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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
Pakistan-Taliban-Al Qaida: New Trends in Terrorism and Violence
Sreedhar, Senior Research Associate, IDSA
Abstract
The Pakistan Taliban-Al Qaida pheonomenon has considerably altered the face of terrorism and violence. What was considered as a hypothetical scenario in 1980s and early 1990s, like nuclear terrorism, became a reality. In addition, the organised manner in which they have conducted their recruitment of cadres and the net-working done with similar outfits in 60 countries, show terrorism will not be the same in the coming years. This paper highlights some of these new trends.
The Pakistan-Taliban-Al Qaida phenomenon, that started in 1994, has brought in seven new dimensions to the politics of global terrorism during the last seven years. To understand these new dimensions, a quick survey of Taliban's birth and growth needs to be taken. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the task of rebuilding the war-ravaged country was handed over to Pakistan, a close ally of the US during its proxy war with the Soviet Union. For its own strategic reasons, Pakistan wanted an amenable government in Kabul. It tried various permutations and combinations with the existing leadership among the Afghan refugees turned (holy warrior), but could not succeed. Finally, in early 1994, the then home minister of Pakistan came to the conclusion that there is a need to create an independent entity away from the traditional leadership of the Afghan polity. 1 By the time Pakistani ruling elite came to this conclusion, its own polity was cracking up due to four and a half decades of mismanagement. Therefore, Pakistan going through the process of a failing state, began looking for shorter routes to achieve its own strategic objectives. These included strategic depth against India in the event of an Indo-Pak war, and resolving the vexed issue of the Durand Line with Afghanistan. These apart, an interesting dimension to the Pakistan-Taliban relationship was put forward by Musa Khan Jalalzai, an Afghan journalist based in Peshawar North West Frontier Province (NWFP). According to him:
. . . their (Pakistan's) goal was at once ideological and economic. Some (Pakistan armed forces) set their sights on detaching Central Asian Republics from the CIS, which they hoped would lead to disintegration of the Russian Federation itself and the emergence of a new space dominated by conservative Islamic regimes. From this point of view, the return to power of the neo-communists in Dushanbe was a reversal for Islamabad, hence its support, through Afghanistan, for the Tajik rebels. 2
On the economic level, Pakistan sought to make itself Central Asian Republic's main route of access to the Indian Ocean. It, therefore, launched a huge roadway construction programme in the summer of 1993, which was to link Karachi and the ports of the Indian Ocean with Central Asia via Peshawar and Afghanistan. According to Musa Khan Jalalzai, Maj. Gen. Naserullah Babar, interior minister in Benazir Bhutto's government, thought of two routes for Central Asia. 'If the route from Peshawar through Kabul and the Salang Highway to Tashkent was blocked by war in Kabul, Pakistan should seek to open the western route, from Quetta through Kandahar and Herat to Turkmenistan. 3
If this objective of Pakistan is correct, it is operating on the assumption that having defeated the Red Army of the Soviet Union once, it is not difficult to defeat the disintegrated Soviet Union's armed forces guarding Central Asian Republic's again. This also raises the question as to whether Pakistan is planning to convert its Taliban forces into a jihadi Islamic army. One can notice a particular pattern to this effect in the Pakistan-Taliban-Al Qaida combine actions.
After giving support to the Tajik rebels, the Pakistan-Taliban-Al Qaida combine target has been Uzbekistan. The leadership of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) attempted to assassinate Uzbek President Islam. A. Karimov in February 1999, when six bombs in Tashkent killed 16 people and wounded 128. The leader of the IMU, Tahir Yoldassev, then fled to the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. In May 1999, the Taliban allowed Yoldassev to set up military training camps in northern Afghanistan, just a few miles off the Afghan-Uzbek border. Unconfirmed media reports say that he was training several hundred Islamic militants from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrghyzstan, as well as Uighurs from Xinjiang Autonomous Region in China. Initially, the Taliban denied having extended any help to the IMU. But in June 1999, when the Uzbek government requested for the extradition of Tahir to Tashkent, it was rejected by the Taliban.
In August 1999, another IMU leader, Juma Nanangani, entered southern Kyrghyzstan with about 800 militants, seized villages and threatened to invade Uzbekistan. All this resulted in Uzbekistan severely condemning Pakistan for supporting the dissident movements in Uzbekistan.
According to Ahmed Rashid, what brought in a new dimension was that:
. . . although the IMU are not Deobandis, they are influenced by Wahhabism and have tried to impose the Taliban code in their areas of influence. Although the Uzbeks have historically been suspicious of the Pushtuns, the Taliban offer IMU a sanctuary from the Karimov crackdown with weapons, and the means to finance themselves through the drug trade. 4
With these objectives in mind, Pakistan became a guiding spirit and mentor of Taliban till about mid-1996. The arrival of Osama bin Laden in May 1996 to Kandahar, and his assuming the leadership of Taliban transformed Pakistan's role from that of a guardian to a partner of the Taliban outfit. By 1998, Taliban became synonymous with bin Laden's Al Qaida movement and Pakistani soldiers started participating in Taliban-Al Qaida activities. From 1996 onwards, Taliban became a pressure point for Pakistan to pursue its foreign policy objectives in its immediate neighbourhood.
Providing Legitimacy
The fall-out of this extraordinary policy towards terrorism and a terrorist outfit like Taliban resulted in their achieving a certain amount of legitimacy and recognition. Pak-Afghan's smaller neighbours in Central Asia even opened channels of communication on the assumption that Pakistan-Taliban-Al Qaida are a combination created by the Great Powers. The arrival of Osama bin Laden, first in the 1980s and later in May 1996 to Afghanistan, was seen as a tacit approval of the custodian of the Holy Shrines of Islam, Saudi Arabia. The recognition of Taliban government in May 1997 by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE further reinforced their perception. Till 10 September, 2001 Saudi Arabia never passed a judgement on Osama's activities, and though the US accused Ohim as a prime suspect in the al-Khobar attacks, Saudi Arabian law-enforcing agencies exonerated him. In addition, countries like Turkey and China, two close allies of Pakistan, even started providing economic aid to the Pakistan Taliban-Al-Qaida combine. China went a step further. It purchased unexploded Cruise missiles, fired by the US on Khost terrorist training camps of Al Qaida in August 1998, from Taliban.
Only three explanations can be given for this extraordinary behaviour of nation-states in the south-west and Central Asia. First, some states found in the Pakistan Taliban-Al Qaida combine a convenient conduit for pursuing their own agenda. Second, most of the nation-states in the vicinity and in the Islamic world felt ideologically drawn to the Pakistan Taliban-Al Qaida's philosophy. Lastly, some small neighbours lacking resources to confront this nexus, subtly accepted its existence.
Networking with Other Organisations
The Pakistan-Taliban-Al Qaida combine, for the first time indulged in extensive net-working with similar organisations across the globe. In the past, terrorist organisations networking has been limited to within the country or, at best, with their ethnic groups living abroad. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in its 1960/1970s incarnations are two examples. According to various assessments, the Pakistan-Taliban-Al Qaida combine spread its network over 60 countries in four continents. This networking is made possible due to poor law and order enforcing machinery in some countries, while others states have blatantly collaborated for a number of reasons (ideological, financial considerations, etc.) with the Pakistan-Taliban-Al Qaida and have allowed them to prosper.
This networking has resulted in organised gangs that have emerged in the name of a particular faith, and have manifested themselves through acts of terror and violence. The IMU that operated in the Central Asian Republics in one example. A close scrutiny of the network reveals three basic characteristics of the countries where this networking has succeeded: These countries are underdeveloped; have a lot of social inequalities and have dissident movements against the ruling governments. Such movements have surfaced time and again in the Central Asian Republics and Philippines and, have found favour with a section of the local population. As the current Afghan war has shown, there is a certain amount of solidarity among these networked organisations. For instance, the Arab cadres would go to Central Asia to fight along with IMU cadres for the latter's cause.
Interestingly, countries like Pakistan, and to a lesser extent China, have started using these terrorist organisations as pressure points to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Every one in the Afghanistan neighbourhood was hesitant to address these organisations as terrorist outfits. Some countries like China have even started doing business with them and are offering economic aid to maintain good relations. Doubts arise from the peculiar Chinese behaviour from 1998 onwards, causing one to wonder whether Taliban was created by one of its closet ally Pakistan, or whether there was a Sino-Pak collusion. This extraordinary behaviour of China-one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council-with a terrorist organisation surprised every nation-state in south and south-west Asia. 5 Apparently, this must have resulted in many others perceiving the Pakistan-Taliban-Al Qaida combine as part of a greater game played by the great powers.
This indeed is a unique situation, where the Pakistan-Taliban-Al Qaida combine is being patronised by one of the permanent members of the Security Council. The question that arises is what punitive action should be taken against this act? This cannot be brushed aside by saying that the Chinese were trying to reform the Pakistan Taliban-Al Qaida combine.
Systematic Recruitment of Cadres
Unlike in the past, with other terrorist organisations, the Pakistan-Taliban-Al Qaida combine started a phased programme for new recruits for their organisation. When the "volunteers" are spotted, they are first given indoctrination in the ideology. If the recruit is too young, about 6-7 years, he is asked to spend some years in a "seminary" studying under the close supervision of senior cadres. A chain of "seminaries" were established both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, (estimated to be around 4000), with a curriculum so as to give it a semblance of an institution of learning. This has resulted in places of worship and institutions of learning emerging as the focal points of terrorist recruitment and training in countries like Pakistan. The physically fit are picked up for weapon training ranging from two to 12 weeks. They are then slowly inducted into battle training under the supervision and guidance of seniors. Those physically not so fit are used for running errands and working as porters, guides and so on.
All of them receive a remuneration from the organisation to which they are affiliated. In fact, if they are killed in action, the families are paid money for the "sacrifice" made by their family member. Interestingly, to make the work more attractive, these terrorists are called mujahideen, and their acts of terrorism and violence were described as part of a jihad (holy war). The impressionable young minds get affected and even children/youth from affluent families have begun joining these organisations. The best example is that of the "Saudi-nationals" who participated in the attacks on World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. They all came from well to do families and were a well educated lot too.
This institutionalised training of terrorists has few parallels in the contemporary history of terrorism.
Regular Armed Forces Supporting Terrorists
Along with this regular recruitment, Pakistani military personnel have also been involved in the Pakistan-Taliban-Al-Qaida combine. According to the anti-Taliban forces estimates, at least a brigade level force (4000-5000 men) of the Pakistani army worked with the Pakistan-Taliban-Al Qaida. Whether these military personnel were hired by the Pakistan-Taliban-Al Qaida combine, or whether they joined voluntarily or were assigned by Pakistan is not completely clear as yet. From the data available it appears that the last factor resulted in this development. The involvement of these Pakistani military personnel included training of the Pakistan Taliban-Al Qaida cadres, extending diplomatic support to them and facilitating their financial activities. They even provided logistic support to the Taliban campaigns to occupy places like Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. 6
This is the first time that the armed forces of a nation-state have become part and parcel of a terrorist outfit, and have provided a direct or indirect support in the activities of the outfit. If the regular armies get converted into terrorist organisations or collaborate with them, then the attack on the WTC or the Pentagon can become a common occurrence.
Ethnic Cleanising as an Instrument of Consolidation
The Pakistan-Taliban-Al Qaida combine has also introduced two new variables to terrorism and violence. They have started ethnically cleanising the society. The best example is the killings of non-Pushtun people in the Bamiyan province in January 2001. One possible explanation for this brutal behaviour could be that Taliban had planned to rule a nation of ethnic homogeneity. At different points of time they seem to have debated and come to the conclusion that people who oppose their regime have no place to stay within the territorial limits of Afghanistan; and since the majority of the people opposing them are non-Pushtuns, they can be physically eliminated. Other ethnic/religious groups who accept their dictates can be allowed to live separately, but as second class citizens. One of the fatwas (ruling) issued by Taliban said that Hindus living in Afghanistan must wear yellow badges to identify themselves as non-Muslims. 7
In the same breath, the Taliban-Al Qaida decided to do away with the pre-Islamic history of Afghanistan. The destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in March 2001 is one example. Similarly, artifacts belonging to pre-Islamic period in the Kabul National Museum were dumped in a basement to deny any links with the pre-Islamic Afghan history. According to some commentators, Taliban sold the artifacts in the international market. Some have argued that Taliban has resorted to this unprecedented action since idol worship is against the basic tenets of Islam. But most of the learned men of the Islamic theology felt that the destruction of pre-Islamic relics was not ordained in Islam. 8
Whatever be the motives of the Taliban-Al Qaida, they, in the name of achieving religious homogeneity, have indulged in vandalism unparalleled in history.
Partnership/Liasion with Narcotics Mafia
Another new trend introduced by the Pakistan-Taliban-Al Qaida combine in global terrorism is the close nexus they have developed with the narcotic mafia. Though, this is not a new phenomenon among the terrorist groups operating in various parts of the world, it was always a subtle and low key operation. The Taliban, however, have openly cultivated poppy and have used the income generated from poppy, cultivation as the principle source of revenue by the state to maintain a subsistence level economy in Afghanistan.
The UN Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) estimates that in 1999 opium production in Afghanistan reached an all time high of 4,600 metric tonnes (mt). This is more than double the estimated production of 2,100 mt in 1998. The UNDCP also estimated that poppy cultivation has increased from 64,000 hectares in 1998 to 91,000 hectares in 1999, and 97 per cent of the cultivation has occurred in Taliban controlled areas.
Table-1: Opium Production in Afghanistan (1995-99)
| Year | Opium Gum |
| (MT) | |
| 1995 | 1,230 |
| 1996 | 1,230 |
| 1997 | 1,265 |
| 1998 | 2,100 |
| 1999 | 4,600 |
As can be seen from the table, opium production has registered a continuous increase in Afghanistan after the arrival of the Pakistan-Taliban-Al Qaida combine, and has continued to do so till 1999. In 2000, poppy cultivation was brought down not because of any change of heart by the Taliban but due to earlier years of excess production bringing down the international prices in narcotics. In the process, the entire neighbourhood of Afghanistan, being under-developed economies and neglected by the international community, readily accepted the income from the narcotic trade. In other words, it is more of a supply and demand in narcotics and less of an international condemnation that resulted in reducing the area under the poppy cultivation by Taliban. This also shows that the Pakistan-Taliban-Al Qaida have acquired a near monopoly of the world narcotics market.
What is alarming is that the narcotics money has been liberally used to acquire arms and ammunition from the grey international arms bazar.
Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction
For the past-decade or so, the international nuclear non-proliferation lobby has talked in terms of hypothetical cases of terrorist outfits laying their hands on nuclear weapons. The available evidence has shown that the Pakistan-Taliban-Al Qaida have not only thought in terms of acquiring nuclear weapons devices but have also put it into action. They have used their money power to buy nuclear weapon casings from a former Soviet Republic. Their creator and mentor, Pakistan, is suspected to have provided nuclear laboratories like A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories in Kahuta to reprocess uranium to the weapon grade level. The trained nuclear scientists from the Pakistani nuclear establishment, in the name of serving the cause of Islamic jihad, have started providing the necessary expertise. 9
If they had a little more time, the Pakistan-Taliban-Al Qaida left to themselves would have acquired nuclear weapons. In fact, the ruthlessness with which they have dealt with their opponents, prompts one to conclude that they were not acquiring nukes as a deterrence, but to use them in order to achieve their political objectives. They would not have hesitated to use them against say, the US, Israel, Iran or even against India.
The Pakistan-Taliban-Al Qaida have demonstrated that given adequate resources they can acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and make nuclear terrorism a reality.
How to dismantle this elaborate network is going to be an immediate problem. Two decades of their existence, first as mujahideen fighting the Red Army and later as an organised force, has created a number of vested interests in a number of countries. How to bring back the young minds indoctrinated by the madrasas to normal educational system are some of the questions that need to be addressed by the international community. The response of the Islamic countries to the 11 September incidents makes it abundantly clear that the ruling elites in these countries are afraid of a backlash in case they are too harsh on them. Their emphasis on "caution and restraint" by the US in dealing with Taliban-Al Qaida shows the extent they are willing to go to.
Against this backdrop, the next question that arises is what do we do with nations that have supported the Taliban-Al Qaida? The culprits are far too many. To begin with Pakistan and a whole lot of other states involved in creating Taliban-Al Qaida. It is not possible to declare all of them as "rogue" states. One possible way could be to bring those responsible for the creation of Taliban and Al Qaida to trial in the International Court of Justice. For instance, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency of the Pakistani armed forces along with former interior minister, Naserullah Babar, should be made to stand trial along with Taliban's supremo, Mullah Umar and Al Qaida founder Osama bin Laden. Not an easy thing to do, given the fact that there are a number of countries who have found in the Taliban-Al Qaida a useful instrument for pursuing their interests.
This takes us to the next question? Can we prevent nation-states to harbour terrorists? The idea of global governance cannot make much headway due to a number of variables. The establishment of an international police force seems difficult, especially when the question of sovereignty of nation-states comes to the forefront. Similarly, just like the United Nations has been misused on a number of occasions there is every possibility of an international police force getting misused in too.
Endnotes
Note 1: There a number of versions about birth of Taliban, see Ahmed Rashid-Taliban, Islam, Oil and New Great Games in Central Asia (I.B. Tarerus 2000), William Malay (ed), Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban (Vanguard, Lahore 1998), Sreedhar and Mohinder Ved, Afghani-Buzkashi, Power Games and Gamesmen (Wordsmiths, New Delhi, 2000), Musa Khan Jalalzai, Taliban: The Great came in Afghanistan (Hanguard, Lahore, 1999). Back.
Note 2: Jalalzai, Ibid., p. 195. Back.
Note 4: Ahmed Rashid, "Talibanisation" in The Nation, November 18, 1999. Also see "The Ferghana Valley" Jane's Intelligence Review, September 2001, p. 24. Back.
Note 5: See Ahmad Lufti, Blowback: China and the Afghan Arabs, Issues and Studies (37 no. 1) January-February 2001, pp. 160-214. Back.
Note 6: In interviews with Indian journalist who were in Kabul in 1996 and Mazar-e-Sharif in November 2001. Back.
Note 7: M.L. Khan, "Death by Taliban". The Herald (Karachi), April 2001, pp. 37-38. Back.
Note 8: Ilyas Khan, "Desperate iconoclasm" and "History for Sale" The Herald (Karachi), April 2001, pp. 32b-36. Back.
Note 9: See T. Sreedhar, "New Threat from Taliban", The Hindu (Chennai), May 19, 2001. Back.