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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
How to Square the CTBT Circle
By G. Balachandran
*
The US pressure on India to at least sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), if not ratify it, continues, and is unlikely to diminish. Those in India who suggest an unconditional acceptance of the CTBT, base it on the argument that having demonstrated its nuclear capability and thereby ensured its national security, India can sign the CTBT without holding out for the gains that may accrue from the act of signing. Those who are opposed to India signing the treaty base their objections on their doubts about the existence/reliability of the Indian nuclear deterrent. The third group comprises those who believe that India's current nuclear deterrent capability is satisfactory and India should sign the CTBT subject to certain gains in return. What is needed is a consensus in the country on signing the CTBT and the time is now appropriate for laying the groundwork for a national consensus without sacrificing the national interests. This article analyses the issues involved in India's signing the CTBT.
The continuing ambiguous/uncertain position of India in the realm of international nuclear politics remains a stumbling block in the normalisation of relations between India and the major nuclear powers, especially the US. Notwithstanding the fact that the current US Administration is opposed to the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), there is not much likelihood of the US lessening its pressure on the Indian nuclear/strategic programmes. It is likely that pressure will be maintained on India to at least sign the treaty, if not ratify it. An international convention on treaty signature, pending its coming into force, will have the same effect as it would if the treaty had been ratified. Under the circumstances, it would be useful to consider the various options under which India will be able to reach a national consensus on the CTBT without sacrificing its vital national interests. Reports about Pakistan signing the CTBT independent of the Indian decision will be only incidental to the analysis of the issue.
At the very basic level, the issue boils down to just one issue. Should India sign the CTBT or not? At the simplest, the answer can be either "Yes" or "No." Nevertheless, even with such options, there can be, and there are, a few variations that need to be examined before any consensus can be reached.
For the moment, we will safely ignore two options that are often suggested by some groups at the margin of the debate. These two options pertain to, one, an unconditional "yes", and the other, to an unconditional "no". Those who suggest an unconditional acceptance of the CTBT, base it on the argument that since India has demonstrated its nuclear weapon capabilities, thereby ensuring its national security, it should sign the CTBT without holding out for the gains that may accrue from the act of signing the treaty. To them, any quid pro quo for India's acceptance of the CTBT is tantamount to a betrayal of the national ideals since independence, the fight for universal peace and global disarmament, etc. Surprisingly, the proponents of an unconditional "no" also base their objections on similar grounds. For them, since the CTBT will not lead to global disarmament, in the presence of an unequal and indefinite nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), India should not sign the CTBT irrespective of the gains that it may make on other fronts by signing the treaty. For them also, any negotiation on India's part for a quid pro quo is a betrayal of the Indian national ideals, the fight for universal peace and global disarmament, etc. It would not be unreasonable to state that neither of these positions commands any significant following in the nation, let alone forms the basis for a national consensus.
So what are we left with? Conditional or qualified acceptance, and rejection. The differences between these groups are primarily based on their estimation of the existence (or non-existence) of an acceptable Indian nuclear deterrent. Those who are opposed to the CTBT, base their objections on their doubts about the existence/reliability of the Indian nuclear deterrent, especially the two-stage fusion weapon. Their doubts about the Indian capabilities are based on the divide that has arisen in the nuclear scientific establishment about the sufficiency of a single test to establish a credible and reliable nuclear deterrent. The thermonuclear device that was tested in May 1998 was only a device and not a weapon system. If the Indian nuclear deterrent is premised on the availability of a thermonuclear weapon, then their objections have some validity. A device is not a warhead or a weapon. The Pokhran test in 1974 tested a fission device. The weaponisation programme of this device was completed only in 1994, and the 1998 tests confirmed the validity of the weapon design and characteristics. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to suggest that the single test of a device in 1998 cannot be said to have established the validity of a weapon and that the Indian nuclear weapon arsenal cannot be said to include such weapons in its current inventory. And, that further tests are absolutely vital for the design and fabrication of such weapons. If it can further be established that the Indian nuclear doctrine requires the Indian arsenal to have thermonuclear weapons in its inventory, then the CTBT should not be signed on grounds of national security. This would seem to be a very convincing argument for the opposition to the CTBT on national security grounds. But as we shall see later, this argument does have certain drawbacks, and needs to be examined in some detail and depth.
The last group comprises those who believe that the current Indian nuclear deterrent capabilities fully satisfy the requirements of the Indian nuclear doctrine and that India should sign the CTBT subject to certain gains for India in return for that acceptance. What are the gains or quid pro quo that would be acceptable to the country? On that question there is no uniformity of thought, not even an informed debate. Some believe that India should be recognised as a nuclear weapon state; others want that India should get all the benefits-in matters of commerce and technology-that are available for the current recognised nuclear weapon states.
The confusion arises from the requirement of recognition as a nuclear weapon state. It is often not clear what conditions would satisfy this requirement. There is only one primary international treaty or arrangement that mentions or differentiates between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. That is the the NPT. Recognition of India as a nuclear weapon state, in a formal manner, can come about only in two ways. The first is an amendment of the NPT to redefine a nuclear weapon state in such a manner as to include India. By common consent, although this can be disputed, there is a consensus that there is very little, if any at all, chance of the NPT being amended to accommodate India as a nuclear weapon state.
The second way is for the international community to recognise India as a nuclear weapon state independent of the NPT. However, it is not entirely clear how this can be done. By the convening of an international conference to recognise India, and no doubt Pakistan as well, as a nuclear weapon state? Or only a convention of the five NPT defined nuclear weapon states? Or a majority of them? Or an exchange of letters between India and the others stating that India is a nuclear weapon state? Should it be a formal one or an informal one? If the latter, hasn't the international community already done so, albeit in an indirect manner, by requesting India to spell out its nuclear doctrine? Or is it, like in the case of the sage Vishwamitra, who after a long and arduous penance was not satisfied with the gods pronouncing him to be Brahmarishi, and wanted that the sage Vashista must also call him so? In any case, what does mere recognition, formal or otherwise, by itself help India in any manner? Often it is explained that other concrete steps, often left undefined, must accompany such recognition. Some of the accompanying steps that are mentioned are permanent membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC), and relaxation of technology, export control regimes, especially those relating to nuclear related technologies and in respect of nuclear power. It is also held that India should have the same concessions or privileges enjoyed by the P-5 under the Permissible Activities Accord (PAA) agreed to by the P-5. Let us begin by considering the first and third potential add-on benefits of recognition as a nuclear weapon state. In respect of a permanent UNSC seat, politically the chances of this as recognition or reward for India's nuclear weapon status are not very high. Such an arrangement would open a veritable Pandora's box. If India gets such recognition, what about Pakistan? That too, is a nuclear weapon state. Politically too, in the context of a universal desire to see the importance of nuclear weapons brought down, it is difficult to envisage a scenario wherein possession of nuclear weapons becomes a criterion for permanent membership of the UNSC.
As regards the PAA negotiated among the P-5, and which is a secret agreement, superficially it may appear that the inclusion of India amongst the P-5 cartel is a welcome development.) But a closer look at the issue of the PAA indicates that the gains, if any, might not be substantial or even significant. Incidentally, there is no official declaration or statement about such an arrangement by any of the countries which are supposed to be members of the PAA. The nearest admission of such an agreement/arrangement/memoranda among the P-5 comes from the testimony presented by Ambassador Ledogar of the USA during the US Senate hearings on the CTBT. While Ambassador Ledogar admitted the existence of memoranda of understanding, including some secret ones, among the P-5, and presented a summary of these in an unclassified form to the Senate, he was specific about only one of these memoranda. This was in reference to the election to the CTBT Executive Council. According to Ambassador Ledogar, however, this arrangement guaranteed the election of the P-5 to the Executive Council in perpetuity. Such an arrangement is possible only with the concurrence of the other members of the regional groupings. If all, or most of the members of the regional groupings were parties to such an informal agreement, it is hardly a secret P-5 agreement. Even so, given the nature of the process of election of the CTBT Executive Council members, it is not clear how any agreement, secret or otherwise, could guarantee the election of any country indefinitely to the Executive Council. Apart from this, no other article or report on the PAA has indicated that such an agreement enables the members of the P-5 to take any action that would violate the provisions of the CTBT. Nor have any of these analyses referred to any possible activity by any member of the P-5 which it has not already indicated, in public, as an activity that will be undertaken by it in conformity with, and as permitted by, the CTBT-activities such as sub-critical testing, etc. It is, therefore, not entirely clear how admission to the PAA would widen the scope of Indian activities under the CTBT activities which India would not have been able to execute otherwise without a PAA.
We come finally to the relaxation of technology control regimes-regimes that at present deny India access to high technologies on account of the Indian nuclear and missile programmes. Here an important point to remember is that these regimes are denial regimes rather than access regimes. Technology denial regimes come in two parts. One, an international cartel of suppliers who arbitrarily set out conditions under which technologies should be denied and not conditions under which they should and must not be denied. Two, the actual circumstances when technologies may be supplied when all cartel requirements are fulfilled and are left to the discretion of national authorities. There is a high degree of arbitrariness in the working of these regimes. Certainly nuclear weapon status is not an automatic indicator of access to high/frontier technologies. Witness the control regimes operating against Russia and China. Conversely, certain non-nuclear weapon states have far greater access to high technologies-South Korea, Singapore, Denmark, Holland, etc. Nuclear weapon status, therefore, does not automatically confer the right to high technologies. It merely makes automatic denial difficult. Thereafter, it is between the recipient country and the supplier state to work out the modalities of supply, if any.
The Indian strategy should, therefore, be to bring about a situation wherein its nuclear weapon status is given some sort of de facto recognition and thereafter negotiate bilateral agreements with the supplier states for access to high technologies. Is this possible?
In the case of civilian nuclear technologies, the technology denial regime is controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines. The NSG Guidelines require that "suppliers should transfer trigger list items or related technology to a non-nuclear weapon state only when the receiving state has brought into force an agreement with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) requiring the application of safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in its current and future peaceful activities" (Para 4(a), INFCIRC/254/Rev.4/Part I). Conversely, supplies to a nuclear weapon state can be made with safeguards applied only towards the equipment/supplies that are made pursuant to a contract.
Is there a scenario under which India can get supplies with limited safeguards from any NSG member, and thereby establish a de facto acceptance of its nuclear weapon status? Prior to May 1998, this would have been difficult. Now it may, just may, be possible to effect such an arrangement. Why and how? Prior to May 1998, India had not claimed to possess any nuclear weapon. Indeed, it had proclaimed publicly that it did not have, and did not require, such weapons. By its own admission it was a non-nuclear weapon state. As such, NSG members were bound to require full-scope safeguards on all of India's nuclear activities. After the Pokhran II tests of May 1998, India claimed to have nuclear weapons and indeed its current talks with various members of the NSG imply the acceptance of Indian nuclear weapon claims by them. In this context, it is not without significance that at a recent press conference, the head of the department of international and foreign economic relations of the Atomic Energy Ministry of the Russian Federation, Mikhail Nikitich Ryzhov, made an interesting observation, "In my personal opinion, both India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons. Since that moment neither India nor Pakistan can be regarded as non-nuclear weapon countries" (press conference with Atomic Energy Ministry officials on May 29, 2000).
In the light of these developments, the agreement for cooperation between India and Russia that was signed during the recent visit of Russian President Putin assumes some importance. While the agreement was not made public, it would not be unreasonable to presume that it envisages extended cooperation between India and Russia in the area of civilian nuclear technologies, especially nuclear energy. In the context of Russia's membership of the NSG, questions have been raised about the limits to such cooperation between India and Russia. The following explanation will demonstrate that not only can Russia expand its nuclear cooperation with India, but that this agreement can become the forerunner of similar agreements with other members of the NSG, especially France and even, perhaps, the US.
The NSG was created in 1975 following the Indian detonation of a nuclear device in 1974. In 1978, the NSG published its Guidelines for nuclear transfers, which were not materially different from those obtaining under NPT provisions then, namely, safeguards applied to specific installations and supplies. The Guidelines did not then require full-scope or comprehensive safeguards i.e. acceptance of IAEA safeguards on all current and future nuclear activities. India did not have any objection to such limited safeguards agreements and, in fact, had concluded a number of these. Between 1978 and 1991, the NSG was not active even though its Guidelines were in place.
However, the NSG once again became active in 1992, following the Gulf War and the subsequent discoveries regarding Iraq's nuclear programmes. It then expanded its Guidelines significantly by (i) establishing separate Guidelines for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use items; and (ii) expanding the safeguards requirements by requiring full-scope IAEA safeguards for future supply of nuclear related items to any non-nuclear weapon state.
India, as a non-signatory to the NPT-because of its opposition to the treaty as a discriminatory one-had resisted all attempts to impose full-scope safeguards on Indian nuclear activities. Russia, which was a member of the NSG, had by then concluded an agreement with India for the supply of a nuclear power plant in Tamil Nadu. This plant was to be supplied under the limited safeguards agreement i.e. limited only to the plant supplied. Russia was able to continue with the agreement, without insisting on full-scope safeguards, since the NSG Guidelines allowed for such limited safeguards in respect of agreements signed before April 3, 1992-the date on which the NSG had modified its Guidelines. Russia is, however, still bound by its membership of the NSG to follow the revised NSG Guidelines-an obligation reconfirmed by Russia through its April 1996 note verbale to the IAEA.
It can be safely presumed that India had not changed its position vis-à-vis full-scope safeguards. How, then, can Russia cooperate with India on the expanded nuclear arena and yet abide by its international i.e. NSG commitments? Is it possible?
The answer is YES. It can do so. Not only that, the new Indo-Russia agreement can, in fact, become a forerunner of similar agreements with other members of the NSG, especially France. How?
The relevant paragraph in the NSG Guidelines dealing with safeguards (Para 4(a), INFCIRC/254/Rev.4/Part 1) states:
"Suppliers should transfer trigger list items or related technology to a non-nuclear-weapon state only when the receiving state has brought into force an agreement with the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in its current and future peaceful activities" (italics added).
It is necessary to bear in mind three important and crucial points when reading the Guidelines. First, the NSG Guidelines are to be implemented by each NSG member in accordance with its national laws and practices. Decisions on export applications are taken at the national level in accordance with national export licensing requirements. Two, the Guidelines do not mention the NPT anywhere; and three, they do not define anywhere what is meant by a nuclear weapon state or non-nuclear weapon state.
Moreover, neither do the Russian laws define anywhere in their national legislation what is meant by a nuclear weapon state. In fact, the only country that defines this term in its national legislation is the United States. According to US domestic legislation, for example, the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA), under which sanctions were imposed against India, defines (Sec. 830(5)) the term "non-nuclear weapon state" "any country which is not a nuclear weapon state, as defined by Article IX (3) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968." That treaty defines a nuclear weapon state as "one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967."
India, till May 1998, had neither claimed to be a nuclear weapon state nor claimed possession of nuclear weapons. Russia could not, under such circumstances, have entered into any fresh nuclear cooperation agreement with India between April 1992 and May 1998, without either reneging on its international commitments or requiring India to agree to full-scope IAEA safeguards. The May 1998 tests have altered the situation radically. India conducted a series of nuclear weapon tests then and also claimed to be a nuclear weapon state. There is now a universal recognition of India as a nuclear-weapon state. It is altogether another matter that the NPT does not recognise India as such. But then India is not a signatory to the NPT. Neither do the NSG Guidelines have any reference to the NPT. The Russian laws do not follow the NPT definition of a nuclear weapon state. Therefore, it is perfectly legal, and under all its international commitments, for Russia to enter into a fresh nuclear cooperation agreement with India without insisting on full-scope safeguards since India is a nuclear weapon state. All that is required for such an agreement is the limited safeguard requirements in line with past practice-something to which India has always been amenable.
Therefore, the new Indo-Russian agreement on nuclear cooperation is fully in line with all of Russia's international commitments on nuclear non-proliferation. In fact, this agreement may well become the forerunner of similar agreements with other countries that have not defined the term nuclear weapon state narrowly, as the United States-and that is practically all the other members states of the NSG.
Once one member of the NSG supplies without requiring full-scope safeguards, it will be comparatively easy to negotiate such supplies with other members as well. India does have certain bargaining chips when negotiating such an arrangement with other suppliers, especially those aligned with the US, notably France. What are these?
The NSG Guidelines require, in case of supplies to nuclear weapon states, safeguards only on the supplied items, unlike in the case of supplies to non-nuclear weapon states which require full-scope safeguards on "all current and future peaceful activities". Currently, only a limited number of the Indian peaceful nuclear activities-Tarapur and RAPS-are under safeguards. Others-Kalpakkam, Narora, etc-are all under no international safeguards. Now, with a moratorium on plutonium production by many of the P-5, and with the NPT covering almost all of the other countries of the world, India, with its many reactors, is the largest producer of unsafeguarded plutonium in the world. Much of this is produced in the many unsafeguarded power reactors constructed by India with its own technology. As an incentive to the Western alliance members of the NSG, India can voluntarily offer to place all of its peaceful nuclear activities under safeguards in return for a negotiated guaranteed access to high technologies from the members of the Wassanar group. Such an act would immediately reduce the amount of the current annual global production of unsafeguarded plutonium by a factor of 10 or so. Pending the completion of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), this could be an attractive incentive for the members of the NSG to come to an agreement with India on technology transfer in areas which are not of direct significance for the strategic sectors, namely, nuclear weapons and strategic missiles.
Therefore, if the Indian nuclear deterrent capability is assured at this moment, there is an opportunity to get a national consensus on signing the CTBT and, at the same time, negotiate a beneficial technology transfer/cooperation agreement with the major technology suppliers and get de facto recognition as a nuclear weapon state as well.
The difficulty is when there is no national consensus on the current level of the Indian nuclear deterrent. What then? Such doubts have been raised on two counts. First, on the Indian capability to manufacture thermonuclear weapons i.e. H-bombs. At the moment, there is a reasonable consensus on the Indian capability to design and fabricate a wide range of fission type weapons. The second doubt is on the availability of capable delivery systems, especially missiles. The latter is not, however, the subject matter of the CTBT.
The first point to note is that the Indian nuclear doctrine envisages a purely defensive deterrent role for its nuclear weapons. That is the rationale of the no-first-use (NFU) doctrine. There is not much a thermonuclear weapon will achieve towards this end that a pure fission device cannot do. True, a thermonuclear weapon has a higher yield-to-weight ratio that can make existing delivery systems more effective but there is a tradeoff between yield and accuracy, which can be effectively used to maintain India's limited deterrent capabilities. That is not to deny the advantages of such weapons-only to state that they are not an indispensable component of the Indian deterrent force. As has been argued elsewhere, a fully functional Indian nuclear deterrent force can be had even without thermonuclear weapons if the lack of such weapons is compensated for by better and more accurate and reliable delivery systems.
What is important is to analyse under what conditions or circumstances a consensus can be reached on signing the CTBT even in the absence of a thermonuclear weapon capability. The following analysis is based on official information made available in recent times, primarily in the report of the Kargil Review Committee. From that report, what do we learn about the Indian nuclear weaponisation programme? The first device was tested in 1974. The nuclear weaponisation programme of the fission type device into a fission weapon began in full strength in 1983 and continued with the full support of successive governments from then on, without any slackening of the effort. The weaponisation programme was completed in 1992-94 i.e. a decade after it began.
Thermonuclear weapons are complex two-stage weapons. Their design and validation is far more complex than that of a pure fission device. It can be assumed without much error that a similar weaponisation programme of a two-stage thermonuclear device will take approximately the same time or perhaps slightly less i.e. about 8-10 years. The two-stage device was tested in 1998. It can be assumed that the weaponisation programme resulting in a workable weapon design will be ready to test around 2005 or so. There will be no incentive to test a pure fission weapon till then. Nor would there be any point in testing a device of the same type as tested in 1998.
Under such a circumstance, the debate on the merits of signing the CTBT will have to deliberate around the following question: what are likely to be the political, economic and other consequences of a nuclear test by India after five or more years in the context of an ongoing moratorium on nuclear testing by the P-5 since 1996 and without the likelihood of another test by Pakistan? By late 2000, the world had witnessed the longest period of no nuclear tests since the first use of this weapon in 1945. What are the chances of an Indian test, after a gap of seven or more years, not provoking severe worldwide reaction? If the consensus is that such a test will have no material impact on India, then the signing of the CTBT at this point will have no relevance. If, however, the consensus is that an Indian test after a long gap, in the absence of testing by any other nation in the intervening period, will have a serious effect on India, politically and economically, then signing the CTBT at this stage will make some sense. Especially if the adverse consequences of such a test will not only be expected to be serious but known to be serious. In such a case, as the self-imposed Indian moratorium on testing-in the absence of sufficient advances in the thermonuclear weaponisation programme-continues, others will have less and less incentive to negotiate with India on the quid pro quo that will have to be offered to India for its acceptance of the CTBT.
In such a scenario, it will be far better to utilise the nascent Indian thermonuclear capability to negotiate for (i) a comprehensive technology access regime for India, along the lines outlined earlier, subject only to the condition that such technology access need not be in areas directly related to weapons related activities; and (ii) an agreement that the Indian missile programme too will not result in non-missile related sanctions.
A small caveat may be added here. Much of the foregoing assumes that the past Indian experience with the nuclear weaponisation programme will be seen in the thermonuclear weaponisation programme as well. If, however, it can be established that this need not be the case and that the time needed for the Indian thermonuclear weaponisation programme, in the light of experience already gained, will be far less and that validation tests can be held within a period of two years or less, there could be some justification for not signing the CTBT now. Much will depend on an objective assessment of the time required. Such an assessment will have to done independently, but with the full cooperation of the official nuclear establishment. Obviously much will depend on such assessments. If the time-frame is short, then it may even be possible to announce a time-bound plan for Indian signature to the CTBT. As the time-frame increases, so do the costs associated with such tests, resulting in a decline in the probability of further tests. Along with that, there will be a decrease in the leverage that India will have in negotiating favourable terms for abstaining from testing.
In short, if there is confidence in the current Indian nuclear deterrent capability, then the recently negotiated Indo-Russian agreement on nuclear cooperation provides an excellent opportunity to reach a national consensus on signing the CTBT with the maximum benefits to India for such a signature, in particular gaining de facto acceptance of India's nuclear weapon status along with high technology access. This could be so even if there are some doubts in respect of the Indian thermonuclear capability.
There are two other factors that may have some influence on reaching a national consensus.
The first relates to the NMD (National Missile Defence) programme of the USA that may result in China upgrading its deterrent force. Would, or rather should, it have any influence on India's decision to sign the CTBT? No. Such a course of action by China, in the absence of any nuclear testing by it, may require India to recalculate its minimum deterrent force and upgrade its own deterrent capabilities. However, India's signature to the CTBT would not in any manner affect its capability/capacity to increase its own deterrent force. Therefore, the NMD programme should have no impact on the Indian decision to sign the CTBT.
The second factor relates to the very intrusive inspection regime proposed by the CTBT. The question to be answered is this: can the very deep and intrusive inspection regime adopted by the CTBT, in any manner, be used by those not friendly towards India to access, or gain information on, various aspects of the broadbased Indian nuclear programme, which today is free from any international inspection regime? This aspect requires some serious and deep study of the various clauses of the CTBT dealing with inspection. Till such time as this is done, it may be well to postpone the decision to sign the CTBT. However, it must be admitted that a superficial reading of the various Articles of the treaty dealing with inspection does not suggest any such danger. The one or two doubtful clauses of the treaty can be handled appropriately by India either through reservations to some of the inspection procedure, reservations that would not in any manner impinge on the inspection regime itself, or appropriate parliamentary resolutions that will take care of any such possible danger.
Therefore, the time is appropriate now for building the groundwork for a national consensus on signing the CTBT.
Endnotes
Note *: G. Balachandran, Independent AnalystBack