself, but has acquired new dimensions with the end of the Cold War. Today, it has to be recognised that such weapons are a major cause of instability in large parts of the world. So far, the issue of light weapons has received considerable attention as has the landmines issue-predominantly within advocacy groups. During the Cold War period, which was characterised by a race in the development of major weapon systems and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their transfer in a qualified context to regional allies, security analysts were focussed on this phenomenon as a major cause of insecurity, disregarding a simultaneous process of wide-scale uncontrolled spread of light weapons in large parts of the world. But the issue of light weapons is a much more dynamic problem, meriting serious attention from scholars. All the facets of this problem are yet to be understood. Though considerable research has been devoted to the dynamics of the international trade in light weapons, there is yet to develop an understanding of the way in which they affect the security of states and civil societies of the developing countries. This paper attempts to evolve a conceptual understanding of the linkages between light weapons diffusion and the security of the developing countries.

Defining and Characterising Light Weapons

The terms small arms and light weapons-often used co-terminously-have come into common use in recent years. It is important to understand what they refer to and what is the distinction, if any, between the two terms. A universal and commonly accepted definition as well as classification of light weapons has yet to develop. There is, however, a general understanding about what light weapons are-an understanding that has been undergoing changes over the years. This is largely a consequence of advances in military technology which, on the one hand, has made many man-portable weapons much lighter and smaller, and, on the other, increasingly more accurate at longer ranges, with a substantive increase in their lethality and rates of fire. Light weapons refer basically to weapons that can be carried by an individual or a few individuals. A larger number of such light weapons are comparable to medium weapons in terms of their capability and effectiveness.

Light weapons is an inclusive term which includes small arms and many other weapons that are man-portable and capable of inflicting severe casualties and destruction, for example, landmines, specifically anti-personnel, and high explosives like the RDX and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that are increasingly being used in irregular conflicts. The real seriousness of the problem of the spread of small arms and light weapons lies in the increased technological sophistication that has greatly enhanced their lethality, accuracy and effective range. There have been tremendous improvements through the processes of leap-frogging technology: the bolt action rifles of World War II have now been replaced by automatic assault rifles-mostly the AK-47-which are capable of releasing bullets at rates of fire of around 600 rounds per minute. ₁

A majority of these weapons are low-tech, inexpensive, sturdy and easy to use. Unlike major weapons, light weapons do not require any complex organisational, logistical, or training capacities to maintain and operate. That is why they are affordable and usable by a large number of users. In terms of their targetting capabilities or expanse, they comprise both point target weapons like revolvers, rifles and machine guns for human targets, as well as area target weapons like grenades, flame throwers and mortars for both human and material targets. They are sturdy with a long shelf life making it possible for them to be circulated from one conflict to another. ₂ Further, their light weight and small size make these weapons easy to conceal and smuggle. Thus, light weapons have become the preferred equipment of the armed forces of many poor countries, guerillas and other sub-state groups. ₃

Conceptualising the Spread of Light Weapons

The easy availability or unrestricted flow of light weapons is referred to as the "proliferation" or "diffusion" process. It would be useful to examine the meaning, differentiation and various nuances of the two terms.

The term proliferation suggests an increase in the number of weapons possessed by certain governments or in the number of states possessing a particular weapon system. It could also imply a great and rapid increase in the numbers of particular weapons into a given area. During the Cold War, the pattern of arms trade essentially involved transfer of arms and technology from a handful of major industrial powers (the US, USSR, France, Britain, Germany, Italy and China) to an ever-increasing number of developing countries. Michael Klare has defined this as the proliferation/arms race model. ₄ However, in the post-Cold War period, significant changes in the pattern of the arms trade point to indicators where the term proliferation seems to be a much more restrictive one for the phenomenon of the spread of small arms and light weapons. Unlike the nuclear issue where the term proliferation pertains mainly to the ability of states to acquire nuclear technology and weapons, ₅ the question concerning light weapons is not only one of the ability of states but also of all kinds of non-state actors to procure them.

The term diffusion suggests the spread of light weapons throughout the world and at all levels of society through multiple channels. It implies dispersion and recirculation of light weapons, extending not only to governments and states but also to non-state actors such as insurgent and militant groups, private armies, criminal organisations and ordinary citizens. Diffusion is, therefore, a process whereby such weapons enter and penetrate states and societies. The lateral dispersal of weapons could be by design (covert war by state intelligence agencies or individual sales) or accident (theft or loss). Often this process is set in motion in specific geographically demarcated areas as limited proliferation but eventually ends up as global diffusion.

There is a certain dynamism linked to light weapons-how they percolate down to society and are regulated by the demand and supply principles and the dynamics of the illegal arms market. This process of diffusion involves a much larger universe of suppliers, recipients and supply routes, including governments and state-owned enterprises and smaller and medium-sized firms, private brokers and distributors, insurgents and separatist forces and black market operators.

The Impact of Light Weapons

The arms trade in the post-Cold War period has adapted to the changing realities in finding new markets to meet the new requirements for light weapons, best suited to low-intensity conflicts. But the introduction of such weapons in low-intensity conflicts that most developing countries are involved in, has played an increasingly important role in destabilising states and endangering civil society in large parts of the developing world. The portable nature of these weapons and their tremendous firepower have contributed to the intensity and duration of ethnic and other intra-state conflicts. The level of destruction caused by these weapons in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chechnya, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia is quite self-evident.

The impact of the diffusion of light weapons on the state and society has been eloquently expressed in the preamble of the proposed Southern African Regional Action Programme on Light Weapons and Illicit Arms Trafficking:

Although they do not in themselves cause the conflicts and criminal activities in which they are used, the wide availability, accumulation and illicit flows of such weapons tend to escalate conflicts; undermine peace agreements; intensify violence and the impacts of crime in society; impede economic and social development; and impede the development of social stability, democracy and good governance. ₆

The anxieties regarding the diffusion of light weapons are well founded as they appear to be the common factor in all states in the grip of turmoil, instability and even civil war-Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Somalia, and so on. The easy availability and accumulation of light weapons has become an important factor in armed conflicts, societal violence, organised crime, drug trafficking, and in sustaining terrorist and subversive groups, thus, contributing to both domestic and regional instability.

Changing Nature of Conflict and Light Weapons

In order to understand the co-relation between light weapons and security, it is important to first examine the changing nature of conflict and the trends in conflict pattern, particularly after the Cold War. Over the years, the nature of warfare has drastically changed due to the compulsions of forbidding costs of resources and manpower and, perhaps, nuclear deterrence as well. Increasingly, armed conflicts are taking place at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Since wars at the lower end of the conflict spectrum employ mostly small arms and light weapons, this shift also implies, among other things, that small arms and light weapons have been playing an increasing role in conficts.

Many conflicts in the developing world and their supply lines of arms have a Cold War lineage. The strategic logic of the development of nuclear and conventional deterrence between the superpower-led military alliances had shifted the Cold War confrontation to proxy wars in the Third World. In order to secure a favourable balance of power and strategic advantages through small, manageable proxy wars in the strategically important regions of the world, the superpowers had encouraged not only surrogate and supportive states, but also militant and rebellious groups. ₇

The proxy wars gained their own dynamism and momentum, and the retreat of their mentors at the end of the Cold War has made no material difference to some conflict situations such as in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Angola. The stockpiles of sophisticated weaponry amassed by the Cold War warriors and their proxies are now being used to carry out diverse struggles for power along ethnic, religious, or ideological lines. Over 75 per cent of all warfare since 1945 has been internal-not between existing states. And the end of the Cold War has made this dominance even more complete. Every year since 1991, there have been at least 10 internal conflicts around the world, each of which caused 10,000 deaths or more. ₈ In 1991, there were 25 major armed conflicts going on in the world. ₉ Angola, Bosnia, Liberia, and Rwanda are some such examples.

It has to be recognised that the increased availability of light weapons does not cause the intra-state conflicts in the developing world. The causes lie in complex social and historical distortions, mismanagement, the failure of state-building processes, unequal distribution of developmental gains or the absence of such benefits, and ideological or political orientations of groups. But evidence suggests that the abundance of arms in society can accelerate the momentum towards conflict, and political dissent can rapidly take a violent turn. Afghanistan is a prototype of a case where the increased availability of light weapons has prolonged the conflict and made the conflict resistant to resolution.

The risk of explosive violence is highest when the diffusion of arms coincides with the fragmentation of societies along ethnic, religious, tribal, caste and linguistic lines. With growing competition and antagonism between social groups, the easy availability of arms increases the possibility that deeply held resentments and differences may end up in violent confrontations. This is evident in such diverse settings as Afghanistan, Angola, Lebanon, Bosnia, Colombia, Haiti, Kashmir, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia and Sri Lanka.

Light weapons provide a low cost, high pay-off solution to pursuing the use of armed force for political purposes. In fact, some states such as Pakistan, are using proxy war as a cheaper and viable option to direct military confrontation. Often, the security forces of the state and armies are finding that their equipment is no match for the lethal light weapons at the disposal of non-state actors. Also, the process of reequipping the former with weapons of similar capabilities has been a rather slow one as compared to the versatility of the non-state actors in procuring light weapons from the 'black' and 'grey' markets or with support from friendly countries.

Another important trend to be noticed is that the density of conflict and light weapons is inversely proportional to the distance from the borders-empirical evidence suggests this. There is a preponderance of weapons in conflict zones closer to international borders. In the case of Afghanistan, the bulk of the fighting, between the Soviet-backed government forces and the Mujahideen, took place in the Kandahar-Khost-Jalalabad region adjoining Pakistan. ₁₀ Likewise, protracted conflicts and strong insurgencies in the South Asian states have been located in the bordering zones: Baluchistan in Pakistan; Punjab, Kashmir and the northeastern states in India; the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) insurgency in Sri Lanka; and the Chakma insurgency in Bangladesh. The Maoist insurgency in Nepal is an exception in this regard. This shows that conflicts in bordering zones can take the shape of violent insurgencies because of the easy accessibility of light weapons to these zones.

Finally, the changing nature of warfare has encompassed civilian populations as well. Warfare has permeated societies and battle groups have emerged within the population. A significant trend has been that wars that earlier used to be counter-state have now become counter-society. An estimated 90 per cent of the victims of contemporary civil wars and internal conflicts are civilians. The consequences and impact of light weapons have been diverse, affecting various sectors of the society. There are certain spillover effects of the diffusion of light weapons in society such as their spread to private hands in post-conflict scenarios, increase in lawlessness and criminal activity, displacement of populations and creation of refugee populations, and retarded economic development.

Implications for Security

The issue of light weapons diffusion had not merited serious consideration in terms of its implications for security, till less than a decade ago. The term itself was somewhat unknown in policy-making structures and barely understood in terms of its far-reaching implications for instability and violence. While scholars and policy-makers were seized with the problems of nuclear proliferation and the spread of ballistic missile technologies, the intra-state conflicts, insurgencies and consequent violence continued unabated, exacerbated primarily by an unprecedented spread of light weapons in the hands of non-state actors. These conflicts have extracted a heavy toll in terms of human life and threats to state structures. In order to fully understand the implications of the light weapons issue for security analysis, it is important to first examine the changing dimensions and characteristics of the concept of security itself.

Security Dilemma of Developing States

Traditionally, the concept of security was defined as the security of the state vis-à-vis external threats, that is, aggressive activities of other states. ₁₁ With a general emphasis on the state as the unit of analysis, security was perceived in terms of the ability and capacity to preserve the "minimum core values of the state" ₁₂ such as territorial intergrity, independence and sovereignty. For most developing states, however, the main threat to security emanates from within its borders rather than outside. The fundamental problem confronted by them is internal subversion and the possibilities of territorial dismemberment threatening its very existence as a cohesive political entity. This security predicament arises from the fact that the process of forging loyalty to the state is still at an early stage. Most developing societies are fragmented along ethnic, religious and linguistic lines, and the regimes in power usually lack the support of some significant component of the population. The legacies of colonial rule had left the political, economic and social structures of such states weak and divisive. This was exacerbated by the pressures to complete the state making enterprise-a process completed over centuries by the European states-within a very short time-frame. In contrast to the industrialisation of the older and advanced Western states, development in the developing states is expected to take place before the unity of the nation has been attained. The demands for political participation, welfare, as well as more equitable distribution of economic resources by the general populace further complicate the process of state-making, leading to conflicts. ₁₃ The patterns of economic development in the developing countries have also intensified both class and regional inequalities and as a result, many states have failed to create a domestic political and societal consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force. ₁₄ Lack of unconditional legitimacy to the existence and security interests of the regimes has resulted in violent contestations. ₁₅ Furthermore, international support for the concept of self-determination tends to provide legitimacy to the violent struggles of secessionist groups. ₁₆ While states are censured severely for human rights violations, the terrorist acts of secessionist groups are mostly overlooked or receive only mild opprobrium.

The eruption of violent ethno-national movements and the pervasiveness of violence result in erosion of the sovereignty of the state due to the loss of control over the traditional monopoly over violence and territory. There is also erosion in the legitimacy of the state when political institutions are unable to provide the minimum order, and when the state fails to provide security to its citizens who may no longer perceive the central government as a manager of conflicts. ₁₇ In such circumstances, the diffusion of light weapons can promote the process of state breakdown by fuelling conflicts or by accelerating a trend towards insurgency and guerilla warfare.

In some situations, it has contributed to the degeneration of some quasi-states into failed states, that is, a combination of juridically sovereign but empirically non-functioning central authority. This is especially true of the states that had witnessed high levels of superpower military involvement during the Cold War when both the United States and the Soviet Union attempted to shore up client governments in internally fragmented societies in order to maintain a semblance of stability in countries that were their allies. One major instrument of this support was the transfer of large quantities of relatively sophisticated arms to friendly countries. Such arms transfers frequently led to countervailing transfers of weapons by the rival superpower to forces opposed to the ruling regime. During the 1980s, Afghanistan epitomised this action-reaction phenomenon.

The superpowers' policies of pouring arms into fragmented polities during the Cold War years have become a major source of instability and disorder in the post-Cold War period. The collapse of the state structure and consequent disorder is most glaringly evident in the cases of Afghanistan and Somalia. As Jeffrey Clark points out: "Today the prevalence of modern weapons, Somalia's most significant legacy of superpower involvement during the Cold War, has undermined the very foundation for order in Somalia's society-the authority of clan elders." ₁₈ He adds:

The presence of large quantities of sophisticated weaponry, ranging from AK-47s to Stinger missiles, combined with the withdrawal of superpower support to weak regimes-support that prevented the central authorities from being overwhelmed by domestic rivals who, in turn, were divided among themselves-has created near total anarchy in countries such as Afghanistan and Somalia. In these places, central authority is completely collapsed, turning these quasi-states into failed states. ₁₉

The Afghan, Somali, Lebanese, Liberian and Zairian experiences demonstrate clearly that such failed states are a major source of suffering and disorder in the developing world. Such developments in a particular country, where the state has failed or collapsed also has a reverberating impact on the surrounding region and possibly on the entire international system, leading to regional and international instability.

Light Weapons, Globalisation and Transnational Security Threats

A clear dichotomy between internal and external security in security analysis is incomplete not only due to their closely inter-linked character as discussed above but also due to the enhanced nature of transnational threats which have been accentuated due to the globalisation process. The globalisation of the world economy pertains to the liberalisation of trade, free flow of capital and internationalisation of banking and production. The transnational networks, thus, created have the potential to generate wealth and promote peace and cooperation. On the other hand, globalisation has contributed to creating the framework and conditions in which localised conflicts have become more violent-it is providing new opportunities, capabilities and incentives for transnational actors to trade in small arms and light weapons, and increased illicit trafficking of narcotics and coordination of terrorist activities. Advances in communications and transportation have tremendously improved the means and the speed with which weapons are transferred. The emergence of transnational financial and commercial institutions has been exploited and used to create a sophisticated black market in arms and illegal goods, making the concealment of illicit exchange of goods and money an easier task for governments as well as non-governmental groups. Together, these developments have lowered the price of light weapons and made them more easily available to a larger number of consumer groups. The global economy enables transnational actors to evade national restrictions and regulations. Given the fluid and mobile nature of global investment and distribution networks, laundering of drug money and distribution of arms and drugs have become easier.

Many contemporary threats resulting from factors such as light weapons diffusion, drug trafficking, money laundering and terrorism are, thus, transnational in character. They cross state borders and generally cannot always be linked to the foreign policies or behaviour of other states. Rather than being created and controlled by national governments, threats from such transnational actors are situated in a complex dynamic and global web created by modern communication, transportation and information technologies. This web allows a vast array of incentives, opportunities and capabilities to individuals and groups whose activities, intentionally or not, can threaten the core values of national security-territorial integrity and political independence, preservation of the well-being, freedom and prosperity of citizens and national culture. ₂₀ It does so by enhancing the ability of non-state actors to operate beyond the limits of governmental control and by undermining the ability of governments to protect their societies from the negative consequences of such transnational activity.

Transnational threats are no longer peripheral security concerns; rather, they challenge the vital interests of the states. The sources of these threats blur the erstwhile clear lines dividing the domestic and international spheres, and they are relatively impervious to traditional state-centric techniques for providing security.

Conclusion

The diffusion of light weapons in the post-Cold War period has become an important issue in the study of the security of the developing world. These states are characterised by instability and disorder, and some are faced with intense violent conflicts. Though the end of the Cold War has removed the dominant overlay of global rivalries from developing world conflicts, new factors like the diffusion of light weapons seem to impact on, and determine, the course of these conflicts and, consequently, undermine security. The security dilemma for these states flows from their incipient stages of nation and state building, heightened by the emergence of new factors like the diffusion of light weapons since the end of the Cold War. The diffusion of light weapons is only one amongst a host of new threats to the developing world.

The arms trade in the post-Cold War period has adapted to the changing realities in finding new markets. The introduction of sophisticated light weapons in low intensity conflicts in the developing world has played an increasingly important role in destabilising states and endangering civil society. These weapons have contributed to the intensity and duration of ethnic and other intra-state conflicts. If such situations lead to the erosion of the legitimacy of the state or the failure of the state to provide security to its citizens, the diffusion of light weapons can accelerate the process of state breakdown by fuelling conflicts and insurgency. Thus, the superpowers' policies of pouring arms into fragmented polities during the Cold War years have become a major source of insecurity for these states. The security dilemma for the multi-ethnic developing states is this relationship between light weapons diffusion and the propensity for armed violence. Light weapons are not the cause of conflicts but comprise a major factor in instability and the consequent violence. States are finding it increasingly difficult to cope with the uncontrolled spread of light weapons. These developments have frustrated attempts to manage internal conflicts in states which are on the path of reconciliation and rehabilitation.

The structures that are emerging to support the diffusion process, whether it is Islamic militancy or cross-border linkages between arms smugglers and drug-dealers also constitute serious threats as they have the potential to destabilise the political system and undermine the economic regime. A lack of understanding of the dynamics of the uncontrolled spread of light weapons has been the reason for the inability to devise appropriate policies to address the issue in all its dimensions. Along with an understanding of the dynamics of the uncontrolled spread of light weapons, it is also imperative to understand the changed nature of conflicts.

To address this security dilemma arising from the impact of the diffusion of light weapons, a systematic effort is required to create stringent domestic laws and also a larger cooperative effort at the regional and global levels. Given the extent and nature of illicit transfers of small arms and light weapons that have already taken place, and the diffusion of these arms to actors and entities outside state control and society in general, instituting controls will be a Herculean task. On the other hand, the risk to civil society and to the stability of states, particularly democratic states, is likely to keep increasing. Therefore, national control measures will need to be strengthened. These would include: (i) improved border surveillance and control; (ii) stricter gun control and legislation and its effective implementation; (iii) strong and effective measures against illegal possession and traffic in small arms and light weapons. National measures would need an increasing degree of harmonisation at both regional and global levels. It also has to be recognised that it may not be possible to control the spread of light weapons without a corresponding control over drug trafficking and money laundering.

---

Endnotes

Note *: Ajay Darshan Behera, Research FellowBack

Note 1: Jane's Infantry Weapons, 1992-93 (Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1992), p. 144. Back

Note 2: An AK-47 Kalashnikov has less than 30 moving parts. Back

Note 3: Edward J. Laurance, The New Field of Micro-Disarmament: Addressing the Proliferation and Buildup of Small Arms and Light Weapons, BICC Brief 7, September 1996. Back

Note 4: See Michael T. Klare, "Light Weapons Diffusion and Global Violence in the Post-Cold War Era," in Jasjit Singh, ed., Light Weapons and International Security (New Delhi: BASIC and IDSA, 1995), p. 1. Back

Note 5: There has always been, even though not in equal proportion, a fear of terrorist groups getting hold of nuclear weapons. Since so far we haven't come across any instance of any non-state actor claiming to possess nuclear weapons, we may presume that proliferation of nuclear technology and weapons has remained confined to states only. Back

Note 6: The Southern African Regional Action Programme on Light Arms and Illicit Trafficking was proposed in a Conference on "Developing Controls on Arms and Illicit Trafficking in Southern Africa" by the Institute of Security Studies, held at Pretoria, South Africa, during May 3-6, 1998. See http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/7.4/regional.html Back

Note 7: Edward J. Laurance, "Political Implications of Illegal Arms Exports from the United States," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 107, no. 3, pp. 501-534 Back

Note 8: "Major Armed Conflicts, 1992," SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). Back

Note 9: "Major Armed Conflicts," SIPRI Yearbook 2000: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 15-49. Back

Note 10: For an elaboration, see Jasjit Singh, "Light Weapons and Conflict in Southern Asia," in Singh, ed., n. 4, pp. 56-58. Back

Note 11: Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 2, June 1991, pp. 211-39. Back

Note 12: Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 116. Back

Note 13: Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Predicament of the Third World State: Reflections on State Making in a Comparative Perspective," in Brian L. Job, ed., The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992), p. 72. Back

Note 14: Mohammed Ayoob, "Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn?" International Affairs, vol. 60, no. 1, Winter 1983-84, p. 45. Back

Note 15: Caroline Thomas, In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987), p. 2. Back

Note 16: Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increasing legitimacy accorded to ethno-nationalism by the international community. Developments in Europe, the prompt recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the European Community and the separation of Slovakia from the Czech Republic have strengthened the legitimacy accorded to the right of ethnic groups to self-determination. For a detailed exposition of this point, see Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 165-84. Back

Note 17: See Mohammed Ayoob, "The New-Old Disorder in the Third World," in Thomas G. Weiss, ed., The United Nations and Civil Wars (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 19. Back

Note 18: Jeffrey Clark, "Debate in Somalia: Failure of the Collective Response," in Lohri Fischer Damrosch, ed., Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993). Cited in Ayoob, n. 16, p. 172. Back

Note 19: Ibid. Back

Note 20: Richard A. Mathew and George E. Shambaugh, "Sex, Drugs, and Heavy Metal: Transnational Threats and National Vulnerabilities," Security Dialogue, vol. 29, no. 2, June 1998, pp. 163-65. Back