Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA

Apr-Jun 2002 (Vol. XXVI No. 2)

 

Economic Dimension of the Strategic Nuclear Triad
P.K. Ghosh ^* , Research Fellow, IDSA

 

Abstract

Nuclear weapons and their delivery platforms are expensive propositions. Since their acquisition, Nuclear Weapon/Capable States have spent billions of dollars in the development and production of their delivery platforms. Unfortunately, in all such countries the detailed cost of their nuclear spending and budget estimates is usually classified information. A detailed study of the amount of money spent on the developmental, hidden and sunk costs for acquisition of such weapons and their delivery platforms has probably never been carried out.

Presently, irrespective of the economic capability of the countries involved, there exists a concerted effort to try and reduce this expenditure without compromising seriously on deterrence capability. The conventional Cold War mindset of having large nuclear arsenals for “massive retaliation” has given way to a more rational, smaller, technologically advanced arsenal amongst all the NWS. In doing so, most of the NWS have tended to shift to the more survivable legs of the triad. The shift towards the dad or even the overwhelming dependence on the single sea-based deterrence leg of the triad has been mainly because of economic concerns and efforts to reduce nuclear expenditure against the background of the altered post Cold War threat perception. This explains the requirement of placing the “burden of maintenance of deterrence” on the more survivable sea-based leg of the strategic triad, even though this leg is the most expensive and technologically difficult one to maintain.

 

Nuclear weapons and their delivery platforms are hugely expensive propositions. Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and the nuclear capable states have spent untold billions of dollars in the development, production and building/ procurement of their delivery platforms. Unfortunately, in all the countries concerned, detailed cost of their nuclear spending and budget estimates are the highly classified information. Indeed, research for this paper revealed that many of the countries have not even carried out the complex task of having a detailed cost estimate. The amount of money spent on the developmental, hidden and sunk costs for acquisition and production of such weapons and their delivery platforms will probably never be known. Rather, in almost all the countries, the required money has been spent under various heads. Even if an exhaustive and complex exercise had been carried out in any of these countries on the cost of nuclear arsenals, its report has remained hidden from the public eye guarded under the veil of secrecy. ¹

This paper attempts to explore the economic dimension of nuclear weapons, mainly the costs associated with the acquisition and maintenance of strategic delivery platforms for nuclear weapons.

 

United States

The US has been handling nuclear weapons since the 1940s. Being a super power (hyper power as has been referred to these days) with an avowed policy of practising extended deterrence, nuclear weapons form the most important part of its deterrence philosophy. Earlier, the Cold War had seen both the super powers amassing vast nuclear arsenals that truly signified the then-prevalent MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) philosophy.

While very little is known about how much the Soviet Union poured into its nuclear programme or in the acquisition of the associated delivery platforms, the US spent nearly $5.5 trillion (in 1996 dollar terms) since the 1940s. Of this $409.4 billion or 7% was spent on building nuclear weapons, $3241 billion or 55.7% was spent on deploying these weapons and $831.1 billion were spent for command and control purposes. (Complete breakdown is shown in fig. 1)

Despite the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 1994, the frequent debates on arms control, a revision of the nature of deterrence and arms reduction treaties like START, both the US and the Russians continue to hold vast nuclear stockpiles of around 6,000 strategic warheads each. Under present conditions, this costs the US government nearly $25 billion yearly (in 1998-dollar terms) for operation, maintenance and upkeep of these weapons. An additional $10 billion is spent towards their storage, and associated programmes concerning environmental remediation and waste management, arms reduction measures and storage and disposal of excess fissile material. Despite such vast spending, experts such as Stephen Schwartz argue that the US government and its officials do not have a clear idea of the enormity of the costs, past or present, mainly because they have never attempted to track these costs. ²

The US spent a total of nearly $3.2 trillion (at 1996-dollar prices) towards offensive nuclear delivery systems, the focus of this article. About 61.1% of this cost or nearly $1,980 billion was spent on strategic offensive nuclear platforms.

The US purchased 3,160 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and 2,975 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) at a cost of about $266 billion. It spent a further $227 billion to acquire 4,700 strategic bombers and another $123 billion to retrofit 59 ballistic missile submarines. This just represents the tip of the iceberg in a summarized form, because if one were to include all direct and indirect costs, one would get the figure of $1.98 trillion stated earlier. ⁴

Like any other weapon system, to be effective, these weapons and their delivery platforms, once operational, require costly maintenance for upkeep. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated the annual Operational and Support (O&S) costs for a number of strategic delivery platforms currently in the US arsenal. The individual services have also evaluated such costs and both have been tabulated below.

Table-1: Annual O&S costs of selected platforms ⁵

Type of Delivery Platform	O&S Costs/ year (CBO Estimates)	O&S Costs/ year Service Estimates)
Minuteman Missile	$1.6 million/ missile	$427,000/ missile(for Minuteman III)
MX Missile	$2.9 million/ missile	$1.96 million/ missile
B- 52 Bomber	$11.4 million/aircraft	$3.3 million/aircraft
B 1B Bomber	$16.1 million/aircraft	$5 million / aircraft
Trident Submarine	$49.5 million/boat	$24 million (excluding missile and other infrastructural costs)

According to the Department of Defense (DoD), the direct total costs of equipping and operating the following squadrons of delivery platforms from 1962-95 are: for squadrons, ICBM $142 billion (which includes $101.6 billion for Minuteman squadrons and $12.4 billion for MX squadrons); for Trident I SLBM squadrom, around about $83 billion; and for the strategic bomber squadrons $171 billion this includes $93.5 billion for B-52 squadrons, $40 billion for B-1B6 squadrons and $16.8 for B-2A squadrons). ⁷

 

Strategic Bombers

It is important to take a brief look at the various strategic bombers that are being maintained by the US for forming the air leg of the strategic nuclear triad.

B-52 Stratofortress

The B-52s were introduced into the US Air Force in June 1955. Equipped with eight engines, this aircraft has proved itself the most durable with many still in service. Boeing built about 744 bombers at a total acquisition cost of $32 billion. According to the recommendations of the NPR 1994, sixty-six B-52Hs were to be retained but the air force has decided to retain 71 of them and they are expected to be “structurally sound” until 2030. ⁸

B-2A Spirit

The B-2A is the latest strategic bombers in the US inventory. Nicknamed the ‘Stealth Bomber’ the aircraft is almost invisible to radar detection. It was only in 1980 that the DoD revealed the existence of the programme to develop such an advanced stealth bomber. Originally the Air Force had scheduled to purchase 132 of these bombers but, in 1992, budgetary constraints forced the Bush Administration to reduce the procurement to only 20 aircraft. The conversion of an earlier test model to an operational one cost the Clinton Administration a phenomenal half-a-billion dollars, thus raising the strength of the fleet to 21. ⁹ The acquisition costs of the B-2A totaled $45 billion ($54.5 billion in 1996 dollar terms) that included $24 billion towards R&D and $20 billion for the procurement programme, making it the most expensive bomber programme in terms of its total development, procurement and its unit costs. ¹⁰

According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), the B-2A will be the most expensive aircraft to operate at $31.9 million annually on a per aircraft basis. This is three times as much as a B-1B ($9.6 million annually) and four times as much as a B-52H ($6.8 million annually).

Though the first three B-2As were delivered to the Air Force in 1994, they were incorporated into the nuclear war plan, the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) only in, 1997.

 

Land Based Strategic Missiles

The US has had ballistic missiles programmes that date back to the World War II period. The current trends and the approximate numbers of different types of Land-Based Strategic Missiles in the US arsenal has been discussed at some length in a previous paper. ¹¹ In this paper, their cost aspects will be the focus.

The Minuteman Missiles

All the types of Minuteman I, II, and III missiles are placed in hardened silos that are dispersed over seven states covering North Dakota, Montana, South Dakota, Missouri, Nebraska, Wyoming, and Colorado. Buried 120ft below ground under a 110ton concrete door about 1000 silos and 100 LCCs were built at a cost of $3.8 million/ silo. Manned round the clock by Air Force launch control officers, the acquisition cost of all the missiles varies between $32,110 and $28,140 million (in 1996-dollar terms; details given in Table-2)

The programme to upgrade and modernise these missiles continues. The first part of the programme involves introduction of Rapid Execution And Combat Targeting (REACT) consoles that allow for rapid and flexible retargeting of individual missiles and the entire force. This part of the programme cost nearly $632 million. ¹²

MX/Peacekeeper:

Introduced in service in 1986, this missile is already being phased out slowly in favour of the Minuteman III missiles. The acquisition costs of all the missiles was about $19,320 million (in 1996 dollar terms).

 

Submarines and Sea Based Strategic Ballistic Missiles

Since the 1960s, the US Navy has had three classes of SSBNs and four SLBMs. The initial Polaris A-1 with limited range was replaced with the A-2s and then with the multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV) A-3. ¹³ With the coming of the MIRVed Poseidon SLBMs in 1971, the capabilities took a quantum jump and in the next five years the number of SSBN warheads increased from 1,500 to 5,500. Between 1979 and 1982, 12 Polaris SSBNs were retrofitted to receive the Trident I that also armed the first eight Ohio class SSBNs that were deployed at the Bangor Naval Base on the Pacific.

As a result of the NPR 1994, four of these were to be retrofitted to carry the Trident II. ¹⁴

Between 1956 and 1967, the Polaris programme with 41 submarines and 5000+ Polaris missiles cost the US nearly $64 billion. ¹⁵ That accounted for nearly 8 to 10% of the naval budget between 1956 and 1964. It is pertinent to mention that between the period 1962-95 the total cost of SSBNs, including weapon systems, the Trident I and II, came to $256 billion.

Table-2: Some US Nuclear Ballistic Strategic Missiles*

Missile	Service	In Service	Number Produced	Warhead	Acquisition Costs in Million $ On procurement then	Acquisition Costs in Million $ In 1996
ICBMs
Minuteman II LGM- 30F	Air Force	1966-91	668	W56	4,855	24,550
Minuteman III LGM-30G	Air Force	1970-	840	W62, W78	6,724	28,140
Titan II LGM-25C	Air Force	1963-87	127	W53	2,170	12,750
MX LGM118-A	Air Force	1986-	102	W87	15,909	19,320
SLBMs
Poseidon C-3 UGM-73A	Navy	1971-91	640	W68	3,542	13,940
Trident I C-4/ UGM-96A	Navy	1979-	595	W76	10,915	22,270
Trident II D-5 / UGM-133A	Navy	1990-	462	W88	22,480	30,120

Source: “Atomic Audit: The Cost and Consequences of US Nuclear Weapons Since 1940 “, Ed Stephen I Schwartz.
* This table contains details of only some selected missiles that are contemporary and were recently in service or are still in active service.

 

Then again the acquisition cost of the 18 Ohio class between 1974 and 1991 was nearly $34.8 billion or 14% of the total sum. In addition, the O&S costs of each Ohio class has been worked out to be $59.5 million/year or roughly about $1 billion annually for the 18 Ohio submarines in the fleet.

Between 1967 and 1986, in addition to all the costs above, a sum of $572.7 million was spent on introducing ‘silent technologies’ or reducing the self radiated noise in the nuclear submarines. ¹⁶ Thus, approximately $320.5 billion was spent on the programmes associated with SSBNs. ¹⁷

 

Britain

Britain conducted its first nuclear test on October 3 1952. But, over the years it has steadily reduced the legs of its strategic nuclear triad. In 1963, it eliminated the land based missile leg of the triad and then steadily reduced the bomber leg of the triad. This later was indicated by the reduction in the numbers of dual-capable Tornado, after the last of the 27 Buccaneer aircraft were retired in 1994. ¹⁸

The decision of the British MoD to cancel the prestigious nuclear Tactical Air to Surface Missile (TASM) programme in October 1993 was a major milestone in this direction. This cancellation was necessitated by the changed threat perception in the post Cold War era and most importantly by the economics of incurring such high costs for procurement of a new nuclear delivery system against the background of the new conditions.

The most important milestone in this direction came in July 1998 with the Strategic Defence Review (SDR). The SDR amongst other things, mooted an “effective and credible minimum nuclear deterrence” based entirely on the new Trident missile-equipped submarine force ¹⁹ and would maintain fewer than 200 operational warheads. The decision to purchase 58 Trident D-5s instead of 65 was also announced at this time. Thus the nuclear deterrence responsibility fell entirely on the Vanguard class of submarine that were designed to carry 16 US produced D-5s.

In 1990, it was estimated that the Trident programme would cost the British $15.451 billion or 9.089 billion pounds, ²⁰ with 32 per cent of the amount or $4.969 billion being incurred in the US. Most of this money was being spent through the US Navy’s Strategic Systems Program Office (SSPO) as had been in the case of the Polaris earlier. It has now been estimated that the entire Trident programme cost the British nearly $18.8 billion. ²¹

To get an idea as to what might possibly be the operating costs of the advanced Vanguard class of submarines, it is first necessary to get an overview of the operating costs of the earlier Polaris fleet of submarines.

The British spent 470 million pounds in 1981-82 for operating the Polaris (Resolution) class, while they spent 472 million pounds in 1982-83 towards the same task. By 1993-94, with the introduction of the Vanguard class and the decommissioning of HMS Resolution, the operating cost of the submarines came down to 107 million pounds. With only two submarines operating, the operational costs came down to 67 million pounds in 1994-95. Finally in 1995-96 the costs stood at 63 million pounds. It was during 1996 that the operational chapter of this class of submarines was closed with the decommissioning of HMS Renown and the retiring of HMS Repulse. However, another 71 million pounds (at 1996-97 rates) is expected to be used over the next ten years for de-fuelling, de-equipping and laying up of these submarines until they are scrapped. The final cost of disposal is yet to be estimated. In addition, a sum of 8 million pounds has already been used to decommission/ scrap the Polaris missiles (excluding the warheads) in the British arsenal. ²²

The SDR 98 had estimated that the Vanguard would cost approximately 277 million pounds annually to operate. This estimate is considered low and is probably understated, keeping in view that the operating cost of the older Resolution class was on an average 400 million pounds per year between 1989-91.

The cost of the associated nuclear weapons programme has been estimated by the SDR to be 410 million pounds in 1997-98, while the conventional forces committed to protecting the Trident class (if they were to be included) cost 308 million pounds. Any major modification to the Vanguard class either to lengthen its life cycle or to upgrade it within its designed 26 years of life would entail at least an additional 30 million pounds. ²³

Table-3: Table of Estimated Operating Costs

System	Year	Estimated Cost in Million Pounds sterling/ year
Polaris Submarines	1981-1990	400 on an average
Trident Submarines	—	277
Trident Submarines associated Nuclear Warhead Programme	1997-98	410

It is also important to note that the British have been taking numerous other steps to reduce nuclear costs without compromising on efficiency or security. The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), looking after the upkeep of nuclear weapons, is now being managed by an industrial consortium consisting of Lockheed Martin, Serco Limited and British Nuclear Fuels under a ten year contract worth 2.2 billion pounds.

 

France

Though the French nuclear research programme commenced before World War II, the French tested their first nuclear device only in 1960. Their nuclear arsenal was largely an independent venture, a legacy of De Gaulle’s insistence on strategic independence. It is often stated that the weapons bestowed the French with the leverage within the Alliance that would have been otherwise denied due to their economic weakness. ²⁴

Most of the nuclear testing that the French carried out was entirely overseas (Algeria and Muroroa) and hence the expenditures involved (the details of which are unavailable) must have been considerable. Amongst the smaller nuclear powers, France was the country with a fairly well developed nuclear triad and according to an estimate, a nuclear arsenal that was the third largest in the world.

In February 1996 President Chirac announced far-reaching changes and paring down of the armed and the nuclear forces. The reasons for the decision lay in the end of the Cold War, the reduced threat perception and the ever-increasing economic burden of maintaining the nuclear forces.

For 30 years, the French had been spending nearly 30% of their defence procurement budget on nuclear weapons with a peak spending of a phenomenal 51% during 1967. ²⁵ In 1960, the French spent 3% of the total defence budget on nuclear weapons that rose to 18% in 1970, came to 14% in 1980 and was 17% in 1990. More recently, the actual expenditures dropped from about $6.9 billion (Fr 35.8 billion) in 1990 to about $2.7 billion (Fr 16.3 billion) in 1998 and has stabilized at around 20% of the total defence budget. ²⁶

The strain or excessive spending led the government to announce the decision to eliminate the land based deterrence by destroying the 30 sub-strategic Hades and retiring the intermediate range S3D missiles without replacement. Thus, on September 16, 1996 all 18 IRBM missiles at the Plateau d’Albion, in South West of France, which, had been operational since 1971, were deactivated. Two years and $77.5 million later, the one-megaton warheads had been removed along with the silos and the complex was dismantled. ²⁷

In July 1996, after finishing 32 years of service, the Mirage IVP relinquished its nuclear role. All the aircrafts have been retired except for five belonging to the “Gascogne” squadron at Mont de Marsan that have been designated for reconnaissance roles.

Three squadrons of Mirage 2000N have now assumed the “strategic” role. The future of this leg rests heavily on the multi purpose fighter-bomber Rafale. The Rafale D is expected to have a nuclear strike role and carry the nuclear tipped Air Sol Longue Portee (ASLP) missiles with a range of 1500 km. Amongst numerous uncertainties, the price of 60 of these missiles is expected to be more than 20 billion francs, excluding the price of the Rafale aircraft that would bring the price to 37 billion francs. ²⁸

The French lay maximum stress on the sea leg of their diad and as such, the strategic submarine force represents nearly four fifths of their nuclear arsenal. Their new strategic submarine programme originally called for six new submarines SNLE-LG (sous-marins nucleaires lanceurs d’engins de nouvelle generation) which were reduced to three due to budgetary constraints. In February 1996 President Chirac confirmed that four will be produced and that a new SLBM M51 will replace the M45 carried presently by 2008/2010. This is likely to equip the fourth submarine as and when it is commissioned around 2005 with the SLBM entering service in 2010.

Bruno Barrillot had undertaken a comprehensive study of the costs with the hypothesis that France will arm the SNLE-NG with M45 missiles or proceed to build and deploy the M5 . The total announced estimated cost of the boats alone ranged from 70 billion francs (1983) to 81.5 billion francs (1991). The cost of a set of sixteen M 45 missiles was estimated to be 9 billion francs with a minimum requirement of three such sets existing for the four boats. Thus, the total cost of four boats equipped with three sets of M 45 missiles would roughly be 108 billion francs. ²⁹

On the other hand, a report released by the French defence ministry in 1999 detailed the cost of the submarine programme. According to the report, the total acquisition costs of the entire submarine programme is estimated to be $9 billion (45 billion francs) not including the cost of the nuclear warheads. The report also estimated that it would cost nearly $20 billion (100 billion francs) to maintain these submarines and the associated weapons for the next 30 years. ³⁰

In an effort to economise on the overall expenditure on nuclear submarines the French have recently reorganised the bases for SSBNs and the SSNs. The SSBNs at lle-Longue and SSNs at Toulon will all be based at Brest. The SSBN command at Houilles (Yvelines) will be shut down and the command shifted to Brest.

 

Russia

Being the direct heir of the powerful erstwhile USSR that at one time held a phenomenal 33,000 nuclear warheads, it is but natural to expect that that there would be varied and detailed information on Russian nuclear expenditures. Unfortunately, details on this aspect are mostly unavailable and at odd times too hazy to be included in an article such as this. The reasons for this are many, the central one being the political and the heavily militarised economic system that the Soviets followed provided no way to accurately measure these costs. This is despite the issue of defence spending being at the heart of civil military relations, throughout Soviet history.

As Clifford Gaddy writes “detailed discussions by Soviet leaders on trade-offs between civil and military spending or the burden imposed by the military were simply not possible . . . because of the fundamental belief that it was immoral and unpatriotic to question the absolute priority of the motherland, the very idea of calculating the costs of defence was implicitly suspect. As a result, much of the data relating to the defence industry were not even collected and when they were, they were not shared with the civilian planners and policy makers.” ³¹

Though it is generally assumed that presently the Russian Federation spends about 17% of its military budget on the military-nuclear complex, such conditions that make it virtually impossible to comprehend and assess the historical or current costs of the nuclear weapons programme. Despite the cataclysmic changes that have occurred in the region with the evolution of democratic Russia, old mindsets persists to a large extent on nuclear related issues. Thus, the recent political changes have not really opened the floodgates of information as very little substantial new information has been obtained about the nuclear weapons-producing complex even after the emergence of the democracy Government in Russia.

 

China

The case of China is unique in many respects. The only other non-market economy (that is undergoing a definite change towards a market economy), its nuclear expenditure costs (if they have ever been calculated) are shrouded in a thick veil of secrecy. However it has been estimated that their effort to just build the nuclear bomb itself cost around $26 billion after proceeding with the programme with utmost caution and studying the US, British and Soviet programmes carefully. ³²

According to most analysts even its announced total military expenditures are considered to be the incorrect representation of their actual military spending since in addition to the official defence budget there are two other sources of military expenditure. These include defence-related outlays in other budgetary categories and the extra- budgetary revenues of the PLA. ³³ Hence deducing the expenditures involving the research/ production/ operating costs of nuclear delivery platforms is a herculean task. However it is generally believed that in terms of figures, the Chinese spend about 5% of their military budget on ballistic missiles, while 28% of the budget is spent on military research and development. ³⁴ These figures are however expected to rise, especially if China decides to qualitatively and quantitatively increase its nuclear arsenal due to the deployment of US missile defence shield.

 

India

India’s nuclear weapons programmes and expenditures have always been shrouded in secrecy. Hence it is difficult to try and gauge the amount of money being spent on development and procurement of the triad of nuclear delivery platforms as no officially released data exists that could help for benchmarking purposes or for providing a guiding light on the issue. In the absence of official data and to continue with the research and arrive at an approximate analysis, “extrapolatory interpretive method” has been used to a certain extent. In the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests and the promulgation of the draft nuclear doctrine by the NSAB, there appeared a deluge of secondary material in the media that obsessively sought to quantify the “minimum credible deterrence” and calculate the costs of weaponisation thereof. While there existed widely varying figures in respect of the “minimum credible nuclear deterrence” issue, surprisingly the unit cost estimates worked out for individual delivery platforms was within a fairly narrow bandwidth. This gave one the confidence to extrapolate these figures and ‘assume’ that these are the correct interpretation of approximate actual figures. While the thrust in this article until now has been on the expenditures that have already been incurred in the context of the present nuclear arsenal of a particular country, in this section the accent shifts to the expenditures that are likely to be incurred by India in future. Admittedly this methodology is unlikely to provide the precise figures of expenditure incurred or provide any clue as to the enormity of associated hidden costs, but will probably help in the overall analysis of the situation in the absence of any concrete data.

Soon after the nuclear tests, Dr. P K Iyengar, the former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), in an effort to rebut the growing perception that the nuclear blasts were expensive propositions, stated that the price of a nuclear warhead was “less than one crore” (rupees). The former Chief of Army Staff, Gen. K Sunderji, however, chose to put the figure at Rs 4 crore. ³⁵

Gen. Sunderji actually headed a task force that assessed the cost of a “balanced minimum deterrence” at Rs. 7000 crores over 10 years (at 1985 prices and hence at 1998 prices would have worked out to Rs.11500 crores approximately). K Subrahmanyam, on the other hand, had (in 1994) assessed the same costs to be around Rs,5,000 crores. Unfortunately, no details of forces, or breakdown of costs had been made public for closer scrutiny in the case of Gen Sunderji’s study. ³⁶ However in the latter exercise, the estimated total cost of weaponising a minimum deterrence (that included production costs of 20 Prithvis and 20 Agnis, their deployment costs in mobile mode, fabrication of 60 warheads and a command and control system) would be around 10,000 crores at 1994 costs. ³⁷

Maroof Raza, writing in the Indian Defence Review, suggested that three early warning satellites would cost Rs. 10,500 crores while the same number of photo intelligence satellites would cost Rs. 7,500 crores. Four nuclear submarines would be Rs. 16,000 crores at Rs. 4,000 crores apiece. Sixty Agnis would cost the Government Rs.1,200 (at Rs.20 crores a piece) crores and 40 Prithvis (at Rs. 8 crores a piece) would incur a total price of Rs.320 crores. After adjusting the cost of warheads at Rs. 240 crores and other costs he came to the total expenditure of Rs. 45,000 crores spread over 10 years ³⁸ as the price of minimum nuclear deterrent for India.

On the other hand, R Ramachandran, a science writer, estimated that the cost of nuclear weaponisation over a 10 year period would be around Rs 5,000 crores only. He visualised 60 warheads at Rs 300 crores, 20 Agnis at Rs 20 crores a piece (Rs 400 crores), 20 Prithvis at Rs 4 crores apiece (Rs 80 crores), a squadron of upgraded Su- 30 at Rs.200 crores, a C3 system for Rs 1,000 crores, while a satellite surveillance system with three satellites would be Rs 1,400 crores. ³⁹

Bharat Karnad, in a comprehensive cost assessment of thermo nuclear forces required by 2030, advocated a 30 year programme costing Rs 60,680 crores. He estimated that the unit costs of an ICBM would be Rs 40 crores each (numbers required 25) and those of an IRBM to be Rs 35 crores each (numbers required 40). Further, an SSBN would cost Rs 5,000 crores (numbers required 4) with the accompanying SLBM costing Rs.50 crore each (requirement 48). Each nuclear capable Su-30 MKI would cost Rs 150 crore (numbers required 70) and the accompanying nuclear tipped ASM would be in the price range of Rs 25 crore per piece (numbers required 70). With an advanced command and control system (C4I2) costing around Rs 15,480 crores, the silos and infrastructure is expected to cost around Rs 5,000 crores. ⁴⁰

Brigadier V.K. Nair, who in 1992 also attempted to quantify the requirement of the Indian nuclear arsenal worked out the unit price of US warhead production, converted it to Indian Rupees (at 1992 exchange rates) and directly applied a 50% margin increase for an arsenal of 132 warheads. The reason why he chose the 50% margin increase or the precise number of nuclear delivery platforms/ arsenal that he assumed is the requirement, remains unclear. He had assessed the cost of an IRBM/SRBM to be around Rs 8 crores while that of an SLBM to be around Rs 10 crores each, the total cost of their production (Rs 6835 crores) to be spread over 15 years. ⁴¹

Dr. Subramaniam Swamy who was one of the earliest analysts to estimate the costs of a credible Indian nuclear weapons programme in the late sixties, estimated that a nuclear tipped IRBM of 2000 miles range would cost around Rs. 4.5 crores. With an arsenal of hundred such IRBMs costing 450 crores, along with other expenditures and with Rs 300 crores being spent on research and development of ICBMs, he forecast a total outlay of Rs 750 crores to be spent over a period of five years. The yearly expenditure of around Rs 150 crores being well within the budgetary allocation even at that time. ⁴²

Thus, we see that many analysts have forwarded their widely varying “wish list” for a credible minimum nuclear deterrence based on their own threat perceptions and analysis, costing varying amounts of money. However a closer analysis reveals that while the total sums have been at variance, the essential unit price of the various delivery platforms in recent estimations, have essentially remained within a small bandwidth of variability. This is except in the case of command and control structures where the wide variations of costing are due to the associated complexity required for such a system.

Hence we see that while the unit cost of a Prithvi is about Rs. 8 crores, an Agni costs about Rs. 20 to 22 crores. The ICBMs, when developed, would probably cost around Rs 40-50 crores each. On the air leg of the triad, a nuclear capable Su 30 MKI costs about Rs 150 crores each and these would have to be equipped with nuclear tipped ASMs costing Rs 25 crores apiece. The most expensive delivery platform would undoubtedly remain the sea-based leg of the strategic triad that would cost about Rs 4000 crores each. The SLBMs required to equip these nuclear submarines would require another Rs 50 crores apiece.

All these costs would necessarily be “up front” and would neither have all the hidden costs associated with them nor have various “sunk” costs that would be difficult to calculate in the absence of official figures.

 

Analytical Remarks

The analysis from the available material on the economic aspects of the current nuclear arsenals in NWS and some nuclear capable states leads to some broad observations:

1. Though tomes have been written on various aspects of nuclear deterrence, the reducing sizes and enhanced capabilities of nuclear arsenals around the world, negligible material is available on the economic aspects of the strategic nuclear triad. The reason for this is not only because most of the states have excessive secrecy surrounding all aspects of their nuclear programmes but also because, such a study of estimates, in all probability, would not have been carried out in detail (except in the case of US). The mindset of socialist economies in this regard is revealing, in that it was considered “unpatriotic” to question the enormous spending on nuclear arsenal.

2. With the thick veil of secrecy surrounding expenditures towards production/maintenance of nuclear arsenals there is bound to be a reducing sense of accountability on such matters-as observed by Stephen Schwartz in his exhaustive study with regards to the US.

3. Nuclear weapons are exceptionally expensive to produce, maintain and upgrade. Irrespective of the economic capability of the countries involved, there exists a concerted effort to try and reduce this expenditure without compromising seriously on the deterrence capability. The Cold War conventional mindset of having large nuclear arsenals for “massive retaliation” has given way to a more rational, smaller, technologically advanced arsenal amongst all the NWS (except for China- to an extent). In this respect, there exists a trend amongst most of the NWS to shift to a more survivable forms of the triad and hence there exists a perceptible shift from maintenance of a classical triad to that of a Diad or a single leg with France and Britain proving to be the leading examples. ⁴³

4. The shift towards the dyad or the overwhelming dependence on the single sea based deterrence leg of the triad has been mainly because of economic concerns and efforts to reduce nuclear expenditure against the background of a post Cold War reduced (altered) threat perception. Hence the requirement of placing the “burden of maintenance of deterrence” on the more survivable sea based leg of the strategic triad even though this leg is the most expensive and technologically difficult to maintain.

5. Even a superficial look at the data above reveals that out of all the three legs of the strategic nuclear triad, the sea based leg is the most expensive to produce and maintain, while also being technologically difficult to master. The land-based missile leg is the cheapest with the air-based platforms coming a close second. However despite this, the tendency of the NWS to place an overwhelming dependence on the sea leg or go in for the Diad can be explained on two factors. Firstly the survivability factor that ensures an assured second-strike capability. Second, the stealth factor that ensures that the movements of a submerged submarine at high seas are extremely difficult to track, given the present technological conditions ⁴⁴ and the inability of present generation satellites or deep sea based acoustic systems to effectively track them at high seas.

 

Conclusion

There is a thick veil of secrecy that surrounds expenditures on nuclear weapons programmes throughout the world and this has prompted very few studies in this direction.

Nuclear weapons being exceptionally expensive to produce and maintain has prompted the NWS (except China) to seek ways and means of curtailing the vast nuclear arsenals without seriously compromising on the deterrence aspects. Hence there exists a tendency to shift to the dyad or a single leg of the triad.

The sea-based leg of the strategic nuclear triad is by far the most expensive and difficult to produce and maintain. Despite this aspect, there exists a trend to place an overwhelming dependence on this leg, primarily because of its associated stealth characteristics and its assured second-strike capability in case of a nuclear attack.

 

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Endnotes

Note *:   Commander P.K. Ghosh is a Research Fellow at IDSA. He specialises in the fields of the Nuclear Triad, the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) System and Maritime Security. He has written extensively and has presented research papers at many international and national fora on these subjects. Back.

Note 1:   It is probably only in the case of US that a detailed study has been carried out, and the results published, on the cost estimate of the nuclear weapons. A team led by Stephen I Schwartz carried out a detailed four-year long study of the cost of US nuclear weapons. The findings were published in Stephen I Schwarte (Ed), Atomic Audit: The Cost and Consequences of US Nuclear Weapons Since 1940. 1998. Brooking Institution Press; Washington DC. Back.

Note 2:   Ibid., pp. 2, 31. Back.

Note 3:   Ibid., p. 3. Back.

Note 4:   Ibid., pp. 105-107. Back.

Note 5:   US Congressional Budget Office, The START Treaty and Beyond. 1991. GPO. p. 140 and Ibid. p.108. The CBO values have been converted to 1996-dollar terms for consistency. It must be noted that the O&S costs data produced by the Air Force and the Navy are consistently lower than the ones produced by the CBO. This reveals the inconsistency in evaluation and that no definitive measure exists for such estimation. Back.

Note 6:   The B-1B strategic bombers have been removed from strategic war plans and converted to a conventional role. Back.

Note 7:   Stephen Schwartz, no. 2, p. 108. Back.

Note 8:   General Accounting Office, “Airforce Bombers: Options to Retire or Restructure the Force would Reduce Planned Spending”, NSIAD-96-192. September 1996. pp. 2, 31. Back.

Note 9:   Bradley Graham , “US to Add one B-2 to 20 Plane Fleet”. Washington Post. Washington. March 22 1996, p. A20. Back.

Note 10:   Stephen Schwartz, no. 2, pp.121-122. It is interesting to note that a B-2A bomber as on January 30, 1998 was worth more than five times its weight in gold ! This is taking into account that gold prices were $300 a troy ounce or $3,600 a troy pound. With an empty B-2A weighing 134,146 troy pounds thus its equivalent price of gold would have only cost $482.9 million. Back.

Note 11:   See P K Ghosh, “Emerging Trends In the Nuclear Triad”. Strategic Analysis. May 2001, 25 (2). Back.

Note 12:   William M Arkin, “The Six Hundred Million Dollar Mouse”. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. 52, November/ December 1996, p. 68 Back.

Note 13:   The MRV unlike the MIRV of the later generation could not strike different targets. Back.

Note 14:   Stephen Schwartz, no. 2, p. 137 Back.

Note 15:   Harvey M Sapolsky, Creating the Fleet Ballistic Missile System: The Interaction of Technology and Organisation in the Development of a Major Weapon System. 1969. MIT Press; Cambridge, Mass. p. 221. Back.

Note 16:   While a major portion of this amount was spent on the SSNs, the balance was used on SSBNs too. There is no way of precisely delineating the portion that was spent on each type of nuclear submarine due to the overall nature of the programme. Back.

Note 17:   Stephen I Schwartz, no. 2, p.138. Back.

Note 18:   Malcom Rifkind , UK Defence Minister in his address before the Centre for Defence Studies London on 16 Nov 1993. See also “Nuclear Weapons Database: United Kingdom Arsenal” at <http.//www.cdi.org/issues/nuke/database/uknukes.htm> Back.

Note 19:   The last of the free fall gravity nuclear bombs the W-177 were withdrawn the same year. Back.

Note 20:   British Information Service, New York, January 1990 as cited in SIPRI Yearbook 1990 World Armaments and Disarmaments p. 38. Back.

Note 21:   SIPRI Yearbook 1999 Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security p. 486. Back.

Note 22:   Operating costs of Resolution class submarines have all been reduced to 1995-96 prices. Proceedings of The House of Commons Monday 13 January 1997 “Operating Costs of British Polaris Submarines” at <http.www.cdi.org> and SIPRI Yearbook 1999 Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security p. 439. Back.

Note 23:   John Ainslie, “Cost of Trident”, Scottish CND Magazine. Back.

Note 24:   See P K Ghosh , no. 11, p. 249. Back.

Note 25:   The Nuclear Roundtable Meeting Summary for November 12, 1997 on French Nuclear Weapons Policy at <http.//www.stimson.org> Back.

Note 26:   Stephen I Schwartz, no. 2, pp. 614-615. Back.

Note 27:   NRDC Nuclear Notebook , “French and British Nuclear Forces” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/ October 2000, 56. Back.

Note 28:   Bruno Barrillot, “French Finesse Nuclear Future”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists at <http.//www.bullatomsci.org> Back.

Note 29:   Bruno Barrlliot, “Rappot relatif aux couts caches du programme Triomphant depuis 1982”(Lyon and Paris: Centre de Documentation et de Recherche sur la paixet les Conflicts and Greenpeace- France, 25 May 1994)pp. 16-18 as cited in Bruce D Larkin, Nuclear Designs. 1996. Transation Publishers; London. p. 264. Back.

Note 30:   As cited in NRDC Nuclear Notebook, no. 27. Back.

Note 31:   Clifford G Gaddy, “The Prize of the Past: Russia’s Struggle with the Legacy of a Militarised Economy” 1996. Brookings; Washington DC. pp.2,3 as cited in Stephen I Schwartz, no. 2, p. 612. Back.

Note 32:   John Wilson Lewis, China Builds the Bomb.” 1988. Stanford University Press; Stanford pp. 52,106-108 as cited in Stephen Schwartz, no. 2, p. 613 Back.

Note 33:   Shaoguang Wang, “Estimating China’s Defence Expenditure: Some Evidence from Chinese Sources”, China Quarterly. September 1996, 147, p. 895 Back.

Note 34:   Procurement of nuclear warheads their delivery platforms and all weapons and equipment are carried out under the group heading “Procurement” in the military budget. The official defence budget of China does not necessarily cover the R&D on new missiles weapons and equipment. According to the Chinese, there exists a difference between military research (junshi kexue yanjiu) and defence research (guofang kexue yanjiu). While the former includes research in military sciences and for minor development in weapons and equipment in the PLA inventory, the latter means all kinds of defence related research carried out by all the institutes under the government. That is why “military research” is included in the Chinese defence budget while “defence research” is not. As stated in Shaoguang Wang in ibid p. 892. Back.

Note 35:   As cited in R Prasannan, Cost of Deterrence. The Week. July 9 2000, p. 37. Back.

Note 36:   Bharat Kanad, “Going Thermonuclear: Why, With What Forces, At What Cost”. USI Journal. 533, July-September 1998, p. 327. Back.

Note 37:   K. Subrahmanyam, Nuclear Force Design and Minimum Deterrence Strategy for India, In Future Imperilled: India’s Security in the 1990s and Beyond, Bharat Kannad (Ed). 1994. Viking; Delhi. p. 193. Back.

Note 38:   Maroof Raza, Nuclear India’s Doctrine of Deterrence. Indian Defence Review. 14, July- September1999, pp. 36-37. Back.

Note 39:   R Prasannan, no. 35 Back.

Note 40:   Bharat Kanad, no. 36, pp. 327-329 Back.

Note 41:   V.K. Nair, Nuclear India. 1992. Lancer International; New Delhi. p. 202,207. The cost of Rs. 6835 crores was calculated for the programme for developing the entire nuclear arsenal. Back.

Note 42:   S Swamy, “Options for Indian Defence Strategy”. Shakti. January-March 1969 as cited in “Nuclear Weapons”, A Compilation Prepared by the Department of Atomic Energy, November 1970, pp. 66-67 Back.

Note 43:   For a more detailed view on the issue see P.K. Ghosh, no. 11 Back.

Note 44:   The blue green laser that is expected to have the capability to track submerged submarines from space is still in its nascent conceptual form. Back.