Strategic Analysis

Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA

Apr-Jun 2002 (Vol. XXVI No. 2)

 

Politics in Pakistan Post-September 11, 2001
Sumita Kumar * , Research Officer, IDSA

 

Abstract

The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 changed the whole context in which developments in Pakistan were taking place. President Musharraf faced unprecedented pressure from the United States forcing him to announce a total about turn in his country’s Afghanistan policy. This action has had far reaching ramifications with respect to the security and stability of Pakistan. This article examines the impact of the Musharraf government’s decision to support US action in Afghanistan. It also looks at the impact of destabilising forces that are active within Pakistan. It is evident that while General Musharraf is trying to bring in moderation within Pakistan, he is at the same time ensuring a place for himself in the future governance of the country.

 

Introduction

Pakistan’s political and social system is beset with contradictions ever since the creation of Pakistan, due to frequent oscillation between military and democratic rule. The military has always projected itself as the only vehicle through which political order could be achieved which in turn would help the nation move towards economic development. In fact, having a certain similarity to the earlier episodes when the military took over in Pakistan, General Musharraf also derided the economic collapse and lawlessness in the country when he assumed power in October 1999. Though General Musharraf took over the reins of government promising good governance, it slowly became apparent that he was not able to deliver on a large number of counts. In that sense, he seemed to add to the already existing contradictions within Pakistan, and created greater uncertainty about the political future of Pakistan.

It was seen that the initial optimism which greeted General Musharraf’s takeover gradually gave way to doubts about the legality of the coup. It seemed as though the problems faced by the country were getting aggravated with time. Tensions between the provinces continued to rise. While the Musharraf government tried to address the numerous economic problems, the strategies used were not effective. The country continued to be in the grip of law and order problems and sectarianism continued to be a major cause of concern. State institutions continued to function in a highly politically motivated manner. It became obvious that General Musharraf’s plans to de-politicise state institutions did not apply to the Army’s interference in these institutions. The local bodies elections were criticised for not being able to develop a new political leadership by keeping the feudals and established politicians out of the way. The accountability process initiated by General Musharraf’s regime which was supposed to bring errant politicians and businessmen to book was increasingly referred to as a black law.

Musharraf tried to destroy all major state institutions which are supposed to provide life and sustenance to democracy. The independence of the judiciary was effectively curtailed by the Musharraf government. The superior judiciary was forced to take fresh oath of office under the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO). General Musharraf was successful in getting the judiciary to do his bidding, as was made obvious by the verdict delivered by the Supreme Court on May 12, 2000. This judgement validated the coup on the basis of “doctrine of state necessity” which had been rejected in the Asma Jilani case. Contrary to the initial expression of belief in the freedom of the press, General Musharraf proceeded to stifle and intimidate the press. He manipulated the political parties in Pakistan to suit his own purposes. This was evident in the manner in which he engineered a split in the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML (N)), by cultivating the dissident faction of the PML. He also tried to eliminate major political opponents by amending the Political Parties Act of 1962 in order to oust, convict and disqualify rival politicians.

General Musharraf’s takeover as President of Pakistan ensured that the army would remain deeply entrenched in Pakistan’s political system and would continue to have a strong hold on matters relating to internal governance, and also on foreign policy and defence issues. His measures to consolidate power include the move to restore the Eighth Amendment which would return to the President his discretionary powers to dissolve an elected parliament, remove an elected government and appoint chiefs of armed forces. The establishment of the National Security Council would ensure a permanent role for the armed forces in the governance of the country. Also, a transfer of power would probably take place only to the leader of a political party having the confidence of the military. General Musharraf’s “road map” for democracy, which he outlined in his Independence Day speech in August 2001, was met with deep suspicion. It could be assumed that his promise to hand over power to civilian rule in October 2002 was due to international pressure to announce an election date. However, this brought to the fore the question of General Musharraf’s perception of the role that both he and the military play, in any future parliamentary set up.

General Musharraf was trying to aggregate his power by the use of jehadi organisations as a means of achieving foreign policy goals. For this reason he made a differentiation between terrorism and jehad, in the face of pressure from western countries to clamp down on militant organisations. Pakistan has been paying heavy political and social costs in patronising militants as some of these groups have been involved in religious and sectarian violence within Pakistan. However, it was understood that any action to curb radical groups would provoke a strong reaction from the conservative political parties. The Islamic parties in Pakistan have been capable of influencing political processes and decision-making. The importance of the Islamists could not be doubted and was evident in General Musharraf’s backtracking on the blasphemy law. Even after Musharraf’s takeover there was a continuation of Pakistan’s policy with respect to Afghanistan and its support for the Taliban.

The events of September 11, 2001, changed the whole context in which the developments in Pakistan were taking place. The terrorist attack of September 11 made President Musharraf face unprecedented pressure from the United States forcing him to announce a total about turn in his country’s Afghanistan policy. There was a clear shift in policy as General Musharraf had no choice but to comply. This compulsion centred around the survival of the Pakistani state and was evident in his address to the nation on September 19, 2001 and his meetings with the corps commanders and various think tanks. This action has undoubtedly had far reaching ramifications with regard to the security and stability of Pakistan. Questions were raised about President Musharraf’s ability to deal with the fallout in terms of the internal repercussions in Pakistan. It is in this context that it becomes important to examine the impact of the Musharraf government’s decision to support US action in Afghanistan. Also significant is how Pakistan is trying to cope under the pressure of destabilising forces. Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has been inextricably linked to its Afghan policy. Given that Pakistan’s involvement with religious extremism and terrorism has been of overarching concern to India, any policy changes of the Pakistan government related to terrorism assume a natural importance for India. This article attempts to analyse the nature of political and social change taking place within Pakistan currently, and the implications that this change would have on Pakistan’s future. The period taken into consideration is from September 11, 2001 to February 2002.

 

US Demands and Musharraf’s Response

The US was initially stunned by the attack on its national sovereignty on September 11. It came up with a set of demands for the Pakistan government soon after the linkages in the terrorist attack seemed to point towards the involvement of the Al-Qaeda group. These demands were received positively by President Musharraf. His decision to abandon the Taliban and offer “unstinted support” to the US was dictated by certain compulsions and involved many risks. This approach not only meant a total turnaround in Pakistan’s foreign and regional policy but could also impact President Musharraf’s ability to retain his position as the country’s ruler.

President Musharraf was forced to go along with the US because he really had no option. According to one report, the US had stated that it would feel free to attack Pakistan’s strategic facilities including its nuclear installations, if it did not get the desired reaction from Pakistan. Also, the ISI chief Lt.General Mehmood who was in the US when the terrorist strike occurred was apparently told in no uncertain terms what the US stand on the issue was. 1 This is corroborated by a report in the Washington Post, according to which Pakistan was given a list of seven demands through the visiting ISI chief General Mehmood Ahmed on September 13. Secretary of State Colin Powell, apparently rang up General Musharraf soon after the demands were handed over to ask for a response. Musharraf responded positively, knowing full well that non-compliance could have disastrous consequences. The seven demands included:

Another important factor which influenced President Musharraf’s decision was Pakistan’s expectations of an abundant economic fallout as a result of siding with the Americans. Finally, Pakistan wanted American support because of the fear of internal turbulence from right wing militants.

That a lot of thought went into this decision with its inherent risks is evident from the fact that President Musharraf consulted the other service chiefs as well as the corps commanders before making a public statement. Musharraf’s meeting with the corps commanders was an attempt at safeguarding his own position in the future, by gauging the extent of support he could muster from them. The corps commanders meeting apparently took into account Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan in the future, how the Taliban might react, and the impact that a military operation led by the US could have on the country’s policy regarding Kashmir. 3 Once Musharraf had the support of the corps commanders he went ahead and addressed the nation on radio and television on September 19, 2001 stressing that resistance to the US campaign against international terrorism would result in dire consequences for the country. He admitted that the Americans had asked for cooperation in terms of intelligence sharing on Taliban and Osama bin Laden, using Pakistani airspace, and logistical support (i.e. use of airbases). 4 The speech was made in the context of the US pressure on Pakistan to change its policy on Afghanistan. It was meant to take the Pakistani public into confidence about the need to meet the immediate crisis and to enlist their support for the same.

This statement of policy reversal caused a multitude of reactions among the mainstream political parties, the Islamic groups/parties, the liberal sections of society, elements within the army and the ISI. It would be interesting to examine the reasons behind the varying responses of these sections of Pakistani society even as President Musharraf made various attempts at moulding public opinion in his favour.

 

Attitude of Mainstream Political Parties

The response of the mainstream political parties to what has been referred as “the greatest national security challenge facing Pakistan since 1971” 5 was supportive of the military regime’s policies. They rallied around the government of the day in order to ensure a certain level of stability. There is a growing realisation within the liberal sections of Pakistani society that the law and order problems within Pakistan, which surfaced from General Zia’s time, are directly linked to Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy. Along with this was also the expectation that things might improve if Pakistan was to de-link itself from the Taliban. However, as events unfolded such noble instincts on the part of various parties could be doubted. It became apparent that each party was trying to gain maximum political mileage out of the situation, with an eye on the future elections.

Nearly all the mainstream political parties like the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), the Awami National Party (ANP), and the Muttahida Qaumi Mahaz (MQM), seemed to be in consonance with the Musharraf regime’s thinking except for the PML(N). The PPP support to the government’s policies with respect to the happenings post-September 11, seemed to be contrary to Benazir Bhutto’s earlier emphasis that politicians must define foreign policy and not the military. The political parties were criticised for not attempting to mobilise public opinion and giving passive support to the regime. However, it is believed that the parties have gained from such support as they got some respite from the regime’s actions against them. The release of Chaudhry Ahmed Mukhtar, an important leader of the PPP, on bail by the Sindh High Court is a case in point. 6

 

Response of Islamic Groups and Parties

The negative response of the Islamic groups and parties to Musharraf’s anti-Taliban, pro-US stance did not really come as a surprise. These parties realised that the tide was turning against them and they felt threatened by the government’s change in policy. These right-wing religio-political parties were used to having a special place in terms of their relationship with the army, ever since the days of General Zia, when they were the main beneficiaries of the US money which was used to raise vast armies or “holy warriors” in the fight against communism, in Afghanistan. These parties have enjoyed the support of the Pakistani establishment and have been reared as a force against the liberal and democratic elements within the country. 7 These groups which have enjoyed the support of the most powerful institution in Pakistan, the army, became perturbed in the face of their impending suppression.

In fact, as is usual for these parties, they resorted to street protests in order to register their displeasure, hoping Musharraf would take back his decision. This tactic had worked in recent times as can be seen by Musharraf’s backtracking on amending the blasphemy law, as well as the fact that the mainstream political parties were denied permission to assemble publicly, while the religious groups were allowed to hold meetings and rallies. However, the circumstances were obviously different this time and the religious groups came together under the umbrella of the Pak-Afghan Defence Council (PADC) in order to campaign against the US and the Pakistan government. 8 One reason given for the inability of these parties to garner the support of the general public and make a lasting impact, is that the parties comprising the council lacked unity in coming up with a concrete plan of action. Added to this was the fact that out of the 30 parties constituting the PADC most were “politically irrelevant”. 9 Though these organisations indulged in several violent demonstrations their campaign came to an end with the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

 

The ISI Post-September 11

The ISI has controlled the country’s policies on Afghanistan, ever since the Zia era, according to its own perception of its national interests. Over the years many commentators have accused the ISI of becoming a “state unto itself” and of functioning in a manner which was “independent of all institutional controls”. 10 By now some instances are known of the ISI manipulating political parties in order to serve their own interests in the past. In recent times, it has been alleged that even during General Musharraf’s rule, the de-weaponisation programme of the federal interior minister was deliberately hindered by the ISI, due to the feeling that it might have a negative impact on the jehadi organisations in Pakistan. 11 The ISI has been accused by former prime minister Benazir Bhutto of asking for monetary help from Osama bin Laden in order to topple her government in 1990. 12 It is believed by senior government officials that Abdul Majid and Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, top ranking nuclear scientists could not have worked for the Taliban without it being known to the ISI. 13 In the recent situation, initially Pakistan seemed to be going along with the US in changing its orientation vis-à-vis its Afghan policy. However, doubts were raised as to whether Pakistan was playing a double game in this respect. While the campaign against the Taliban continued with Pakistan’s support at one level, the US Ambassador to Pakistan raised the point that the Taliban were continuing to receive armed men and ammunition from Pakistan. 14

According to a Pakistani writer, the western media believed that the ISI was averse to sharing information with the US about the Taliban, Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network. It was also believed that that the ISI was imparting wrong information to US bombers so as to jeopardize the US military campaign in Afghanistan. However, according to the same writer, dissemination of these thoughts could have been meant to obfuscate the fact that the ISI was used as a “catalyst” to bring about a “US-UK nexus in the politics of oil pipelines in Central Asia”. He has quoted Michael Chossudovsky, a professor of economics at the University of Ottawa, who stated that the Taliban which was “backed” by the ISI had been catering to American “geopolitical interests”. The writer came to the conclusion that it would not be right to think that the ISI is no longer involved in Afghanistan, or that it was “playing a double game”. In fact he felt that the ISI had only started a new aspect of its involvement in Afghanistan. 15

Obviously it is going to be a very difficult task to get the ISI to disengage itself from, a task in which it has been involved over the years, i.e., deciding the direction that Pakistan’s foreign policy should take.

 

The Army’s Position

As the US military campaign in Afghanistan intensified, General Musharraf came under increasing onslaught not only from the religious extremists but also from people who believed that he had sold out to the Americans. In the face of increasing countrywide protests, and the call for the removal of General Musharraf by Qazi Hussain Ahmed of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), there were increasing concerns about the possibility that Musharraf might lose power. Added to this was the fear that the hardliners within the army might rise against Musharraf.

General Musharraf made sure he strengthened his position by reshuffling the army. His appointment of a new Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and creation of the post of Vice Chief of Army Staff was intended to remove discord from the higher levels of the military. On October 7, 2001 two of his most trusted lieutenants during the coup i.e., Deputy Chief of Army Staff General Muzaffar Usmani and ISI Chief General Mehmood Ahmed were removed while General Muhammed Aziz was sidelined as he was reassigned as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, considered to be a mainly ceremonial post. At the same time, other senior generals who were supporting the earlier Afghan policy and could possibly create trouble were also transferred from important command posts. These actions which were meant to clamp down on immediate or future dissent against the President, were combined with a reshuffle in the police and local administrations. 16

It is obvious that in the new context the army will have to let go its dependence on the Islamic extremists for creating an impediment to the functioning of mainstream political parties/democratic processes and for helping it to achieve the country’s foreign policy goals. While it would probably be easier for the army to do the former, only time will tell whether it will manage to achieve the latter.

 

General Musharraf’s Speech of January 12, 2002

The “Talibanisation” of Pakistani society has been an issue of concern in many quarters. The increasing number of sectarian killings in Pakistan is a pointer to this phenomenon. That the malaise has spread to gigantic proportions was evident in October 2001, when the followers of the Tehrik Nifaz Shariat-i- Mohammadi (TNSM) blocked parts of Swat, Dir and the Karakoram Highway, protesting against the US forces operating in Afghanistan. Such militant organisations do not subscribe to the writ of the state and any efforts to rein them in can be met with disastrous consequences. A recent example is that of the killing of the interior minister’s brother after the minister had laid bare his intention to curb religious extremists.

The foremost priority for the military regime was to bring the situation under control particularly with regard to law and order, as well as extremism and sectarianism. It is especially evident in the run up to the January 12 speech of General Musharraf. On January 2, 2002, a meeting of the Interprovincial Committee on Law and Order was held, presided over by the President. This meeting reportedly dealt with the issues of extremism and sectarianism extensively. 17 Severe criticism of the government’s policies in Afghanistan from various leaders of the JI, instigated by Jamaat Chief, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, led to the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) government extending Qazi’s detention on January 4, 2002, by thirty days, under section 3 (1) of the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance. 18 The government cracked down on various militant organisations like the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) responsible for internal law and order problems. Also, the chiefs of the Jaish-i-Mohammad and the Lashkar-e-Toiba, were taken into preventive custody under the Punjab Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance. These instances showcase the government’s attempts to rein in a situation which could spiral out of control. There existed the fear of a backlash from the followers of various militant organisations once the president announced strict action against them. It was due to this that a large number of activists of religious parties and militant organisations like the SSP, Sunni Tehrik (ST), Tehrik-i-Jafria Pakistan (TJP) and the Jaish-i-Mohammad were especially rounded up just before he delivered his speech.

Musharraf’s January 12, 2002 speech was made in the face of US pressure to make a strong verbal denunciation of terrorism, considering the fast escalating tension between India and Pakistan, in the aftermath of the December 13, 2001 attempted terrorist attack on the Parliament of India. This speech which outlined a step by step approach to reform the Pakistani society is a major landmark for Pakistan. 19 General Musharraf made a forthright condemnation of the exploitation of religion in Pakistani society by vested interests. He stressed the need to transform Pakistan into a modern society. Pakistan has been facing the innumerable problems identified by General Musharraf for a long time. However, except for a piecemeal response by various governments and the adoption of measures whose efficacy could be doubted, nothing substantial was done to remove these deep rooted problems by the previous governments. A contributing factor to such a limited response was obviously the various vested interests involved which would not allow such measures to be successful. At the same time, it is clear that a multi-pronged approach to the whole issue of improving society in Pakistan was never adopted. One is not sure whether such an all encompassing policy of reform would have been attempted in different circumstances, if President Musharraf had not been cornered into taking such a position.

Right after General Musharraf’s speech, the government agencies swung into action in the clampdown on various militant organisations. A large number of activists of extremist religious groups were arrested in a sweeping crackdown. It was decided that the State Bank of Pakistan would freeze the assets of such organisations. The ban on the militant organisations included by General Musharraf in his speech was notified by the interior minister under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997. Accordingly, the four provincial police departments and the Islamabad capital territory police were required to take a number of measures. These included sealing of their offices, freezing of their accounts and seizure of all of their literature etc. The names of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-i-Mohammad, SSP, TJP and TNSM were included in the notification. 20

One can assume that General Musharraf is going to be committed to his agenda of reform, considering the fact that the very survival of Pakistan is at stake. Except for the procedural factors it will not be as difficult for him to go in for this process as compared to political parties in Pakistan which have always been puppets in the hands of the army and the ISI. In that sense, the army is a highly disciplined organisation 21 which has the capacity to bring in fundamental changes in the social system. However, it will obviously be a time consuming process. Also, as religious parties and jehadi groups are deeply ingrained in Pakistan’s socio-political system, it may not be possible for General Musharraf to completely undo their influence.

These steps enumerated by General Musharraf have had a positive impact with respect to his image amongst the international community. While it is true that he has shown tremendous courage in taking such steps, it is also true that he has succeeded in completing the projection of himself as a moderate leader with progressive ideas, in the eyes of the West, something he has tried to do ever since he took over power in 1999. As such, Pakistan has gained in importance, and the West would have an interest in keeping Pakistan afloat. Also, the destabilisation in Pakistan has been a factor which has led to loss of investor confidence and lack of foreign investment. Pakistan would probably provide a much more investor friendly environment in the future.

 

Assessment

Pakistani politics has entered a new and interesting phase post-September 11. On the one hand, General Musharraf whether out of compulsion or conviction, is trying to bring in liberalisation and moderation within Pakistan. On the other hand, due to his lust for power, he is taking steps which would ensure a place for himself in the future governance of the country. As far as the nature of political change in Pakistan is concerned, the PPP has conducted negotiations with the military government intermittently. On the army’s side, it is trying to cobble together various alliances in order to keep the PPP out of power. While the government is assured of the support of the PML(LM), it is believed that the military government will go for alliances in all the provinces, relying on the support of “powerful party dissidents” like Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao, to undercut PPP’s position. Reportedly, the ISI chief General Ehsan, is involved in developing a relationship between the ANP and the government, the party having dropped out of the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD). At the same time the MQM has also moved closer to the military after quitting the ARD. 22

General Musharraf has been able to exploit the tendencies of confrontation and polarisation existing between the political parties in Pakistan for his own gains. However, whichever party allies itself with the army, it will be playing second fiddle to the army after the restoration of democracy. The credibility of the political leadership is not high. The combined opposition is not necessarily a match for the military. It is doubtful as to whether the one point agenda of restoration of democracy is enough motivation for the various political groups to act together, as can be seen by the discord within the ARD, an example being the resignation of Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan from its presidency in January 2002, though he resumed his position later. Like Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq before him, General Musharraf is destroying the political elite of Pakistan. While Nawaz Sharif is in exile, Benazir Bhutto would probably not be allowed to return to the country, which would increase Musharraf’s ability towards political manoeuvring. While several prominent leaders of both the PML(N) and the PPP are under detention, this brings to mind the absence of a second line of leadership within these parties.

Amongst the reforms President Musharraf has undertaken, a move which has been appreciated in most quarters is the reintroduction of the joint electorate system 23 , as it was envisaged in the 1973 Constitution. The system of separate electorates which was introduced by General Zia in 1985, only served to push the minorities out of mainstream politics. A decision was also taken to bar those not having done graduation from contesting elections. Another decision, which most political parties have expressed reservations about, is the appointment of Justice Irshad Hasan Khan, the former chief justice of Pakistan, as the new chief election commisioner. It has been alleged that since Justice Khan had taken oath under the Provisional Constitutional Order, his credibility was questionable. 24

Though it seems that the country will probably go ahead with the general elections in October 2002, what is certain is that Musharraf is will stay on as President. The military is going to continue to play a key role in policy-making in Pakistan. As such the country’s legal experts have been involved in an exercise to work out the required constitutional amendments so that Musharraf can stay in power. As in previous years, there is a fear that elections might be manipulated to suit the interests of the army. However, in the new circumstances it is most probable that the US is going to give up its demand for restoration of democracy in the true sense, and would not mind Musharraf continuing in power as long as he is able to deliver on his promises to convert Pakistan into a moderate state, and pushes American interests in the region.

 

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Prof. Kalim Bahadur and Shri T. Sreedhara Rao for their valuable comments and suggestions.

 


Endnotes

Note *:   Ms. Sumita Kumar is a Research Officer at IDSA. She specialises on South Asian security issues with special focus on Pakistan. She has published a number of articles on aspects concerning Pakistan’s internal security and foreign policy. Back.

Note 1:   Abbas Zaffar, Pakistan’s Great Gamble. The Herald. October 2001, 32 (10) 22. Back.

Note 2:   Washington Post report as reproduced in Dawn. Pakistan Had Little Choice On US Demands: Paper. Dawn. Karachi. January 30, 2002. For original see, Dan Baltz, Bob Woodward and Jeff Himmelman, Washington Post, January 29, 2002. Back.

Note 3:   Abbas Zaffar, no. 1. Back.

Note 4:   Abbas Zaffar,no.1, p.21. Back.

Note 5:   Hasan Syed Ali Dayan, No Pain No Gain. The Herald. November 2001, 32 (11) 48c. Back.

Note 6:   Ibid. Back.

Note 7:   However, it is to be noted that Islamist parties have never really done well in terms of votes in the General Elections in Pakistan. Back.

Note 8:   The hostility against General Musharraf is evident in a statement by Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, chairman of the PADC. He stated that, “Musharraf should step down and be sent into exile, and the Pakistan army and the people of Pakistan should take over the government.” The hatred and anger against the US was expressed by the murder of 18 Christians in a church in Bahawalpur, in October 2001. See Hussain Zahid, The War Comes Home. Newsline. November 2001, 12 (5) 24, 26. Also see Brig. (retd.) A.R. Siddiqui in Nation. Islamabad. November14, 2001. He states that the Bahawalpur episode “reaffirms Pakistan’s image as a country threatened with instability.” Back.

Note 9:   Bakhtiar Idrees, Losing Steam. The Herald. October 2001,32(10)30.There are different numbers given for the parties comprising the PADC. Another figure given is 22. See Hussain Zahid , Ibid, p.26. According to Salman Hussein, political differences combined with differences over the “strategy and approach of the movement” prevented the PADC from being successful. For an insight by the commentator see Friday Times. Lahore. November 16-22, 2001. Back.

Note 10:   Khan Aamer Ahmed,The End of Jihad. The Herald. December 2001, 32 (12) 20. Back.

Note 11:   Ibid., p.21. Back.

Note 12:   Ibid. Back.

Note 13:   Ibid. Back.

Note 14:   It is believed that the DG ISI General Mahmood Ahmed was removed from his post due to the fact that the ISI continued to pursue its pro-Taliban policy in Afghanistan post September 11. See Khan Aamer Ahmed, p.21. Back.

Note 15:   Khan M.Ilyas, The ISI-Taliban Nexus. The Herald. November 2001, 32 (11) 26. Back.

Note 16:   Abbas Zaffar, Home Truths. The Herald. November 2001, 32(11)44-45. For more details on the reshuffle within the army see Hussain Zahid, General Shuffle. Newsline. October 2001, 12 (4) 24. It is interesting to note that General Muhammed Yousuf, supposed to be liberal in outlook was assigned to the new post of Vice Chief of Army Staff. See Hussain Zahid, Dangerous Liaisons?. Newsline. October 2001, 12(4),27. For an interesting analysis on the functioning of the JCSC see article by Ayesha Siddiqa Agha. Friday Times.Lahore. December 14-20, 2001. Back.

Note 17:   Islamabad Hopes Peace Moves Will Prevail: Any Aggression To Be Repelled. Dawn. Karachi. January 3, 2002. Back.

Note 18:   JI Chief’s Detention Extended By 30 Days. Dawn. Karachi. January 5, 2002. Back.

Note 19:   For text of President Pervez Musharraf’s address to the nation on January12, 2002 see www.pak.gov.pk/public/President_address.htm Back.

Note 20:   Ban On Five Outfits Notified. Dawn. Karachi. January16, 2002. Back.

Note 21:   For more on this aspect of the army see Lieven Anatol, The Pressures on Pakistan. Foreign Affairs. January/February 2002, 81 (1). Back.

Note 22:   Zaidi Mubashir, Moving the Goalposts. The Herald. January 2002, 33 (1) 63. Back.

Note 23:   For details on electoral reforms see The News. Islamabad. January17, 2002. Back.

Note 24:   Amjad Mahmood, New CEC Seen As Controversial: PPP Welcomes Appointment. Dawn. Karachi. January16, 2002. Back.