Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA

August 2001 (Vol. XXV No. 5)

 

Policing the Indo-Bangladesh Border
By Kulbir Krishan _*

 

Abstract

The Indo-Bangladesh border is the longest land border which India has with any of its neighbours. Traditionally, this border has been fairly open and peaceful. However, it has made problems for, and is of great strategic importance to, India's northeastern region. This long and porous border has been used by various terrorist and insurgent groups to wage war against the state and for illegal immigration into India from Bangladesh. In the interest of national security, it is essential that this border be properly safeguarded and its policing revamped. This paper briefly recounts the details of the border clashes in April 2001 in which 16 Indian border guards were killed. It points out some of the lacunae at present and makes a few suggestions towards improving policing of this sensitive border.

Introduction

The recent incidents along the Indo-Bangladesh border in which 16 Border Security Force (BSF) men were killed in April 2001 have focussed public attention towards this hitherto neglected border. This paper seeks to highlight the strategic importance of this border, describe the recent incidents in some detail, draw attention to some of the problems in policing this border and prescribe some of the policy changes which can help safeguard India's northeastern states. It also makes out a case for enhancing and improving policing of this border in the interest of national security.

India's northeast, comprising the states of Assam, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh, is spread over an area of 255,000 sq. km. ₁ The region is located at longitude 89.46 degrees east to 97.30 degrees east and latitude 21.57 degrees north to 29.30 degrees north. The entire area is connected to the Indian mainland by a tenuous 22-km land corridor through Siliguri in the state of West Bengal, popularly known as the "Chicken's Neck". The region is of great strategic importance and shares international borders with China, Myanmar, Bhutan and Bangladesh, and is home to over 40 million people. ₂ Due to its geographical location, and great distance from the capital, New Delhi, the people of this region often suffer from a feeling of neglect and feel that the central government does not have much time or concern for their security, priorities and needs. This feeling has, at times, been exacerbated by responses from New Delhi which did not take into account the feelings and sensitivities of the people inhabiting this area.

Besides Bangladesh, India also shares borders with Pakistan, China, Myanmar and Nepal. The nature of each of these borders, their topography and characteristics are varied and so the problems of policing each of them are also quite different. India shares a 4,096-km-long international border with Bangladesh, which incidentally is the longest international border that India has with any country. This article only covers the Indo-Bangladesh border and the peculiarities and specific concerns which the security agencies have to face while policing this border.

Problems of Policing

Three main problems arise while policing the Indo-Bangladesh border. These are: incomplete demarcation, the problem of enclaves, and the problem of areas in adverse possession.

Incomplete Demarcation

The creation of a new country, East Pakistan, which later became Bangladesh, out of undivided India in 1947, led to a new set of problems. It was artificially carved out of undivided India by the Radcliffe Line. Not only were the new borders artificial, but also no one knew for sure where they began, because the border had not been physically demarcated on the ground. It not only divided a nation but also cut through the middle of several villages; in some cases, while the main house was in one country, the servant quarters or bathrooms were in another. More importantly, it disrupted the traditional way of life and people were cut off from their traditional markets, sources of livelihood, medical facilities, etc.

The issue of physically demarcating the Radcliffe Line was taken up from the 1950s onwards and the field parties of the Survey of India and those of Pakistan and later Bangladesh got down to the task of actually translating the line on the ground. Almost the entire work has now been completed and only a small stretch of 6.5 km remains to be demarcated.

Enclaves

There are 51 Bangladeshi enclaves having a total area of 7,110 acres in India and 111 Indian enclaves measuring 17,158.1 acres in Bangladesh. ₃ These are isolated strips of land or villages, which are surrounded on all sides by the neighbouring country. This peculiar problem has come up due to the rajas of two neighbouring princely states wagering these small strips of land and even villages with each other. Over time, they kept on losing and winning these small parcels of land and when the erstwhile princely state of Cooch Behar opted to join India, it created an anomalous situation wherein these enclaves were left surrounded by the neighbouring country.

Adverse Possession

Similarly, there are about 52 pieces of land which actually belong to Bangladesh but are in the adverse possession of India and about 49 pieces of land belonging to India which are in the adverse possession of Bangladesh. These are small pieces of land varying in size from 5 to 500 acres which, due to historical or other reasons, remain in the possession of one country even though by physical demarcation they should be handed over to the other.

Presently, the main agreement relating to the Indo-Bangladesh border is the Indira-Mujib Pact of 1974. Article 24 of this pact envisages that all the areas in adverse possession of each country would be measured and demarcated at the earliest. Following this, the areas in adverse possession would be exchanged within six months. While Bangladesh ratified this agreement in 1975, it is yet to be ratified by India. The Ministry of External Affairs is of the view that the ratification by Bangladesh is conditional to the entire border being demarcated, and India will ratify the treaty once the process is completed.

However, during the annual meetings of India's BSF and Bangladesh's Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) at the level of director-general, the Bangladesh side has been repeatedly raising this issue. The Indian stand has been that the BSF is not competent to take any action, as it is basically a political decision. On the other hand, the BDR have been insisting that they have the mandate from their government to raise this issue with the Indian side. However, Article 4 of the same agreement ₅ binds the two sides to maintain peace and tranquillity on the border and eschew the use of force to make any changes at the border.

The border has traditionally been peaceful and quite open. Although the number of authorised transit points for goods and people is limited, for villagers living on both sides of the border, it virtually does not exist. Traditionally, villagers have been crossing the border to access markets, raw materials, medical facilities, etc. For example, it is a known fact that almost all of the 25,000 cycle-rickshaw plyers in Agartala, the capital of Tripura, come every morning to ply their trade from Bangladesh and go back the same evening. They also carry head loads of smuggled goods both ways. Both governments have generally ignored this kind of informal cross-border trade.

The existing legal structure in 1947 did not envisage any such partition and was not capable of meeting the new challenges which arose due to this decision. It was only in 1955 that the Indian Citizenship Act was passed by Parliament, and it was not till 1967 that a new Act, which took cognisance of illegal immigration into India, was passed.

Initially, the Government of India did not pay much attention to this border, which was thinly policed, mainly by armed police battalions of Assam and West Bengal. This state of affairs was not very satisfactory and in 1965, a central force, the BSF, replaced the state police. However, the BSF was never deployed in sufficient strength and the main problems plaguing this border continue. These chiefly consisted of: (1) trans-border trafficking by various underground groups to set up training camps and bases in erstwhile East Pakistan and Bangladesh. The Naga and Mizo insurgents travelled extensively across this border to bring men, material and supplies to wage war against India. Later, other underground outfits of various northeastern insurgent groups also used this porous border to bring in arms and ammunition and send across recruits for arms training. They also used it for drug smuggling. In fact, taking advantage of this thinly policed border, not only local insurgent groups but also Kashmiri and Pan-Islamic terrorist groups have been using it, particularly since the mid-1990s, to send their leaders and specially important, highly trained cadres for carrying out terrorist activities in India. (2) The porous border allowed easy flow of migrants from East Pakistan and later Bangladesh, which are densely populated, to Assam and other northeastern states, where land is available comparatively freely.

Illegal Migration: Background and Current Situation

It is a well-known fact that illegal immigration from erstwhile East Pakistan and present Bangladesh has led to serious social tension in the entire northeastern region, particularly in Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura. In the post-partition period, the quantum of illegal immigration to Assam has been phenomenal. It became a crucial issue for the Assamese because they feared that the population profile of the Assam Valley would change in favour of immigrant Muslims if the influx continued. The example of Tripura, where the original tribal population, which comprised 67,906 out of the total population of 91,759 in 1876, was reduced to a minority by immigration from East Pakistan, was well known to them. Table 1 clearly brings out how the migrants have outnumbered the indigenous tribals in this state since independence. It is primarily due to this reason that there is violence and insurgency in the state. ₆

Table 1. Tripura Demographic Composition

Year Population Growth Rate for 10-Year Period

Total Tribal Total Tribal

1951 639,929 237,953 24.6 36.8

1961 1,142,005 360,070 78.7 31.5

1971 1,556,342 450,544 36.3 25

1981 2,053,058 583,920 32 30

1991 2,757,205 853,345 34 46

The problem of migration from East Bengal, later East Pakistan and now Bangladesh, has a history of nearly 95 years. The idea was first mooted in 1906, when, at the invitation of Nawab Salimullah Khan of Dacca, some prominent Muslims of India gathered at Dacca to deliberate over the formation of the Muslim League. This idea of forming a separate political party for Muslims of India had been suggested to them by Lord Curzon, the viceroy, when a Muslim delegation had called on him at Shimla. Earlier, in 1905, Lord Curzon had partitioned Bengal and the Muslim majority East Bengal had been joined with Assam to form a new province of East Bengal, and Assam. In a public meeting held at Dacca in 1906, Nawab Salimullah Khan exhorted the Muslims to migrate to Assam and settle there. This was followed by large-scale immigration of Muslims, particularly from the East Bengal districts of Mymensingh, Pabna, Bogra and Rangpur. ₇

So rapid and large was the immigration from Bengal that between 1911 and 1931, the Muslim population in Assam increased from five per cent to 30 per cent. C. S. Mullan, a British census commissioner, commented in his census report of 1931 that "immigration was likely to alter permanently the whole future of Assam and to destroy more surely than the Burmese invasion of 1820, the whole structure of Assamese culture and civilisation". He analysed the impact of the immigration and called it "the invasion of a vast horde of land hungry Bengali immigrants, mostly Muslims, from the districts of East Bengal... a population which must amount to over half a million has transplanted itself from Bengal to Assam Valley during the last 25 years... it is sad but by no means improbable that in another 30 years, Sibsagar district will be the only part of Assam in which an Assamese will find himself at home." ₈

Alarmed by these developments, the then British India government tried to stem this migration by segregating areas where new immigrants could settle, from those which were declared to be the exclusive preserve of the Assamese by drawing imaginary lines across Assam demarcating these areas. However, this "line system" ₉ failed to contain the immigration flows. The Muslim League and its Chief Minister Saadulla subverted the scheme, and under the slogan of "grow more food" in 1942, encouraged immigration of Muslims to Assam. The viceroy also stated that the slogan actually meant "grow more Muslims." Saadulla met the Cabinet Mission on March 24, 1946, and tried to prove that Assam was a Muslim majority province. He proposed that not only Sylhet, but also the whole of Assam should be transferred to Pakistan. On this issue, the viceroy was blunt: "Jinnah, could not expect Assam in East Pakistan", he said. ₁₀

However, there was a significant change in the legal position after the partition of the country in 1947. While earlier, people from other parts of the country had every right to come and settle in Assam, now those living in East Pakistan were foreigners and not eligible to come and settle in this state. However, this did not make much difference on the ground and the problem of illegal infiltration into Assam continued. Given the long porous border and the fact that ready shelter was available to new immigrants from relatives who had migrated earlier, large-scale infiltration of Muslims from East Pakistan to Assam continued. Addressing the Assam State Committee of the Congress Party in Parliament on June 27, 1962, then Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru ₁₁ stated: "You refer to Pakistani infiltration. This is perfectly true. But you will appreciate that this infiltration from Bengal to Assam has been taking place for a very long time past... This infiltration should be stopped and effectively dealt with... Probably it will be difficult now to deal with illegal immigrants who came before 1952. We might, therefore, fix 1952 as the date of our enquiry". However, the problem of illegal immigration continued unabated and Nehru and his successors did not take any serious steps to secure the porous border with East Pakistan. As a result, infiltration continued unchecked with serious consequences for the nation's security.

It was only when Bangladesh was created in 1971 that the problem of illegal immigration was officially recognised for the first time. It was agreed that Bangladesh would take back all those of its citizens who had taken shelter in India after March 25, 1971. Although it is a well-known fact that many of the refugees who came to India after the crackdown by the Pakistan Army in March 1971 never went back to that country, yet no serious attempt was made to send them back. ₁₂ Instead, the porous border and ready availability of shelter encouraged more infiltration from Bangladesh. Local vote bank politics also encouraged such migration. The Bangladesh government, while covertly encouraging such movement, officially denies that there has been any illegal influx of its people to Assam or any other part of India.

The issue began to alarm demographers who observed that Assam's rate of population growth during 1901-1951 was the second highest (127.8 per cent) in the world, exceeded only by Brazil (204 per cent). This trend continued in the subsequent years and sociologist Monirul Hussain ₁₃ observes: "It is a historical fact that the rate of growth of population in Assam has been much higher than that of India's average since the colonial period. Significantly in 1921, when the population growth rate was negative for India, Assam had shown a tremendously higher growth rate, that is 20.47 per cent. And the gap of growth between India and Assam was as high as 20.77 percent. In 1901, Assam's population constituted only 1.38 per cent of India's total population. However, by 1971, Assam's share nearly doubled at 2.67 per cent".

Indo-Bangladesh Border Clashes, 2001

Given this background, there has been little need for alertness on the part of India's BSF. This fact was fully utilised by the BDR in April this year. On the evening of April 15,2001, about a dozen men of the Bangladesh Rifles came to Pyrdiwah village in the East Khasi Hills district of Meghalaya and threatened the villagers to leave as the land belonged to Bangladesh. The villagers ran to the nearest BSF outpost located about 1 km away and requested the BSF to come and help them. It may be pointed out that both the village and outpost of Pyrdiwah are located in a small stretch of 320 acres, which have been in the adverse possession of India for over 40 years. The BSF did not respond but assured the villagers that they were capable of meeting any problem. Later the same night, the BDR entered the Indian village in strength, chased away the villagers, surrounded the BSF outpost on all sides and started digging trenches and fortifications around it. On the morning of April 16, the BSF outpost which was held by one platoon (of approximately 30 men) found itself surrounded by six companies (approximately 100 men each) of the BDR. The platoon commander enquired from the BDR commander the reasons for this intrusion but was told that the area being occupied by the BSF was Paduah (the Bangladeshi name for Pyrdiwah) and was a part of Bangladesh. The BSF was asked to withdraw behind the international border, which they refused, saying that they had been holding this post since 1971 and would not withdraw. In the meanwhile, the BDR had constructed trenches around the BSF post and used the corrugated iron sheets of the village school roof to construct overhead protection. The villagers of Pyrdiwah in the meanwhile fled to the neighbouring hills and took shelter temporarily in neighbouring villages.

The attack by the BDR was so well planned that on April 16 when the attack on Pyrdiwah took place, no senior BSF officer was available at Shillong, the sector headquarters. The senior BSF officers were all busy in law and order and anti-insurgency duties in another state. ₁₄ Pyrdiwah village is about 92 km southeast of Shillong and only five km from Dawki, where various security and intelligence organisations have a significant presence. Needless to say, there was no advance intelligence about the impending attack from any of them. Later, it was confirmed that the BDR from Partapur as well as the Bangladesh Army from Muktapur were mobilised for this attack and advance intelligence should have been easily available. The local BSF officer at Shillong requested the Meghalaya police for help by providing armoured bullet-proof trucks as well as bullet-proof jackets. However, the BSF only asked for three armoured vehicles and 10 bullet-proof jackets which would have been woefully inadequate in case of any attack. The whole of April 16 and 17 was spent by the BSF trying to mobilise additional forces to break the siege of their border outpost at Pyrdiwah.

Meanwhile, the villagers of Pyrdiwah, led by their headman, visited Shillong on the evening of April 16 and apprised the state chief minister about their plight. The next morning, the state home minister accompanied by the inspector general of police (IGP), and other senior officers visited the site. They could not proceed to Pyrdiwah village or the BSF outpost as the village was under the occupation of the BDR and the outpost was surrounded by the BDR. However, they spoke to the villagers at a place nearly four km away where they had taken shelter, distributed some relief and ascertained the facts. ₁₅ On their return to Shillong the same evening, the chief minister was apprised of these serious developments. Despite several attempts, the Meghalaya chief minister was able to speak to the union home minister only after considerable bureaucratic delay. Finally, when the chief minister explained to the union home minister the seriousness of the developments and the inadequate response of the BSF, the home minister was amazed, as this was the very first time that he had heard of these developments from any source. A detailed fax message was also sent to him the same night by the chief minister asking the BSF to take appropriate action so that the life and property of the Indian citizens was safeguarded.

According to media reports, ₁₆ on April 18, the BSF launched a "counter-attack" or resorted to "aggressive patrolling" (depending on the point of view) near Boraibari, a small enclave in Bangladesh's adverse possession in the Mankachar sector of Assam's Dhubri district, more than 200 km to the west of Pyrdiwah. Apparently, the BSF thought that by capturing the enclave in the adverse possession of Bangladesh, they would be able to neutralise the advantage gained by the BDR at Pyrdiwah. However, the attack was poorly planned and implemented as a result of which the BSF party, which was numerically small, was surrounded and lynched by a mob of Bangladeshi villagers who were backed by the BDR. As a result, 16 of the BSF men were killed, two injured and captured, while the others managed to scramble back to safety in India.

Following this fiasco, diplomatic pressure was brought to bear upon Bangladesh, and following a flag meeting on April 19, the BDR agreed to withdraw from Pyrdiwah and go back to the situation that existed before April 15, 2001. However, even in this flag meeting, the BDR insisted that a village footpath constructed by some villagers nearly 10 km away from Pyrdiwah at Lynkhat village should be dismantled before they would withdraw. The BSF, accordingly, destroyed this footpath which had been recently repaired with government assistance and was well inside Indian territory before the BDR withdrew later the same evening.

The chief minister of Meghalaya visited Pyrdiwah on April 21 and spoke to the BSF officers and the local villagers. The BSF officers claimed that they had been able to break the siege of Pyrdiwah by using the three armoured trucks given by the Meghalaya police. The BDR had been taken by surprise and did not have the weapons to face such armoured vehicles and so had no option but to withdraw. They also alleged that the local villagers had helped the BDR by digging trenches, etc. This was strongly denied by the local headman who pointed out that the villagers had been forced to flee from their homes on April 15/16 night itself, and on their return on April 20, had found their houses ransacked and all their livestock, chickens, etc looted by the BDR. Even the local church had been desecrated and slogans in favour of the BDR and Bangladesh National Party had been painted inside it. The statue of Christ had also been removed. ₁₇ The chief minister himself pointed out that the village consisted of 69 families all of whom were either Adivasis or Khasis and staunchly loyal to India. They had suffered considerable loss at the hands of the Bangladeshis and there was no reason for them to support Bangladesh.

The state government has expressed its misgivings about the way the situation was handled by the BSF ₁₈ and the apparent lack of trust between the villagers and the BSF. The BSF officers also were not forthcoming with any information from April 15 till April 19, about the situation on the border, claiming that they were answerable only to the central government. Later, when the central team led by the minister of state for home affairs visited Shillong, the state government demanded that it should also have a role in protecting the border. In case this was not possible, then local youth should be recruited into the BSF to improve relations between it and the local people.

Prescriptions for the Future

In spite of the Assam movement, and the unrest in the general public over this issue, particularly in Assam, Meghalaya, and Tripura, the Indo-Bangladesh border remains as porous as ever, as the Pyrdiwah incidents have shown. There is a pressing need to defend this border and guard it adequately, not only to prevent unrest in the region but also to safeguard national security. Even the central government admits that instead of having 57 battalions of the BSF to guard the border, there are only 40 battalions at present guarding it. Although the scheme for fencing the border had been approved more than 15 years ago, only about 600 km of the 4,096-km-long border has been fenced so far. ₁₉ In sharp contrast, almost the entire Indo-Pak border from Gujarat to Punjab has been properly fenced, even though this project was mooted much later. Due to this, there is unchecked ingress of foreign nationals into India.

A number of steps need to be taken urgently to improve policing along this border. These would include proper double fencing of the entire 4,096-km-long border with concertina wire in between. This work should be taken up on a war footing and completed early. In addition, identified vulnerable stretches should be intensively patrolled, not only by the BSF, but also by using high-tech equipment like movement sensors, night vision devices, etc to prevent infiltration.

The strength of the BSF guarding the border needs to be increased. Depending upon the terrain, each battalion should be responsible for guarding 40 to 60 km of the international border. Wherever necessary, appropriate physical structures, adequate illumination, infrared sensors and other technical aids should be provided to make infiltration difficult. The Foreigners Act should be strictly implemented to push back illegal immigrants, and amended to make the harbouring of an illegal immigrant a heinous crime having the minimum deterrent punishment of three years rigorous imprisonment. For this purpose, either the BSF should be given adequate police powers or else a small contingent of the state police force of appropriate rank must be provided to the BSF to carry out this task. The existing anti-infiltration checkposts of the state police should be strengthened and relocated so that they work in close coordination with the BSF.

Before the creation of the BSF in 1965, this border was guarded by the respective state police forces. While they were not very efficient, they had the advantage of knowing the terrain and the people extremely well. The BSF does not have these advantages; also, it stays in the area for only a short time and then moves to another location. There is need for the BSF to have specialised knowledge about the border and the people inhabiting it. For this purpose, one company of each BSF battalion should be from the armed police of the local state, having adequate knowledge of the area, people, language, local customs, etc. If necessary, these state police companies could be coopted into the BSF battalions on a permanent basis. Alternatively, the recruitment into the BSF should be modified so that 50 per cent of its strength should be from states having an international border.

Policing this border would definitely improve if the help of the local people is taken by the security agencies manning the border. In many places, the locals are interested in keeping out illegal immigrants. This feeling should be utilised to the maximum by giving them specific short duration jobs having a bearing on their own security. Local villagers should be involved in the construction of border roads and fencing wherever they are willing.

Further, a National Citizenship Register should be compiled on the basis of a similar register which was prepared in 1951-52.Given recent advances in information technology, this is not a very difficult task. Perhaps, the data collected for the latest census in 2001 could be used to compile such a comprehensive citizenship register. On the basis of this register, proper identity cards could be issued to all citizens, beginning with the border states first. This card would not only identify the holder as an Indian citizen but could truly be multipurpose and be used for voting, getting rations, as a driving licence, etc, based on different stickers to be pasted on it.

Even if all the above measures are taken, they will not be enough to stop illegal immigration completely. However, they can make the cost of illegal immigration much higher and the current torrent of illegal immigration from Bangladesh would become a trickle. What is needed is the political will to enforce these measures. The genuine citizens of India, particularly those from the northeastern region, would be eternally grateful to any government which takes concrete steps to protect them from this illegal tide which is swamping them and threatening to end an entire way of life and culture.

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Endnotes

Note *: Kulbir Krishan, Senior Fellow, IDSA Back

Note 1: V.K. Sarin, India's North-East in Flames (Delhi, 1980), p.7-10. Back

Note 2: According to the Census of India, 1991, the population was 31.82 million. Back

Note 3: Reforming the National Security System", Report of the Group of Ministers on National Security, p.58. Back

Note 4: The pact was signed at New Delhi on May 16,1974 and is officially known as the "Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh concerning the demarcation of the land boundary between India and Bangladesh and related measures". Back

Note 5: Article 4 states "The Governments of India and Bangladesh agree that any dispute concerning the interpretation or implementation of this agreement shall be settled peacefully through mutual consultations." Back

Note 6: Annexure-1 of the Memorandum submitted by the Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti to Union Home Minister L. K. Advani, Agartala, March 27, 2000 cited by Wasbir Hussain in Faultlines, vol. 7, p. 122. Back

Note 7: B.P. Shukla, What Ails India's North-East (New Delhi, 1980), p.14. Back

Note 8: Census Report of India-Assam, 1931, vol. III, part 1, p. 49. Back

Note 9: Government of Assam, Memorandum on Waste Land and Immigrant Policy, August 1943, cited by M. Kar, Muslims in Assam Politics (New Delhi: Omsons Publications, 1990), p. 59. Back

Note 10: P. Moon, ed., Wavell: Viceroy's Journal (Delhi, 1977), p.41. Cited by Dinesh Kotwal, Strategic Analysis, vol. XXV, no. 2, May 2001, p.316. Back

Note 11: M. V. Kamath, " Neglected Assam", Illustrated Weekly, January 20-26, 1980, cited by Hussain, n. 6, p.118. Back

Note 12: Copy of Government of India's letter dated 29-11-1971 reproduced in Sanjoy Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist (Delhi: Penguin Books, 1994), p.380. Back

Note 13: Hussain, The Assam Movement, p.60. Back

Note 14: Shillong Times, April 17,2001. Back

Note 15: BDR-BSF Shootout Spurs Tension in Dawki," The Assam Tribune, April 18, 2001. Back

Note 16: Several media reports, for example, "300 BSF Men Fled, Leaving the 18 Behind," by Vishal Thapar in The Hindustan Times, April 27, 2001. Back

Note 17: "BSF, Villagers, Cops, Must Work in Tandem, The Hindustan Times, April 24, 2001. Back

Note 18: "Mankachar Limping Back to Normalcy," The Assam Tribune, April 23, 2001. Back

Note 19: "Sarkar Urges Centre to Erect Barbed Wire Along Border," The Assam Tribune, April 18, 2001. Back