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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
Pakistan's Military Spending: Socio-Economic Dimensions
By Shalini Chawla
*
Abstract
In the past years, Pakistan's defence expenditure has always been on an increase and on the higher end. Even though Pakistan's fragile economy has been unable to support it, the military spending in Pakistan has been at the cost of development expenditure. The factors claimed by Pakistan to be behind the high defence spending are the perceived security threat from India, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which gave an opportunity to the Pakistani military to fulfill its long desired modernisation plans, and domestic factors such as societal violence and sectarianism. However, the fact remains, that the military enjoys immense control over the decision-making process in Pakistan and, thus, the defence budget has been prioritised over the social sector. This is evident in the form of the retarded growth of the social sector in Pakistan. An increasing non-development budget has also entailed huge cuts in the development budget and, thus, has badly affected Pakistan's economy. Initially, the declining development budget was financed through debt. Consequently, debt repayment and debt servicing increased the non-development budget. With the progression of time, borrowing financed the non-development budget also. Currently, Pakistan is in a position where new loans are being acquired to repay the old ones. Thus, the defence expenditure has added to the miseries of Pakistan in a spiralling manner.
A heavy debt burden, rising inflation and a nation starving for development mark the economy of Pakistan, but it continues to focus on an ever-increasing defence expenditure. Pakistan has always accorded priority to territorial security as compared to social and economic security, using the argument that it is military strength and stability that can ensure the overall security of the country.
Islamabad also believes that effective defence of the state borders and the resultant expenditure provide strong spin-off effects for the economy. 1 The implementation of this belief is evident in the gradual increase in the nation's defence expenditure, despite the fact that the Pakistani economy is increasingly unable to support this burden. The gap between the economic growth of Pakistan and its defence expenditure has been steadily widening. Defence spending has been at the cost of socio-economic growth in Pakistan.
This article aims to study the trends in Pakistan's defence expenditure and the factors behind the high level of defence spending. Also, an attempt has been made to study the economic and social impacts of the same.
Trends in Defence Expenditure
Pakistan announces only the overall figures of its defence expenditure and does not provide any details. The defence expenditure of Pakistan as a percentage of total expenditure for the last three decades is enumerated in Table 1.
Table 1. Defence Expenditure of Pakistan: 1970-2000 (rupees million)
Year Defence Expenditure Defence Expenditure as Percentage of Total Expenditure
1970-71 3,201.5 55.66
1971-72 3,725.5 59.09
1972-73 4,439.6 59.34
1973-74 4,948.6 42.20
1974-75 6,914.2 42.83
1975-76 8,103.4 25.10
1976-77 8,102.6 23.10
1977-78 9,674.5 23.7
1978-79 10,302.0 21.0
1979-80 12,654.8 23.2
1980-81 15,300.1 23.2
1981-82 18,631.0 24.5
1982-83 23,224.0 26.7
1983-84 26,798.0 26.8
1984.85 31,866.0 27.3
1985-86 35,606.0 26.5
1986-87 41,335.0 27.1
1987-88 47,015.0 26.1
1988-89 51,053.0 25.4
1989-90 58,708.0 26.5
1990-91 64,623.0 24.8
1991-92 75,751.0 23.6
1992-93 87,441.0 25.0
1993-94 91,776.0 25.2
1994-95 1,00,221 23.4
1995-96 1,15,252 23.3
1996-97 1,31,400 26.26
1997-98 1,33,834 26.2
1998-99 1,45,000 26.1
1999-2000 1,42,000 22.0
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey, Islamabad, Pakistan, The Military Balance (International Institute of Strategic Studies-IISS), 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-2000; Military Technology, vol. Xxiii, Issue 1, 1999, as cited by Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema; Jasjit Singh, "Defence Expenditure in South Asia, An Overview", Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) Policy Studies 10, Colombo, 2000, pp. 53-54.
Pakistan's defence spending shifted into higher gear following the Indo-Pak War of 1965 when it more than doubled in one year from Rs. 1,262 million in 1964-65 to Rs. 2,855 million in 1965-66. 2 In terms of proportion of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), this rise amounted to a jump from 4.82 per cent to 9.86 per cent of the GDP. 3 It came down over the next two years, before beginning to rise again. The US arms embargo which was consequent to the launching of Operations "Gibraltar" and "Grand Slam", and receipt of military assistance from China and also some Arab countries, led to the reduction in defence expenditure. Pakistan's defence expenditure again increased in 1971-72, when the army was deployed in a repressive role in East Pakistan and because of the costs of the war later in the year.
Though with the secession of East Pakistan as independent Bangladesh, the defence needs ostensibly reduced, the expenditure on this front continued to grow. Pakistan's domestic equations among its civil, military and political leaders and their respective interests influenced these increases in the defence spending.
Factors Behind High Defence Spending
Pakistan claims that it is India's military posture that has a deep impression on Pakistan's defence planning. 4 The early 1970s comprised the era of Bhutto and the late 1970s that of General Zia, who resisted almost all ideas aimed at defence reduction. Being a military man and dependent on the support from the army, General Zia never supported cuts in defence spending.
This high level of defence spending during the 1970s also resulted in heavy growth of force levels. The effect was a substantive increase in military power, especially between 1972 (after the war) and December 1979 (before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan) when the size of the army nearly doubled, the navy grew three times and the air force grew one-and-a-half times. 5
During the 1981-1990 decade, defence expenditure grew at a slightly slower pace (as evident from Table 1), but the defence spending was maintained at a much higher level after 1988. In the 1980s and 1990s, Pakistan's policy-makers quoted the "perception of threat" as the root cause of the high defence spending.
During General Zia's time, Pakistan faced tremendous pressure from international institutions to cut its defence spending. During Prime Minister Junejo's time, it was the security issue which was highlighted to convince them and also to thwart any effort aimed in the direction of bringing down the defence budget. 6 General Zia did not allow any cuts in defence allocation, because, according to him, "How can you fight a nuclear submarine or an aircraft carrier with a bamboo stick? We have to match sword with sword, tank with tank and destroyer with destroyer. The situation demands that national defence be bolstered and Pakistan cannot afford any cut or freeze in defence expenditure, since you cannot freeze the threat to Pakistan's security". 7
This perception of threat by Pakistan has continually been the argument provided in favour of the nation's rising defence spending to the foreign aid donors, as well as domestically, to prevent a cut or even a freeze in the defence expenditure.
Threat Perception
Perceived Security Threat From India
Pakistan's strategic environment has been, to a great extent, conditioned by its perception of a security threat from India. Its adversarial relations with India definitely play a vital role in the formation of its official threat perception and national security plans. The two nations have fought a number of wars and experienced countless border clashes. This perceived threat from India has led the nation's security planners being constantly engaged in a search for a situation that could generate a sense of security.
It has led the defence planners of Pakistan to raise well equipped, modern armed forces. Pakistan looks at India as a powerful state with hegemonic ambitious. The most disconcerting factor is the rationalisation by Pakistan of this inequality between the two nations. This insecurity has taken strong roots due to the fragmentation of Pakistani society. The governments in Pakistan have used the security issues like Kashmir and nuclear deterrence to generate a national consensus. Eventually, this has increased the fear of India in the minds of the people.
The logic of Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme is Indo-centric. It aims to neutralise the inevitable conventional military superiority of India. The impetus for Pakistan's nuclear development came in January 1972, when Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto announced a plan to develop nuclear arms at a meeting with Pakistan's top scientists at Multan. 8 Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War and India's proven conventional military superiority over Pakistan were the main reasons for Pakistan's decision to go nuclear. Pakistan's nuclearisation has been aimed at managing the Indian threat by matching India's nuclear capability. Former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's remarks that Pakistan will "eat grass" if necessary to stay at par with Indian nuclear capability demonstrate the depth of insecurity in the nation. Agha Shahi, the former Pakistani foreign minister, said about the Pakistan nuclear programme, "The rationale of the programme is linked to the sovereignty, independence and security of Pakistan. It is grounded on the security imperatives of Pakistan to equalise, to compensate our military imbalance that hangs like the sword of Damocles over the head of the nation, which cut our country into two in 1971." 9 Then, by 1983, Pakistan had formulated plans to develop a nuclear weapon programme, and it was reported that in May 1983, China had tested a Pakistani nuclear device. 10 Since then, it has aggressively pursued a covert nuclear programme which reached fruition in the 1990s. The maintenance of conventional balance and Pakistan's decision in 1998 to follow India in going overtly nuclear depicts Pakistan's sense of insecurity vis-à-vis India.
The Afghan Crisis
Strategic developments like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave a chance to the Pakistani leadership to enhance its perception of threat. In fact, it also added a new dimension to Pakistan's threat perception. Islamabad was of the view that after consolidating its control over Afghanistan, Moscow would proceed further with the objective of reaching the "warm waters" through Pakistan. 11 The Soviet invasion gave an opportunity to the Pakistani military to fulfill its long-desired modernisation plans. This was also the time when tension between India and Pakistan escalated and, thus, the threat from the former USSR was used by Pakistan to acquire weapons from the US.
There was, in fact no evidence of the Soviet's intentions of a prolonged stay in the territory or of extending their invasion into Pakistan, but Pakistan held the notion that the former Soviet Union, in cahoots with India, had plans to reach the "warm waters" through Pakistan.
Indubitably, pressure on the northern borders had increased, especially after Islamabad's involvement in backing the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet troops. 12 The threat posed due to the Soviet presence on Pakistan's northern borders was an opportune moment for Islamabad to cash in on the fear and anger of the American people and their policy-makers, and, possibly with the help of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), that fear was exploited. 13
To make the threat appear more realistic, the (late) General Zia opened the country's doors to the Afghan immigrants and started a programme for the formal training of both Afghan Mujahideen and Pakistan Army personnel to fight a clandestine war in Afghanistan. 14 The hype created during the early 1980s helped the Pakistan government in persuading the US to provide it with arms. Thus, the fundamental inspiration for Islamabad attaching so much importance to the Afghan invasion was to convince the Americans of its need for armaments. The quality weapons that Pakistan's armed forces had desired since the 1960s could only be obtained if there was unopposed convergence of strategic perceptions between Islamabad and Washington-an opportunity provided by the developments in Afghanistan.
Also, the event was sufficient to convince the Pakistani public of the importance of increasing defence spending.
Domestic Factors
Pakistan has been troubled with internal problems, and has been continuously experiencing periodic upheavals. A consistent search for a viable political system, lack of national cohesion, economic problems and disparities among the federating units that form Pakistan, are some of the factors which have contributed to an unstable and insecure state. Pakistan has not been able to evolve a stable political system with high quality leadership, and political experimentation at various periods by different leaders has delayed the solution for this economically distressed and socially fractured state. Although since 1985, the nation has been trying to latch onto democratic practices, political stability has still not surfaced, with democratically elected regimes, since 1988, being dismissed on various grounds.
The Pakistan government faces an acute dilemma with politicised ethnic consciousness, incumbent population imbalances and high levels of unemployment. Confronted with an intense political divide, increasing economic problems, active drug trafficking, gun culture, increasing societal violence, terrorism and sectarianism, Pakistan's sense of insecurity has deepened. And this fear appears to manifest itself in the form of increasing defence expenditure.
Another factor that has facilitated large allocations to defence revolves around the inability of the resource managers to either suggest alternatives or to logically make a case for reduced defence allocatiions. 15 Usually, in democratic countries, resource managers are the concerned members of the executive and legislature, but under authoritarian regimes, the resource control is often confined to a few individuals. And Pakistan has experienced parliamentary and authoritarian forms of government in almost equal proportion. The budget is formulated by a few, select individuals but is presented annually before the Parliament.
Main Players: Threat Perception and Defence Budget Formulators
The Military Lobby
The decision and policies of a nation are a reflection of the interests of the players involved in the decision-making process. The military enjoys immense control over the decision-making process in Pakistan. It is the country's most powerful institution and is the largest organised force with approximately 700,000 personnel. 16 There appears to be no single democratic institution in Pakistan that can claim to have such numbers. The cost of maintaining such a large force claims a large amount of financial resources from the state.
The main reason for the military's emergence as the most influential element in defence decision-making lies in its relevance in the country's power politics. It has assumed the responsibility of guarding the Islamic ideological identity and the frontiers of the country. 17 The fear of India among the Pakistani policy-makers has always had a serious ideological orientation. The perceived idea has been that India, with a predominantly Hindu population, cannot tolerate the existence of an Islamic Pakistan and, thus, the defence establishment needs to provide security to this country.
In fact, this projection of threat from India appears to be fundamental to the survival of the Pakistani establishment. Ironically, the nation even views the domestic unrest as a continuation of the external threat. This notion strengthens the ground for heavy military spending. This exercise of blaming each other has been the most regular feature of the strained bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. But the Pakistan government's projection of threat fails to take into account the inability of its leadership to handle the domestic unrest and the internal forces which have been escalating such problems.
Pakistan used India's projection of its military capability in the 1980s and 1990s as a justification for a similar military build-up. Also, Pakistani leaders have highlighted the issue of Kashmir and its significance for the survival of the country. This enables the military to play a significant role in national security and political affairs.
Military personnel are highly motivated to be actively involved in defence decision-making. The interest of the military is not only from the strategic angle- their interests are also political, organisational and personal. So, the defence decision-making in Pakistan has a distinguishing feature in the presence of a strong military lobby. However, the three Services do not have equal influence on the defence decision-making. The Pakistan Army is more influential in this regard. while the say of the other two forces, the air force and the navy, in the strategic planning, has depended on their importance to the army.
The Civil Bureaucracy
The civil bureaucracy involved in the defence decision-making refers to the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and Ministry of Finance (MoF).
The MoD's organisational structure is fashioned to function in the interest of the defence organisation. Serving and retired military officials are placed in central positions in the ministry to enable them to control and monitor the work according to the desires of the defence establishment. 18 It is presumed that the civilian officials of the ministry do have adequate authority to handle military affairs on their own.
The MoFA assists the government in locating sources of supply for weapons. The ministry is not proactive in the procurement process and its significance in arms procurement decision-making has varied with the heads of government in Pakistan.
The MoF is important in defence decision-making. Though the ministry controls the finances of the defence establishment, it is not in a position to dictate terms to the military in Pakistan. It does not have the power to override decisions taken by the military. The MoF faces tremendous pressure from the military to provide funds for the maintenance of the existing infrastructure and for fresh acquisitions. And, despite the resource limitation, the ministry cannot afford to take its own decisions. At the most, it can delay the decisions. Thus, the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan is largely a follower of the military in the defence budgeting process.
The Decision-Makers
In the last two decades, the president of Pakistan emerged as one of the most important players in defence arms procurement policy-making. This was due to several factors.
Firstly, the constitutional power acquired by President Zia-ul-Haq through the Eight Amendment. This empowered him to dismiss the government, appoint the chiefs of the three Services, and appoint the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC). 19 His successors inherited this legacy. Moreover, this authority was exercised frequently. Especially in 1989-90, when a controversy surged between the president and the prime minister over the appointment of Admiral Sirohey as the chairman, JCSC, it was the president's will that prevailed. 20
Secondly, personalities like General Zia strengthened the president's office. In 1977, he installed himself as the chief martial law administrator (CMLA) and later assumed the position of president. Even after the restoration of democracy in 1985, he continued to enjoy this status. 21
Thirdly, in the absence of the constitutional position, the military resorted to co-opting the president as a junior partner in defence decision-making and also in the formulation of policies affecting the armed forces. The president in Pakistan, has always catered to the interests of the military. 22
The armed forces in Pakistan do not allow any interference in the general military planning and administrative control of the armed forces. When former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif threatened the core interests of the military, he was accused of conspiring to destroy the institution of the military and this led to his removal. Before him, Prime Minister Junejo met the same fate in 1988.
As far as the Parliament in Pakistan is concerned, it has never been in a position to impose its will on the military. In the national budget, defence expenditure is categorised as "charged" expenditure on which public debate cannot take place. And, conventionally, the elected representatives do not have the power to debate on defence expenditure. Thus, there is little chance of the Parliament playing an important role in defence decision-making.
Military Intelligence Agencies
Pakistan's intelligence agencies have an indirect but important role in building the influence of the military in the country. Though they are not direct beneficiaries of the defence planning, their moves certainly add to the strength of the military.
Pakistan's intelligence agencies have played a significant role in the country's power politics. They have contributed towards the formulation of the threat perception and have, thus, highlighted the position of the military. They are influential to the extent that they have been running independent defence policies, especially in Central Asia. All the three services have their own intelligence branches but the most significant is the Inter-Services-Intelligence (ISI), which is controlled by the army. The core of its personnel is drawn from the army. And, thus, obviously, the institution is used to serve the greater organisational interests of the armed forces. The ISI gained national prominence with its involvement in the Afghan crisis where it was allowed to operate freely in running the operations. The ISI became an important player in the military bureaucracy and, thus, Pakistan's Afghan policy after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan has been controlled by the ISI. The institution was also strengthened by its involvement in domestic politics. 23
Media
The Pakistani media is also one of the indirect factors strengthening the image of the military. The media in Pakistan has been more or less government oriented, and has demonstrated a tendency to present the state's point of view, especially on defence related issues. The media has played an important role in highlighting and building a positive image of the military, by posturing views in the interest of the armed forces. It has provided an emotional dimension to the Kashmir issue. Also, the need to maintain a militaristic posture in this regard has been projected, which supports the position of the armed forces.
Thus, both the direct and indirect factors playing a role in defence decision-making, are influenced by the military in Pakistan, making it the most important institution. This has effectively sustained high defence spending.
Economic and Social Costs of Military Spending
The high level of defence expenditure in Pakistan has resulted in an adverse impact on Pakistan's economy. According to one study, "Defence expenditure in Pakistan has a negative impact on GDP when it increases to over 6.5 per cent of the GDP for a decade and more. During the 1978-88 decade, this threshold had already been crossed with defence expenditures averaging 6.8 per cent." 24 The study, which covered a period of over a quarter century since 1960, concluded, "An examination of a budgetary trade-off in Pakistan found that economic services as a whole were adversely affected by military expenditure." 25
From the time of the creation of Pakistan, 40-50 per cent of the revenue has been spent on defence, totalling more than Rs. 10,000 billion till now. Currently, 55 per cent of the revenue is spent on debt repayment, 30 per cent on defence and 10-15 per cent on civil and administrative costs. 26 This is in spite of large quantities of high technology weapon systems being acquired as part of external aid.
An increasing non-development budget has also entailed huge cuts in the development budget and, thus, has badly affected Pakistan's economy. Initially, the declining development budget was financed through debt. Consequently, debt repayment and debt servicing increased the non-development budget. With the progression of time, borrowing has financed the non-development budget as well.
Currently, Pakistan is in a position where new loans are being acquired to repay the old ones. Thus, the defence expenditure has added to the miseries of Pakistan in a spiralling manner. Added together, debt servicing and defence expenditure exceed the total national income of Pakistan. The country has been living beyond its means and its economy is in a downward spiral.
Since 1982, Islamabad has carried a growing burden of defence and debt servicing which obviously resulted in a growing gap between revenue and expenditure. To exemplify, in 1982-83, the Pakistani annual deficit was Rs 25,654 million, that increased to Rs 56,060 million in 1989-90, and in 1994-95, it was at an astronomical level of Rs 103,405 million. 27
In 1999-2000, the budget deficit amounted to Rs 183.7 billion, being six per cent of the GDP as against the target of 3.5 per cent. 28
Since 1984-85, there has been an exponential growth of debt servicing which has threatened the macro-economic stability of the country. Public debt went up at a rapid pace in relation to the GDP. Domestic debt, in relation to the GDP, averaged 44 per cent during 1990-97. It rose to 48.8 per cent in 1997-98, 49.9 per cent in 1998-9 and 51.1 per cent in 1999-2000. 29 The interest payments on domestic debt have increased from Rs. 37 billion (3.6 per cent of the GDP) in 1990-91 to Rs. 186.5 billion (6.4 per cent of the GDP) in 1998-99, and Rs 194 billion (6.1 per cent) in 1999-2000. 30
Constant borrowing by one government after another has left the nation facing a total debt of approximately US$38 billion. 31 The present military regime has been struggling to service this debt and has been on the verge of defaulting. Since the time it assumed power in October 1999, it has been negotiating with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a US$2.5 billion three-year credit which would help the country stay afloat and maintain at least a semblance of fiscal credibility. Pakistan managed to temporarily avert the crisis of immediate default when the IMF approved a 10-month stand-by credit of US$596 million in November 2000. 32 However, Pakistan would have to adhere to the stiff conditions imposed by the IMF in order to obtain all the tranches of the IMF package. 33
Another reason for this continued high defence spending is the "high percentage of wastage of resources" which grew as a result of oversight, and the encouragement of the top managers at the highest decision-making level in the MoD and the armed forces. 34 This wastage occurred due to the excessive number of employees, the duplication of activities, and corruption. The cost-effectiveness of the Pakistani forces is not very high. General Musharraf, is now in favour of thrift in defence spending, and getting the most out of what is spent on the forces. 35
A significant proportion of military spending, especially the purchases of major weapon systems, is met from extra-budgetary sources. The resources or funds are diverted from the organisations created for the welfare of retired military personnel. These four organisations-the Fauji Foundation (est.1960), Army Welfare Trust (AWT) (est. 1979), Shaheen Foundation (est. 1977) and Bahria Foundation (ets. 1981)-were created with the objective of contributing to the pension fund and the welfare of retired military personnel. 36 These organisations operate various projects-airlines, fertilisers, gas stations, etc. But they have contributed in increasing the defence burden, as some of the overhead costs are met from the annual defence allocation. Also, these organisations represent monopolistic tendencies and create an additional burden by not paying the taxes for their corporate ventures as they are established as welfare organisations.
The distortions of the heavy debt burden and deficit are significant. In the period 1988-2000, debt servicing overtook defence expenditure, and the end of the century, Pakistan reached a stage where it had to reschedule part of its US$30 billion external debt only to keep afloat. 37
Though it has been quoted that external borrowing ballooned in the period from 1988-98, when domestic governments were in power, the fact is that they were compelled to keep the military happy by giving them their allocations, even if it meant reducing allocations for the social sector and development, where the money was needed the most.
The negative influence of defence spending and borrowing is obvious in the form of retarded growth of the social sector in Pakistan. Pakistan's social conditions are pitiful and the state of development is deplorable. Pakistan ranks 9th among 117 market economies in terms of the government's expenditure on defence as a percentage of total expenditure. On the other hand, it ranks 2nd among the 34 poorest economies. It ranks 17th in education and 34th in health per capita expenditure in these 34 poorest economies. 38
According to a Human Development Report on South Asia, "While less than one-third of Pakistan's people are income poor, nearly one-half suffer from serious deprivation of several opportunities of life. Nearly two-thirds of the total adult population (and as much as three-fourths of the adult female population) cannot read or write. Access to basic social services like primary health care and safe drinking water is denied to nearly half of the population. About 38 per cent of the children under five are malnourished." 39 Arming the nation does not essentially mean security and an overarmed country is not secure if its people are poor and malnourished.
Much of the insecurity is caused by extreme socio-economic injustice between the rich and poor, among different regions and classes, which often leads to violence. Pakistan, in human development terms, lags behind the other major regional states such as India and Sri Lanka. As Table 2 depicts, the Pakistan government's resource allocation policies are also biased in favour of defence spending as against social development.
Table 2. Pakistan: Defence versus Development
FY Health Education Defence
% of GNP % of GNP % of GNP
1990-91 0.7 2.1 3.0
1991-92 0.7 2.2 6.2
1992-93 0.7 2.2 6.5
1993-94 0.7 2.2 5.8
1994-95 0.6 2.4 5.3
1995-96 0.6 2.4 5.4
1996-97 0.8 2.5 5.4
1997-98 0.7 2.3 4.9
1998-99 0.7 2.2 4.8
Source:Pakistan Economic Survey, 1998-99.
Note: The defence expenditure figures are taken from Table 1
As Table 2 shows, Pakistan's focus on defence has been disproportionately much more than one the other two important social sectors, health and education. The combined expenditure on these sectors is much less than the military spending.
Conclusion
Although questions have been raised in Pakistan regarding the military burden and its negative impact on the economy of the country, no reduction in the defence expenditure has taken place in the past. The economic aid donors have asked Pakistan to bring down its deficit spending through decreasing its non-developmental expenditure, the most significant being defence. 40
Successive governments in Pakistan have tried to convince the donors, citing their threat perception and concept of national security. Increasing non-development expenditure in a less than healthy economy invariably increases poverty and unemployment. This leads to increased societal disparities, resulting in internal disturbances and conflicts, and, consequently, to political instability and secessionist movements which jeopardise the national security. Thus, the concept and the argument which Pakistan uses for defence modernisation seem inadequate. This interpretation of "national security" is adding to Pakistan's pitiful social indicators.
The Soviet Union and China are two recent examples which prove that strengthening of the military capacity does not essentially pave the way for strengthening of the nation itself. During the Cold War, the former Soviet Union indulged in enormous military spending to stay at par with the United States, at great cost to its economy. Neglect of human security eventually led to the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the former USSR. In the Sixties and Seventies, even China built an enormous military capability but, fortunately, started focussing on economic and social development well in time.
The spin-off effects of defence spending cited by Pakistan in justification of its increasing defence expenditure are not evident. Big investments in arms procurement and production do not seem to be impacting the economy positively. In fact, conventional wisdom would dictate spending on the civil-industrial sector, potentially resulting in a positive spin-off on the defence sector.
Endnotes
Note *: Shalini Chawla, Research Officer, IDSA Back
Note 1 Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, "Defence a Public Good? A Case Study of Pakistan's Military Expenditure, 1982-99", in P.R. Chari, Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Defence Expenditure in South Asia, India and Pakistan, RCSS Policy Studies 12, (Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 2000), p. 23. Back
Note 2 Jasjit Singh, "Trends in Defence Expenditure", in Jasjit Singh, ed., Asian Strategic Review, 1988-99, (New Delhi; IDSA, 1999), p. 71. Back
Note 3 Ibid., p. 71. Back
Note 4 Siddiqa-Agha, n.1, p. 23. Back
Note 5 Singh, n. 2, p. 73. Back
Note 6 Mushahid Hussain, "Pressure Put on Pakistani Spending", Jane's Defence Weekly, vol. 10, no. 2, July 16, 1988, p. 70. Back
Note 7 Ibid., p. 70. Back
Note 8 Sumita Kumar, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapon Programme", in Jasjit Singh, ed., Nuclear India, (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998), p. 157. Back
Note 9 Fasahat H. Syed, ed., Nuclear Disarmament and Conventional Arms Control Including Light Weapons (Islamabad: FRIENDS, 1997), p. 421. Back
Note 10 See Ashok Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development (London: Croom Helm, 1987) Back
Note 11 Interview with Lt General (Retd.) Hameed Gul and Lt General (Retd.) Kamal Matinudin (Rawalpindi, 15/05/94 and 23/02/94),as cited by Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Pakistan's Arms Procurement and Military Build-up, 1979-99: In Search of a Policy (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 23. Back
Note 12 Siddiqa-Agha, n. 1, p. 29. Back
Note 13 Interview with Niaz Naik (Islamabad, 23/02/94), as cited by Siddiqa-Agha, Ibid., p. 30. Back
Note 14 Ibid., p. 30. Back
Note 15 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Defence Expenditure in Pakistan", in Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Jasjit Singh, Defence Expenditure in South Asia, RCSS Policy Studies 10 (Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 2000), p. 45. Back
Note 16 Siddiqa-Agha, n. 11, p. 56. Back
Note 17 Ibid., p. 56. Back
Note 18 Ibid., p. 69. Back
Note 19 The Government of Pakistan issued a White Paper on Defence in 1976 which established the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC), Defence Council and Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC). While the JCSC was entrusted with the task of seriously considering all problems relating to the military aspect of national defence and rendering professional military advice to the highest decision-making body, the DCC was the highest decision-making body in all defence matters. Back
Note 20 Siddiqa-Agha, n. 11, p. 73. Back
Note 21 Ibid., p. 73. Back
Note 22 Ibid., p. 73. Back
Note 23 See K.N. Daruwalla, "Pakistan: Intelligence Agencies and Political Destiny", in Rajiv Sharma, ed., The Pakistan Trap (New Delhi: UBSPD, 2001). Back
Note 24 General Aslam Beg, The Nation, December 13, 1993, and Jasjit Singh, "Pakistan's Nuclear Posturing: Hitching its Star to India's Wagon", The Times of India, November 13, 1996, as cited in Jasjit Singh, "Trends in Defence Expenditure", in Jasjit Singh, ed., Asian Strategic Review 1997-98 (New Delhi: IDSA, 1998), p. 68. Back
Note 25 Ibid., p. 68. Back
Note 26 Ziauddin, "Neither Secure nor Developed", Internet site, http://www.pakistanlink.com/Opinion/2000/June/16/01.html. Back
Note 27 Economic Survey of Pakistan, as cited by Siddiqa-Agha, n. 11, p. 85. Back
Note 28 B. Raman, "Pakistan's Fragile Economy", September 15, 2000, Internet site, http://www.asiafeatures.com/business/0009,1315,04.html Back
Note 29 Ibid. Back
Note 30 Ibid. Back
Note 31 Ahmed Rashid, "Borrowed Time," Far Eastern Economic Review, December 14, 2000, p. 28. Back
Note 32 Ibid. Back
Note 33 See Shalini Chawla, "Recent Developments in Pakistan", Strategic Analysis, vol. XXV, no. 2, May 2001, p. 285-294 Back
Note 34 Siddiqa-Agha, n. 11, p. 82. Back
Note 35 See Sultan Ahmed, "Enhancing the Defence Capability Through Cost Effectiveness", Internet site, http://www.defencejournal.com/dec99/enhacing.htm Back
Note 36 Siddiqa-Agha, n. 11, p. 84. Back
Note 37 Kamal Siddiqi, "Will a Miracle Happen", Dawn, Internet edition, http://www.dawn.com/events/century/pla11.htm. Back
Note 38 Ziauddin, "Neither Secure nor Developed", Internet site, http://www.pakistanlink.com/Opinion/2000/June/16/01html. Back
Note 39 Mahbub-ul Haq, Khadija Haq, Human Development in South Asia 1998 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 17. Back
Note 40 See Fakhr Ahmad, "America Tells Pakistan to Cut Defence Expenditure or no Aid", Internet site, Goggle search, mizola@yahoo.com. Back