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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
Russian Perspective of the START Process and NMD
By Kalpana Chittaranjan
*
Abstract
US President George Bush's speech on May 1, 2001, on his Administration's policy on National Missile Defence (NMD) sharply brought the issue into global focus. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 strongly impacts on both the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process and NMD, as the offence-defence debate rages on. This article gives a brief background on these two issues, i.e., the START process and NMD, their status, and ends with a Russian perspective on them (February-May first week, 2001).
It's déjà vu time all over again. Writing in the 1990 preface of Foundation for the Future: The ABM Treaty and National Security, the then Chairman of the Arms Control Association, Gerard C. Smith, who had earlier been the chief US negotiator of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, 1 stated, "With the dramatic warming of superpower relations, the idea of tearing up the treaty to pursue the Star Wars chimera appears increasingly far-fetched. But President Bush and Secretary of Defense Cheney still pay homage to a more limited form of President Reagan's Star Wars 2 dream, declaring their intention to deploy a prohibited nationwide missile defence as soon as it is ready. The scandalous 'reinterpretation' of the ABM Treaty has not yet been abandoned - an issue the Senate may be forced to address when it considers the ratification of START 3 . The long ABM controversy President Reagan sparked in 1983 is not yet over." 4 A little over a decade later, Bush II, the son of the then US president, with almost the same team his father had, while addressing the National Defence University on May 1, 2001, gave a speech, 5 which though containing less than 2,000 words, made clear that he intended to deploy "the son of Star Wars," i.e., a National Missile Defence (NMD) that is clearly prohibited by the terms of the ABM Treaty.
This article looks at various Russian views on the START process and NMD during George Bush II's presidency (up to the May 1 speech).
Brief Background
The START Process: START I
US President Ronald Reagan first outlined the elements of the first START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) proposal on May 9, 1982, in an address at Eureka College. 6 START I 7 was signed at the end of nine years of negotiation between President George Bush of the USA and President Mikhail Gorbachev of the former Soviet Union in July 1991 and the treaty 8 was the last major bilateral Cold War nuclear arms treaty the two nuclear giants had agreed upon. What is noteworthy is that the Soviets stated that the treaty would be effective and viable only as long as there was compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty. 9 The Soviet era ended in December 1991and left nuclear arms deployed in four ex-Soviet republics - Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The Russian Federation and the three republics undertook to arrange among themselves the implementation of the treaty's provisions, at a May 23, 1992, ministerial meeting at Lisbon. The USA, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol, making all five countries signatories to the treaty and committing Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to accession to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states. While START I was ratified by the US Senate and the Russian Parliament in 1992, Ukraine became the last republic to do so, in 1993, 10 when its Parliament, the Rada, approved a resolution to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state on November 16, 1994, thus, paving the way for Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma to deposit the NPT instruments of ratification at a ceremony on December 5, 1994, held at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit meeting in Budapest, Hungary. This led to a second ceremony on the same day where leaders of the five Lisbon Protocol signatory countries signed a Protocol exchanging the START I instruments of ratification, thus, bringing it into effect.
START II
START II was signed in Moscow on January 3, 1993, and is considered the most sweeping nuclear arms reduction treaty in history. The treaty requires the USA and Russia to eliminate their MIRVed* intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and reduce the number of their deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500 each. START II consists of eight Articles and includes two Protocols and a Memorandum of Understanding. The treaty sets equal numerical ceilings for strategic nuclear weapons that may be deployed by either side. 11
In order to address Russian concerns 12 about START II, Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin met at Helsinki, Finland, on March 20-21, 1997, and in a joint statement, 13 reached agreement on a number of arms control issues. Regarding START II, the presidents agreed to extend by five years the deadline for the elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
With regard to START III, the two presidents agreed to immediately start negotiations for an agreement once START II entered into force. It was also agreed that START III negotiations would include four basic components: a limit of 2,000-2,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads for each side by the end of 2007; measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories as well as to the destruction of strategic warheads; conversion of the current START agreements to unlimited duration; and the "deactivation" by the end of 2003 of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to be eliminated under START II.
The US Senate overwhelmingly approved a resolution of ratification of START II on January 26, 1996, by a vote of 87-4, 14 but it was only on May 4, 2000, that Russia officially ratified the treaty 15 after President Vladimir Putin signed the resolution. 16 It had taken the Russians a little more than seven years 17 to ratify START II, after it was signed.
NMD
The idea for an NMD began under US President Dwight Eisenhower in the late 1950s, when, faced with the prospect of Soviet missile fleets, his Administration embarked on a secretive crash programme of anti-missile research which included ideas for space-based arms, and over a course of time, involved thousands of that country's top scientists. The fear of expensive spirals of anti-missile action and reaction prompted the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972, which in time limited the US and the Soviet Union to one interceptor site each, as experts believed that no matter how good the interceptors were, the single sites would be unable to defend large territories. The Nixon Administration built the Safeguard system in North Dakota in 1975 but the $25 billion weapon system had to be abandoned after just 133 days as strategists concluded that the Soviets could overwhelm it with a rush of MIRVs that were being fastened onto new missiles. 18 Under President Bill Clinton, the NMD system would be a fixed, land-based, non-nuclear defence system with a space-based detection system, consisting of five elements: ground based interceptors (GBIs); battle-management command, control, and communications (BMC3), which includes BMC2 and in-flight interceptor communications system (IFICS); X-band radars (XBRs); upgraded early warning radar (UEWR); and satellite/space-based infrared system (SBIRS). The central feature of the proposed system would be an "exoatmospheric kill vehicle" (EKV) that is designed to be carried atop a rocket which then guides itself to a collision with an incoming warhead. Clinton's NMD architecture was set to grow in four steps: from an initial 20 missile interceptors in 2005 to a much larger system by 2011. At completion, the shield would require at least two launching sites, three command centres, five communication relay stations, 15 radars, 29 satellites, 250 underground silos and 250 missile interceptors. It would be based in Hawaii, Alaska, California, Colorado, North Dakota, Massachusetts, Greenland, Britain and possibly Maine. Japan and South Korea were the possible Asian sites for two radars. It would have cost a minimum of $ 60 billion. 19 On September 1, 2000, at a speech at Georgetown University, Clinton stated that he did not believe that the technology was yet ready for an effective national defence system and passed the decision of whether to deploy an NMD to his successor.
Status of the START Process and NMD
Where the START process is concerned, START I is the only treaty in force. Compliance with treaty limits must be reached by December 2001. By January 2001, the US had reduced its nuclear warheads to 7, 295 from a high of 10, 563 in September 1990 while the Soviet/Russian warheads were reduced to 6, 094 in January 2001 from a high of 10, 271 in September 1990. 20 As regards START II, when the Duma ratified it on April 14, 2000, it made "strong and explicit" conditions under Article IX 21 of the Resolution of Ratification which made clear that Russia would exchange the instruments of ratification with the US only when the US had carried out a number of actions - the US would also have to update the START II that had originally been ratified by the Senate. As noted earlier, the Helsinki Accords had changed the treaty and extended its implementation by five years. The US Senate has so far not placed the updated version of START II for consideration and is unlikely to do so in the near future. 22 Terms for a START III cannot start without START II coming into effect. Earlier, on November 14, 2000, President Putin had issued a statement directed towards the US that Moscow was keen on making deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the US as soon as a new president took over, after Clinton. He (Putin) was prepared "to consider even lower levels" than the 1,500 warheads presented by negotiators in Geneva earlier in 2000 at the outset of negotiations for a START III agreement, and some officials said that he would like to cut strategic arsenals to 1, 000 weapons each. 23
In the area of NMD deployment, it was as far back as May 23, 2000, during his campaign for presidency that George W. Bush had stated, "America must build effective missile defenses based on the best available options at the earliest possible date. Our missile defense must be designed to protect all 50 states and our friends and allies and deployed forces overseas from missile attacks by rogue nations or accidental launches." 24 From then, when he called for new-and possibly unilateral-reductions in American nuclear weapons coupled with a robust anti-missile defence system, to his May 1 speech on NMD wherein he said, "We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today's world," 25 it becomes clear that this is his broad vision of missile defence but not a specific programme. 26 According to Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, the goal for US NMD deployment " is to explore a variety of ways that missile defense can conceivably evolve without prejudging exactly which ones will be the most fruitful. And there's no question but that the use of land and sea and air and space are all things that need to be considered, if one is looking at the best way to provide the kind of security from ballistic missiles that is desirable for the United States and for our friends and allies." 27
Earlier, the Russians had their own regional missile shield proposal when on February 20, 2001, then Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev delivered a confidential paper entitled 'Phases of European Missile Defence' to the visiting North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Secretary General Lord Robertson, at Moscow. Options for elaborating a system to defend against attack from theatre-range ballistic missiles are sketched in the paper in very broad outline. Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, head of the Defence Ministry's International Affairs Department, quoted by Itar-Tass on February 20, summarised the three main phases as follows: 28
[This plan is] radically different from what the Russians are proposing. If experts conclude that there are such threats [from non-strategic missiles] or [that such threats] can emerge, the second stage will set in: construction of a conceptual model of countering or neutralising those threats....Creation of elements of a missile defence system is provided for only at the third stage, if need be This is not a defence of the entire territory of Europe, or part of it, but a system designed for protecting missile-threatened directions. The mobile anti-missile units will be deployed in the directions of the greatest risk of [attack from] missiles, to cover the most important facilities...
This plan does not take into account an earlier Russian suggestion that had been placed forward by President Putin among others, for a 'boost-phase' component designed to destroy missiles during early stages of their ascent.
Russian Perspective (February 2001 - May 2001)
From the very beginning, two issues that affected the Duma's decision to stay ratification of START II for a long period were Moscow's concerns about US efforts to abrogate or undermine the ABM Treaty, which would clearly be the case if the US went ahead in developing and deploying a multiple-site NMD and, concern over the expansion of NATO. 29 Reacting to Rumsfeld's PBS TV channel interview during which he accused Russia of violating international accords dealing with the non-proliferation of missile and nuclear technologies, a number of senior officials in the Russian military establishment rejected the accusations. According to Igor Sergeyev, Russia's ex-defence minister, a possible US decision to abrogate the 1972 ABM Treaty posed a danger to Russia and the entire world. He saw the treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability, which was attained as a result of the efforts of many years. Sergeyev told reporters on February 15, "We have virtually attained START III accords stipulating the entire nuclear club's mandatory involvement in strategic offensive arms reductions". He also felt the ABM Treaty would be wrecked as soon as the United States begins to deploy its strategic NMD system; and quite possibly, this would spell some rather dangerous consequences for the entire world. 30 According to Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, Chief, Main Department of International Military Cooperation, Russian Defence Ministry: "Russia unfailingly abides by its international commitments, including those stemming from the relevant missile-technologies non-proliferation regime. Even America's allies don't believe all those tall tales concerning missile threats allegedly being faced by the United States from those particular countries that were mentioned by Rumsfeld. This is proved by the UN vote on the resolution concerning the need to preserve the ABM Treaty." 31
Talking about Vladimir Putin's address to the South Korean Parliament and George Bush's address to the US Congress on February 28, 2001, when they spoke about ABM, Dimitry Gornostayev wrote,
This seems like a chance coincidence, but it is quite logical. Both advocated opposing views. Putin called for the preservation of the 1972 ABM Treaty intact, while Bush demanded that the treaty be reviewed or the US would withdraw from it. To begin with, it must be said unequivocally that the USA has not announced its acceptance of the Russian proposals on the European ABM system-this is a fact-and will not do this in the near future-this is a forecast with which the overwhelming majority of experts agree. We must understand that the NMD system, about which Bush is speaking, and the European ABM system, which Putin is advocating, are two completely different things, both technologically, politically and even philosophically. Theoretically, a compromise between Moscow and Washington is possible. And the sides have resumed the search for it. But I repeat that there is no agreement between them and will not be any for a long time yet. No Putin-Bush meeting, if held before the G8 summit in Genoa, will change anything radically. But if a separate Russo-American meeting is not held even in Genoa, this will mean that we are in for big trouble. Happily, the current circumstances show that this is a purely hypothetical variant." 32
He went on to add:
The initiative on the joint evaluation of the situation was made mostly to carry on cooperation, to develop the elements where points of contact between Russia and the USA can be found. But the USA refuses to see these nuances. But then, it is acting quite correctly-from the viewpoint of its position. "The Russians have recognised the threats, and hence we are interested in their plan." This is the main idea of the latest public speeches of George Bush and his team. Anyway, the wrong impression that all sides have come to an agreement with each other must be dispelled and the Russian leadership in the person of the president, the foreign or defence ministers and the secretary of the Russian Security Council must answer certain questions. First, how clearly does Moscow see the danger of the USA speaking about the alleged Russian acceptance of the US evaluation of threats? Second, has Russia devised a reply diplomatic manoeuvre-I don't mean reaction to the creation of the NMD, which is well known, but reaction to the deliberately wrong interpretation of our proposals? Third, since Russia has drawn the Republican administration into dialogue on ABM, how long can the talks last? Fourth, has Russia changed its stance according to which if the USA withdraws from the 1972 ABM Treaty and creates the NMD system, Russia will reciprocate by creating and reviving such types of strategic offensive weapons that would make the USA feel less secure than before it started talking about threats? In principle, the reply to the latter question is obvious, because I don't see any signs of change in the Russian stand. And yet, it must be reaffirmed. This must be done mostly for the sake of George Bush, so that he would not entertain illusions. It appears that the best argument in the debates on ABM and strategic offensive weapons with Washington is still as follows: After creating the NMD shield, the USA will find itself in a more threatening situation than before. On the other hand, perhaps that fourth question need not be answered publicly, because dialogue with the new US administration is being carried on, if one is to judge from the Ivanov-Powell meeting in Cairo. And any harsh or arrogant statement can break it up. However, not only Russia, but also the USA, which has become excessively harsh and arrogant of late, should remember about caution. 33
Valentin Kunin felt that even after the Cold War has officially ended, the situation that obtains between the USA and Russia is that of 'Cold Peace,' due to the policies of the former. He writes,
Obviously, two factors-the plans of further expansion of NATO in which the USA holds the leading position, and the US plans to deploy a national anti-missile defence (NMD) system-will have the most tangible influence on the development of Russian-US relations in the next few years. Russia categorically disagrees with NATO's expansion, since it holds the view that this threatens its national security and actually reanimates the situation of the Cold War era when the European continent was divided into two confronting camps. Moscow also rejects the alliance's claims to the role of an organisation which must serve as the pivot of the process of the setting up of a new system of European security. Only the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe can play such a role. The Russian leadership also toughly opposes the Washington plans to create a national anti-missile defence system. The Kremlin has stated that creation of a "missile shield" over America would inevitably result in undermining of the ABM treaty of 1972 and hence in the destruction of the entire system of global security which was built for the past few decades, since Russia will be forced to make adequate moves in response to the creation of the American ABM system. It looks, however, that the new US administration, too, intends to ignore Moscow's warnings. Anyway, President George Bush has already stated more than once that both the process of the NATO expansion and the works on the NMD will be continued. And in the CIA report to the Senate, intelligence committee director of the CIA George Tenet listed Russia, together with China, among the enemies of the United States. But the plans and statements of this kind will hardly help Russian-US relations get out of the not simple period of "cold peace" in which they, at Washington's will, have been for the past several years. 34
Reaction to Bush's May 1 speech from the Russian government was comparatively mild. Igor Ivanov, the foreign minister said:
I want again to stress that we are ready for consultations, we're ready to listen to the position of the American side and state our own approaches. As for the ABM Treaty of 1972, this document, from our point of view, cannot be separated from the general architecture of arms control agreements that has been formed in the last 30 years and that has become the basis of international security. This most complex architecture includes bilateral and multilateral agreements in such major questions as non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, strategic offensive arms, limitation and reduction, a ban on nuclear tests, and the restriction on conventional arms etc. That is why we have been so insistently advocating that the 1972 ABM Treaty be preserved and strengthened in the interests of international security. The United States President in his speech emphasized that the United States and Russia should work together on the creation of foundations for future international security in the 21st Century. We welcome the statement and believe this will create prerequisites for a constructive dialogue on the issues of strategic stability in the interests of our two countries, and in the interests of the whole international community." 35
Given below are some more Russian reactions to Bush's speech: 36
Vladimir Lukin, State Duma committee deputy chairman:
It is necessary to hold joint negotiations on the preservation of a strategic balance between Russia and the U.S. and the situation of guaranteed retaliation in the event of first nuclear strike. This is our main task, and there can be no compromises in this context. Taking into account the opinion of Russia would create a certain base for such serious negotiations.
Viktor Delia, rector of the Russian Academy of Socio-Economic Forecasting and Modelling:
The striving of Washington to gain technological superiority over Western Europe and Japan in addition to other countries, is not the last of the goals pursued by its plans to deploy national anti-missile defense. The aim of all this is crystal clear: while talking of deploying such a system and claiming that the 1972 ABM Treaty is "a relic", the U.S. tries to prepare world public opinion for a calm acceptance of tremendous financial injections into the American military-industrial complex.
Ivan Vasilenko, full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, State Research Center of the Russian Federation (Biophysics Institute):
Demand for a ban on deployment of nuclear materials in outer space should be the pivot of Russian-American ABM negotiations. Delivery of fissionable materials in the warheads of missile interceptors or energy blocks of laser pumps is fraught with great and real danger. The very presence of uranium or plutonium in space will jeopardize global civilization. Even if these fissionable materials are not used for military purposes, they will inevitably get into the near-Earth atmosphere and then reach the surface of the Earth as a result of man-made catastrophes.
Trend Analysis
From the above discussion, it becomes clear that as far as Russia is concerned, most Russian analysts are of the view that how they (the Russians) will react to the whole question of offence-defence, i.e., the START process and NMD, will hinge on the fate of the ABM Treaty of 1972. Though Bush called this treaty a relic of the past which has no relevance to the present or future, he has not yet withdrawn from it. Even if he were to withdraw and should a firm decision to deploy an NMD be taken, he would have to give a six-month notice of doing so. In any case, most experts are agreed that it will take a decade, at the very minimum, to deploy a full-fledged NMD of the type Bush talked about in his May 1 speech. Therefore, how US-Russian relations play out in the near future could depend largely on whether Bush decides to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. If this were to happen, Russia could follow with one of these scenarios:
First, decide that since it cannot afford to maintain the present strategic arsenal of nuclear warheads, go along with Bush's example of a unilateral reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and bring it down to a 'manageable' level of 1, 500 - 2,500 nuclear warheads; as well as jointly cooperate with the Americans on NMD deployment after wresting maximum concessions from them, specially in financing of the ongoing joint US-Russian nuclear cooperative ventures - which could take place after signing a new treaty to replace the ABM Treaty.
Second, decide that the ABM Treaty is still the "cornerstone of strategic stability" and, therefore, immediately stop the START process by withdrawing from both START I and II. This would leave it with enough strategic nuclear weapons to feel secure and confident about overwhelming any US NMD deployment; carry on with research and development projects to counteract the influence of NMD as well as take the arms race in space to the next level, after making sure its MIRVed ICBMs remain intact. If it chooses to follow this course, it could have closer relations with China and given the current deteriorating downward swing in US-China relations and vehement Chinese opposition to a US NMD/TMD (Theatre Missile Defence) deployment, this relationship (Russian-Chinese) could act as a powerful balance on the current unipolar hyperpower status of the US.
Third, follow a middle path, i.e. maintain friendly relations with both the US and China in its own national interests. 37
Endnotes
Note *: Kalpana Chittaranjan, Research Officer, IDSA Back
Note 1: The ABM Treaty was part of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) alongwith the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. SALT I was signed on May 26, 1972, between the USA and the former Soviet Union. By its provisions, the parties undertook (Article I) not to deploy ABM systems for the defence of the territory of their countries or to provide the base thereof, and not to deploy ABM systems for regional defence except as specifically provided. Article III specifies in detail the missile launchers and ABM radars permitted for defence of (a) the national capital; and (b) one ICBM field with 100 missiles and launchers at each (a 1974 Protocol reduced the permitted deployment to one or the other of these sites). The prohibitions and limitations are further reinforced (Articles V and VI, and some agreed statements and common understandings). Sea-, air-, space- and mobile land-based components are prohibited; this is essentially because mobility is inconsistent with the basic prohibition of other than limited regional defence. Back
Note 2: The controversial Strategic Defence Initiatives (SDI) popularly known as the "Star Wars" system was introduced in the 1980s by President Ronald Reagan and resulted in the ABM Treaty again being a subject of heated debate, both within the USA as well as between the USA and the former Soviet Union. Regan, an initiator and ardent proponent of the SDI, set out his plans on the programme in a speech he made on March 24, 1983. The SDI had been set out in a 175-page document, brought out by the Heritage Foundation and prepared by the former Director of the US Defence Intelligence Agency, Lt. General Daniel Graham. For details of the SDI programme, see Kalpana Chittaranjan, "US and Russian TMD Systems and the ABM Treaty," Strategic Analysis, vol. XXI, no. 10, January 1998, p. 1457. Back
Note 3: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Back
Note 4: Gerard C. Smith, in the preface of Matthew Bunn's, Foundation for the Future: The ABM Treaty and National Security (Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, 1990), p. vii. Back
Note 5: For the text of the speech, see Appendix I. Back
Note 6: For details on negotiations leading up to the signing of START I, see Kalpana Chittaranjan, "Prospects for START II Ratification by Russia," Strategic Analysis, vol. XIX, no. 7, October 1996, pp. 1053-1054, Kalpana Chittaranjan, "The START Process: Status and Challenges," Strategic Analysis, vol. XXI, no. 11, February 1998, pp. 1705-1705. Back
Note 7: By the terms of START I, the two countries undertook to reduce their strategic offensive arms to equal levels in three phases over a seven-year period. It has a duration of 15 years, unless superseded by another agreement. It limits the United States and Russia to 1,600 deployed strategic delivery vehicles (bombers and land- and submarine-based missiles) carrying 6,000 nuclear warheads, to be counted according to rules delineated in the treaty text. The parties can agree to extend the treaty for successive five-year periods but each party has the right to withdraw from it any time it decides that extraordinary events have jeopardised its supreme interests. Back
Note 8: See SIPRI Yearbook 1995: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) for excerpts of The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and related documents at Appendix IA, pp. 38-63. Back
Note 9: Chittaranjan, n. 6. Back
Note 10: US Senate ratification of START I came on October 1, 1992, with the Russian Parliament ratifying it on November 4, 1992. Earlier, Kazakhstan ratified it on July 2, 1992, and deposited the instruments of accession to the NPT on February 14, 1994. Ukraine ratified the treaty on November 18, 1993. Back
Note 11: The agreed ceilings were to be reached in two stages. Back
Stage One: The first stage had to be completed seven years after entry into force of START I and by the end of it, each side should have reduced the total number of its deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,800-4,250. Of these warheads, no more than 1,200 could be deployed on MIRVed ICBMs, no more than 2,160 on deployed SLBMs (submarine launched ballistic missiles) and no more than 650 on deployed heavy ICBMs.
Stage Two: This stage had to be completed by 2003 or even earlier, i.e., by the end of 2000 if the USA could help finance the elimination of strategic nuclear arms in Russia. By the end of this stage, each side should have reduced the total number of its deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500. Of the retained warheads, none could be on MIRVed ICBMs, including heavy ICBMs. Only ICBMs carrying a single warhead would be allowed.
Entry into Force and Duration: START II enters into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, and since it builds upon START I, it must remain in force throughout the duration of the latter. As in START I, each side has the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary efforts have jeopardised its supreme interests.
Note 12: The concerns being that of US efforts to abrogate or amend the ABM Treaty and NATO expansion. Back
Note 13: For the text of the Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces, see "Joint Statements of the Helsinki Summit," Arms Control Today, vol. 27, no. 1, March 1997, p. 19. Back
Note 14: See "START II Resolution of Ratification," Arms Control Today, vol. 26, no. 1, February 1996, p. 30. Back
Note 15: Earlier, on April 14, 2000, the Duma, by a vote of 288-131, with four abstentions, finally passed a resolution of ratification approving START II. On April 19, 2000, the Upper House of Parliament followed suit, by voting 122-15 in favour of the resolution. Back
Note 16: For full text of an unofficial translation of the resolution, officially known as the Federal Law on Ratification of the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, see "START II Resolution of Ratification," Arms Control Today, vol. 30, no. 4, May 2000, pp. 26-28. Back
Note 17: See Kalpana Chittaranjan, "START II Moves-Does it Really?" Strategic Analysis, vol. XXIV, no. 8, November 2000, pp. 1458-1460. Back
Note 18: For a more detailed background to the US process towards an NMD deployment, see Kalpana Chittaranjan, "US NMD: An Issue That Just Won't Go," Strategic Analysis, vol. XXIV, no. 10, January 2001, pp. 1928-1932. Back
Note 19: Ibid., p. 1932. Back
Note 20: Factfile, "US and Russian/Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces," Arms Control Today, vol. 31, no. 4, May 2001, at http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/May2001/may01factfile.html Back
Note 21: Article IX states, "The exchange of instruments of ratification of the START II Treaty by the Russian Federation shall be done upon completion by the United States of America of the procedure of ratification of the START II Treaty, including the Protocol Relating to the START II Treaty of September 26, 1997, done at New York, Memorandum of Understanding Relating to the ABM Treaty of September 26, 1997, done at New York, First Agreed Statement Relating to the ABM Treaty of September 26, 1997, done at New York, Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures Relating to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles of September 26, 1997, done at New York." See n. 15, p. 28. Back
Note 22: For a detailed discussion on the unlikely movement of START II towards an exchange of ratification of instruments between the US and Russia, see Chittaranjan, n. 17, pp. 1461-1463. Back
Note 23: Patrick E. Tyler, "Eyeing US Missile Defence, Russia Wants Less Offence," The New York Times, November 15, 2000. Back
Note 24: Alison Mitchell, "Bush Says US Should Reduce Nuclear Arms," The New York Times, May 24, 2000. Back
Note 25: Appendix I. Back
Note 26: A clearer picture could emerge on May 25, 2001, when President Bush is scheduled to address the Naval Academy, which will present "the vision of where we need to go as we move into the 21st century" as a Pentagon official pointed out, as a culmination of Defence Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's planned unveiling of sweeping changes in US military strategy. See Thomas E. Ricks and Walter Pincus, "Pentagon Plans Major Changes in US Strategy," The Washington Post, May 7, 2001. Back
Note 27: Steven Lee Myers and James Glanz, "Taking a Look at the Workings of a Missile Shield," The New York Times, May 3, 2001. Back
Note 28: News Review, "Russia and US Push Clashing Missile Defence Plans," Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 55, March 2001, at http://www.acronym.org.uk/55plans.htm. Back
Note 29: Chittaranjan, n. 17, p. 1459. Back
Note 30: "Russia Observing All Accords," Ria Novosti-Military News Bulletin, February 28, 2001. Back
Note 31: Ibid. Back
Note 32: Dmitry Gornostrayev, "ABM: False Interpretation, Deliberate or Not." Back
Note 33: Ibid. Back
Note 34: Valentin Kunin, "'Cold Peace' Instead of 'Cold War,'" Ria Novosti, March 5, 2001. Back
Note 35: Quoted in http://www.acronym/org.uk/bush1.htm. See Ibid., for more comments and reactions on President Bush's May 1 speech on NMD. Back
Note 36: "What US Withdrawal From ABM Treaty Might Mean to Russia," Ria Novosti-Rossiiskaya Gazeta, May 5, 2001. Back
Note 37: Talk with Dr. Manpreet Sethi on May 19, 2001. Back