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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
Religious Extremism In Central Asia
Poonam Mann, Researcher, IDSA
Abstract
The Central Asian republics are bearing the brunt of terrorism fed by religious extremism for the last few years. Uzbekistan, Kyrghyzstan and Tajikistan have suffered the most among the five Central Asian republics. Uzbekistan and Kyrghyzstan are currently facing armed rebel incursions that began in 1999.
After the end of the Communist control, the somewhat unsettled situation made the region a happy hunting ground for a new breed of highly motivated Islamic clergy. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan liberally provided religious literature and funds for the construction of mosques and religious schools etc. At the same time, the socio-economic dislocation in the republics and the vacuum following the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union and socialism was cleverly exploited by Islamic radical elements backed by the Taliban. The Taliban helped the Islamic opposition movements of the Central Asian republics providing them sanctuaries and training. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), whose ultimate objective is to establish an Islamic state, was given arms and training in Afghanistan by the Taliban. These linkages have made religious extremism a potent source of destabilisation for the region. The turbulence in the region is unlikely to disappear anytime soon.
The terrorist strikes on the Indian Parliament on 13 December and the devastating attacks on the United States, on 11 September 2001 both by Islamic Jehadi forces based in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region and the accompanying calamity have brought into sharp focus the need to combat the rampant armed religious extremism. Reacting with rage to these terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush declared that United States would go all out to crush the terrorists and went on to describe it as the first war of the 21st century.
To confront this menace of international terrorism, the United States along with other countries have fought the Al-Qaida and the Taliban 1 , defeating them swiftly in the military operations in Afghanistan. The Central Asian States, being the immediate neighbours of Afghanistan and the sufferers of the Taliban phenomenon and the rising Islamic fundamentalism, have expressed their official support for Washington’s efforts to combat this terrorism. In doing so, the Central Asian States have sought to focus international attention on the region’s major security concern. "These kinds of inhuman acts need the co-ordinated and effective actions of all countries and international organisations", said a Kazakh foreign ministry statement. 2 Similarly, President Akaev of Kyrghyzstan, whose country has suffered armed incursions by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) said, "This act of aggression shows what a threat international terrorism brings". 3 They have also emphasised that international terrorism should also be effectively dealt with by the United Nations. "The United Nations . . . . must play a key role in setting up a global system to counter this large-scale threat posed by international terrorism", said Tajikistan’s UN Ambassador Rashid Alimov. 4
The region’s readiness to assist the United States and repeated statements that the UN play a role to curb international terrorism stems from its own concerns about Islamic fundamentalist and terror organisations. Before 11 September, the Central Asian states were already grappling with religious rebel groups, many of whom were receiving arms and training from the Taliban. Among these groups, the IMU, which has stated its arm to be the creation of an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, is considered as the most important militant organisation which threatens the region’s security.
This paper examines the key extremist organisations active in Central Asia and their attempts to destabilise the region. It also examines the reasons behind the rise of religious extremism and the measures taken by the Central Asian countries to combat it.
A Brief Background of the Rise of Religious Extremism
During the Soviet period some of the prominent analysts had predicted that Islamic radicalism would be the cause of the demise of the Soviet Union. They also believed that underground Islamic activism, which had persisted through Soviet times, would emerge to challenge the successors to the communist rule. 5 However, these apprehensions did not prove to be real. In fact, until 1999, the notion that religious extremism led by radical Islam would be a serious destabilising factor following the collapse of Soviet Power in Central Asia seemed an exaggerated fear. The most important role of Islam was in the cultural sphere rather than as an active opposition to the post-Soviet governments. Islam played only a minor role in larger Central Asian politics with the exception of Islamism’s rise to prominence in Tajikistan during the civil war there (1992-1997).
However, in recent years Islam as a religious tradition and as a form of cultural and political identity has acquired new meaning in Central Asian republics. There has increasingly been a greater observance of Islamic rites, adoption of "Asslamwalaikuan" as a form of greeting, religious marriages, performance of daily prayers and attendance at mosques. There has also been a phenomenal increase in the construction of religious places. The number of unaccredited mullahs has increased and there is proliferation of mosques particularly in rural areas. It is estimated that the number of mosques has gone up to 5,000 from 160 during the past few years. A number of theological schools have been established in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. Huge donations are voluntarily collected to be used for the construction of mosques and madrassas. Surveys conducted in Central Asia have shown that the level of religiosity among Muslims is higher than it was ten or twenty years ago, especially among the younger generation and intellectuals. 6
Yet the revival of Islam in the Central Asian Republics was still largely a cultural, social and religious phenomenon with people publicly wanting to demonstrate their separateness from the communist system. The popular knowledge of the religion of Islam was minimal and information on political activism, ideas and debates in the Islamic world beyond Central Asia was almost non-existent. But the arrival of funds, Korans, literature and mullahs from Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan had its effect, each spreading its particular version of Islam in these countries. The vacuum created by the lack of leadership from the official Islamic hierarchy allowed fundamentalist groups to proliferate. The refusal of Central Asian Governments to allow Islamic education in government schools resulted in the spread of unofficial Islamic schools. Many learned to bypass official Islam as they set up their own mosques and other structures. 7
In the beginning of 1992, M. Abdullah Islamailov (incharge of international relations at the Spiritual Administration of Religious Affairs of Central Asia) enthusiastically declared, "Three years ago Uzbekistan had eighty mosques. Today there are 1000 in the Namangan region alone. (Namangan is one of the most religious regions). We had only two madrassas in the whole of Soviet Union for the instruction of religious leaders. Today, there are twelve." 8
The Importance of Fergana Valley
It is worth mentioning that in the Fergana Valley, which has always been the country’s most religious region, radical Islamic elements are on the increase. Today, it is the "educational centre" for Central Asia’s fundamentalists. Most of Central Asia’s religious figures are still in the ‘proselytizing phase’, more interested in training new clerics and increasing the level of religious learning among the population than in getting the laws of society to conform to those of Islam. 9 "First Fergana, the Uzbekistan and then the whole Central Asia will become an Islamic State," said Imam Abdul Ahmad in Namangan. Imams said their aim was to overthrow the ‘communist government of Karimov’ and spearhead an Islamic revolution throughout Central Asia. 10
All this shows that Islam has regained its importance in Central Asia and provides a fertile ground to the radical Islamists for expansion. Pakistan, whose track record of support for religious fundamentalism, political extremism, international terrorism and armed subversion have become an important component of its regional strategy, used this opportunity through its latest manifestation-the Taliban. Apart from their destructive activities, they carried out a silent war of subversion and infiltration in the republics of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The long term aim was to arouse the religious and nationalist passions of the 30 million Muslims north of the Afghanistan border. 11 To achieve this objective, they first provided sanctuaries and then training to the disparate anti-government forces in Central Asian Republics. For example, the leadership of IMU was provided a safe haven by the Taliban and its guerillas were receiving training and arms in the Taliban controlled Afghanistan.
Key Extremist Organisations in Central Asia
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
The IMU is an extremist paramilitary group that the US Department of State ranks fourth in its list of international terrorist organisations. 12 Judging by the identity papers found on dead paramilitaries, numerous Chechen, Arab, Afghan and European mercenaries are fighting side by side with Uzbeks under the command of the warlords, Jumabai Namangani-a Wahabi trained in Afghanistan and prominent among IMU chieftains and Tahir Yuldash. 13 Jumabai Namangani is the military leader of IMU while Takhir Yuldash is the political leader. Both are formerly from Namangan province located in Uzbekistan’s portion of the Fergana Valley. The IMU had its headquarters in Afghanistan. Several thousand Uzbek and Tajik religious extremists underwent training in Afghan-based camps for fighting and acts of terror and sabotage. 14 It announced that its primary aim was to focus world attention on the persecution of thousands of Muslims in Uzbekistan, and ultimately to overthrow the current Uzbek leadership and establish an Islamic state. 15 Following this declaration, the IMU planned and conducted a series of terrorist attacks. Among attacks attributed to the IMU is a series of bomb attacks in Tashkent in February 1999. 16 These attacks were targeted against Uzbek President Islam Karimov. Though the President had a narrow escape, 16 people were killed and 128 injured in this attack. 17 The leader of the IMU, Takhir Yuldash, then fled to the Taliban controlled Afghanistan. In May 1999, the Taliban allowed Yuldash to set up military camps in northern Afghanistan just a few miles from the Afghanistn-Uzbek border. Unconfirmed media reports say that he was training several hundred Islamic militants from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrghyzstan, as well as Uighurs from Xinjiang Autonomous Region in China. 18
Initially, the Taliban denied having extended any help to the IMU. But in June 1999, when the Uzbek Government requested for the extradition of Takhir to Tashkent, it was rejected by Taliban. 19
Besides Uzbekistan, the IMU has recruited heavily in the Batken region of Kyrghyztan, a swath of land on the border between Southern Uzbekistan and northern Tajikistan. Batken has high unemployment and poverty and the IMU has attempted to use this discontent for a political programme. Youth in Batken are quicker to join radicals than older traditional Muslims. According to social workers in Southern Kyrghyzstan, the majority of homes have IMU leaflets advocating an Islamic state. 20 High mercenary traffic in the region accounts for an increase of militants subordinate to IMU. Kyrghyz Security Council Chairman, Bolot Dzanuzakov reported in April 2000 that Islamic militants from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asian Republics collaborate in terrorist training and narco-trafficking. 21 Kyrghyz officials were also concerned that between 2,000 to 5,000 militants have received training in camps at Tavildara in Tajikistan. 22
The other armed operation launched by the militants after the Tashkent explosions was in the Batken region itself. Trouble started when a group of armed militants, mostly ethnic Uzbeks crossed over to the Batken district from northern Tajikistan and took Kyrghyz officials hostage, releasing them a week later after a ransom of US $50,000 had been paid. The Kyrghyz military tried to expel the armed group from Kyrghyzstan. However, on 22-23 August, a new group of hostages was taken, including four Japanese geologists. The confrontation continued for two months, during which Kyrghyz troops appeared powerless to expel the insurgents from several villages.Uzbekistan offered military support, and without a go-ahead from either country, its air force bombed the territory of Kyrghyzstan and Tajikistan, provoking sharp protests, especially from the latter. 23 The insurgents withdrew after reportedly having been paid a ransom of US $3 million. 24
Aside from the vague intention of bringing down the Uzbek Government, and the specific demand for ransom, the insurgents also insisted that the Kyrghyz Government give them leave to pass freely through Kyrghyz territory to Uzbekistan, which was their actual target. Though the total number of fighters was reportedly around 1,000, they could not realistically have expected that they would be able to take and hold any territory in Uzbekistan, which has a relatively strong army and has been fortifying border regions in recent years, especially in the Fergana Valley. 25
As a result of these events, tensions grew sharply between the three states. Uzbekistan criticised Kryghyzstan for military weakness and inability to control its territory and Tajikistan for harbouring Uzbekistan’s enemies. Tajikistan protested the unsanctioned over-flight and bombing of its territory (which Uzbekistan first denied, but later admitted). Eventually, however the incursion prompted security agreements between these states (and with Russia), as they braced for new incursions the following summer, once snow melted on the mountain passes between Tajikistan and Kyrghyzstan. 26
The incursions began anew in August 2000, initially in Uzbekistan. IMU groups seized rural areas of Uzbekistan. 27 Within a week, separate incursions had begun in several places in southern Kyrghyzstan. The terrorists were discovered in the mountainous Lyalyak district in Kyrghyzstan’s Batken province, which borders on Tajikistan. The Kyrghyzstan military was undoubtedly better prepared this time. Border guards and the regular Kyrghyz units joined the battle with them. The operation against the extremists was supervised by the republic’s defence minister personally. 28 According to the Kyzghyz authorities, the invasion of Kyrghyzstan was launched from Tajikistan. However, Dushanbe categorically denied it. 29 Also according to Uzbek intelligence, the militants fighting in southern Uzbekistan underwent special training in camps in Afghanistan. Then, they slipped into Tajikistan along mountain trails in small groups. There they got their final briefings and made their way into Uzbekistan. Uzbek intelligence officers say it is impossible to monitor all the trails: 10 to 15 families live in each village here and each family has its own paths. 30 The Tajik authorities deny that "their people are involved in any way in the conflict." Major General Safarali Saifullayev, vice-chairman of Tajikistan’s State Border Protection Committee, told a Kommersant correspondent in an interview that such charges were a fabrication. According to a source in the Tajik Security Council staff, the militants fighting in Southern Uzbekistan belong to a unit under the command of Namangani. 31
In the year 2001 also, the extremists started a new campaign of violence by making two attacks in one week in the Batken region of Kyrghyzstan. The first attack was made on a border post on 24 July 2001 and second on a radio transmitter station near Chauvai, in the Kadamjai district on 30 July 2001. A small group of them tried to cut through a perimeter fence, but fled after security guards opened fire. 32 The IMU’s spokesman, Zubair ibn Abdurahim, confirmed that the insurgents were members of the guerrilla group. "These are our mujahideen", he said in a telephone interview with the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR). 33 Abdurahim also said, "we are determined to continue our Jihad (holy war) against the regimes in Uzbekistan and Kyrghyzstan", he said, adding that while their main target is Uzbekistan, they now treat Kyrghyzstan as an enemy because of its opposition to the IMU. 34
Another indication that the IMU has launched a new insurgency comes from Uzbekistan. An aconymous source told IWPR that in the Surkhandaria region skirmishes between Uzbek troops and gunmen resulted in casualties on both sides. The source said the gunmen might well have been IMU members who had crossed over from a camp in Afghanistan. 35
Coping with conflict in Central Asia could become increasingly difficult, as the IMU insurgency becomes progressively entangled with the geopolitical struggle surrounding Afghanistan. It is gradually transforming itself from a national movement, whose energy is focused on the ouster of Uzbekistan’s government, into more of a regional force. Also, recently it renamed itself as Hizb-i-Islami Turkestan, or the Islamic Party of Turkestan. 36 This is an adjustment to the fact that all its members are not Uzbek but also Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kyrghyz, Tajiks and Chechens. This also reflects the expanding aspirations of its leadership. While priority is still to topple the Uzbek President Karimov, now it also wants to liberate the whole of Turkistan-from Zinjiang to the Caspian Sea. It is hoped that the overthrow of Karimov will have a domino effect and make other Central Asian states weaker. 37
The change in name from ‘movement’ to ‘party’ implies that the group has broadened its aspirations, perhaps in the hope of increasing the size of its following. It probably means that the group will develop more of an ideology, which wasn’t the strongest point of the IMU earlier.
Further, IMU has received critical support and training from the Taliban. It supported the Taliban’s fight against the Northern Alliance. And now, in the post-11 September crisis, when United State has started its attacks over the Taliban, IMU has offered full support to the Taliban. This help has made Namangani’s group very important for the Taliban. It is said that Namangani is now the most honoured guest of the Taliban after Bin Laden. 38 Also, only ten days prior to the attack on Ahmed Shah Masoud, the leader of Northern Alliance, the Taliban appointed Bin Laden the military commander of their army. It may be specially noted that Bin Laden then nominated Namangani of the IMU, as his deputy. 39
Now, as the retaliatory attacks by United States on Taliban are continuing, the Taliban seems to be nearing its demise. This raises the question that with the fall of Taliban, will the IMU still survive? One answer to this question can be yes. Because, the IMU is only supported, not created by the Taliban. It came into existence because of the circumstances in Uzbekistan and the ideas of Yuldash and Namangani. These will not be solved nor destroyed with the disappearance of the Taliban. On the other hand, there is a possibility of, as Gleb Pavlovsky, an advisor to Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Russia and United States must coordinate positions on a post-war settlement, otherwise, "the vanquished terrorists and their Taliban masters will have no other way, but to retreat to Central Asia." He further warned that "There (in Central Asia), a ‘gray zone’ could be created where the vanquished will revive their extremism." 40
Hizbul-Tahrir
Besides IMU, Hizbul-Tahrir is another organisation which is spreading religious extremism in Central Asian States.
This is a religious, political, reactionary and underground organisation. The main political objective of this organisation is to change the existing regimes and to create a new Islamic state by means of a violent revolution. This organisation was actually founded by Sheik Takitdin Nabahony at the beginning of the 1950s with the creation of its first cell in Baytul Makris (Syria). It is organised on a pyramid principle. Every group or cell consists of 5-6 people who remain separate from each other; this structure minimises the possibility of the cell breaking up and is particular to secret and revolutionary organisations. 41 It also maintains a website (http://www.hizb-ul-tahrir.org/) with extensive material on its ideology, goals, methods etc. 42
According to the organisation, the creation of an Islamic State in Central Asia is to be realised in three different stages:
First, members of the group will undertake underground work providing training and recruiting young people to the party. This underground work will help create a leadership structure.
Once, this structure has been established, the members will openly declare their objectives through spreading leaflets, organising meetings and processions and public appeals.
Once, the structure is deemed sufficiently strong, the organisation will overthrow the incumbent constitutional and secular regimes by revolution and will then build the Islamic state according to Shariat. 43
This Hizbul-Tahrir is very active in Kyrghyzstan. Sources in the Kyrghyz security services believe that the organisation has 3,500 members on the territory of Kyrgyzstan, mainly former students of theological colleges, state employees and businessmen. 44 It is making the biggest impact in the south of the country-Osh and Jalalabad Regions. However missionaries have also been noticed in the Chu region where an underground printing house has been found. 45
Kyrghyzstan first heard the name off Hizbul-Tahrir in 1998. The first leaflets appeared in southern Kyrghyzstan calling for the Islam Karimov regime in neighbouring Uzbekistan to be removed and provide help for distant Palestine in the struggle against the Israelis. And, although the wording of this appeal did not refer to Kyrghyzstan, nevertheless the special services were alarmed by it. In 1999, a total of 13 incidents of stirring up inter-religious enmity were recorded in the republic. Approximately 15 people were detained. In eight months of 2001, 117 members of Hizbul-Tahrir were detained for disseminating propaganda encouraging people to join a jehad. 46
Not only in Kyrghyzstan, this organisation is also working in Uzbekistan, where it is operating as an underground movement. Though the Uzbek Government officially insisted that Hizbul-Tahrir and IMU were working hand in hand but Hizbul-Tahrir denied it. 47
Such organisations are out to foment instability in Central Asia by overthrowing existing regimes and imposing on the Central Asian people their ideas of governance by arousing religious sentiments.
The Tajik Situation
The above discussion shows that Uzbekistan and Kyrghyzstan are currently the most affected by religious extremism. Tajikistan is another state that is affected. Rather, Tajikistan provides a special case since Islamic forces have played a very destructive role in that country’s civil war. 48 Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) of Tajikistan was formed even before the disintegration of the USSR and then it was supported by Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan and the Islamic elements of Iran. Success of Mujahideen factions in Afghanistan gave further impetus to the Islamic elements in Tajikistan. In the wake of the Soviet collapse, IRP tried to seize power. There were incidents of brutal violence against ethnic Russians of Dushanbe and other parts of the Tajik Republic by the Islamic fundamentalist elements. After the declaration of independence by Tajikistan in September 1991, the pro-fundamentalist elements tried to seize power. In the civil war that followed, the Tajiks wedded to Islamic extremism crossed the border into Afghan territory. There the Afghan Mujahideen groups undertook to impart training in sophisticated weapons to these Tajik migrants. The Tajik militants conducted armed incursions into Tajik territory with the tacit support and connivance of the Afghan warriors with the clear objective of bringing down the government and replacing it by a fundamentalist regime. 49 Thousands died in the Tajik civil war.
However, in 1997 a peace agreement 50 was reached with the help of the Russian and Iranian good offices, thus formally ending the civil war. Despite the peace agreement, Tajikistan continues to be plagued by outbursts of violence involving groups that do not recognise the deal. 51 On 9 September 2000, celebrating his country’s Independence Day, Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rakhmanov, expressed concern about the threat posed by the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), elements of which have continued to battle his beleaguered regime despite the May 1997 agreement with this group and his sweeping parliamentary poll victory in early 2000. 52 Islamic rebels living in Tajikistan are keeping the security forces engaged in the region and there is a considerable increase in the number of rebel forces in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrghyzstan. 53 When the snow melts on the mountain passes between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrghyzstan, the rebels typically migrate from Tajikistan to other countries, killing or taking hostage anyone who gets in their way. 54
Thus, these extremists forces are threatening the political leadership of all the three republics-Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrghyzstan. Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan is also threatened by the influx of these elements, which along with armed insurrection, can also upset the social order with their Islamic radicalism and militancy. 55
Measures Taken by Central Asian Republics to Combat Religious Extremism
From the above discussion it is quite clear that religious extremism is increasingly posing a great threat to peace and stability in Central Asia. Therefore, maintaining security and stability in the region has become one of the most important and urgent issues of these countries. Taking into consideration the national interests of their respective countries, as well as realising the doctrine of maintenance of stability in Central Asia in reality, they aspire to achieve security through cooperation in the framework of the international and regional organisations. The formation of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in June 2001 bears witness to that. The declaration on the creation of the SCO and the convention on the struggle against terrorism, separatism and extremism, was seen by the Central Asian republics as important steps towards the strengthening of the regional security. 56
Actually, SCO has grown out of the "Shanghai Five" mechanism. Five years after its modest start as an organisation that would broker border disputes, the Shanghai Five members-China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan and Tajikistan-welcomed the new member Uzbekistan and renamed itself as Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
While SCO allows the participants to meet and discuss various regional security issues, it does not have a military dimension. To safeguard regional security, all the member countries will work closely in implementing the "Shanghai Convention on Rebuffing Terrorism, Separatism and Radicalism", which includes the anti-terrorist centre in Bishkek. 57 In this regard, SCO has come at a time of heightened concerns about Central Asian security as regional governments are battling to contain extremist forces in the region. In the words of Uzbek President Karimov, "We consider the Shanghai Organisation as a tool of mutilateral cooperation for strengthening peace and stability, an open, constructive partnership and multilateral cooperation, first of all, in the fight against such global and regional threats as international terrorism, regional extremism aggressive separatism and trade of narcotic drugs". 58 In the aftermath of the 11 September terrorist attacks on the US and the war against the Taliban and Al Qaida, the geopolitics in the region is likely to shift. The US presence and its ties with Uzbekistan, Russia, Kyrghyzstan and Afghanistan will have an effect on the SCO.
Another step taken towards regional security is the CIS Collective Security Treaty. The Collective Security Treaty was signed in Tashkent in May 1992. This treaty defined the major sources of military danger, and the factors which might contribute to military dangers evolving into a direct military threat. 59 But the efforts towards this end have had very little success. To give it a boost, at the May 2001 CST meeting, an agreement on the creation of rapid deployment forces (RDF) was ratified. The agreement included plans to deploy such forces in Central Asia by August 2001. Another major recent initiative taken was the creation of an Anti-Terrorist Centre (ATC) to be based in Bishkek. 60
Further, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan & Tajikistan are the members of Six-Plus-Two grouping which also includes Pakistan, China, Iran, US and Russia. This grouping sought some political solution to the continuing civil war in Afghanistan 61 which has been destablised by Taliban.
Besides, with the exception of Turkmenistan, which officially remains neutral in political and security affairs, the other Central Asian republics entered into a significant pan-regional agreement in April 2000. They signed a 10 year treaty to combat terrorism, religious extremism and organised crime. 62
Central Asian Response to Post-11 September Developments
The Central Asian republics have supported the "war against terrorism", led by the United States after 11 September 2001 incidents. The leaders of all the Central Asian countries quickly condemned the attacks in America and offered their help. Not only have they condemned the attack on America but have also supported retaliatory attacks by America on the Taliban and the Al Qaida.
The Uzbek Government has been the most enthusiastic as it was keen to welcome a strike at the Afghanistan-based IMU, which it considers its own deadly enemy. Karimov’s government has said that it was open to allowing the US to use Uzbek airspace or territory for an attack. 63 Besides, on 12 October 2001, a US-Uzbek joint statement was also issued, according to which the United States has extended security guarantees to President Islam Karimov’s government. In return, Uzbekistan has sanctioned the use of its military facilities by US armed forces for offensive military operations against Afghanistan. 64
Prior to the release of the joint statement, Uzbekistan had been a somewhat reluctant host to US military forces in Central Asia. While Karimov granted the United States access to military bases, he insisted that American soldiers could only use Uzbek facilities for humanitarian and search-and-rescue missions. Tashkent repeatedly demanded stronger US security commitments in return for greater Uzbek cooperation. 65
Kazakhstan has apparently consulted with Russia on the issue of giving support to US military strikes on extremists in Afghanistan. As it is located far from the possible theatre of war, Astana’s support to the US military operation would not oblige Kazakhstan to take any steps that may endanger its security. 66 It offered the US the use of its airspace for the strikes. 67
Tajikistan, the most convenient springboard for the American attack, has also offered its help to the US. "Being in solidarity with the United States people, we at the same time express our willingness to cooperate with international community including US Government, in the fight against international terrorism and extremism," said the Tajik President, Rakhamonov. 68 It is also to be noted here that they took the decision in consultation with Russia. 69 Though it offered its support, it remains concerned about the impact on the shaky secular-Islamic coalition that rules the country. And, is also anxious about the risk of refugees fleeing across the border with Afghanistan. 70
Kyrghystan which has suffered the most from international terrorism among Central Asian republics is also coordinating its actions with its partners within the CIS collective Security treaty. At the same time, it has expressed its political support to the US in its struggle against international terrorism. Given that Kyrghyzstan does not have common borders with Afghanistan and any suitable airbases, Bishkek will hardly be an active player in the global war against terrorism. However, the country may face a flood of refugees fleeing from war which can threaten its stability. 71 s
Turkmenistan, on the other hand, operates under a system of neutrality and isolation that precludes overt cooperation with the West.
The Central Asian States’ support to the US can serve two of their interests. First, they can ask the US, "If you want our military cooperation, we also want you to target the IMU bases-i.e., that you take out not just Bin Laden’s camps but also IMU camps and you try and strangle the IMU as well," as quoted by Ahmed Rashid, a leading expert on Taliban and a Pakistan based correspondent for The Far Eastern Economic Review. 72
Second, they can gain economic assistance from the US. All these countries are struggling with widespread poverty and difficulties in implementing market reforms and people have shown increasing dissatisfaction with their political and economic circumstances.
How far they will be able to achieve these interests will depend on a number of factors that cannot yet be adequately weighed. Though, a large packet of economic assistance to Central Asia as a region has been discussed in Washington, 73 this will prove to be helpful only if it actually promotes reforms and gets down to the grass roots. The region’s endemic corruption has blocked or diluted the effects of such attempts by international institutions in the past. Despite the above discussed measures, the Central Asian governments have not still been able to curb or control the movements caused by extremism.
Analysis of the Problem
It is clear from the above discussion that the Central Asian republics have tried to curb growing religious extremism through various religious cooperation organisation by seeking support of major powers but little has been done to tackle the socio-economic problems within the countries that give rise to religious extremism.
The movements caused by religious extremism and militant Islam are not the cause, but the consequence of deeper and more complex problems. The main reason, probably, is the growing dissatisfaction of various population groups with their socio-economic conditions-unemployment, poverty, little prospects of social advancement, which have taken the form of religious protest.
Independence of the Central Asian republics in 1991 has brought huge economic problems. The collapse of the USSR meant the end of direct budgetary support from Moscow. This affected most areas of civil administration and social security. Other effects of the collapse included a rapid end to the distribution system that carried imports and exports between the Soviet republics, a sharp decline in industrial production, large-scale emigration of management and intellectual elites. Within one or two years, it became painfully obvious to the governments in Central Asia that the Commonweath of Independent States (CIS) framework had little to offer their economies. Kyrghyzstan and Tajikistan, with the poorest resources and the weakest infrastructure, suffered the sharpest economic decline. In Tajikistan, the economy was further decimated by civil war. Uzbekistan a major cotton producer with generally a much stronger agricultural base as well as significant gold and fossil fuel-resources, did not suffer as badly but was still severely affected. Yet, despite having the greatest economic potential, Uzbekistan has yet to implement key reforms such as currency convertibility. This has stifled direct foreign investment and impeded trade with its neighbours. The failure to reform recently prompted the IMF to declare its intention not to appoint a new representative to Uzbekistan, causing great concern for the government and diminishing the prospects of other international assistance. 74
Further, privatisation in Central Asia has not produced the expected results, as successful enterprises have been transferred to a narrow, powerful elite. Businessmen in the region frequently complain that officials and bureaucracies are unsympathetic to the development of an entrepreneurial spirit and that continuous government intervention makes the life of private firms extremely difficult. Growing disparities of income and wealth have introduced a series of social tensions as the gap between average monthly wages and the minimum living wages continues to widen. These negative processes grow out of-and in turn further reinforce-corruption among the political elite, arbitrary behaviour by representatives of state institutions, and especially the law enforcement bodies, and the consolidation of economic wealth and power in ruling families. 75
Further, the quality of education in many areas has plummeted, and jobs and land have become critically scares. Lacking opportunities and firm social framework leave people susceptible to radical forces. When the incursions have occurred over the past two or three years, the insurgents have found support among the local population of the region. These people are not particularly disposed to militancy, but they appreciate that the militants have treated them fairly well and paid them well for food, unlike the government which they identify with disinterest and corruption. 76
Further, Central Asian republics have failed to develop democracy, rather all the states in the region have seen concentration of power in one set of people. Moreover, the governments have adopted very oppressive policies to curb any kind of political opposition and are especially hard against practicing Muslims not affiliated with officially recognised Islamic organisations. Uzbekistan is a specific example of such policies. Karimov’s harsh repression has "radicalised the opposition" according to Reuel Hanks, editor of Journal of Central Asian Studies. He said that the condition has forced growing numbers, even of the middle class, to "turn to increasingly desperate and violent actions", against the government. 77 There is hardly a family in Uzbekistan’s middle class, in which a member has not been detained, questioned, arbitrarily imprisoned or beaten by internal security forces, according to Robert Culter, a Central Asia Specialist at Carelaton University in Montreal. 78 Therefore, Karimov’s harsh rule is actually radicalising Uzbekistan’s disaffected and disenfranchised youth and driving them into the arms of IMU and its radical allies.
There are also intra-regional causes of conflict. The ethno-nationalist tendencies, water crises, border problems and migration problems provide sufficient grievances, insecurity, mistrust and perceived vulnerability that any new crisis in the region could rapidly transform itself into widespread civil unrest. 79
Conclusion
Thus, economic deterioration on the domestic front, conflicts and antagonisms among the Central Asian Republics themselves, absence of democracy and rise of authoritarian regimes, are all factors that have contributed to the instability and tensions in Central Asia. These are being fully exploited by transnational religious extremists through their local fanatics. Therefore, a comprehensive solution to the Afghan conflict and political and economic progress are essential for curbing religious extremism in Central Asia.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Dr. Jyotsna Bakshi and Shri Sujit Dutta for their guidance and inputs while writing this paper.
Endnotes
Note 1: Taliban is the name given to the political movement that had been in control of most of Afghanistan’s territory between 1996-2001 till it was overthrown by the US-led global coalition and the Northern Alliance of anti-Taliban groups in Afghanistan. The movement is radical and fundamentalist, and is largely identified with the majority Pushtun ethnic group in Afghanistan. The group suddenly emerged as a military force in 1994, and by 1997 had conquered almost two-thirds of Afghanistan’s territory, as quoted by ICG Asia Report, Recent Violence in Central Asia: Causes and Consequences, 18 October 2000. Now, the US decided to fight with Taliban because according to the US sources, Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Qaida network, the prime suspect of 11 September, attack has been given shelter by Taliban. The Taliban refused to hand him over to the US authorities. Back.
Note 2: "US Anti-Terrorism Plans Get Central Asian Backing", http://www.iwpr.net, 12 October 2001. Back.
Note 4: Todd Diamond, "Central Asian States Advance Multinational Fight Against Terrorism", http://www.eurasianet.org, 10 October 2001. It is to be noted that Central Asian representatives took part in the United Nations debate on combating terrorism from 1-5 October 2001. The delegates attempted to foster debate about the Post-Taliban order. Several speakers focussed on the under-funded Terrorism Prevention Branch of the UN office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, which operates in Vienna. Uzbekistan’s UN envoy, Alisher Vohidev, said, new funds should be made available so that the Vienna office could develop into an anti-terrorism centre. Such an office could "Provide technical and consultative services to states, international and regional organisations to implement international instrument and decisions of the United Nations," Vohidov added. Back.
Note 5: Alexander Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), as cited in ICG Asia report, No. 14 "Central Asia: Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security" 1 March 2001, p. 7. Back.
Note 6: See, Poonam Mann, "Fighting Terrorism: India and Central Asia," Strategic Analysis, vol. XXIV, no. 11, February 2001. Back.
Note 7: Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia-Islam or Nationalism, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 244-245. Back.
Note 8: Giampaolo R. Capisani, The Handbook of Central Asia-A Comprehensive Survey of the New Republics, I.B. (London: Tauris Publishers, 2000) p. 124. Back.
Note 9: Snyder, Jed. C (ed.) After Empire: The Emerging Geo-Politics of Central Asia (Washington D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1995). Back.
Note 10: Rashid, n. 7, p. 100. Back.
Note 11: Poonam, n. 6, p. 2043. Back.
Note 12: Valentin Kunin, "Kabul to be Centre for War against all Infidels", National Herald, 17 September, 2000. Back.
Note 13: Ibid. Also see, ICG report, Recent Violence in Central Asia: Causes and Consequences, 18 October 2000, p. 3. Namangani fought for the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) during the Tajik civil war, and prior to that, he served in the Soviet Army, fighting for three years as a paratrooper in Afghanistan, where friends say he was emotionally influenced by the stubborn resistance put up by the Afghan Mujahideen. "Afghanistan changed his beliefs and he became a practicing Muslim". He was inspired there," says a resident of the Karategin valley who knows him well. Together with his political mentor Takhir Yuldash, they formed the IMU in 1998 in Afghanistan, calling for a Jihad to topple Karimov. This information is quoted from, Ahmed Rashid, "Pamirs Offer IMU Secure Base", http://www.eurasianet.org 10 April, 2001. Back.
Note 14: Kunin, n. 12, also see, Tatiana Sinitsyna, "Uzbekistan-Nine Years in Company with Independence", National Herald, 1 September 2000. Back.
Note 15: Tamara Makarenko, "Crime and Terrorism in Central Asia," Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 12, no. 7, July 2000, p. 17. Back.
Note 17: Sreedhar, "Is the Taliban Being Converted into a Jihadi Army", Aakrosh, vol. 3, no. 7, April 2000, p. 19. Back.
Note 20: Quoted from paper presented by Bakaeyev Askar on International Security and Strategic Environment in Context of Problems of Southern and Central Asia, during the second Indo-Central Asian Seminar Organised by IDSA on 11-12 September, 2000. Back.
Note 23: ICG Asia Report, no. 14 Central Asia: Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, 1 March, 2001, p. 7. Back.
Note 25: ICG Asia Report, n. 23, p. 8. Back.
Note 27: Kenley Butler, "Internal Conflicts and Security Concerns in Central Asia and Afghanistan", http://www.cns.miis.edu., 26 September, 2001. Back.
Note 28: The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. 52, no. 33, September 13, 2000, p. 19. Back.
Note 30: The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. 52, no. 32, 6 September, 2000, p. 14. Back.
Note 32: Sultan Jumagulov and Kubat Otorbaev, "Kyrgyz IMU Fears Mount", http://iwpr.vs4.cerbernet.co.uk, 4 August, 2001. Back.
Note 36: Daan van der Schriek, "The Central Asian Taliban", The Times of Central Asia, vol. 3, no. 42(137), 18 October, 2001, p. 5. Back.
Note 39: Ariel Cohen, "Central Asia to Play Prominent Role in US-Russian Cooperation", http://www.eurasianet.org, 14 September, 2001. Back.
Note 40: Ariel Cohen, "Central Asia: The War Preparations Tempered by Political Indecision", http://www.eurasianet.org, 13 October, 2001. Back.
Note 41: As quoted in Colonel Razakov T.J. "Religious Extremism in Central Asia," The Times of Central Asia, vol. 3, no. 44 (139), 1 November, 2001, p. 1. Back.
Note 42: ICG Asia Report, Central Asia: Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, no. 14, 1 March, 2001, p. 6. Back.
Note 43: Razakov T.J., n. 41. Back.
Note 44: Kabar News Agency, Bishkek, October 23, 2001 (quoted from BBC Monitoring Global Newsline-Central Asia). Back.
Note 46: Delo No web site, Bishkek, 24 October, 2001 (quoted from BBC Monitoring Global Newsline-Central Asia). Back.
Note 47: ICG Asia Report, n. 42, p. 6. Back.
Note 48: For details see, Olivier Roy, The Civil War in Tajikistan: Causes and Implications, Washington D.C., United States Institute for Peace, December 1993; B. Rubin, "The Fragmentation of Tajikistan", Survival, vol. 35, no. 4, winter 1993-94, pp. 71-91. Back.
Note 49: The Pioneer, 26 August, 1993. Back.
Note 50: "Central Asia-Development in 1997," World Focus, vol. 19, no. 5 March 1998, pp. 21-23. Back.
Note 51: Umed Babakhanov, "Attackers Storm Tajikistan City, take 30 Hostages", The Asian Age, 5 November, 1998. Back.
Note 52: Quoted from paper presented by Mahendra Ved on "Afghanistan and Cross-border Terrorism in CIS", during the international seminar on The Afghanistan Crisis: Problems and Prospects of Peace, organised by Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation and Indian Council of Social Science Research, 19-21 November, 2001. Back.
Note 55: See, ved, n. 52. Back.
Note 56: See, "Text of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Declaration", FBIS-CHI-2001-0615, June 15, 2001. Back.
Note 58: "Preserving Peace in Central Asia is a Cornerstone of Uzbek Foreign Policy", http://www.times.kg, 1 September, 2001. Back.
Note 59: Cristoph Bluth and Oumirserik Kassenov, "The Game of Security in Central Asia", in Yalena Kalyuzhnova and Dov Lynch (ed.) The Euro-Asian World-A Period of Transition, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000) pp. 30-35. Back.
Note 60: See, ICG Asia Report, Central Asia: Fault Lines in The New Security Map, no. 20, 4 July, 2001, pp. 19-20. Back.
Note 62: Tamara Makarenko, "Friendly Co-operation Brings Mutual Benefit", Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 13, no. 2, February 2001, p. 40. Back.
Note 63: Jyrgalbek Kasabolotov, "Central Asia Waiting for War", The Times of Central Asia, vol. 3, no. 38 (133), 20 September, 2001, p. 4. Back.
Note 64: Anthony Baird, "New Alliance Brings US, Uzbekistan into Long-Term Embrace", posted on TOL Wire, 19 October, 2001. Back.
Note 66: Kasabolotov, n. 63. Back.
Note 67: Interfax-Kazakhstan News Agency, Almaty, November 7, 2001, (quoted from BBC Monitoring Global Newsline-Central Asia). Back.
Note 68: For more details see, "Tajikistan Ready to Co-operate with US" www.the star.com, 22 September 2001. Back.
Note 70: "Central Asian Perspective on 11 September and the Afghan Crisis", http://www.eurasianet.org, 4 October, 2001. Back.
Note 71: Kasabolotov, n. 63. Back.
Note 72: Jeremy Bransten, "Central Asia: Afghanistan’s Neighbours Face New Concerns", http://www.rfeal.org., 14 September, 2001. Back.
Note 73: Robert M. Cutler, "Islamic Militancy in Central Asia: What is to be Done?" http://www.fpif.org, October 19, 2001. Back.
Note 74: ICG Asia Report, Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia’s Localised Poverty and Social Unrest, 8 June, 2001, pp. 2-3. Back.