Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA

December 2000 (Vol. XXIV No. 9)

 

North Korea's Missile Programme: A Matter of Concern
By A.K. Sachdev _*

 

Introduction

During the last decade or so, the world has managed to sweep many sullied remnants of the Cold War under one carpet or the other; some unfinished businesses, however, continue to persist much like bad dreams-distasteful, prolonged, and very, very real while they last. One such case is that of Korea. The Japanese surrender and the consequent dual occupation of Korea is now fifty five years behind us in post-World War II history, and a bitter war between the two Koreas did nothing to solve the problem. There are many who would like to believe that the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK)-more commonly referred to as North Korea-is philosophically inclined to reunite the two Koreas through the decisive use of military force. Even the five-point accord signed by DPRK's Korean Worker's Party (KWP) General Secretary Kim Jong-il and the Republic of Korea's (ROK) President Kim Dae-jung-the first ever agreement on national reconciliation-is seen by some as only a tentative step that hardly inspires the hope of a time bound and hiccup-free re-unification. ₁

Authoritarianism has its own benefits and there is no doubt that DPRK benefited in some ways from the long and unquestioned rule of Kim Il-sung. However, its advances in some areas such as its nuclear power (and corelated nuclear weapons capability) and missile programmes have generated international concern and even attracted international opprobrium. Notwithstanding this, Kim Il-sung's legacy in both these areas of development was carried on by his successor and during the 1990s, these two issues became large enough for the US (and the rest of the world) to sit up and take notice. US Defence Secretary, William S Cohen, while addressing a press conference at Tokyo on July 28, 2000 held out a veiled threat to North Korea when he said, "Another test launch will jeopardise North Korea's relations with the international community." ₂ While the US has at stake the interests of its client-the ROK, for India the implications of the nuclear and missile programmes of North Korea are indirect (but nonetheless significant). They impinge on India's security through the machinations of China and Pakistan.

This paper looks at the missile programmes of North Korea with a view to assess its capability in that area. Needless to say, the nuclear capability will have to be touched upon to complete the picture. An attempt is also made to detect cause and effect linkages between doctrinal and strategic manifestations on the one hand and missile capabilities on the other. The North Korean missile programme has intimate Chinese and Pakistani connections. As both these nations are our neighbours and feature prominently in our strategic construct, their linkages with North Korea are the other focus of attention in the paper.

Chuch'e as the Doctrinal Backdrop

The cornerstone of party and government operations and functions in North Korea has been the ideology of Chuch'e, ₃ proclaimed in December 1955 by Kim Il-sung and promoted by his son Kim Jong-il after the former passed away. It continues to provide the fundamental backdrop for national doctrines, strategies and policies-including those related to missile development and deployment. In its initial years, Chuch'e represented the application of Marxism-Leninism as adapted to the DPRK experience, with a focus on autonomy and self-reliance. However, it slowly stopped leaning on Marxism-Leninism and came into its own during the 1970s. Long after the term Marxism-Leninism disappeared from official intonations around 1980, Chuch'e continues to provide official guidelines for independence in politics, economics, national defence, and foreign policy. Chuch'e was designed to inspire national pride, a sense of collective identity and a strong focus for internal solidarity centred on the KWP, and more importantly, Kim Il-sung. According to Kim, Chuch'e meant the independent stance of rejecting dependence on others and of using one's own powers, believing in one's own strength and displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance.

During the early 1960s, North Korea had to face a series of crises that had potentially adverse implications for its national security. There was a sharp decrease in aid from the Soviet Union and China. In fact, tension between these two nations had overspilling implications for North Korea's confrontation with the United States and South Korea. Pyongyang's disagreements with Moscow raised doubts about the reliability of the Soviet Union as an ally, and the rise of an authoritarian regime in Seoul under former General Park Chung Hee raised the grim spectre of military confrontation in which North Korea could well be at the receiving end. All these developments emphasised the need for self-reliance as a national objective.

Traditionally, the North Korean military has made a sizeable contribution in national decision-making. This fact is significant insofar as the military domination and the Chuch'e ideology mingled together to produce a heady mixture of policies to which many Western scholars attribute North Korea's current cup of woes. According to Sally Harris, North Korea is in the second of four stages that characterise "the demise of a communist regime: economic disintegration, government paralysis, the unravelling of the political system and the fall of the state". ₄ She sees North Korea confronting the dilemma of having to abandon its isolation and communist ideology-the two main tenets of Chuch'e-for its survival. Since Chuch'e currently provides the dynastic regime its legitimacy, she sees the state as destined to collapse --- one way or the other. However, this prediction may prove to be wrong if the Korean re-unification process accelerates in the future.

On September 2,1998, North Korea amended its constitution to abolish the post of the President and to establish a working cabinet that will function under the control of the Chairman, National Defence Commission (NDC)-a post held by Kim Jong-il, the de facto head of state. ₅ The resultant modified military dictatorship has replaced the former term "regime" by "state" and the phrase "the means of production is the state and co-operative organisations" by "the means of production is the state and social co-operative organisations". ₆ Whether these are portents of genuine reform in the state's (there is hardly any private business in North Korea) secretive design, research, development and production machineries, is hard to tell. Meanwhile the state's missile programme continues to make considerable, visible progress.

North Korean Missile Programme

On August 31, 1998, North Korea claimed to have attempted placing a small satellite into orbit. The satellite was carried on board a Taepo Dong I rocket. The first stage of the vehicle crashed into the Sea of Japan roughly 115 km southeast of Vladivostok, Russia. The second stage is reported to have flown over the main Japanese island of Honshu and landed roughly 330km away from the Japanese port city of Hachinohe after flying for approximately 1,320km. ₇ A solid fuel third stage is claimed to have carried a small satellite. The fact that no satellite was detected in space thereafter may indicate two possibilities: either the third stage was destroyed before reaching orbital parameters, or there was no satellite on the rocket in the first place. In either case, the launch nevertheless represented a significant leap in North Korea's ongoing missile development programmes.

The saga of North Korea's missile programme-if counter-proliferation rhetoric is set aside in favour of an objective assessment, is an excellent success story of a developing nation's quest for self-sufficiency in the context of national security. Not surprisingly, North Korea's missile aspirations were kick-started by Soviet and Chinese assistance. Perhaps the first step in this direction was the production of a Chinese Type 63 (107mm) multiple rocket launcher. ₈ During 1968-69, DPRK received Soviet S-2 Sopka (SS-C-2b/Samlet) missiles ₉ for coastal defence; China assisted in the re-organisation and expansion of Samlet maintenance and assembly facilities. China also went on to supply HY-1 naval missiles which were themselves reverse engineered from the Soviet SS-N-2 Styx missiles. ₁₀ While some of them were supplied ready-made, others were in knocked down kits; the assembly process would have helped North Korean technical personnel to gain valuable experience in the field of missiles. Soviet reluctance to provide more modern missile designs (beyond the Samlet) prompted North Korea to approach China for assistance in the form of transfer of reverse-engineered Soviet-designed missile systems and Chinese missile research and development technology (including tactical ballistic missiles which China itself did not possess at that time). ₁₁ In 1972, a production facility for the indigenous manufacture of HY1/SY1 was set up (later this facility was upgraded to produce HY2 missiles), albeit with a significant Chinese content of major components. In 1973, 'The Military Balance (1973-74)' reported that DPRK possessed 24 unguided FROG 5/7 rockets and 6 SS-C-2b missiles. ₁₂ Around that time, North Korea started trying to reverse-engineer the FROG 7 rocket-an endeavour that was to be abandoned before fruition in favour of the more lucrative task of reverse-engineering the Scud B missile which North Korea had acquired from Egypt (along with MAZ 543 Transported-Erector-Launcher or TEL vehicles) during the late 1970s (or the early 1980s). In the mid-1970s, North Korea approached China with a proposal for the joint development of a single stage mobile tactical missile called the DF 61 with a maximum range of 600 km and a cluster/ fuel air explosive payload of one ton ₁₃ . The development was aborted in 1978 due to the ouster of Chen Xilian ₁₄ -the programme's supporter in the Chinese establishment, but the experience provided excellent training to North Korean technical and scientific personnel and prepared them for their future missile development programmes. The Scud C, incidentally, bears close similarity to the scrapped DF 61 system and there may, after all, have been a connection between the two programmes.

The North Korea-Egypt connection probably took off in 1981 when the two entered into an agreement for technological co-operation and exchange including missile-related technologies; it was probably at this stage that Egypt provided North Korea with Scud B missiles. In 1983, the Iranian Prime Minister and Defence Minister visited North Korea to finalise arrangements for long term financing of North Korea 's Scud B development programme in exchange for purchase option on the missiles. A year later, the first successful test of a North Korean-built Scud B was conducted amidst speculation that it may have been the launch of an Egypt-supplied Scud B. During 1984, there were at least three Scud B tests from No Dong ₁₅ and by the next year, pilot production had begun and a special missile unit had been formed at To-Kol. Scud B production facilities were established near Pyongyang with an annual target of 50 missiles. ₁₆

In 1987, Iran agreed to purchase 90-100 Scud B missiles (along with 12 TELs) from North Korea. Limited scale assembly of Scud B missiles is said to have begun in 1988 near Isfahan, Iran's ballistic missile plant, ₁₇ and all missiles on order delivered by February 1988. These were used during the "War of the Cities" from February 1988 to April 1988. North Korea 's own IV Corps received Scud B missiles in 1988.

The Scud C prototype was tested secretly during January 1987 in Hamgyong Namdo and production probably started in 1990. The first test-an unsuccessful one-was in early 1990, but a successful one followed in June 1990. Full scale production at the rate of 4-8 missiles a month was achieved by mid-1991. During this period, Egypt approached North Korea for help in upgrading Soviet Scud missiles held by Egypt, thus consummating the reverse-engineering cycle. Meanwhile, Iran extended its original arrangement and included the Scud C in its purchase order while seeking North Korea 's help in expanding the facility at Isfahan.

Some time in 1989, North Korea embarked on a programme to produce what is now known as the No Dong I missile. US satellite pictures showed the new missile on its launcher at Hwadae-gun in mid-1990, but the prototype was ready only by early 1991. A perturbed South Korea loudly announced to the world on April 13, 1991 that North Korea possessed the No Dong I missile that could reach any part of South Korea. US administration officials claimed that North Korean military officials visited Libya to sell the No Dong I at $7 million each under an arrangement wherein Libya would finance the development of the system in return for purchase of the missiles when ready. In 1992, a Pakistani group was spotted inspecting the No Dong I. Successes in the missile development field inspired nuclear ambitions-a natural corollary, which is discussed later in this paper. An unsuccessful test of the No Dong I was reported as having taken place in June 1992 by a Japanese daily ₁₈ but the final missile was probably ready by March 1993. Four missiles were tested on May 29-30, 1993 of which perhaps two were No Dong Is.

There have been reports of two distinct missiles-the Taepo Dong I and the Taepo Dong II-being developed with ranges greater than the No Dong's. The Taepo Dong I was tested in August 1998 as mentioned earlier; pressure from the US and others seem to have been successful in preventing another test so far in the Taepo Dong series. The Taepo Dong II is expected to have a range between 3500 km and 6000 km. ₁₉

It can thus be seen that the Scud has been the keystone of all the missiles fielded by that country. ₂₀ The Scud B (Hwasong 5) and the Scud C (Hwasong 6) were the first development programmes, the No Dong I used a cluster of four Scud engines for increased range and the Taepo Dong uses clusters of Scud engines in two stages to further enhance the range. Some sources indicate that the Taepo Dong I has a No Dong I equivalent as its first stage and a Scud B/C equivalent as the second; on the other hand, in the Taepo Dong II, the first stage is a Chinese CSS-2 equivalent (with the second stage remaining a Scud B/C type). All missiles are liquid fuelled-with attendant problems of activation timings, fuel storage, impeded operational mobility and high risk of accident. The majority view in the US intelligence community is that the missile programmes have been indigenous in nature while a minority believes that Chinese assistance was instrumental in its achievements.

So how do North Korea's missiles interface with the doctrinal and strategic thinking of the two Kims, the KWP and the NDC?

The Doctrinal and Strategic Linkages

From the North Korean point of view its missiles serve the national security imperatives admirably. According to Paul Bracken, "North Korea's national security policy consists of linking internal and external pressures, so that outsiders had better not pressure North Korea where it may implode, or they may cause it to explode". ₂₁ Faced with the enormous increase in the capabilities and strengths of South Korea, its own internal contradictions, the decline in support from traditional allies and the US role in the Korean peninsula, North Korea's missiles provide the balancing mechanism which-in the nuclear context-subserve the Chuch'e model of self-sufficiency in national security.

North Korea has been called a "crazy state" and, in the view of some, it meets all the criteria to be labelled so; it is "counter-reasonable in its goals... has a high intensity commitment to goal fulfilment... is prone to undertake risky and provocative actions... often pursues counter-instrumental policies... and acts in ways that are not accepted or condoned by the international community...." ₂₂ If the theoretical framework of a 'crazy state' is to be accepted, the extended analogy would suggest that North Korean behaviour as a state is unlikely to be easily redirected; in fact its coercive stance may only harden further. Therein lies an indicator for future aspirations of North Korea in the missile arena; as long as US continues to play the big bully, there can be no let up in the missile programmes of North Korea. From the North Korean point of view, "the USA is its principal enemy and the ROK is its puppet ...USA interfered in a purely internal dispute (the Fatherland Liberation War) and threatened to use nuclear weapons". ₂₃

The US strategic assumptions focus on two likely areas of conflict in which it may have to "engage" itself-the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. A "win-win" strategy refers to a situation in which two major wars erupt at the same time, and the US deploys its military forces to both theatres with the intention of winning both wars. General Ronald Fogleman, US Air Chief of Staff, recommended in 1996 that the US modify its "win-win" strategy to a "win-hold-win" one (originally proposed in 1993 by then US Secretary of Defence Les Aspin). ₂₄ The implication thereof is that, in the case of two wars, the US would fight one to win, "holding" the other adversary till the first one has been defeated. The Army Chief of Staff opposed the idea and thence arose a debate which is not of concern to this paper. What does seem pertinent to note is the fact that North Korea, replete with missiles capable of reaching almost all of South Korea, cannot be wished away and is a prominent blob on US strategic radar screens. Scud missiles deployed at Kaesong have only a three-minute travel time to Seoul. Missiles thus continue to rule the roost in the delivery department-despite the Air Force being modest in size and capability.

The Air Force became a separate service in 1948. It adopted Soviet and Chinese doctrine and tactics and adapted them to suit local conditions. Its primary mission is air defence of the homeland (a role that the Air Force probably got only in the 1980s before which an Air Defence Command had the responsibility, independent of the Air Force). Secondary missions include tactical air support to the army and the navy, transportation and logistic support, and insertion of special operations forces. Around seventy airfields of which twenty four are jet capable, military airfields and sixteen highway landing strips support the Air Force operations. ₂₅ Its present strength of combat aircraft is 82 H 5 light bombers, 107 J 5s, 159 J 6s, 130 J 7s, 46 MiG 23s, 16 MiG 29s, 18 Su 7s and 35 Su 25s. ₂₆ The quantitatively impressive figure of more than 600 combat aircraft needs to be considered with caution since almost the entire fleet consists of aircraft of old design, the two MiG types being the only redeeming features. The air force of its southern neighbour, despite an arithmetically smaller figure of combat aircraft, would definitely overshadow the DPRK Air Force algebraically (it has 88 F 16s, 195 F 5s, 130 F 4s and 22 A 37s; to this could be added 23 combat aircraft of the Navy and 28 RF 4/5 recce aircraft ). Active US participation in a future Korean War would alter the picture altogether. Strategic considerations seem to indicate an AD role for the Air Force while missiles don the offensive mantle and carry the war to the enemy's territory.

The only three organs of the military that "appear to have been sustained at mid-1980s levels of readiness are the artillery, Scud missile brigade and special forces". ₂₇ To this list of efficient forces can be added the No Dong force and the Taepo Dong series whenever it gets operationalised. Each of these missiles has (theoretically) had the capability to deliver a nuclear warhead (the Scud C carries a 500 Kg payload while all the other missiles carry 1000 Kg or thereabouts). US threats have served to provide the motivation for nuclear ambition in North Korea. In February 1953, while the Korean War was still on, President Eisenhower warned that he would employ nuclear arms if the truce negotiation produced no good result; since then the threat of nuclear use by the US has been held out several times to North Korea . ₂₈

The Nuclear Angle

Although North Korea embarked on the nuclear weapons route early (the KPA's 'Atomic Weapons Training Centre' near Kilchu in the North East was established in 1958), ₂₉ its progress has been stunted-largely due to US machinations. The task of building nuclear facilities in the DPRK is a specialised one assigned to the Third Bureau of Engineers, also known as the Third Sappers Bureau. Incidentally, it is the only one manned by the military, in contrast to the other four Bureaux of Engineers. ₃₀ North Korea has several nuclear facilities that, collectively, have the potential to produce nuclear fuel for weapons. Most are located at Yongbyon, 60 miles north of Pyongyang. ₃₁ In the early 1990s, the major installations included a 5 MW research reactor, two larger reactors of unknown capacity (under construction), a 50 MW reactor in Yongbyon, a 200 MW reactor at Taechon and a Plutonium reprocessing facility. The research reactor was constructed in the 1980s and was thought to be capable of producing about 7 kilograms of Plutonium annually. The two reactors under construction were expected to yield another 200 kilograms of plutonium annually--enough plutonium for about 50 atomic bombs per year. The reprocessing facility separated weapons-grade Plutonium 239 from the reactor's spent fuel (which may have been used for producing war-heads).

Although North Korea had signed the NPT in 1985, it refused to sign the related full-scope safeguards agreement, predicating it to several conditions-the most important ones being the removal of US nuclear weapons from South Korea and a US guarantee that it will not pose a nuclear threat to North Korea. In July 1991, it suddenly changed its policy and agreed to the safeguards. However, its nuclear diplomacy continues to be hinged upon "brinkmanship strategy", ₃₂ an apt illustration is its announcement on March 12, 1993 of withdrawal from the NPT and then suspension of its withdrawal on June 11, 1993-just one day before it was to take effect. Under the "Agreed Framework" of 1994, North Korea agreed to remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), freeze the operation and construction of its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities (including the reprocessing plant) and co-operate with the US in the safe storage and disposal of the spent fuel in its possession. In return for these concessions, the US agreed to, among other things, create an international consortium of member countries to replace North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors with a light-water reactor project by a target date of 2003 and supply it with energy-heavy oil for heating and electricity production--pending the completion of the first light-water reactor.

In the final analysis, it can be stated that, while the nuclear programme has been manacled by the US, North Korea has not abandoned its nuclear ambition and it probably has several nuclear warheads for use on its enviable missile arsenal. ₃₃

Implications for India

It is an unhappy coincidence for India that two of its worrisome neighbours-one with a tremendous nuisance value at the present time, and the other posing a strategic challenge in the foreseeable future-have linkages with the missile (and nuclear) programmes of North Korea. A four member fact finding team of the US House of Representatives International Relations Committee was told during a visit to North Korea that it earned $500 million annually from sale of ballistic missiles (the US estimate is $1.5 billion). In 1998, North Korea is said to have demanded compensation from the US in exchange for stopping the proliferation of missiles. ₃₄ On August 9, 2000, a CIA report to the US Congress pointed to the North Korea-Pakistan missile nexus. ₃₅ If there was any lingering doubt in anybody's mind about the sale of missiles by North Korea, it ought to have been cleared by Kim Jong-il's recent statement to South Korean press reporters that North Korea did sell missiles to Pakistan, amongst others. ₃₆

Pakistan's testing of the Ghauri I (Hatf V) 1,500 km ballistic missile has raised India's security concerns. The Ghauri series of missiles owes its genesis to North Korea's No Dong I missile. North Korea's relationship with Pakistan dates to the early 1970s. During mid 1971, with tensions between Pakistan and India growing, Pakistan's President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto approached North Korea in an effort to obtain critically needed weapons. In subsequent years, military advisers from both the countries worked side by side in Iran and Libya. North Korea's supply of Scud missiles provided Pakistani technicians the opportunity to work alongside its trained personnel handling the missiles; this initiated the North Korea-Pakistan co-operation in the field of ballistic missiles. The Ghauri programme probably took off in 1993 during which year Pakistani officials witnessed the No Dong tests in May. Later that same year, Benazir Bhutto visited North Korea-barely a few weeks after her election as the Prime Minister. As the No Dong programme was a mutation of the Scud (a liquid fuelled missile), the No Dong and its clone, the Ghauri, are also liquid fuelled. The distinction is made here because there is another parallel programme in Pakistan-the Shaheen series-that derives its sustenance from Chinese assistance and is based on solid fuel. China was also party to a Sino-North Korean-Pakistani arrangement under which it was to provide guidance technology for Pakistani missiles while the rest of the components were to be produced by the Fourth Machine Industry Bureau of the 2nd Economic Committee and delivered by the Changgwang Sinyong Laboratories to Abdul Qadeer Khan Research Laboratories (Pakistan). The US State Department slapped sanctions on both these entities on April 24, 1998 after the Ghauri test. Dr AQ Khan announced a few days after the Ghauri test that a new missile-the Ghaznavi-with a range of 2000 km was under development; Western sources place a very high probability on the new missile being a clone of the Taepo Dong I, much as the Ghauri is of the No Dong. Both the (Pakistani) missiles are a matter of concern for India and owe their existence to North Korea's cavalier attitude towards international (and US) concern with missile proliferation. However, the philosophy guiding the sale of missile and missile technology to Pakistan, when juxtaposed with the sale of missiles to other client countries (Syria, Libya, Iran and Egypt) seems to suggest no anti-India motives. Monetary considerations and a missile-for-nuclear equation seem to be the driving forces behind North Korea's missile nexus with Pakistan.

China's motivations for colluding in the Sino-North Korean-Pakistani nexus, on the other hand, are quite different from those of North Korea; at least some of them are India-centric. Not only does the collusion directly assist Pakistani missile capability against India, but it also forces India to invest resources to counter that threat. By using North Korea as a conduit for its infamous proliferative dealings with Pakistan, it avoids international pressure, improves its MTCR-related image and keeps its arch rival, India, preoccupied with its annoying neighbour, Pakistan.

There is one other indirect repercussion of North Korea's missile programme and that is its status as a "nation of concern" in US perception. The ostensible purpose of the US National Missile Defence (NMD) programme is to defend the US mainland against some "nations of concern". A discussion on the hidden agendas behind the NMD is beyond the scope of the present discussion. What is relevant to it is the fact that the NMD will have a "cascading effect" ₃₇ on India's security; China may respond by increasing the number of missiles in its arsenal. China has threatened to accelerate its ballistic missile programmes if the planned US NMD is put into place; if this threat is carried out, India will not only have to think seriously about a defence against Chinese ballistic missiles, but also of enhancing the range and numbers of its own ballistic missiles.

Conclusion

The missile programme of North Korea is in defiance of the international concern for promiscuous proliferation, but a success story for the nation's inward looking philosophy of Chuch'e. Despite strong pressures from the US and its allies, it continues to develop missiles with longer ranges and improved on-board systems. Its clientele in the missile bazaar is a motley group-some that are a cause of concern to the US and some for whom the US has concern. For India, North Korea's missiles pose no direct threat, but its connections with Pakistan and China pose serious security problems. Only a re-unification of the Koreas (with subsequent removal of North Korea from the US list of "nations of concern") or, alternately, an implosion a la USSR may remove North Korea as a supplier of missile and missile technology to Pakistan. Meanwhile, India's best options seem to be two-fold-a diplomatic assault on the Sino-North Korean-Pakistani ballistic missile nexus while striving for rapid operationalisation and deployment of the Agni missile.

 

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Endnotes

Note *: Research Fellow, IDSA Back.

Note 1: Harvey Stockwin, "Korean Summit: More Questions Than Answers", The Times of India, June 16, 2000. Back.

Note 2: Linda D Kozaryn (American Forces Press Service) as quoted on Aerotech News and Views Internet site <www.aerotechnews.com/starc/1999/073099/North_Korea_Missiles.html> Back.

Note 3: According to Vasily Mikheev of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, the chuch'e ideology was originally copied from the Stalin strategy followed by the USSR in the 1940s and the 1950s. For details, see Eric Croddy, "Chuche:The Political Economy of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea", Jane's Intelligence Review, June 1996, p. 272. Back.

Note 4: Sally Harris, "Merely Postponing the Inevitable?", Jane's Intelligence Review & Jane's Sentinel Pointer, March 1997, p. 9. Back.

Note 5: Shin Il-chul, "North Korea's New Constitution", Korea Focus, September-October 1998, p. 103. Back.

Note 6: Ibid., p. 104. Back.

Note 7: Internet site <http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/dprk.htm> Back.

Note 8: Christopher F. Foss, Jane's Armour and Artillery 1991-92, (Jane's Information Group, Coulsdon, Surrey: 1991), p. 719 (as quoted in Internet site <http//:www.cns.miis.edu/nkorea/ chrono60-79.htm>). Back.

Note 9: The Russian language word for 'missile' is 'raket' and thus the loose usage of the word 'rocket' in place of 'missile' in literature on Soviet/Russian missiles. Technically speaking, the term rocket signifies the absence of an in-flight guidance system. Back.

Note 10: Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp.203-207 (a lot of these details are taken from the Internet site <http//:www.cns.miis.edu/nkorea/chrono60-79.htm> quoting the article by Joseph S Bermudez Jr). Back.

Note 11: Hua Di, Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter, September 1991, pp.14-15 (as quoted in Internet site <http//:www.cns.miis.edu/nkorea/chrono60-79.htm>). Back.

Note 12: The Military Balance: 1973-74, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1973), p.53 (as quoted in Internet site <http//:www.cns.miis.edu/nkorea/chrono60-79.htm>). Back.

Note 13: Hua Di, Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter, September 1991, pp.14-15. John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, International Security, Fall 1992, pp.5-40 (as quoted in Internet site <http//:www.cns. miis.edu/nkorea/chrono60-79.htm>). Back.

Note 14: Greg Gerardi and Joseph S Bermudez Jr, "An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing", Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1995, vol. 7, no 4, p 184. Back.

Note 15: Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Jane's Defence Weekly, April 10, 1993; pp.20, 220 (as quoted in Internet site <http//:www.cns.miis.edu/nkorea/chrono60-79.htm>). Here the words "No Dong" are used in reference to the place ( test facility) from where the tests took place. Back.

Note 16: 16. Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter, April 1991, p.24 (as quoted in Internet site <http//:www.cns.miis.edu/nkorea/chrono90-91.htm>). Back.

Note 17: Kenneth Timmerman, Mednews, December 21, 1992, pp.4-5 (as quoted in Internet site <http//:www.cns.miis.edu/nkorea/chrono91-92.htm>). Back.

Note 18: Sankei Shimbun (Japanese Daily) as quoted by Executive News Service on Internet site <http//:www.cns.miis.edu/nkorea/chrono92-93.htm>). Back.

Note 19: Natalie W Crawford, Chung-in Moon (Eds), "Emerging Threats, Force Structures, and the Role of Air Power in Korea", RAND: Santa Monica, 2000, p. 184. Back.

Note 20: A facetious missile-related observation could be that all ballistic missiles could be divided into two categories --- those derived from the Scud and those not derived from the Scud. Back.

Note 21: Paul Bracken, "Risks and Promises in the Two Koreas", Orbis, Winter 1995, vol. 39, no. 1, p. 55. Back.

Note 22: David B Dewitt, "The Security Environment on the Korean Peninsula", The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Summer 1997, vol IX, no 1, pp. 91-93. Back.

Note 23: Joseph S Berrmudez Jr, "Use of Nuclear Weapons", Jane's Intelligence Review Special Report no 9, 1996, p. 19. Back.

Note 24: Chosun Ilbo, quoted in Korea Focus, January-February 1997, vol. 5, no 1, p. 145. Back.

Note 25: Internet site <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/facility/air_base.htm>. Back.

Note 26: "The Military Balance 1999-2000", London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999, p. 194. Back.

Note 27: David A Fulghum, "North Korea Forces Suffer Mobility Loss", Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 24, 1997, p. 63. Back.

Note 28: Young Sun Song, "The Korean Nuclear Issue", Korea and World Affairs, Fall 1991, vol XV, no 3, pp. 473, 474. Back.

Note 29: Joseph Bermudez Jr, "North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure", Jane's Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 79. Back.

Note 30: Internet site <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/agency/engineers.htm>. The First Bureau is in charge of building ordinary tunnels such as those for the Pyongyang Subway System; the Second, the construction of hydraulic power stations; the Fourth, the construction of vertical pits in Anju Coal Mine; and the Fifth, the construction of a two-track railway between Pyongyang and Chongjin. The Third Bureau of Engineers [also known as the Third Sappers Bureau] is a military unit under the party Central Committee that specialises in building nuclear facilities. This bureau operates its own trading firm, Puhung Trading Corporation, to procure materials from overseas. Back.

Note 31: For details of DPRK's nuclear facilities, see Peter Lewis Young, "The Threat of Nuclear War on the Korean Peninsula", Jane's Intelligence Review, September 1995, vol. 7, no 9, pp. 418,419. Back.

Note 32: Young Whan Kihl, "North Korea's Foreign Policy Alternatives", Korea Journal, Autumn 1996, vol. 36, no 3, p. 74. Back.

Note 33: Kenneth Brower, "North Korean Proliferation: The Threat to the New World Order", Jane's Intelligence Review August 1994, p. 376. Back.

Note 34: This information is attributed to Peter Brookes, aide to US House of Representative's International Relations Committee Chairman, Benjamin Gilman, according to Internet site <http//: www.fas.org/news/dprk/1998/980820-ht.htm> Back.

Note 35: Ovais Subhani, "Pakistan Denies CIA's Charge on Chinese Missile Help", as reported on Internet site of Lycos News Service dated August 10, 2000. Back.

Note 36: The Times of India, August 16, 2000. According to Kenneth Brower, Ibid., the other recipients of DPRK's missiles include Iran, Syria and Libya. Back.

Note 37: Gaurav Kampani, "How a US National Missile Defense Will Affect South Asia", Centre for Non-proliferation Studies as accessed on Internet site <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/usmslsa.htm> Back.