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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
Terror Enterprise: Organisation, Infrastructure and Resources
Shebonti Ray Dadwal, Research Fellow
Abstract
The 11 September 2001 attack on the US once again underlined the connection between the oil and politics. While the global economic slowdown developed recessionary trends, it also had its fall-out on the oil market. Demand dropped to a nine-year low, which in turn caused prices to fall by 20 per cent since pre-11 September days. This article discusses the impact of sustained low prices on the international oil market, its impact on producers which are dependent on oil revenues, and the possible political repercussions it may have on the world’s most important producer, namely, Saudi Arabia.
Introduction
The terrorist assault on US business and military centres on 11 September 2001, which caused oil prices to surge to over $31 per barrel, albeit temporarily, once again reiterated the connection between the oil market and political instability. The attack affected the heart of the US oil trade (the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), as it was situated close to the World Trade Centre), and while it caused stock markets to plunge, it also impacted on the oil market, particularly after it was confirmed that several of the hijackers involved in the attacks were from West Asia. Many were concerned that the US war against terrorism would expand to include those countries accused of harbouring terrorists (viz., Iran, Iraq and Libya). That all these countries are major oil producers added to the market’s concern. Also, with the West Asia Peace Process currently going through one of its most turbulent and violent phases there has been an increase in the uncertainty in the oil market although prices have since fallen to $18-20 per barrel.
Other factors pertaining exclusively to the oil market are also causing concerns that a crisis may be developing. Though it is generally agreed that sufficient oil reserves exist to take care of consumption over the next few decades or more, the supply situation could, nevertheless, become a problem. While the two largest oil producers-Saudi Arabia and the Russian Federation- are locked in a battle for market share, causing concerns of an imminent price war, the ongoing economic downswing in global financial markets will have long term repercussions on the oil market, whose impact may be felt for years.
The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which has of late succeeded in getting its act together and reined in some of its more renegade members, has managed to forge a (conditional) agreement with the major non-OPEC countries to try and restore some order to the oil market by modulating production. However, given many producers’ proclivity to indulge in quota busting, there are doubts whether the agreement, even if implemented, will have the desired result of stabilising the market and bring oil prices to levels suitable to the producers.
India, being one of the developing countries whose dependence on imported oil is expected to grow over time, is susceptible to issues that affect the oil market, as it would have a direct impact on not only its supply situation but also its economy. This article attempts to take a look at some of the concerns that have been cited above, which in turn, would impact not only on the international oil market but would also have repercussions on both producers and importers of oil. The paper argues that neither extremely high nor low prices are good for the stability and long term security of oil supply.
Current and Future Energy Scenario
According to the both, the International Energy Agency (IEA), and the US Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA), world proven oil reserves are around one trillion barrels, enough to meet demand well beyond 2020, at current rates of production (see table 1).
Table 1. World Proven Crude Oil Reserves (in billion barrels)
| Region | 1975 | 1985 | 1995 | 1999 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Americas | 84.1 | 118 | 156 | 164.3 |
| West Europe | 26 | 24 | 16.5 | 22.5 |
| FSU &EE | 112 | 65 | 59 | 59 |
| Middle East | 403.4 | 398 | 660.3 | 673.6 |
| Africa | 68 | 55.4 | 62.2 | 75.4 |
| Asia-Pacific | 21 | 37.6 | 44.4 | 43.1 |
| World | 715 | 699 | 999 | 1,038.1 |
However, many experts warn that a disbalance may be developing in the demand/supply scenario. While crude oil demand is currently to the tune of around 76 mbd, supply is in excess of 900,000 b/d. 1 (see table 2)
Table 2. World Oil Supply and Demand-1998-2002 (in mbd)
| 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total OECD Demand | 46.8 | 47.7 | 47.8 | 47.6 | 47.7(E) |
| Total non-OECD Demand | 26.8 | 27.6 | 28.1 | 28.4 | 28.8(E) |
| Total Demand | 73.6 | 75.2 | 75.9 | 76 | 76.6(E) |
| Total OECD Supply | 21.9 | 21.4 | 21.9 | 21.8 | 22.2(E) |
| Total non-OECD Supply | 21.3 | 21.6 | 22.2 | 22.9 | 23.5(E) |
| Total non-OPEC Supply | 44.8 | 44.7 | 45.9 | 46.5 | 47.4(E) |
| Total OPEC Supply | 30.8 | 29.4 | 30.8 | — | — |
| Total Supply | 75.6 | 74.2 | 76.7 | — | — |
E= estimated
Source: World Oil Supply and Demand Tables, IEA Monthly Oil Report, 12 November 2001.
Worse still, demand, which was growing at an average annual rate of one mbd for the last few years, is now estimated to be growing at around 100,000 b/d for 2001. 2 This downturn in demand is due to several factors such as the global economic slowdown, high country inventories, and the impact of the 11 September attacks on the international aviation, insurance and tourism industries-some of the largest consumers of oil.
Neither is demand expected to be restored to March 2001 levels (around 77 mbd) 3 as according to the IEA, demand through 2002 is also expected to increase by only 600,000 b/d. The global economy is only expected to begin the process of recovery sometime towards the end of 2002, following which, the demand for oil too is expected to recover. However, the oil companies and producers, which made huge profits since in 1999-2000, when oil prices shot up to almost $35 per barrel, did not invest sufficiently in drilling for “new oil”. Most oil fields need a gestation period of 5-7 years to begin production and investments for exploration and developing a newly discovered field need to begin atleast 8-10 years before it comes into production. Where older producing fields are concerned, many of them are nearing peak production, and need substantial investments to keep production at current levels, leave alone an increase in output. 4
Now, with oil prices at a nine-year low in real terms, investment in new production will be even more unlikely. As a result, despite the existence of a large reserve capacity, a major market squeeze in terms of production appears inevitable. Hence, it may not be long before the world may be looking at oil prices of $50-60 per barrel when demand picks up. Though softening demand in the future due to greater demand for alternative fuels, including natural gas and coal, may ease or delay the crunch for a while, no substitute for oil for transportation will be ready over the next 20-30 years so as to effectively reduce demand. Neither will new drilling technology make “unconventional” oil* available in the quantities or at the price that will be acceptable to all countries in the foreseeable future.
The IEA too seems to share the same concerns. In a book titled “World Energy Outlook, 2001 Insights: Assessing Today’s Supplies to Fuel Tomorrow’s Growth”, published on 23 October 2001, to coincide with the World Energy Congress in Buenos Aires, the IEA says that while sources are ample, supply is not guaranteed. Though the book agrees that advances in technology are driving production and transportation costs lower, the depletion of the cheapest reserves and the growing distances over which new supplies must be transported are pushing costs of delivered energy up. 5
Consumption is projected to reach 115 mbd by 2020, i.e., equivalent to 40 per cent of the world’s total energy supply. To meet this demand, the book opines that 61 mbd of additional capacity must be brought on stream by 2020 to compensate for the decline from existing fields as well as new fields. Since around $5 million is required to produce one mbd in low production-cost Middle East countries, the investment required to develop this production capacity would be over $300 billion (in today’s money). The average investment required to add production capacity in non-OPEC higher production cost countries is estimated to be four times higher. 6
However, non-OPEC producers, other than Russia and former Soviet Union (FSU) states, are not showing much signs of contributing additional oil to the market. While North Sea fields have reached, or are nearing, peak levels and new fields needed to offset the decline are not yet in sight, in the US, too, the onshore and shallow water fields that are pumping conventional oil are in terminal decline and have been overtaken by deep water production. The same goes for the older and mature producing areas in Angola, Colombia and Egypt. 7 Hence, other than the Middle East, only the FSU fields hold out promise of additional oil in the future. This causes a sense of unease in the oil market, as most companies as well as importers are trying to reduce their dependence on the Middle East, while transport problems continue to dog FSU oil exports.
There is no doubt that the majority of the world’s future supplies will be sourced in the Gulf region, which holds 66 per cent of the world’s oil reserves. The current production capacity of the major Persian Gulf countries is around 23 mbd, with potential capacity additions to the tune of 3-6 mbd in the near future. 8 However, here too, many of the oil producing states are faced with declining production, thanks to inadequate investment, while development of new projects has been delayed. For instance, though Algeria and Qatar are developing new fields, expansion in Kuwait has to wait till the new energy policy, which opens up the upstream sector to foreign investment, is enforced. Iran, and particularly Iraq, have extra capacity to be exploited, but US and UN sanctions policies imposed on both have seen investment in the former being restricted and banned in the latter. 9 (Ironically, it is the sanctions that have allowed these countries to have additional capacities as they have not been able to fully exploit their energy potential as a result of insufficient investments).
However, the Persian Gulf region’s reputation of instability, which is periodically strengthened by intra-regional tensions, not least the Arab-Israeli conflict, and more recently due to intra-state tensions arising from Islamic fundamentalism, does not augur well for large FDI as well as technological inflows, without which it would be difficult, if not impossible, for these countries to sustain, leave alone increase, output.
Other than concerns dealing with issues regarding production enhancement, which in turn have a bearing on oil prices, the potential physical disruption of oil supplies, due to conflict in producing countries, disruptions that may take place en route to destinations and take-over of producing countries by hostile forces, also give rise for concern. Since most of the Gulf Arab countries are rentier states, and dependent on oil revenues to keep all kinds of opposition to their rule at bay, production and export of oil is crucial. Though fears of the mining of the Straits of Hormuz or an oil blockade resorted to by any of the Gulf states have receded over time, the attack on the USS Cole on 12 October 2000, raised fears of potential suicide attacks on oil tankers or even oil rigs. The 11 September attacks have also served to reinforce these concerns, forcing governments to devise scenarios which take into account the possibility of any or all of the above.
Since the late 1980s, Gulf oil exports to Asia-Pacific countries, including India, have overtaken those to European OECD countries. For instance, in 2000, almost 60 per cent of Gulf oil exports went to Asia, as compared to 21 per cent to Europe, and 14 per cent to the US. 10 While Europe has increasingly been substituting coal and oil with natural gas, mainly for power generation, the US has been increasing oil imports from neighbouring countries like Canada and Mexico at the cost of Gulf imports leaving Asia-Pacific countries as the chief importers of Gulf crude. Therefore, any disruption of oil supplies, whether physical or a drop in production, which in turn would affect prices, would impact these countries the most. Hence, it is in these countries’ interest to see that oil production from the Gulf region remains consistent. The growing anti-West sentiments among the ordinary people of the region have led to deepening concerns that some of the current regimes, which are crucial for Western, and particularly the US the Gulf foreign policy, are vulnerable to change. Washington’s chief worry is that a change in the Saudi monarchy could lead to the installation of an anti-West, fundamentalist theocracy akin to the Iranian model, which could endanger crucial oil supplies to the US’s OECD allies.
The Saudi Factor
The importance of Saudi Arabia in the international oil market cannot be over-stated. Not only is it one of the major states in the Gulf region, it has the largest known reserves of oil in the world (around 260 billion barrels or a quarter of the world’s total) and is also the largest producer and exporter of oil. More importantly, it is the only “swing” producer, increasing or cutting production as per requirement, and hence plays a critical role in setting the market price for crude. 11
However, Saudi Arabia’s claim to its position in international policy is not only restricted to its status as the world’s largest oil producer, but also because it is home to Islam’s two holiest places-Mecca and Medina, with its rulers claiming the title of “guardian” of the religious shrines. For the US, in particular, Saudi Arabia, under the helm of the al-Saud family, holds up one of the two main pillars of US strategy in West Asia (the other being Israel). As a result, the British and the US Governments have helped to repress and suppress any challenge to the Saudi regime. Though some stress lines did develop during the Clinton presidency because of its handling of the Middle East Peace Process, the Bush Administration, with its array of former oil men, including Vice President Dick Cheney, has once again seen to it that relations are restored to their erstwhile warm levels. 12 In fact, Washington depends on the Saudi regime to provide a moderate voice within an increasingly strident OPEC, which can ensure that oil will never again be used by the cartel as a political weapon. Small wonder then that the issue of Saudi stability has been of prime importance to the US foreign policy.
Though periodic protests have taken place in the Kingdom, concern for the safety and stability of the Saudi regime only surfaced after the 1990-91 Gulf War. Earlier protests had been mainly confined to the Shia-dominated eastern (oil) province, and had been organised by illegal militant Shi’ite organisations, particularly after the rise of the Islamic republic in Iran. These groups were agitating for equal rights and respectful treatment of the Saudi Shi’ites, with some of the protests taking on terrorist overtones. However, in December 1993, they reached an agreement with King Fahd, whereby the government agreed to improve the treatment of Shias in the Kingdom and channel development in Shia-dominated regions. In return the organisation ceased all underground operations at home and abroad. 13
But post-1991, more and more Saudis were openly questioning the credibility of a regime that spent billions of petro-dollars on purchasing sophisticated weaponry, yet had to rely on US troops for protection against regional threats. Tensions were exacerbated by the state of the Saudi economy and the loss of much of the lavish lifestyle enjoyed by most Saudi citizens made the regime realise it had to tighten its belt to stave off financial disaster. Rising unemployment added to the discontent. With more than half the population of 21 million comprising below 20-year-olds, and the job market unable to absorb thousands of graduates each year, resentment against lack of democratisation has begun to increase. 14
The fact that the Kingdom had failed to move away from its declared agenda of diversifying its economy from an essentially oil-based one has exacerbated the problem. Unstable and see-sawing oil prices starting from the mid-1980s caused oil revenues of the OPEC states to drop by 30 per cent, with Saudi Arabia per se witnessing double digit budget deficits, forcing the government to cut subsidies in power generation and telephone rates, and impose taxes for the first time in the Kingdom’s history. 15 Though the situation improved somewhat between 1994-97 (when deficits dropped to below five per cent), the Asian financial crisis and the oil price crash of 1997-98 saw the Saudi economy once again teeter on the edge of a financial precipice. 16
However, it was the stationing of “infidel” US troops on “holy” Saudi soil, a perceived US anti-Palestinian stance in the Middle East Peace Process and the unrelenting aerial bombing of Iraq by British and American aircraft for a decade, which has caused the greatest resentment against not only Washington, but also the royal family, increasingly seen as an American stooge.
The regime had always kept all forms of dissidence at bay by providing its citizens with lavish lifestyles as well as maintaining a tight control over the media. Religion is state controlled, with the clergy handpicked by the rulers. However, despite the strict censorship over all aspects of civilian life, voices of opposition began to arise even among respected Islamic scholars. In September 1992, some hundred Islamic scholars and academics petitioned the King for political reform in various aspects of governance, including civil society, foreign relations and the economy. However, their chief demand was stronger relations with fellow Islamic countries and an end to the Kingdom’s special relationship with Washington. Though the petition, the first among many, was ignored, the regime, and particularly the royal family itself, was increasingly targeted for its rampant corruption in all spheres of life, including nepotism and royal profligacy. Members of the royal family were accused of disbursing state funds and other largesse to relatives and associates with the principal objective of securing their loyalty and security. 17
Though the founding of the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) in May 1993 by two Saudi academics-Mohammad al-Masa’ari and Saad al-Fagih-was the only real organised opposition group in the Kingdom, popular Islamic clerics such as Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Aouda, too were increasingly regarded as threats to the regime. Despite the CDLR being a moderate organisation which restricted its opposition to petitioning the government for more reform and disseminating information to Saudi citizens, their leaders were under considerable threat and were forced to seek political asylum in London. By 1995, widespread demonstration in various cities in the Kingdom, spearheaded by dissident members of the clergy and incited by literature faxed from London by CDLR functionaries, saw hundreds of dissident scholars, clerics and academics being arrested, with many of them being held without any formal charges. 18
It was also around the same time that Osama bin Laden, a scion of one of the most influential Saudi business families, who had returned triumphant from Afghanistan, began to cause some concern for the regime. Though the bin Ladens were close to the royal family, Osama, disillusioned by the lack of recognition for his achievements in Afghanistan, now turned against the regime when his offer to provide an army of mujahideen to defend the Kingdom was turned down in favour of the US troops. 19 Soon after, Osama began to articulate his anti-regime sentiments publicly, and with his Islamic credentials and status as a jihadi, gathered many disenchanted Saudi youth around him. In 1991, Osama was forced to leave Saudi Arabia for Sudan, where he built up a formidable terrorist organisation, targeting the “enemies of Islam”, which included the US and the Saudi regime. By 1994, his pronouncements and sponsorship of dissident activities in the Kingdom forced the government to revoke his Saudi citizenship.
In the mid-1990s, opposition against the regime took a violent turn. In November 1995, a truck bombing destroyed the Saudi National Guard installation in Riyadh, resulting in the death of five US citizens and two Indian workers. Four Saudi nationals were tried and beheaded for the bombing in May 1996. Seven months later, another bomb attack caused the death of 19 US servicemen stationed in Dhahran. The Saudi authorities never divulged the names of the real culprits responsible for the Dhahran attack, though some US investigations pointed towards Iran. What probably alarmed the Saudi authorities was the fact that most of the opposition activists, including the four executed for the Riyadh bombing, came from moderate backgrounds and began their activism with an Islamic missionary movement which ran its operations legitimately within the country. All four had also served in the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s and claimed to have links with other radical groups such as the CDLR and Osama bin Laden’s organisation. 20
In 1996, Osama bin Laden was quoted in The Independent (London) as saying: “The ordinary man knows that (Saudi Arabia) is the largest oil producer in the world, yet at the same time he is suffering from taxes and bad services. Now the people understand the speeches of the ulemas in the mosques-that our country has become an American colony. They act decisively with every action to kick the Americans out of Saudi Arabia. What happened in Riyadh and (Dhahran) when 24 Americans were killed in two bombings is clear evidence of the huge anger of Saudi people against America. The Saudis now know their real enemy is America.” 21
However, by 1997, most of the more overt political opposition had been effectively silenced. The CDLR too, which had split up into two factions, had ceased to be effective, mainly because of its sometimes factually questionable writings. 22 Though political participation in the Kingdom continued to be controlled by the state, the Shura Council was expanded to include spokesmen for important tribes and major interest groups. 23 According to some analysts however, it was covert Saudi (mainly financial) support of Islamist movements, including terrorist organisations, in other parts of the world, mainly to serve as a guarantee against attacks against Saudi targets, both at home and abroad, that saw much of the overt anti-regime opposition die down. 24
In the economic arena, too, there was some respite for the regime. Large production cuts enforced by Riyadh on OPEC members saw prices once again edge up by 2000, which in turn caused the Kingdom’s and other Gulf states’ economies to look up. Factors such as implementation of IMF recommendations, such as an increase in diversification to other (non-oil) sectors, development of the private sector, and a shift to market based pricing, also helped. The government also took the crucial decision to encourage FDI (by opening up the upstream gas sector to foreign companies), while continued expenditure control through 2001 is expected to see the fiscal balance being maintained with a rise in net foreign assets. 25
By the late 1990s, many analysts concluded that the earlier instability was a thing of the past. However, the 11 September attacks in the US, where 15 of the 19 hijackers were later identified as Saudi citizens, 26 have rekindled earlier concerns regarding the stability of the regime. Though it is unlikely that the regime will be replaced in the near future, the fallout of the low oil prices on the economy, which in turn may have repercussions at the political level, is causing some discomfort to the government.
The Russian Factor
The recent agreement worked out between OPEC and non-OPEC producers, if successful, may stall the price slide in oil. But the success of the deal is, to a large extent, dependent on Russia’s behaviour.
Russia is today the second largest oil exporter (and third largest producer after the US and Saudi Arabia), with production at 7.25 mbd. 27 The importance of the oil sector in the country can be gauged by the fact that it provides 25 per cent of the country’s hard currency earnings, which is crucial for the country’s economic revival. Similarly, in 1998, the 30 per cent drop in oil export earnings due to the low prices, contributed to the collapse of the economy. 28
Therefore, it did not come as a surprise when Moscow clearly showed its reluctance to cut production to help boost prices. Russia has, in the past, taken advantage of OPEC production cuts to increase market share without contributing to price stability. However, after protracted negotiations with Saudi and other OPEC officials, Russia agreed to cut production by 150,000 b/d (Mexico and Norway agreed to cut 100,000 b/d each, while Oman agreed to make cuts of 40,000 b/d) on 1 December, 2001. Nevertheless, serious doubts continue to be cast over Moscow’s seriousness to implement the cuts. As the Russian energy minister, Igor Yusufov, said, “If it is profitable for us to produce and export more, we will do so.” 29
With proven oil reserves at 49 billion barrels (bb)-though according to some estimates proven reserves are closer to around 60-70 bb 30 -Russia is in a position to be one of the world’s major oil suppliers. Already, it provides 16 per cent of Europe’s oil requirement and is trying to establish an energy corridor (along with other Central Asian countries) to East Asia. If it succeeds, Moscow could become a serious competitor to the Persian Gulf countries for the Asian energy market.
Conclusion
The oil market today is experiencing the kind of volatility and uncertainty prevalent in the 1980s and early 1990s, with the issue of security of supply making a reappearance. The current drop in demand growth notwithstanding, most countries, particularly the industrialising nations, are poised to see their dependence on imported oil grow over the next few decades. This is especially true of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, including China and India. Therefore, under these circumstances, the need for oil market stability is vital.
Oil security issues mainly revolve around availability of supplies and price volatility. Both issues are dominated by events in West Asia/Persian Gulf region, and particularly in Saudi Arabia. While no shortage of reserves are envisaged over the foreseeable future, lack of timely investment in older producing fields as well as new ones, are likely to lead to tightness in supply over the next decade. Prolonged low prices, as is being witnessed now, will see a further drop in investment flows, while a rise in religious dissension and the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict will continue to be the major impediments to regional investment. This in turn may exacerbate an already tenuous situation. Most of the countries of the region are dependent on oil revenues to maintain the citizens’ high living standards, which in turn are needed to keep the increasing opposition to their mainly autocratic regimes under control. A change in leadership in any of these countries to an anti-West orientation could once again see a return of 1973-like conditions, which sent the world economy into a tailspin.
The role of Saudi Arabia as the world’s major producer and the only swing producer is crucial. If any internal crisis takes place in the Kingdom, such as the replacement of the current regime by one that is inimical to Western or non-Islamic interests, or one that would affect production, it would have a debilitating impact on the global oil industry.
Therefore, it is in everyone’s interest to see that the oil market remains stable and that prices are maintained at levels which would be suitable to both producers as well as consumers. While most Gulf producers would ideally like prices to be maintained at around $25 per barrel, current global economic conditions require that prices be set much lower.
Today, the fate of oil prices and, consequently, that of the oil producers, is also critically dependent on Russia’s behaviour. Without Moscow’s compliance, any production cutbacks would prove pointless, as it would be only a matter of time before other producers renege on cutback agreements and try to increase their market share.
Therefore, while a price war is good news for importers in the short term, in the long run, the effects of low prices would have disastrous repercussions for the international oil market as well as the global economy at large. It is time that producers and consumers gave up narrow individualistic policies and looked at the larger picture that could have devastating repercussions on the energy market in the long run. Perhaps the events of 11 September will help lay down the basis for necessary structural changes, which, in turn, would lead to a more homogeneous and cooperative energy market.
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to Shri Sujit Dutta for his valuable suggestions.
Endnotes
Note 1: World Oil Supply and Demand, IEA Monthly Oil Market Review, 12 November 2001 Back.
Note 2: Middle East Economic Survey, 19 November 2001. Back.
Note 3: World Oil Supply and Demand, IEA Monthly Oil Market Review, 12 November 2001 Back.
Note 4: Richard Shepherd, “Oil Market Nerves: Fear of World Downturn: Calls for Cheaper Oil Deny the Fundamentals”, Tomorrow’s Oil, January 2001, Vol.3, Issue 1 Back.
Note 5: As reproduced in Middle East Economic Survey, 12 November 2001. Back.
Note 7: Maarten von Mourik, “And No Ado About Much”, Tomorrow’s Oil, July 2001, Vol. 2, Issue 7. Back.
Note 9: Middle East Economic Survey, 12 November 2001 Back.
Note 10: Fereidun Fesharaki and Hassan Vahidy, “Middle East Crude Oil Trade: Future Directions and Implications for Formula Pricing”, 9 October 2001, FACTS Inc. Energy Advisory # 258, as re-re-printed in Middle East Economic Survey, 22 October 2001. Back.
Note 11: Anthony H Cordesman, “Changing Saudi Energy Strategy”, Geopolitics and Energy in the Middle East, 1997, Center for Strategic and Internal Studies, website: www. csis.org/ Back.
Note 12: Ed Blanche, “Oil is Thicker than Blood in Saudi Arabia-US Relations”, Jane’s Intelligence Review,Vol. 13, No. 9 September 2001. Back.
Note 13: Mordechai Abir, “Saudi Arabia in the 1990s: Stability and Foreign Policy”, Jerusalem Letter Internet Edition, No. 365 29 Av 5757/1 Sept 1997. Back.
Note 14: “Joblessness Threatens Saudi Arabia”, International Herald Tribune, 27 November 2001. Back.
Note 15: Paul Aarts, “The Arab Oil Weapon: A One-Shot Edition?”, ECSSR Occasional Paper No. 34, 1999. Back.
Note 16: Anthony H. Cordesman, “Changing Saudi Energy Strategy”, Geopolitics and Energy in the Middle East, Center for Strategic and International Studies, website: www.csis.org/ Back.
Note 17: Geoff Simons, Saudi Arabia: The Shape of a Client Feudalism, Macmillan, London 1998. Back.
Note 18: Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and Politics of Discontent, St. Martin’s Press, New York 1999. Back.
Note 19: “Who is Osama bin Laden?” 10 November 2001, website: http://news.bbc.co.uk/ Back.
Note 20: Daryl Champion, “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Elements of Instability within Stability”, MERIA Journal, Vol.3, No.4, December 1999, website: www.biu.ac.il.SOC/besa/meria/journal/1999/issue4 Back.
Note 21: “A Global Pan-Islamic Network: Terrorism Entrepreneur Unifies Groups Financially, Politically”, Washington Post, 23 August 1998. Back.
Note 22: Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and Politics of Discontent, St. Martin’s Press, New York 1999. Back.
Note 24: Saudi Elite Linked to bin Laden’s Financial Empire": A Special Report, 14 October 2001, website: www.bostonherald.com/ Back.
Note 25: Middle East Economic Survey,19 November 2001 Back.
Note 26: “Pressed by Militants and the West, the Saudi Royal Family Treads a Thin Line”, New York Times Service, 5 November 2001. Back.
Note 27: World Oil Supply and Demand, IEA Monthly Oil Market Review, 12 November 2001 Back.
Note 28: Amy Myers Jaffe & Robert A. Manning, “Russia, Energy and the West”, Survival, Vol. 43, No.2, Summer 2001. Back.
Note 29: Robert Ebel, “Russian Oil: Boom or Bust?”, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 20 August 2001, website: www.csis.org/ Back.