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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
China as a Space Power
A.V. Lele
*
, Research Fellow, IDSA
Abstract
During the last few decades, space has gained considerable importance in many facets of military operations. The Gulf War and a few other campaigns have shown that the US seeks to undertake asymmetric operations by exploiting various space technologies that its opponents do not possess. After the end of the cold war, China is perceived to have emerged as a major competitor to the US. China understands the advantages of space technologies from the point of view of space control. This article examines the overall growth of Chinese military space programme during the last 30 years and looks into its future.
1. Introduction
During the last few decades space observations have become an integral element in fighting wars. Today, space is considered as the ‘fourth environment’ for military operations, after land, sea, and air. Space science is one of the most active disciplines in modern science. The breakthroughs in space technology such as those of rockets and satellites since the late 1950s have formed the basis for the development of space systems.
China’s space programme began in the late 1950s when the State Council implemented the “12 year development plan of science & technology,” which included rocket programming, radio electronics, automatic control, computer & semiconductor technology. 1 Since then China has independently established a small-scale but well-balanced and co-ordinated infrastructure of space-related institutions, including research and development centres, launching sites, tracking, telemetry and command stations and centres, and manufacturing plants.
A survey of Chinese military-related literature indicates that China’s current view of future warfare appears to have reached a certain measure of consensus at the strategic and operational levels. It appears that a key area for future development, as well as for future conflict, in the Chinese conception, could be space.
The Gulf war, NATO intervention in Kosovo, the war against Terrorism in Afghanistan, US determination to pursue the ballistic missile defence system have all forced China to shift its focus more towards the fourth environment of military operations.
By and large, in the Chinese perception, there exist some prospects of its conflict with the United States over Taiwan in the near future. Also, there is a distinct possibility of conflict with India due to the dynamics of the geopolitical situation in South/South East Asia.
Today, China is making rapid progress in the military as well as civilian fields of space technology.
This paper examines various primary, secondary and electronic sources and attempts a limited analysis on the subject. It tries to see the Chinese view on space technology in the context of future warfare. Here it is assumed that the Chinese view on the use of space in future warfare will more or less depend on its security considerations and how Western forces, particularly the US, have utilised space-based technologies to enhance their war fighting capabilities during the last decade. While analysing the ‘space preparedness’ of any nation it must be borne in mind that most of the achievements in the civilian space programme have direct relation to the use of the same technology with some modifications in military programme. This paper does not discuss ‘missile technology and satellites’ in greater detail because of the sheer vastness of the subject.
2. Chinese Conceptions of Need for Space Technology
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) understands that military preparedness could be judged by assessing advances in space science. During the last 30 years China has made slow but steady advances in military space technology. But it would be wrong to jump to the conclusion that every civilian project has a hidden military objective. China is trying to modernise its space arsenal but arms development is not its most important goal. China must have learnt from the breakdown of the erstwhile Soviet Union, and its investment in space technology therefore appears to be pragmatic and cost effective.
However, major events of the last decade have forced China to pursue its military space programme with greater vigour. Today, it is catching up with the rest of the developed world.
The 1991 Gulf War demonstrated, among other things, what can happen when a nation that does not enjoy the benefits of space exploitation wages war against one that does. In that conflict, the US enjoyed a virtual monopoly on access to space-based surveillance, communications, and navigation support. 2 In Kosovo, the NATO alliance reportedly used over twenty different types of satellite systems, totaling fifty platforms in all. 3
Similarly, in the Afghanistan theatre, even though satellite technology alone did not help the US to catch a single individual, the overall concept of operations was much more dependent on inputs received from various satellites. Also, aircraft were guided from satellites for accurate delivery of bombs over the target. In fact, the US had used the same technology when the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was accidentally (?) bombed during the NATO air offensive against Yugoslavia. 4
In all these operations it has been found that US military satellites have substantially increased the effectiveness of strike forces and also reduced the loss of personnel and equipment.
It has also been seen that US and NATO forces tried to dominate the outer space arena and succeeded very well. In the Gulf War and in Kosovo, these were relatively straightforward efforts. In the Gulf War, NATO effectively embargoed all satellite information for Saddam Hussein. Similarly, in the Kosovo War, NATO is reported to have effectively muted Yugoslavian broadcasts by persuading satellite owners to cease handling their signals. Thus, “without expending a single soldier, Yugoslavia lost its ability to broadcast counter-invasion messages.” 5 During the recent Afghan conflict the US asked private satellite firms not to circulate satellite imageries of the area under attack. 6
During peacetime hundreds of kilometers above earth, camera equipment on a satellite passing over the Taiwan Strait captures images of bases in Fujian province, where PLA missiles are aimed at the island. It is almost a daily occurrence as US spy satellites take high-resolution photographs to monitor the build-up of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) hardware.
China must have surely taken note of these advantages of space technology. Today, China is a relatively wealthy and technologically sophisticated power. After the end of the cold war it is the only country that could disturb the balance of power equation in the world. It understands that the US seeks to undertake asymmetric operations against its opponents through exploitation of technologies and capabilities that its opponents do not possess. Hence, it could be inferred that China would make all efforts to become less and less susceptible to asymmetric operations if the need arises. Also, China would like to use space power to its own benefit.
A book was written by two Chinese PLA colonels advocating asymmetric war; exerpts appeared in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and it was reviewed in Parameters. It is apparently available (English trans.) in some university in the US! Going through that could prove beneficial.
3. Historical Overview
In China, research in space science mainly began in the 1960s. The Chinese Government was determined to develop technologies relating to rockets and artificial earth satellites during the great international upsurge of the development of rocket and satellite technologies. Since 1970, China has successfully flown a variety of satellites, including communications, meteorological, and surveillance systems. The China National Space Administration (CNSA) manages governmental space co-operation with other countries and the development of satellites for civil use. 7
China sent its first man-made earth satellite, Dongfanghong-1, into space in 1970. It was the fifth country to exhibit this capability, following the then USSR, the US, France, and Japan. 8 In 1975 China became the third nation after the US and the erstwhile USSR to successfully launch a recoverable satellite with the first FSW-0 photo reconnaissance/remote sensing satellite. 9
During the last three decades, the Long March system of rockets has been performed gradually. Satellite systems including the SJ satellite system for space science exploration, the recoverable satellite system for earth observation, the communication satellite system, the meteorological satellite system and resource satellite system have been completed.
According to Xu Fuxiang, Director of Chinese Research Institute of Space Technology, Chinese scientists have so far developed, or been involved in the development of, more than 40 satellites and spacecraft, which include major models of low, intermediate and high orbit satellites. 10
The following are the top 10 events in China’s Space Programme: -
April 24, 1970 The Long March 1 launch vehicle sent the Dongfanghong 1, China’s first man-made satellite into orbit.
November 26, 1975 The first recoverable satellite was successfully launched.
April l8, 1984 The first geosynchronous stationary orbit satellite was launched.
November 20, 1999 The Shenzhou experimental spaceship was successfully launched.
October 14, 1999 A resource satellite co-developed by China and Brazil was successfully launched.
September 7, 1988 A sun-synchronous meteorological satellite was successfully launched.
August 14, 1992 The Long March 2E, high-propulsion launch vehicle, was successfully launched.
May 12, 1997 The Dongfanghong 3, a large capacity communications satellite, was sent into orbit.
October 25, 1985 China entered the international commercial launching market.
August 20, 1997 Long March 3, a high earth orbit and high propulsion launch vehicle, was successfully launched. 11
4. Military Component of Space Programme
In order to be a space power, a nation must have launchers and satellites, and a mission support capability to monitor a satellite launched by it and utilise the information. The PRC has succeeded in creating a “full end-to-end research, design, trial-manufacture, production, and testing system” for both satellites and launchers. 12
China boasts Asia’s only functioning arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the East Wind missiles, as well as many shorter-range missiles. Since 1986, it has pursued what it calls the 863 Programme, which concentrates government investments in seven distinct areas, like information technology, which have both civilian and military applications. But only two of those areas, lasers and space technology, are supervised by the government’s Weapon Development agency. 13
Today, China is emerging as a major economic power in the world. It is concentrating on improving its industrial base and developing new technologies. Hence, it becomes extremely difficult to pinpoint a particular technology that the PRC is trying to acquire purely from the military point of view. But most of these technologies are dual-purpose technologies like fibre optics, supercomputers and satellites. The following paragraphs briefly discuss the development and acquisition of various space technologies by China that have got a direct bearing on its military space programme.
4.1 Launch Vehicles
Way back in 1958 rocket propulsion was included as one of the key technologies in the ‘Twelve Year Development Plan of Science and Technology’. This led to the launch of the first indigenously developed sounding rocket on February 19, 1960. 14 During the last 40 years, China has achieved considerable success in its long cherished goal of launcher autonomy.
The primary Chinese launcher, at present, is the Long March (LM) series. The PRC has demonstrated the capacity, with this series, to loft a variety of payloads into a range of orbits, including low-earth orbit, medium-earth orbit, geostationary orbit, and sun-synchronous/polar orbit. Also, the PRC is one among a handful of countries, with multiple launch sites. 15
Various launch missions are co-ordinated from the China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control Centre. This includes the Command &Control Centre and the Tracking, Telemetry &Control Network. Supporting these ground-based stations are a series of communication ships, which provide the PRC with overseas tracking abilities. 16
Suffice to say that China has launched and is capable of launching various types of military satellites as per its requirements.
4.2 Communication Satellites
Communication satellites remain a high priority for the PRC, both due to the continued shortage of phone lines and because some 80 per cent Chinese communications needs are currently met by transponders on foreign satellites. 17
From the early 1990s onwards, it became clear to the Chinese leadership that its military telecommunication systems were lagging technologically behind the exploding civil telecommunications sector. Faced with the unattractive option of pouring large amounts of money into an upgraded military system, Jiang Zemin on June 7, 1991 issued the following instruction: “In such a big country as ours, as it is neither possible nor necessary to build separate telecommunication systems for military use and civil use respectively, we should take such a road as building a telecommunications system usable for both military and civil purposes, which meet both peace time and war time needs.” 18
Presently, China has got Apstar series, AsiaSat series, Chinasat series, and Zhonxing series of national and commercial communication satellites in space. 19 The Chinese space white paper issued by the State Council noted that a major effort has been under way to distribute Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) communication service. China’s next generation of large communications satellites will carry C_, Ku_, Ka_, and L band transponders for TV, communications, data, voice & video transmissions. 20
China launched its first military communications satellite in January 2000 as part of the People’s Liberation Army command & control network linking forces for combat. These will be netted to airborne and ground based sensors to give ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft and ships a seamless tactical-to-strategic targeting capability. This is supposed to be China’s first advanced technology spy satellite. 21
Studies are under way to develop a Global Mobile Satellite Information System (GMSIS), which would provide personal hand-held communications via 18 to 24 satellites in medium orbits.
4.3 Navigational Satellites
In early 1980s China began to utilise other countries’ navigational satellites and developed application technology of satellite navigation and positioning, which is now used for land survey and ship and aircraft navigation.
Now, China has its Beidon Navigation Test Satellites (BNTS) programme. First, two navigational satellites were launched in 2000 in geostationary orbit, and are expected to provide full-time, all-weather navigational information. Both were built domestically, though Beijing has not officially released any details of the satellites and their orbits. These satellites would be used for providing navigational positioning services for ships and railway transport. 22
4.4 Intelligence Gathering
China basically gathers signal intelligence by flying modified AN-12 transport aircraft and also by PL-5s, HZ-5s, and Tu154Ms among other aircraft. 23 It is believed to have a large number of ground stations, ships and submarines, trucks and limited satellite capabilities dedicated to signal intelligence (SIGINT) collection. They have developed a large SIGINT facility with satellite communications intercept capabilities on Hainan islands and at a few other places, with the primary objective of monitoring US and other naval forces in the South China Sea. 24
Also, China takes the help of various facets of space technology for gathering electronics intelligence (ELINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT). The available open sources about the Chinese methods of intelligence gathering do not reveal any specifics though a few vague references to that effect are found.
A space-based ELINT capability is reportedly under development that will be integrated with photo-reconnaissance and communications satellites (passive ELINT capabilities were reportedly to be integrated with Hughes-built satellites for Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecom, or APMT). 25
The PLA Third Department’s science and technology units are responsible for decoding and analysis of intelligence collected by Chinese military reconnaissance satellites, generally termed “technology experimental satellites.” These are generally considered to have relatively limited capabilities (compared to their US or Russian counterparts) because of their small numbers and limited orbital life. However, China’s capabilities are improving and will progress further through foreign remote sensing technology transfers.
The PRC’s imagery programme has focused both on military reconnaissance and on earth resources and disaster monitoring. It has adopted a three-tier approach to developing its imagery capabilities. First, it has a Landsat imagery pressing facility, which became operational in 1986. This was upgraded in 1993 to accommodate synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery from European ERS and Japanese JERS 1 satellites. Second, it has deployed (FSW) photographic reconnaissance satellites since 1974. These operate in low earth orbit, with a perigee of 178 km and physically eject film capsules for recovery on earth. Finally, the PRC has developed China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) jointly with Brazil. This satellite has a 5-channel linear charge coupled device (CCD) with spatial resolution down to 20m. 26
The JSSW series of satellites are supposed to have ELINT capabilities. This series of Ji Shu Shyan Weixing satellites has never been discussed in Chinese literature, but Western sources claim these are series of ELINT satellites which the Chinese dropped as an operational programme after the death of Mao Zedong who supported this technology.
China is developing a new generation of photo-reconnaissance satellites, the FSW-3 series, which will provide 1-metre resolution. The Chinese National Remote Sensing Centre also receives imagery from US LANDSAT, French SPOT, Israeli EROS, and Russian remote sensing satellites. So far they have developed three models of recoverable reconnaissance satellites (FSW1/2/3) and launched 18 of them for military operations. 27
On September 1, 2000 the Ziyuan-2 (ZY-2) satellite was launched and is officially known as a civilian ‘remote sensing’ spacecraft, for terrestrial surveying, city planning, crop yield assessment, disaster monitoring and space science experimentation. In reality it is used to spy on US and other forces in Asia. Secretly, it is designated Jianbing-3. 28 Such photo-reconnaissance satellites could be used for planning combat missions, targeting missiles at US forces in Japan, or preparing aircraft strikes on Taiwan. This satellite has a life span of two years and a resolution of 5m, 29 which is more than sufficient for strategic targeting.
4.5 Micro satellites
The PRC has been exploring the possibilities of micro-satellites, which are smaller than most satellites and therefore less expensive. A satellite in this category, Tsinghua 1, was launched on June 28, 2000 30 by a Russian booster. It was a joint project of Tsinghua University of Beijing and Surrey Satellite Technology Limited (UK). It is a 50 kg bird and its launch has put China into the selected bracket of countries that can design and operate micro and nano-sized satellites. This success has implications for both China’s scientific programmes as well as for enhanced military satellite capabilities. It is equipped with a CCD camera that can image objects up to 39m in three spectral bands. 31
4.6 Other Military-related Satellite Technologies
It has been seen that China’s capabilities are focused in the areas that are most likely to have both military and economic benefit. The nation is essentially looking at space technology with dual-use aspects. Already, China’s current space systems offer it some measure of military capability.
Today, most of the military operational requirements are driven by technology and China’s military leadership understands the importance of C4I systems in this scenario. The PLA’s C4I strategies and policies are developed based on various transformative principles that include use of space technology for telecommunications, military information networking, intelligence, reconnaissance, etc. 32
China’s Shenzhou spaceship has now had two test-launches and reports are that the Chinese are planning a manned launch in 2002. 33 To put a man in space is China’s dream project with more of a desire to capture international attention and to instill pride at home. A manned programme will raise the technology levels in the country. The allied military benefits would be improvement in missile/rocket technology and capability of damaging space based systems of other countries. Also, along with technical experiments in space, the Chinese astronauts could investigate the utility of manned reconnaissance from space.
China is increasingly viewing Information Operations/Information Warfare (IO/IW) as a strategic weapon to use outside its traditional operational boundaries. 34 China’s IO/IW is in the early stages of research. It currently focuses on understanding IW as a military threat, developing effective countermeasures, and studying offensive employment of IW against foreign economic, logistic, and C4I systems. The PLA’s general staff has reportedly established a high level ‘Leading Group of Information Warfare’ to develop related strategies and tactics. They are mainly involved in designing measures to launch vital strikes in future warfare, so as to damage the enemy’s intelligence gathering and transmission facilities and weaken the enemy’s information warfare capability.
Presently, China has three meteorological satellites in sun-synchronous polar orbit and geosynchronous orbit. These satellites give China an added advantage of having accurate weather inputs during operations, which is an important variable in planning an amphibious strike or even concerted air and missile attacks.
4.7 Anti-Satellite (ASAT) System
According to a Hong Kong newspaper, Sing Tao Jih Pao, China has completed ground tests of an advanced anti-satellite weapon called ‘Parasitic satellite’. It is likely to be deployed on an experimental basis and enter the phase of space test in the near future. This ASAT system can be used against many types of satellites such as communication satellites, navigational satellites and early warning satellites in different orbits. The cost of building this satellite system is 0.1 to 1 per cent of a typical satellite. 35
According to sources, Beijing’s decision to develop and deploy the ASAT system has both long and short-term strategic objectives. The long-term objectives are to establish a strategic balance among the larger nations, and to break the monopoly on utilisation of space that large space systems of the superpowers are holding, thus weakening their capabilities in information warfare.
According to a Pentagon report, “China’s PLA is building lasers to destroy satellites and already has beam weapons capable of damaging sensors on space- based reconnaissance and intelligence systems. Consequently, China could blind the US intelligence and military space equipment systems vital for deploying US military forces in current and future warfare.” 36
In the short-term, China would strengthen its capabilities in controlling the use of space globally, and change drastically the Chinese-American military balance so that the US would not intervene easily in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and at the Chinese perimeter.
5. Space Science Experiments
During the last few decades China made all out efforts to strengthen its technology base. Presently, application satellite systems important to China’s development and modernisation are receiving high priority, but China is also making some long-term studies and planning, looking closely into the emerging advanced technologies. Out of these technologies, a few have indirect applications in the military field.
Ionospheric physics deals with long distance propagation of short waves (it depends on reflection of the ionosphere) that have a bearing on quality of communication. Also, middle atmospheric research (10-100km) is likely to give vital inputs for tropospheric propagation and space-based systems 37 . Remote sensing satellites are looking overtly at Himalayan environment but inputs over Hindu Kush Himalayan Region that separately belongs to eight different nations will also have some use in the country’s security spectrum.
Investigation and exploration of the West Pacific Ocean and South China Sea will help to study submarine topography, which has significance in submarine operations and energy pipelines. 38 Rise of sea level and availability of oceanic wealth in Spartly islands area could also be judged.
6. Future Plans
China is planning to launch at least 35 different science and applications satellites during the years 2002-2006, according to Xinhua News Agency. The satellites would be used for communications and direct-to-home broadcasting, meteorological & oceanographic observations, navigation & positioning, disaster mitigation and seed breeding. 39
China is planning a manned mission to space by 2002 and later by 2015 they intend to build an orbital space station. 40
7. Conclusion
China understands the monopolistic space exploitation by countries that “control” satellite technologies and hence is engaged in development of indigenous substitutes. Over the last 30 years China has gradually developed a multi-functional, multi-orbit space infrastructure composed of various satellite systems. The major aim of China’s space technology is to enhance its comprehensive national strength, safeguard national security and consolidate its status as a powerful country.
China’s capabilities are focused in the areas that are most likely to have both military and economic benefits. Already, China’s current space systems offer it some measure of military capability. Today, when we compare its satellite capabilities with those of other major Asian players like Japan, Taiwan and India it appears that China’s capabilities represent a major stride ahead of others.
It becomes imperative that in days to come, China would strengthen its capabilities in controlling the use of space globally, and change drastically the Sino-American military balance so that the US would not intervene easily in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Also, further improvement in Chinese rockets means more reliable Chinese nuclear missiles.
The recent launch of its first military communication satellite gives China seamless tactical-to-strategic targeting capability in the Taiwan Strait. But in case of gathering SIGINT in the nearby vicinity, China will still have to depend more on aircraft because it provides greater mobility than satellites and land based systems.
On the diplomatic front, satellite technology sometimes works even towards transparency and confidence building, because it reduces the possibility of suspicion and deception. In Chinese military strategy in the recent years, ICBMs and nuclear technology received adverse press in the west. With the help of satellite imageries, the Chinese can convince the world about its intentions.
Also, satellites could help to avoid conflict over the Spratly islands. China can take the help of satellite imageries to prove to the world about the structures built on the reefs by any rival claimant.
In the American thinking, China’s development of an advanced spy satellite may be really problematic because of Beijing’s links with such states as Iran which have been accused of sponsoring terrorism. If intelligence about the location of US aircraft carriers obtained by satellites were passed to terrorist groups, it would become difficult for the US to fight a war against terrorism. China’s space-based surveillance and remote sensing will increase PLA’s situational awareness. It will help the PLA to understand and analyse USAF assets in more detail. China’s interest in a variety of anti-satellite capabilities, ranging from jammers and blinders to direct energy weapons, poses a threat to US.
In days to come, Chinese advances in space technology will force US planners to think differently about their strategy in the Asian theatere because PRC is much less vulnerable to asymmetric operations and US can not take it for granted like Iran, Yugoslavia, or Afghanistan.
Today, the Western aerospace press calls the Chinese space programme inferior, perhaps due to the failures it suffered in the launch vehicle category. Also, the Chinese have not reached anywhere near the sub-metre resolution achieved by US satellites. However, China’s space journey in the last thirty years is impressive. By possessing its own indigenous capability, it has proved that its military space power cannot be underestimated.
India’s long-term strategic interests are dependent on whatever is happening at its periphery. India has also sought autonomy in many areas of the satellite technologies. However, compared to China, India is lagging behind, particularly in the field of military related aspects of satellite technology. India’s major area of concern could be that Pakistan may be able to enjoy many of the advantages of space exploitation without building or launching a single satellite of its own.
Today, it may not be possible to make any definitive pronouncements on the shape and future of China in 2020. There are too many variables, such as solution to the Taiwan problem, China’s economic growth rate, nature of Sino-US relations, overall East Asian security environment, etc. It is not likely that China will emerge as a global military competitor to US by 2020. China could however emerge as a formidable space power in areas contiguous to its borders.
Endnotes
Note *: Sqn Ldr A.V. Lele is a serving Indian Air Force Officer from the Meteorological Branch. Presently, he is working as a ‘Research Fellow’ at IDSA. Back.
Note 1: Win Rui Hu, Space Science in China, Gorden and Breach Science Publishers, Australia,1997, p. 15. Back.
Note 2: Z.M. Khalizad, The US and Rising China, Rand Corp., Santa Monica, 1999, p. 81. Back.
Note 3: Dean Cheng, “Space and Chinese Views of Future Warfare,” 2001 CAPS-RAND PLA Conference. Back.
Note 4: “China’s Intelligence and Internal Security Forces,” Jane’s Information Group, Alexandria, USA, October 1999, p. 74. Back.
Note 7: “Civil Space Programme hold steady in 2000,” Aerospace America, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Reston Va, August 2000, p. 6. Back.
Note 8: Li Ning, “30 Years of Development in Space Technology”, Beijing Review, June 19, 2000, p. 12. Back.
Note 9: Phillip Clark, “Chinese designs on the race for space,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Alexandria, USA, April 2000, p. 178. Back.
Note 13: Evan A. Feigenbaum, “China’s Military Civilian Complex”, The New York Times, 22 May 1998. Back.
Note 14: “Launch Vehicles (Orbital & Sub-orbital), Jane’s Space Directory, Alexandria, USA, 2000-2001, p. 196. Back.
Note 19: Jane’s Space Directory 2000-2001, pp. 319. Back.
Note 20: “China’s Space Satellites”, www.spacetoday.com Back.
Note 21: www.fas.org/spp/guide/china/wp112200.html Back.
Note 22: Wei Long, “China completes First satellite Navigation System”, Space Daily, 8 January 2001. Back.
Note 24: “Look who else is spying like US, China and many other countries, www.ABC News.Com Back.
Note 25: Feng Ruming, “ China to join Asian Satellite Project”, www.fas.org/new/China/1998. Back.
Note 26: Bhupendra Jasani and Andrew Rathmell, ”The Role of Space based Surveillance in Gulf Security,” The Emirates Center For Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi, UAE, 1998, pp. 62-63. Back.
Note 27: Holmes S. Liao, “Chinese Military Technology Modernization”, Strategic and International Studies, Taiwan Research Institute, Taiwan News, March 2000. Back.
Note 29: Bill Gertz, “Chinese Civilian Satellite A Spy Tool,” Washington Times, 01 August 2001. Back.
Note 30: Frank Sietzen Jr., “Microspace Technology Comes to China,” www.spacedaily.com, 10 October 2000. Back.
Note 31: Ibid., 19 October 2000. Back.
Note 32: Zhang Fuyou, “With Joint Efforts made by Army and People, Military Telecommunications Makes Leap Forward,” Jiefangiun bao, Hong Kong, 27 September 2000, p.9 (source mentioned by James Mulvenon, “Chinese C4I Modernization: An Experiment in open source Eexploitation”,2001CAPS-RAND-PLA Conference) Back.
Note 33: Phillip Clark, “China’s Space Dream Countdown in Sight,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Alexandria, USA, 01 September 1999. Back.
Note 34: Annual Report on Military Power of PRC, The US Secretary of Defence, 2000, Defence Pentagon, Washington DC, http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/dodrpt00.htm Back.
Note 35: Cheng Ho “China Eyes Anti Satellite System,” 08 January 2000. www.gyre.org/news/cache/650 Back.
Note 36: John Vennari, “China to test Mobile ballistic missile capable of striking Western USA,” www.fatima.org/chinanukes.html Back.
Note 40: Lawrence and Dhume, “Blasting Off”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 03 August 2000, p. 30. Back.