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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
Indian Ocean and the Safety of Sea Lines of Communication
By Vijay Sakhuja
*
Abstract
Sea lines of communication comprise the umbilical cord of a state's economy and the arteries of a region's economic health. During times of peace, they serve as commercial trade routes but during war, these routes are considered strategic pathways to keep the war machine fully oiled. Today, these routes are being threatened by piracy, drug trafficking, gun running, human smuggling, pollution, accidents, inter-state conflicts and territorial disputes. None is independent of the other and failure in one often leads to failure in others. This calls for greater cooperation among states to enhance security and safety of maritime enterprise.
Throughout history, the sea has been an important medium for economic prosperity. The waterways have been used as a medium of trade and have provided the impetus for growth of maritime enterprise. Over the years , dependence on the sea as an economical and efficient means of transport has grown and resulted in greater concern for the safety of the sea lines of communications ( SLOCs). Therefore any act that is inimical to the safety of the SLOCs, almost by definition, challenges security.
According to World Bank estimates, in 1999, the world sea-borne trade was pegged at 21,480 billion ton-miles; it is expected to touch 35,000 billion ton-miles in 2010, and 41,800 billion ton-miles in 2014. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Report, "Review of Maritime Transport 2000", has noted that world sea-based trade recorded its fourteenth consecutive annual increase and Asia's share of imports and exports was 26. 1 and 18.8 per cent respectively. Given these trends, sea-based commerce offers a mood of great optimism. While this optimism is a welcome sign, the SLOCs are being threatened from several directions. This raises the important question of what should be the strategic response by states to ensure the safety and security of the SLOCs.
Towards that end, this paper examines the spectrum of threats to the SLOCs in the northern Indian Ocean. It highlights the transnational nature of the threats and the global reach of some of the actors. The paper classifies these threats to help develop strategies to combat disorder at sea and also sets out measures for maritime cooperation that may be considered at the bilateral, multilateral and regional levels to enhance the security of the SLOCs.
SLOCs, Geography and Geostrategy
A SLOC is a route taken by a ship to transit from point A to B. In maritime terms, it should be short, economical and safe for transporting cargo. The SLOCs serve as umbilical cords of a state's economy. They are also referred to as the arteries of a region's economy. During times of peace, the SLOCs serve as commercial trade routes, but during war, these routes are considered strategic paths. The SLOCs vary in length depending on the geography in terms of landmass, choke points , reefs, foul ground and location of ports and harbours. There is an important link between the SLOCs and geography in the construction of any strategy. Economists, the military and politicians highlight geography in their discussions as it helps them to understand and appreciate strategic relationships and requirements. To an economist, the shortest route, low transportation cost and timely delivery of cargo are some of the factors that play a dominant role in developing maritime economic strategy. But when the military examines the SLOCs as they relate to the maritime instrument of power, geography becomes the fulcrum on which the forces must be deployed, keeping in mind the location of friends and adversaries as also the geography that has to be traversed by one to get to the assistance of the other. To a politician, it is the state of relations with countries located along the sea route being traversed that will help develop a strategy for the safety of the SLOCs. It is beyond doubt that it is the appreciation of geography and its effects on the SLOCs that will determine the strategy.
A geostrategic region can be defined as a region within which a state's interests lie, and it considers using political, economic and military instruments of power to safeguard its interests. The number, location and size of the geostrategic region vary from state to state, based on national interests. For instance, the United States has global interests and, therefore, there are several geostrategic regions that figure in its national strategy. Similarly, Japan's national interests demand that the SLOCs be safeguarded and it has accordingly defined its geostrategic region out to 1,000 nautical miles from shore. It is evident that states intend to exercise influence far beyond their shores thereby establishing several geostrategic regions through which their respective shipping would transit during both hostilities and periods of tension, and peace.
Geographical Settings
The Indian Ocean is home to important SLOCs and maritime choke points. A large volume of international long haul maritime cargo from the Persian Gulf, Africa and Europe transits through this ocean. This sea-borne trade, primarily oil, virtually affects every aspect of the daily lives of most people of the world. Similarly, the Southeast Asian choke points of the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok Straits affect the economic vitality of the Asia-Pacific region. Measured by the sheer volume of merchant traffic transiting these straits, in 1993, almost half of the world's merchant fleet capacity and one-third of the world's ships sailed through these choke points.1 Shipping traffic through the Malacca Strait is several times greater than the traffic either through the Suez Canal or the Panama Canal. The shipping lane transiting the Indian Ocean and entering the strategic choke point of Southeast Asia has great geostrategic importance to the United States, China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the Southeast Asian countries. Given these conditions, the northern Indian Ocean is booming with maritime activity, and both economic and security interests impact in a concentrated form.
By its very location, India lies approximately half way between the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca. Both these choke points have the potential to become major flash points. There are alternatives to the Strait of Malacca but there are no other routes to transport the Arabian Gulf oil except through pipelines over land, which have their own vulnerabilities. Therefore, any contingency in the Strait of Hormuz has direct implications for the region. By its geographic location, the Indian peninsula dominates the SLOCs from the Persian Gulf before they round off south of Dundra Head in Sri Lanka. Further, this SLOC passes close to the Indian islands of Andaman and Nicobar before entering the Malacca Strait. The mercantile traffic transiting the Malacca Strait passes close to the Indian area of maritime interest and, therefore, any unforeseen contingency or development in the Malacca Strait places greater responsibility on India to preserve order at sea.
Threats to the SLOCs
Threats to the SLOCs can be identified as arising from several directions : piracy, drug trafficking, gun running, human smuggling, pollution, accidents, mines, closure of choke points, inter-state conflicts and territorial disputes. None is independent of the other and failure in one often leads to failure in others.
Piracy
Pirates are like sharks. They breed and show up more often in some regions than others. They can strike anywhere but some areas are popular with them. According to the Worldwide Maritime Piracy Report, Southeast Asia is one of the two hotspots of piracy. 2 It retains its position as the most active with regard to attack on vessels accounting for more than half of the reported attacks. It appears that piracy moves around, and its centre of gravity keeps shifting. However, pirate-plagued areas remain active. It may simply happen that one area may record more attacks than others but no area can claim to be entirely free from pirates.
The Malacca and Singapore Straits continue to be popular among pirates. This is due to geographical and operational reasons. The area around these straits attracts the heaviest maritime traffic concentration. Over 200 vessels of different types transit the Malacca Strait every day and the traffic density is very high. Although there is a traffic separation scheme, the transiting vessels reduce speed to negotiate traffic. Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) transit the strait at safe speeds with only a metre or two of clearance under the keel. Besides, the strait is home to several shipwrecks and shallow areas. These navigational and operational conditions provide the right type of environment for pirates to perpetrate attacks as also manage a quick getaway. The number of attacks is fast increasing and is alarming.
In the recent past, piracy related incidents, which were more common in the Malacca Strait and South China Sea, have tended to spill over into the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. The centre of gravity of piracy appears to shift in waters around India. Although the waters off Sri Lanka have generally remained free from piracy, the northeastern waters have witnessed frequent acts of piracy. In one incident, the MV Cordiality, a merchant vessel, was captured and five Chinese crew members were killed, allegedly by Sri Lankan terrorists near the port of Trincomlee. 3 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) rebel forces are also reported to hijack ships and boats of all sizes, and kidnapping and killing of crew members is a common practice. In August 1998, a Belize flagged general cargo vessel, the MV Princess Kash, was hijacked by LTTE rebels. 4 While on its way to Mullaitivu, an LTTE stronghold, the Sri Lankan Air Force bombed the vessel to prevent the ship's cargo falling into the hands of the LTTE. The status of 22 crew members is still not known.
According to the International Maritime Bureau, there were 107 reported attacks in 1991, which increased to 228 in 1996. In 1997, this figure witnessed yet another increase, thereby totalling 247 attacks. 5 The number of reported attacks during the period June 15, 1998, to June 15, 1999, reached an all time high of 275 attacks, with the number of unreported attacks pegged at 130. 6 In terms of statistical data, the threat posed by piracy has exhibited a marked increase. The 1990s have, thus, witnessed an impressive increase of 160 per cent. The statistical data in respect of Southeast Asia is indeed disturbing. The reported attacks in the region rose from three in 1989 to 60 in 1990, before reaching an all time high of 102 in 1991. 7 Southeast Asia, along with the South China Sea are hot spots for piratical attacks and comprise danger zones. The actual problem of piracy is much more disturbing and serious than what the figures reflect.
The most horrifying aspect of maritime piracy is the violence associated with it. Crew traumatised, hurt, injured, left adrift or even killed are some of the violent shades of modern day piratical attacks. The international shipping community is growing more pessimistic over the ability of states to control piracy and the viciousness of the attacks. In the first three quarters of 1999, the International Maritime Bureau reported more than 430 violent attacks on crew. 8 From a mere 25 reported incidents of violence on crew in 1991, the figure rose sharply to 246 in 1996, and reached an all time high in 1999. 9
Drug Trafficking
Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia comprise the two top opium and heroin producing regions in the world. For Myanmar , history, climate and politics have been instrumental in its emergence as a top poppy cultivating and heroin producing country. With similar climatic conditions in northern Thailand and Laos, cultivation soon spread to these areas, and the region came to be known as the "Golden Triangle'. Myanmar tops the list with an annual production of more than 2,360 tonnes. 10 In addition to its leading role as a producer of smoke opium, Myanmar is the Golden Triangle's centre for heroin refining.
Myanmar's heroin shipments pass through neighbouring Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, China and India. Heroin produced by Myanmar is largely trafficked through unmarked transit land routes and through sea routes. Traffickers move heroin through central Myanmar, often from Lashio, through Mandalay, to Rangoon or other sea ports such as Moulein for sea-borne passage to the West.
The Indian Ocean , by virtue of its geographic location, is home to the narcotic trade from the "Golden Triangle" and the "Golden Crescent". The ocean has emerged as an important transit route for the dispatch of large consignments of narcotics to the Western world as also to the Far East. Besides, the drug trade has flourished in India, both as part of legal produce as also a final destination. India's northeastern states of Manipur, Tripura, Meghalaya and Mizoram serve as an important and easy route for drug carrying couriers.
One of the more important concerns of this trade is the rise of narco-terrorism. Although bank robberies and kidnappings can be lucrative, drug trafficking is far more so, for generating funds for arms and fuelling insurgencies. Long insurgencies need a lot of money. The LTTE is deeply involved in drug trafficking; it owns a significant number of merchant ships that are manned by its cadres/personnel. 11 Besides transporting general cargo such as timber, fertiliser, sugar and other commercial goods, the LTTE owned ships transport narcotics from Myanmar to Turkey. 12 The LTTE's activity in Myanmar has been legitimised with the connivance of some leaders of the military junta. Myanmar offers an important base for the LTTE drug trafficking network. It appears that the Myanmarese government had given the LTTE permission to operate from Twante Island. 13 The island is now reported to have been vacated, but the LTTE remains active in the area. According to a report in recent months, Tamil drug smugglers have been arrested at several places in the region. The Sri Lankan port of Jaffna is home to Tamil pirates and the LTTE's drug dealings. The LTTE provides security and couriers for Myanmarese drug shipments. They have become an unlocking part of the narcotic traffic around the world. The bulk of the drugs move through the sea-borne routes to the US and Europe from Myanmarese ports.
As per an internal Indonesian military report, small-scale ganja cultivation is being resorted to by some Acehnese in the remote areas of the province. If the "Free Aceh" rebellion catches on, drug cultivation and gun running could be used by them to further finance their insurgency. In an attempt to thwart the use of Malaysia as a transit point for the heroin trade and the growth of addiction among the local population, Malaysia has adopted the most severe anti-drug policy in the world. This includes a mandatory death sentence for anyone, including foreigners, in possession of more than 15 grams of pure heroin. Malaysia's narcotic policy appears to have forced traffickers to adopt alternative routes. Consequently, larger quantities of heroin now pass through India, Thailand and Laos than in the past.
Gun Running
The linkage between drug trafficking and proliferation of small arms is well established. It may not be possible to control the spread of small arms unless there is a corresponding control of drug trafficking. Myanmar offers a classical example of the linkage between the drug trade and small arms proliferation. This linkage in Myanmar started in the 1950s. The United States supplied the nationalist Chinese of the Koumintang (KMT) with weapons and drugs to fight against the Communists in Mainland China. By 1953, the opium industry had been well established to fund the movement. In more recent times, the drug king Khun Sha had maintained a private army of over 10,000 troops to guard his opium cultivation territory. His army was well equipped in terms of sophisticated small arms. Besides, the insurgent movements like the Karen rely on drug sales proceeds to equip their army. In Bangladesh, small arms smuggling is quite common. The porous land borders and the coast line of Bangladesh offer an easy inflow of weapons and drugs. 14
The LTTE has established a very sophisticated network of gun running. It has contacts in several Southeast Asian countries and as far as Japan and North Korea. The LTTE gun trade route passes through the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. Arms originating from Cambodia are loaded onboard small fishing trawlers in the southern Thailand port of Ranong. 15 These vessels then transfer the consignment to larger vessels at sea for onward passage to Sri Lanka. Some of these weapons are transported by small boats to Cox Bazaar in Bangladesh. Several vessels engaged in gun running have been captured in the region. 16 In 1996, Bangladeshi authorities seized 600 rifles onboard a fishing trawler originating in Thailand. In 1997, the Royal Thai Navy seized an arms shipment for the People's Liberation Army (of Manipur) following a chase in the Andaman Sea off the port of Ranong. 17 From 1984 to 1990, a Malaysian island was used by the LTTE to train its sea Tiger personnel. 18 Gun running by ships is by far the safest method. Another related problem is that of money laundering. Drug lords have been able to take advantage of Singapore's liberal banking laws and money laundering opportunities. Drug lords these days are engaged in the gold trade also. The proceeds of drug sales are converted into gold and smuggled to Myanmar; this gold is then sold in the region, disturbing the currency situation.
The fact that the Sri Lankan foreign minister had to undertake a dedicated tour of Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand to seek their governments' cooperation to stop illegal arms smuggling by the LTTE, further confirms the existence of gun runners in the Malacca Strait-Andaman Sea region.
Illegal Fishing
For an estimated billion Asians, fish is the main source of proteins. Over half the world's fish catch is taken in Asian water, and five of the top fish producing countries are in Pacific Asia. Thailand is the largest exporter. As traditional fishing grounds have been exhausted, competition for newer stocks has intensified. Fishermen from Thailand are the most enterprising and 'aggressive' fishermen in this part of the world, encroaching into the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ's) of neighbouring states. Thai fishermen regularly plunder fish in the EEZs of Myanmar, India, Malaysia and Indonesia. In 1995, Thai warships clashed with Vietnamese patrol craft that were trying to arrest Thai fishing boats. Two Vietnamese sailors were killed. 19 Each country claimed that the encounter took place in its waters. Similarly, the Myanmarese, Malaysian and Indian Navies have fired on Thai vessels. At times, it becomes difficult for states to enforce EEZ laws. The Myanmarese government says it simply cannot enforce its prohibition on fishing by Thai vessels: Myanmarese maritime patrol aircraft see hundreds of Thai boats in the Gulf of Martban, but the navy can do nothing about it, as it is not possible to sink all the boats. 20 In January 1999, a Royal Thai Navy patrol boat, Tor 99, while responding to a distress call of a Thai fishing vessel off the Ranong coast in the Andaman Sea, was fired upon by a Mayanmarese naval vessel, Yen Noing 510, and had to return the fire. 21 The diplomatic fallout of this incident, apart from allegations and counter-allegations regarding jurisdiction of the incident area, led to joint naval patrols and a hotline link between the two Foreign Ministries. A state's population could become extremely inflamed by the illegal fishing and may even influence diplomatic relations, since the sea is a source of livelihood and survival. Throughout the Sri Lankan and LTTE crisis, the Indian government spared no effort to ensure that the fishing ground off Kachaitivu was not denied to its fishermen. Also, the Sri Lankan Navy had to factor in the requirements of these fishermen while combatting coastal hopping by the LTTE. Analysis of data on vessels apprehended for poaching in the Indian EEZ from 1981 to May 1999 reveals some disturbing trends in the Andaman Sea. 22 Between 1981-85, out of 79 vessels apprehended, 22 were in the Andaman and Nicobar (A&N) region, which constitutes 27.8 per cent of the total apprehensions. Similarly, between 1986-90 and 1991-95, the percentage works out to 27.8 and 24.03 respectively. However between 1996 and May 1999, out of 137 vessels apprehended for poaching in the Indian EEZ, 55 were in the A&N region which constitutes 40.1-44.2 per cent increase over the 1981-85 and 1986-90 period. Except for a few apprehended vessels of Pakistani and Chinese nationality, the rest of the arrested vessels belonged to maritime littorals in the Bay of Bengal.
Maritime Pollution
With such a high density of maritime traffic in the Malacca Strait, accidents have taken place on a regular basis. The oil tanker traffic through the region is expected to increase as the demand for oil grows in the Asia-Pacific region. Regional governments are concerned that a major oil spill could seriously disrupt or even close the strait. A large scale spill and subsequent pollution would have devastating economic and environmental consequences. The recent forest fires in Indonesia, apart from greatly affecting daily life and economic activity in Malaysia and Singapore, have had implications for maritime traffic in the Malacca Strait. The choking smog resulted in poor visibility and led to at least one reported accident. Piratical attacks also threaten the environment. Little attention is being paid to the environmental dimension of piracy, though it is not directly connected with it. The ecological and environmental disaster caused by the MV Exxon Valdez still looms large in the minds of environmentalists. Take the case of a vessel left adrift in the Malacca Strait. In an incident in April 1992, pirates attacked the Cypress registered MV Valiant Carrier, an oil tanker. 23 During the attack on the ship, the pirates locked the crew and the ship remained "not under command" during the attack. One of the crew members managed to escape and averted a major disaster. Pirates attacking a ship often put the crew in life rafts and boats, and the ship is then left adrift. These vessels can result in collision or grounding, leading to environmental and navigational hazards. In September 1992, the MV Ocean Blessing, a container vessel and a 'rogue ship', collided with the super tanker MV Nagasaki Spirit, resulting in a major spillage and fire. All twenty crew members on board the tanker were killed. 24
Human Smuggling
Smuggling of humans beings is not a new phenomenon. Humans have been smuggled for exploitation as also to alter demography. Also, human beings have moved voluntarily due to political, economic and security considerations. Today, however, human smuggling has emerged as a lucrative business. It is less risky and more rewarding in terms of profits. For instance, smuggling drugs into Singapore entails the death penalty, but smuggling migrants into the US can net profits at the rate of $30,000 per person. A large number of human smuggling syndicates and gangs have mushroomed all over the world and are engaged in a highly profitable industry.
Millions of Asians leave their countries in search of better economic conditions. According to the International Labour Organisation, there are approximately seven million Asians working abroad, and more than 50 per cent of these are illegal migrants. By one estimate, on an average, one million people are smuggled illegally the world over every year and 20 per cent of these come from China. The other countries from which illegal migrants come include Iran, Iraq, India, Pakistan, Sudan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
Smuggling by sea is the cheapest and easiest form of illegal transportation of migrants. For instance, the Hong Kong police found 26 Chinese stowaways inside a US-bound ship container. 25 Similarly in 1999, 100 Chinese stowaways were found in ships sailing for California, Vancouver and British Columbia. 26 More recently, 14 young men of Iraqi and Iranian origin found onboard the MV Medstar as stowaways were apprehended by the Indian Coast Guard. They had boarded the vessel at Bandar Abbas after paying US$250 to an agency engaged in this business. On being discovered, they had threatened the captain of the vessel that explosives had been placed in the ship, and wanted to marshal the vessel. The captain radioed the Indian Coast Guard who apprehended them and sent them back to Iran. 27
Illegal trafficking and human smuggling by sea has increased in the Asia-Pacific region. The general direction is towards the US, Western Europe and Australia. There are reported cases of human movement from the Middle East to Australia; migrants are moved to coastal areas where they embark on small ferries to be moved into international waters. They are finally transported to designated ships that are engaged in this specific business for onward transportation to the desired destination. There are others who are willing to undergo a long and difficult sea voyage in small boats.
The UN Annual Report on Oceans and the Law of the Seas has described illegal trafficking in persons as "a reckless exploitation of people in distress, and thus is a reprehensible form of international terrorism". The International Maritime Organisation has even adopted an instrument entitled "Interim Measures for the Combating of Unsafe Practices Associated with the Trafficking or Transport of Migrants by Sea."
Mining
Sea mines are the cheapest form of maritime warfare. They can be laid by both military and civil vessels, and aircraft. There are 48 navies that have the capability to undertake mining operations. 28 The mere threat of a mine is sufficient to deter any ship from entering a channel or strait. Mines laid in the Red Sea in 1984 and the Persian Gulf in 1987 clearly demonstrate the lethality of this form of warfare. Several ships were damaged and it needed an international effort to clean up the area. The Malacca Strait is no exception. This is further aggravated by the presence of choke points along the 960-km-long strait, giving access to several ports like Penang, Kelang, Belawan, Lumut and Singapore. The strait is also vital to states that have ports on either side of it. The closure of the strait directly affects the domestic coastal trade. Commodore Teo, chief of the Singapore Navy, was quoted as saying that sea mines can be used to disrupt freedom of navigation in the Malacca Strait. 29 Added to that is the poor mine counter-measure capability of the regional navies to undertake clearing efforts. Even states have reportedly engaged in acts to threaten the SLOCs. For instance, 18 merchant ships were damaged in the Red Sea in July 1984 due to mines laid "as an expression of Libyan indignation with Egypt". 30
Navigational Errors and Ship Husbandry
In recent years, advancements in technology have greatly improved the safety of the ships and crew. The shipbuilding industry has made progress in terms of ship design, propulsion, navigation and habitability. However, the number of ship accidents at sea has increased. These can be attributed to poor seamanship and ship husbandry, the age of ships and, more importantly, human error. Between 1992 and 1999, a total of 593 ships were lost at sea, of which 77 were oil tankers. 31 This represents only 13 per cent of the total accidents worldwide, but it accounts for 31 per cent in terms of tonnage. More importantly, 60 of the 77 oil tankers lost during the period were more than 20 years old. Besides, the natural perils of ocean transportation like storms, typhoons and other nature related conditions continue to cause problems for the safety and security of the SLOCs.
While there have been advances in ship-borne navigation equipment, satellite communication and shore-based vessel monitoring and control, collision at sea is a recurring phenomenon. Some of the collisions are so severe that it is difficult to separate the vessels, thereby posing major challenges to salvage and damage control experts. On occasions, incompetence on the part of the crew has resulted in collision, grounding, and even loss of vessels. Vessels have been grounded due to inaccurate navigation and are firmly embedded in narrow channels, approaches to harbours and fairways, causing navigational constraints. Breakdown of ship machinery can be serious enough to disable a vessel for a long time. More often than not, shipping companies do not undertake planned preventive maintenance of machinery/dry docking of ships to check sea-worthiness which has been, to some extent, responsible for accidents. This problem is further aggravated by the lack of onboard expertise to handle fires, flooding and damage control.
Strategy for the Safety of the SLOCs
As noted earlier, threats to the SLOCs arise from several directions. Some of these can be attributed to external factors and some to internal ones, while there are other factors (storms, cyclones, typhoons, fog, rain) also over which the maritime community has limited control. It is, therefore, important that the threats to the SLOCs be classified into two distinct groups. This classification of the threats helps the maritime community to develop sophisticated strategies to ensure the safety and security of the SLOCs. External factors would include piracy, laying mines at choke points and fairways, military conflicts, spillover of domestic disorder to the sea, and territorial conflicts. The internal factors are partly the making of the maritime community itself: poor seamanship, incompetence of crew, environmental pollution by ships, gun running, drug smuggling and illegal migration of humans by ships.
External Factors
Piracy at sea continues to top the list of threats to the SLOCs. The number of incidents, including violent attacks, continues to rise. The maritime community is growing pessimistic about the ability of the states to counter piracy. It also appears to doubt the intention of states to take the matter seriously. On occasions, states have been accused of not responding to anti-piracy operations since it does not affect their national carriers. Regional efforts have not been effective, and multilateral approaches to challenge this crime are a distant dream.
At present, there are no indications to suggest that choke points are likely to be threatened by states astride these waterways but such eventualities cannot be rued out. Similarly, the threat of mining by regional terrorist organistions to draw international attention remains a potent one. There are distinct possibilities of disruption of the SLOCs due to inter-state conflicts. States are bound to declare maritime exclusion zones or areas dangerous to shipping due to conflicts at sea. Although countries have been pursuing an aggressive maritime cooperation strategy, both bilaterally and on a multilateral basis to prevent scuttling of the SLOCs, conflicts have continued and have threatened the SLOCs.
These factors challenge maritime order and threaten the use of the sea. They have the potential to disrupt and destroy maritime enterprise. Efforts have been made by several countries to address these problems but only in terms of bilateral, and at best, trilateral arrangements. There is a near total absence of a multilateral approach to combat maritime disorder. Although multilateral Track II arrangements like the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific ( CSCAP) and Western Pacific Naval Symposium ( WPNS) have been actively engaged in hosting seminars and discussions, states are yet to incorporate the agenda in their national policy-making. This calls for greater cooperation among states to build upon the recommendations of the Track II arrangements. A framework for regional maritime cooperation could include the following measures:
Basic Maritime Cooperation
Advance Maritime Cooperation
Broader Maritime Cooperation
Internal Factors
Poor seamanship and ship husbandry and inaccurate navigation have been responsible for a majority of accidents/fires/collisions/sinking of ships. Although the crew are trained to handle emergencies onboard ships, they have been found wanting in professional competence. Shipping companies often purchase old ships, and hire crew of low comptence at low wages. Besides, the shipping companies do not meet international ship safety standards. Added to this woe is the desire on the part of shipping agents to transport cargo by the cheapest means, which ultimately encourages poor standards of maritime transportation.
It will be unfair to put the entire blame on the shipping companies. The ships' crew have frequently engaged in activities such as drug smuggling, gun running and transporting human cargo. They also transport cargo that is not part of the legitimate consignment. For instance, on June 25,1999, a North Korean vessel, the MV Kuwolsan, was impounded by Indian custom authorities at Kandla port in India for carrying equipment for the production of tactical surface-to-surface missiles. The cargo comprising 148 boxes also included special materials and parts for guidance systems, blueprints, drawings and instruction manuals. Reportedly, the owners of the vessel admitted that the consignment was to be offloaded at Karachi port in Pakistan. 32 Then there is always the nexus between corrupt port/customs officials and the ships' crew that further threatens the safety of maritime transport.
It is a common practice for vessels to clear bilge in the open sea. The crew has little or no concern for environmental degradation. Some vessels even engage in dumping toxic waste. On occasions, crew have dumped cargo at sea to claim insurance. There is also an urgent need to educate the shipping community on the environmental aspects of the seas. The maritime community must establish stringent rules/regulations in terms of crew expertise and professional competence. The "Certificate of Competency" for sea-going personnel should be issued only by an international agency established for this purpose. Likewise, the sea-worthiness of ships and vessels must be subjected to stringent tests by an international agency. This would prevent poor quality and non-sea-worthy ships sailing and resulting in accidents and loss of life. Marine customs/police authorities should be empowered to stop entry of such vessels into ports.
Conclusion
The security environment in the northern Indian Ocean is being challenged from several directions. The region is plagued with piracy, drug smuggling, gun running and illegal migration. Efforts have been made by states to address these problems and there has been an encouraging response from states but only as part of a bilateral agenda. Only a few issues such as "search and rescue" and "piracy" have been taken up on a multilateral basis. There is a need to encourage bilateral naval and coast guard exercises/patrols aimed at improving transparency, establishing common procedures to address problems related to maritime disorder, search and rescue at sea, and support protection of the marine environment. This, in turn, would contribute to stability in the region.
Endnotes
Note *: Vijay Sakhuja, Research Fellow, IDSA Back
Note 1: B.A. Hamza and Mohd. Nizam Basiron, The Strait of Mallaca : Some Funding Proposals, MIMA Paper, Maritime Institute of Malaysia,p.67. Back
Note 2: See <http://www.maritimesecurity.com> and < http://www.specialopsassociates.com> Back
Note 3: "Report on Ship Attack in Sri Lanka", Xinhua ( Beijing), in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), September 11, 1997. Back
Note 4: Rohan Gunaratna, "Trends in Maritime Terrorism: The Sri Lanka Case", Lanka Outlook, Autumn 1998, p.13. Back
Note 5: Ibid., 3. Back
Note 6: n.3, p.2. Back
Note 7: n.4, p.4. Back
Note 8: Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annual Report, 1 January-30 September 1999, ICC International Maritime Bureau, United Kingdom, p.71. Back
Note 9: Ibid. Back
Note 10: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1997, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, US Department of State, Washington DC, March 1998. Back
Note 11: Rohan Gunaratna, "Illicit Transfer of Conventional Weapons: The Role of State and Non-State Actors in South Asia", in Jayanth Dhanapala, Small Arms Control: Old Weapons, New Issues (Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1999), p. 266. Back
Note 12: Ibid. Back
Note 13: Ibid. Back
Note 14: Muhammad Shahedul Anam Khan, "Linkage Between Arms Trafficking and the Drug Trade in South Asia", in Dhanapala, Ibid., p. 248. Back
Note 15: Ibid. Back
Note 16: Ibid. Back
Note 17: Ibid. Back
Note 18: Ibid. Back
Note 19: Gordon Flairclough, "Floating Flashpoints", Far Eastern Economic Review, March 13, 1997, p.54. Back
Note 20: Ibid. Back
Note 21: "Myanmar's Armed Forces and Their Ongoing Campaigns", Asia Defence Journal, 3/99, p.11. Back
Note 22: Data obtained from Indian Coast Guard authorities at New Delhi, Back
Note 23: Flairclough, n. 19, p.6. Back
Note 24: n.1, p.10. Back
Note 25: "26 Chinese Stowaways Intercepted in Hong Kong", The Times of India, October 20,2000. Back
Note 26: Ibid. Back
Note 27: P. Palari, "Transnational Ocean Crimes", seminar on Transnational Security, Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies, Ausust 8-10,2000, Honolulu, Hawaii. Back
Note 28: Henry J. Kenny, An Analysis of Possible Threats to Shipping in Key South-East Asian Sea Lanes (Virginia: Centre for Naval Analysis), p.22. Back
Note 29: Ibid. Back
Note 30: James Cable, Navies in Violent Peace (London: Macmillan Press,1989), p.98. Back
Note 31: See "Safety of Seaborne Oil Trade" at <32: http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/1vb/124230.html> Back
Note 32: See "Pallone Raises Issue of North Korean Missile Help to Pakistan" at <http://www.indiainnewyork.com/iny0733099/chronicle/Pallone/html> Back