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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
Terror Enterprise: Organisation, Infrastructure and Resources
Kshitij Prabha, Associate Fellow, IDSA
Abstract
Terrorism has slowly evolved over the past three decades into an organised international network. It is no more a domestic phenomenon as it used to be during the early phase. While during the initial stage, terrorism posed threats only to national and regional security, it now threatens the entire global security environment.
This paper argues that the causes behind the growth of terrorism worldwide can be traced to the organisational structure, infrastuctural back-up and resources. The present study analyses these factors in the light of the current international environment.
Terror is an age-old phenomenon in the realm of politics. The Assassin or the Nizari Ismaili and the Christian Crusaders later followed by the Jewish Zealots were among the early practitioners of terror tactics. 1 However, there has been a dramatic increase in the incidence of terrorism and the number of terrorist groups since the 1970s. The United Nations (UN) took note of the situation and decided to adopt a resolution on terrorism in 1972, 2 which, sadly, turned out to be an exercise in futility. The international community was still coming to terms with the post-colonial hangover and could not decide whether terrorism is ‘terrorism’ per se, or one of the symptoms of freedom fighting. This dilemma and the failure of the international community to act has resulted in the loss of over 35,000 innocent lives in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) alone and approximately 10,000 in various parts of the world during the period 1991-2001. 3 Ironically, the international community needed a catastrophic event like the 11 September terrorist attacks on the US, to wake up to this reality.
Since volumes of literature are available on the genesis of terrorism, 4 it is needless to retreat into history. The need of the hour is to examine the elements that have strengthened terrorist groups and enabled them to run parallel invisible governments in many places. Terrorism has, thus, emerged as a major challenge to an established and acceptable system of governance. The key to an understanding of terrorist groups is an in-depth look at the organisational base, the infrastructural support and the financial and manpower resources. Often official and illegal agencies have nurtured cross-border terrorism. The fact that the global community is attempting a crackdown on terrorist organisations and their funding sources 5 underlines the need for an insight into the organisational aspects of terrorism and accordingly prescribe some counter-terrorism measures. The present study, therefore, is divided into three sections. While the first quarter of the paper examines various facets of terrorist organisations in general, the second segment highlights profiles of four major terrorist groups operating in India e.g. Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), Laskar-e-Toiba (LeT), Al Qaeda (AQ) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). Finally, based on the factual analysis of terrorist organisations, the concluding portion of the paper lays emphasis on the internal and external counter-terrorism options for India.
Organisation, Infrastructure and Resources
The international network of terrorist organisations is described here as terror enterprises because the organisation of these groups is getting increasingly more structured and effective than what it used to be during the 1960s and 1970s. One of the important factors that have contributed to the effective growth of terrorism is its flexible and cohesive organisational base. Current profiles of terrorist groups present a unique blend of rigidity in commitment to the cause and flexibility in operation that makes the task of countering terrorism difficult.
Organisation
Organisation, infrastructure and resources are vital to the growth of any organisation. Terrorist groups are no exception to this rule. It is the organisation that sustains terrorism, not individual ‘adventurism’. Hence, if the phenomenon of terrorism is dealt organisationally, groups involved in using terror tactics to achieve political objectives could be curbed. From this perspective terrorist groups could be placed under two categories-formal and informal. A formal organisation has three components. These are: (1) registration, (2) finance and (3) commitment of purpose, whereas an informal organisation needs only two of these elements, viz. common purpose and fund. Registration is not relevant to informal groups mainly because they operate only as offshoots of a formally organised larger group and their average life is not more than two to five years. The informal groups operate as a front to protect the agenda of the bigger groups and frequently get dismantled and re-organised. Therefore registration is not really important for these groups. However, recent findings reveal that most terrorist groups even if they are part of an umbrella organisation are now registered and maintain proper accounts, 6 which could be apparently described as a departure from the earlier practice. For instance, LeT, an off shoot of Markaz-ul-Dawa Irshad (MDI) operating from Pakistan managed financial transactions through bank accounts all over the world. However, in spite of the fact that major terrorist groups now prefer to be formally organised, there are many informal groups operating in India that run without registration and bank accounts. It is reported that there are 30 groups operating in J&K. Out of 30 merely five/six of them are formally organised. Rest of them are informal terrorist groups e.g. Al Faran, Mahaz-e-Azadi, Al Jehad Forces, Tehrik-e-Jehad, Laskar-e-Jabbar etc. These groups are not registered as they are created for a specific purpose and are dismantled as and when required. 7 But they do play an important role in the overall operation and therefore cannot be whisked away from the gamut of counter-terrorism offensive against the terrorist groups.
In so far as the impact of terrorism is concerned, both formally organised groups like the AQ, LeT, HM and others as well as the informal groups like Al Faran and Al Burq, are equally effective. Al Faran, for instance, kidnapped five foreign tourists from the Kashmir valley and one of them was killed in 1995. This incident had a tremendous impact on the international community against terrorism in India. Hence, keeping the impact as a focal point, a thin line of distinction emerged between the two organisations. A formally organised group can sustain longer than the informal groups because of broad-based organisation and lasting resources to sustain. Therefore it offers a bigger potential threat to an established system than the informal groups.
In spite of their loose and defused structure, terrorist groups are now formally organised with official recognition in some countries. For instance, most of the terrorist groups operating from Pakistan have been registered according to government rules and have bank accounts. 8 The LeT and JeM, for example, are registered organisations in Pakistan, provided with official patronage till 26 December 2001. Even the US Government banned these organisations formally only after 11 September terrorist attacks. 9
Infrastructure
Another significant organisational aspect of terror enterprise is the access to infrastructure. There are three basic infrastructure facilities essential for any organisation to function. These are-essential supplies, transport and communication. All these are as necessary for a terrorist group as they are to any other professional organisation. As a matter of fact, if terrorists don’t have access to essential infrastructure facilities such as a communication system, transport, supply of food and medicine they cannot reach their target leave alone achieve success in their diabolical missions. The movement of men and material would be restricted if sufficient infrastructure is not made available to them. Terrorists often use hit and run tactics for which rapid transport and a sophisticated communication system is necessary. It is relevant to note in this context that terrorist groups are dependent more on transnational organised criminal network 10 rather than the officially available infrastructure.
Another significant infrastructure essential for terrorist groups to operate is the safe havens along the exterior periphery of the target area to fall back upon for supply of food and medicine to cater to the immediate requirement of terrorists after the operation. These necessities are generally taken care of by their sympathisers. Human network is as important for the success of terrorism as transport and communication system. Absence of these infrastructural facilities can frustrate terrorist designs. Supply of weapons, transaction of money through Hawala and communication of secret information to terrorist groups is often done by human network. Recent arrests of the ISI agents in India reveal this fact. 11 It is interesting to note that most of the terrorist groups are dependent on the infrastructure available across the border rather than that available within the country.
Resources
Resources for terror enterprises could be divided into two categories-manpower and financial. Both of these are vital components for the organisational growth of terrorism and carrying out subversion against their targets. It would be naive to ignore these two from the broader premise of terrorism. While these resources are easily available to political and religious organisations, terrorist groups have to rely mainly on illegal and unofficial channels.
Manpower
A steady supply of manpower resources is as meaningful to terrorist organisations as finance, though this aspect has not been given a prominent place in the study of the phenomenon of terrorism. Dominance of finance has undermined the significance of human resources in the operation of terrorism.
Terrorism operates in a network, which needs multiple hands to implement the subversive plans and this operation demands both skilled and unskilled manpower. It is relevant to note that unlike professional organisations, members of terrorist groups are inducted more on the basis of their physical fitness and age for mercenary training. The average age of a terrorist ranges from 15-35, 12 and at the time of recruitment, it is not beyond 15-20 years. The social and family status of the recruits varies from being extremely poor to immensely rich. There are very few cases of middle-class children joining the terrorist cadre, unless some personal loss in the family has taken place in the midst of terror and counter-terror operations. It is worth noting that the psyche of the poor and the rich moves along the similar wavelength, i.e. ‘no fear of loss and gain’ and, hence can take risks in life. The poor are fearless as they have nothing to lose and the rich have plenty to fall back upon. Besides, the poor need a source of income for livelihood, which the terrorist organisations provide. As a matter of fact, an important component of terrorism is its nexus with the transnational criminal network, 13 which happens to be an important source of manpower as well as for transaction of arms and money across borders. Another new trend that has developed during the recent past in the manpower resources of terrorism, is the induction of orphan children, mainly those who lost their parents in the Afghan turmoil or in the Indo-Pak conflicts. 14 These children are inducted in the madarassas in Pakistan and Afghanistan and are groomed as a mercenary force. Some of them are inducted into suicide missions as well. It is important to emphasise that the relationship between the recruits from the poor class, the orphans and the terrorist organisations is based on mutual benefit. They need each other for sustenance and these organisations attract the rich as well the poor. While the poor and the orphans need shelter and a source of livelihood, the rich and the wealthy want a purpose in life after having achieved material success. Their disillusionment with wealth and lack of creativity divert them towards issues close to their hearts. Since terrorism aims to achieve certain political or religious 15 objectives, a section of rich members of society see terrorist groups as a good forum that might add purpose to their lives.
Finance:
The most significant resource for terrorist organisations is finance. Terrorist operations involve huge investments-both mental and material. While mental and moral inputs come from the ideologue members within, they are dependent on legal and illegal channels for funds. 16 Groups operating along the lines of a formal organisation have official and legal channels for raising funds besides the criminal flow of money. Al Qaida could be taken as an example. It runs its own business empire spread over many countries mainly in West Asia and Africa. Its business interests vary from real estate, construction, manufacturing consumer goods to animal husbandry and farming. 17 The following chart highlights the legitimate and illegitimate sources of funding for global terrorism of Al Qaida.
Table-1: Financial Resources of Al Qaida
| Legitimate | Illegitimate |
| Construction/Real Estate | Trading in banned products |
| Manufacturing Units: | Manufacturing small weapons in Afghanistan |
| (Sweets/honey/leather/oil/furniture/bakery/etc.) | Illicit trade in weapons |
| Agro products | Narcotic drug trafficking |
| (Fruits/vegetables/corn/wheat/peanuts/etc.) | |
| Exports: | Organised crime |
| (Wool/olive/raisins/diamonds/camels/etc.) | Extortion, etc. |
Notwithstanding the fact that some formally organised terrorist groups do have legal sources of funding, a large sum comes from illicit channels mainly from international drug-trafficking, which accounts for an approximately $400 billion-dollar-industry-larger than the global automobile sector. 18 Pakistan and the ousted Taliban regime of Afghanistan, the main hub of the global network of terrorists alone contributes 4,600 metric tonnes of the total 6,000 metric tonnes of illicit opium produced in the world. 19 In spite of the economic sanctions imposed by the UN and the US on Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks on the US embassy in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the Taliban regime of Afghanistan sustained itself mainly on the illicit production of opium.
After having analysed the oranisational aspect of the terrorist groups, the following section presents the profiles of the four major terrorist organisations operating in India.
Al Qaida
The AQ is the parent organisation for most of the terrorist outfits operating in South Asia especially Islamic ideologue groups such as LeT and JeM. This broad-based outfit with enormous resources and multinational network could be well described as a formally organised group. The organisational structure of AQ is explained here through the following diagram.
This simplified version of Al-Qaida’s organisational base is self-explanatory in so far as the management and functioning of this group is concerned. These groups have all the qualifications required for any professional enterprise, for instance, registration and bank accounts. The bank accounts of some of these groups have been now frozen by many countries including the US and Pakistan. 20
It is relevant to mention in the context of Al Qaida that the Chief and the Head of the Religious Committee dominates the decision-making. Rest of the departments and committees implement the decisions taken by the Chief and, facilitate the operation rather than have equal share in the process of decision-making.
Hizbul Mujahiddeen (HM)
Originally known as Al Badr HM came into existence as a militant outfit of Jamat-e-Islami in 1980 under the leadership of Master Ahsan Dhar, who was arrested by the Indian security forces in 1993. The main purpose behind the creation of this group was counter popularity of the JKLF as the main front fighting for independence of J&K against the Government of India. The secular credentials of JKLF did not appeal to the Pakistan Government that supported this organisation during the early phase of the secessionist movement in J&K. Another significant reason behind Pakistan’s alienation from the JKLF was its commitment to independence of J&K rather than accession to Pakistan. This was not acceptable to Pakistani establishment, which has been aspiring to caputre the state since 1947.
The Pakistan Government and its intelligence agencies have realised that the prevalent secular belief in the Kashmir valley would hamper the process of capturing the state by applying means of terror-tactics. They believed that religion can play an important role towards this end. Therefore a religion-based outfit is required, which would not merely arouse religious sentiments of the masses, but would also facilitate the accession of J&K to Pakistan. Against the backdrop of this approach the ISI, the agency in-charge for promoting terrorism in India, launched HM in 1989.
The internal situation in J&K during the late 1980s was conducive to the ISI to organise a militant outfit to alienate the masses from the mainstream 21 and divide the society along religious lines. Syed Salaluddin, who lost the assembly elections in 1987 was picked up to command the terrorist operations.
Thus, HM emerged as the main terrorist outfit to challenge the monopoly of JKLF. Kashmiris, Pakistanis and Afghans were recruited for mercenary training in the camps located in POK and Pakistan. It has the strength of 800-1000 members. This was the biggest group operating in Kashmir during the 1980s and the early 1990s. Young school and college drop-outs from the Kashmir valley, POK, Pakistani nationals and Afghan refugees joined the cadre for mercenary training on payment of a certain fixed amount according to the merit and risk of the job. 22 Most of these operations are pre-planned in tandem with other terrorist outfits operating in this region mainly AQ, LeT and JeM. Notwithstanding the fact that the HM has been involved in the major terrorist incidents in J&K such as the seizure and the burning of the Charar-e-Sharif Mosque in 1995, attack on the Indian security forces, the Wandhama massacre in February and March 2000 respectively, 23 sufficient information is not available about the organisational structure of this group. The Chief of the Jamat-e-Islam, Pakistan controls the overall needs of the organisation, whereas there are two commanders looking into the operations-one is Pak-based directly under the ISI and the other is Kashmir-based. Each of them coordinates and issues orders for the recruitment, training, propaganda and direct action.
It is pertinent to note that this group is gradually losing support from the ISI because one of its former commanders has denounced violence and supports a peaceful dialogue. Similarly, the Kashmir-based Jamat-e-Islam has shown disapproval of a violent course of action. Besides, ever since JeM and LeT came in to prominence, the priority of the ISI has shifted and there appears to be a clear division between the Pak-based and Kashmir-based commanders. In the post-Taliban situation there is increasing international pressure on the Pakistan Government. This might sober down the aggressive posture of the ISI in Kashmir and restrict its support to terrorist outfits. 24
Laskar-e-Toiba (LeT)
LeT is the most active terrorist group in India operating from Pakistan. The genesis of this group goes back to the history of the Afghan turmoil. Its foundation was laid in the Kunar province of Afghanistan under the religious influence of AQ supremo Osama Bin Laden. It emerged as an organised group operating from Lahore in Pakistan. 25
LeT is an offshoot of Markaz-ul-Dawa Irshad (MDI), a religious organisation whose area of operation expands across the entire Indian sub-continent. J&K is merely a stepping stone to achieve its Pan-Islamic agenda. It came into existence in 1989 under the leadership of Prof. Hafiz Mohammed Saeed-the Chief of MDI. 26 LeT is the largest terrorist outfit in this region, which has the strength of nearly 1, 500 trained mercenary force drawn mainly from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Africa and the Arab countries. This group is different from the HM in the sense that LeT does not have any immediate political agenda. Its main objective is to establish a political system based on the Shariat law as prescribed in Islam. Unlike HM its scope is not confined to J&K, but encompasses the entire South and Central Asian region. 27 In India its tentacles are spread all over the northern and western region mainly J&K, Punjab, Rajasthan, Gujrat and Maharashtra.
Organisationally, LeT is headed by the chief of MDI known as Amir and has a broad-based decentralised structure. Its operational area is divided into districts led by district commanders. Each of the commanders hold the responsibility of recruitment, training and handling resources especially those operating in the POK and Pakistan. However, the commanders operating in J&K coordinate and facilitate actual operations-like identification of target, supply of weapons, modus operandi and create a broad network for gathering information and intelligence by hiring economically weaker sections of the local Muslim population in India.
An important organisational aspect of LeT is the creation of the fidayeen or the suicide squad, which have been the hallmark of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) and West Asian terrorists outfits. 28 This trend of suicide missions has become a popular mode of operation of the Pak-based groups mainly the LeT and JeM. It is worth mentioning that from April 2000 to November 2001, there have been 13 incidents of fidayeen attacks in J&K alone in addition to the five LeT/JeM combined squad who died in the 13 December attack on the Indian Parliament. 29 This trend reflects upon the depth of indoctrination and training given to the new recruits by the LeT commanders and the Pakistani armed forces. The members of the fidayeen squad come mainly from the Karachi-based madarassa run by the Binouri Mosque. These squads consist of 10 to 15 members. In spite of a broad-based organisational structure, LeT is now banned by the US. As a response, Pakistan has also taken certain measures like re-christening the MDI and replacing its Chief. MDI, the parent body of LeT is now known as Jamat-ul-Dawa Pakistan and its Chief Prof. Saeed is replaced by Moulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri. 30
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)
JeM is the most recently formed terrorist group, which came into being in February 2000 under the leadership of Moulana Azhar Masood, who was released from the Indian prison following the IC 814 Indian Airlines highjacking in December 1999. This outfit is also based on religious conviction and as a matter of fact is the new name for Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA), which was banned by the US in 1998 because of its links with the AQ. Moulan Azhar Masood, a Karachi based radical Islamic leader was the general secretary of HuA when he was arrested from Srinagar in February 1994. Ever since his arrest many terrorist groups attempted to get him released from India. HuA in 1994 and Al Faran in 1995 kidnapped British and American nationals to facilitate his release. 31 It is apparent that he was an important leader of Pak-sponsored terrorist outfits. The Government of India, however, did not succumb to their demands until December 1999 to rescue the lives of 155 passengers on board the highjacked Indian Airlines plane at Kandahar. This was the beginning of JeM.
Moulana Azhar Masood launched this group soon after his release. The strength of this group is approximately 500 well-trained mercenaries recruited and trained in Pakistan. This is the only group, which consists mainly of Pakistani nationals. Though organisationally this group is not strong, it has been very effective in inflicting terror. The reason behind the weak organisation of JeM is that it operates closely with the government establishments in Pakistan, which take care of its organisational needs. So far as the modus operadi is concerned, JeM follows the same pattern as the LeT e.g. propaganda, sabotage, killing of civilians and security forces and suicide bombings. The fate of this group also appears to be bleak after the failed mission on the Indian Parliament.
It is relevant to note in this context that after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, General Mohammad Aziz Khan, Chairman and Joint Chief of Staff Committee of Pakistan convened a meeting of the JeM, LeT and other Pak-based Jehadi forces on 10 October 2001. In this meeting it was decided that JeM would change its name to Tehrik-al-Furqan (TAF) and Azhar Masood would be replaced by Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai of Binouri Mosque. 32 Azhar Masood is supposed to be under house arrest. However, the real picture about this group is not yet clear, because Pakistan often adopts double standards in dealing with terrorism. Unless the government takes serious action against the leaders involved in sponsoring terrorism in India, the counter-terrorism situation is unlikely to change.
India’s Options
India has seen the ugly face of transnational terrorism and has been coping with it single-handedly for the last two decades. So far the country has already lost thousands of precious lives in J&K alone and the international community has watched the killings unaffected. They became sensitive to the threats from terror enterprises only after the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed and sternly shaken when nearly 7,000 people died and billions of dollars 33 were lost in the 11 September attacks in New York and Washington D.C. The Bombay blasts that took place on 12 March 1993 and the innumerable incidents in J&K and the rest of India were not very different from those of New York and Washington except in terms of magnitude. The US, however, doesn’t include incidents of terrorist attacks on India in the list of global acts of terrorism. The following table highlights the gap between the US and Indian understanding of terrorism.
Table-2: Victims of Terrorism 34
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| (US Dept. of State) | MHA (Government of India) | |
| 1991 | 87 | 1,393 |
| 1992 | 102 | 1,909 |
| 1993 | 109 | 2,567 |
| 1994 | 314 | 2,866 |
| 1995 | 163 | 2,768 |
| 1996 | 311 | 2,858 |
| 1997 | 304 | 2,199 |
| 1998 | 273 | — |
| 1999 | 233 | 821 |
| 2000 | 405 | 762 |
Major powers have vital strategic interests to protect, which could be more relevant than countering terrorism or, certain specific immediate problems that emerge now and then. Terrorism is one of the issues that has surfaced in the changing global conflict scenario. This gap in attitude leads to a lack of commitment in defining immediate goals. The US policy on international terrorism and on Afghanistan after the 11 September terrorist attacks is a reflection of the same.
An immediate redressal of the socio-economic and political grievances of the terrorists is farfetched in the given political and economic scenario. India, or for that matter any other country, plagued with the virus of terrorism, would not be in a position to meet the demands of terrorist groups instantly, because the issues are intricately woven with the politico-economic conditions that take their own time to change. Therefore, India has to move forward patiently and persistently without publicity. Media hype and euphoria can only jeopardise and complicate issues at stake in the arena of terrorism. India’s domestic and foreign policy interests are indigenous and therefore not incongruous with those of the US interests in the regional politics of South Asia, though there is a convergence of interests in the current situation. It is mutually beneficial to support any anti-terrorism campaign launched by a single country or a coalition of nation states.
However, the Government of India has to work cautiously while dealing with major powers. Politico-economically dominant nations often have multidimensional objectives, which also include covert agenda. The US military exercise against AQ in Afghanistan reveals the same. The forces (Northern Alliance/United Front) opposed to the harbingers of terrorism in Afghanistan were not taken into confidence by the US-led forces at the initial stage of the military campaign against the AQ-Taliban combine. Their support at the initial stage could have been more effective in destroying the terrorist bases and would have caused less civilian casualties. Similarly, credibility of the aim of ‘war against terrorism’ could be questioned because of the operation being launched by the western coalition forces in tandem with Pakistan-the very state that sponsors terrorism and the only country that allowed the Taliban-AQ regime to operate from its territory till November 2001.
In so far as India’s option is concerned, New Delhi’s positive response to Washington D.C. is not unwarranted. It would definitely benefit India in some form or the other, especially in light of the fact that Pakistan, the main sponsoring agency of terrorism in India, would come under pressure. In retaliation there would be immediate terrorist attacks and violent reactions as is obvious from the recent attacks in J&K and on the Parliament in the very heart of the Capital on 13 December 2001. In the long run the situation would change when the support and supply is cut off from the sponsoring states. But things would change favourably only if the US-led forces destroy the criminal network of terrorists in the Middle East, Eurasia (East Europe and Central Asia) and South Asia. These three regions are the main theatres of international terrorism. Afghanistan and a majority of Afghans are not the real culprits of cross-border terrorism in India and the Central Asian Republics. The culprits are based in the Southeast neighbourhood of Afghanistan (Pakistan), the affluent Arabs and the poverty-ridden population of East Africa. Haphazard pounding of missiles and bombs on poorly identified targets would boomerang and belie the purpose of the ‘war against terrorism’. There are about 10-15 commercial airports, besides a few military and air force bases in war-ravaged Afghanistan, the destruction of which should not have taken more than a month for the western forces, given their technical superiority and precision in air strikes. The kind of counter-terrorism tactics the US-led West has adopted, are unlikely to change the problems emanating from transnational terrorism mainly because the US does not have a one-point agenda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It has multi-dimensional objectives to achieve. Counter-terrorism is one of the many foreign policy interests of the US decision-makers. In the light of the fact that Osama Bin Laden is untraceable and the number of supporters of Taliban is growing in Pakistan, wisdom demands that India be cautious and carry on with its independent plan of action against terrorism.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks to Shri Sujit Dutta for his valuable inputs while writing this paper.
Endnotes
Note 1: Paul Illiot, Assassin: The Bloody History of Political Murder (London: Blandford Book, 1999) pp. 68-74. Back.
Note 2: UN General Assembly Ad Hoc Committee Report on Terrorism, 1973. Back.
Note 3: Annual reports of Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India and Annual Reports on the Global Patterns of Terrorism, Department of State, Government of the United States of America (1991-2001). Back.
Note 4: Organised form of terrorism dates back to 11th century AD when for the first time Assassin or the Nizari Ismaili, a sub-sect of Shia Islam, used terror tactics against their politico-religious opponents in the land of the Arabs ( Iraq and Libya). For details see Walter Lacquer’s The Age of Terrorism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987) pp. 11-23 and Terrorism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977) by the same author also E.V. Walter, Terror and Resistance: A Study o Political Violence (London: Oxford University Press, 1969). Back.
Note 5: The Department of Treasury, Office of the Foreign Assets Control, The Executive Order No. 13224 Blocking Terrorist Property and the Summary of the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, Dated 23 September, 2001. For detail visit the web site http://www.treasury.gov/terrorism.html. Back.
Note 7: For detail list see www.satp.org Back.
Note 8: The Hindu (New Delhi), 27 December 2001. Back.
Note 9: US Department of State, Official Release, Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organisations (Washington DC) 26 December, 2001. Back.
Note 10: Franc Cilluffo, "Dealing with Transnational Threats: Terrorism, Crime, Narcotics, and Information Warfare" www.ndu.edu/inss.html Back.
Note 11: The Hindu (New Delhi), December 27, 2001. Back.
Note 12: Satyapal Dang revealed this fact in his empirical study on the phenomenon of terrorism in Punjab in his book titled Genesis of Terrorism (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1988) p. 33. The same fact was revealed by the terrorists in direct interview with the author in Jammu in January 1998 and also by the IOC senior executive, Doraiswamy kidnapped by the Kashmiri terrorists in Srinagar in 1992. Back.
Note 13: Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act and Rules 1999 and Notifications, Government of Maharashtra, Mumbai, also see UN Fifty-Fifth General Assembly Sixth Committee Meeting Report Report Dated 15th November 2000 (GA/L/3169). Back.
Note 14: Based on the information gathered from direct interaction with the perpetrators of terrorist crime. Back.
Note 15: Both these issues are vital in human life. Religion governs personal feelings and thoughts whereas politics dominates their material life. Back.
Note 16: UN Convention for Suppression of Financing Terrorism (New York), 1999. Back.
Note 17: Rohan Gunaratna, "Blowback" Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 2001, pp. 42-44. Back.
Note 18: United Nations Drug Control Programme Report, on Afghanistan (New York: United Nations 1999). Back.
Note 20: The US Presidential Document, Executive Order 13224, Op. Cit. Reference 5. Back.
Note 21: Tavleen Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors (London: Penguin Books, 1996) pp. 105-117. Back.
Note 22: Kshitij Prabha, "Narco-terrorism and India’s Security" Strategic Analysis, January 2001, vol. XXIV, no. 10, p. 1886. Back.
Note 24: Muralidhar Reddy, "Echoes in Pakistan", Frontline (Chennai), January 4, 2002, p. 15. Back.
Note 25: Its office was housed in MDI complex in Lahore till December 26, 2001. Back.
Note 26: US Department of State, Annual Report Global Patterns of Terrorism, (Washington DC) 2000. Back.
Note 28: Rohan Gunaratna, "Suicide Terrorism" Jane’s Intellignece Review, April 2000, pp. 52-54. Back.
Note 29: Praween Swami, "Fact, Fiction and Fidayeen" Frontline, January 4, 2002, p. 12. Back.
Note 30: B. Raman, "LET Changes Clothing" www.saag.org, Dated December 26, 2001. Back.
Note 31: www.state.govt (US web site) Back.
Note 32: B. Raman, op. cit. Reference no. 30. Back.
Note 33: The exact figure of economic damages is not yet available. The US congress has already cleared $40 billion as relief measures to protect immediate economic interests. Back.
Note 34: These figures are collected from different volumes of Global Patterns of Terrorism, Annual Publication on Terrorism, US Dept. of State (Washington DC) 1991-2000, and the Annual Reports Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India (New Delhi) 1991-2000. Back.