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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) Before and After September 11
Jyotsna Bakshi
*
, Research Fellow, IDSA
Abstract
In June 2001 Shanghai Five was renamed Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) after Uzbekistan was admitted as the sixth member. Joint struggle against separatism, extremism and terrorism is its main task. Before September 11, SCO projected the image of a powerful regional grouping wherein two major powers, Russia and China, sought to protect their interests in Central Asia and keep potential rivalry within limits. While India keenly watched the developments in its strategic neighbourhood, Pakistan formally applied for the membership of the Shanghai grouping. China reportedly lobbied Pakistan’s case strongly but others-notably Russia and Tajikistan-opposed it.
In the wake of the momentous developments in and around Afghanistan following September 11, the SCO is widely seen as not being very effective, but attempts are being made to resuscitate it. USA has registered its military presence in the entire region. The fast changing geopolitical equation in this region of vital strategic importance for India may have wider and long-lasting impact on Indian interests.
The countries constituting the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) are Russia, which is our strategic partner, China, with whom India shares a 4,700-km long disputed border and the four newly independent Central Asian states-Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan-that happen to be our strategic neighbours if not immediate neighbours. SCO is stated to be not a closed grouping but one still in the process of evolution. It has grown from Shanghai Five formed in April 1996 to a regional grouping of six in June 2001. In the wake of post-September 11 momentous developments in Afghanistan and the surrounding areas an extremely complex geopolitical game is unfolding in the whole region. This paper seeks to study the impact of these developments on the SCO and looks at the ramifications and implications for India.
The Beginning and Evolution of Shanghai Process
Shanghai Five began as a forum to resolve the boundary dispute between the former Soviet Republics and China. The “Agreement on Strengthening Military Confidence in Border Areas” was signed at Shanghai on April 26, 1996, by Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, that came to be known as the Shanghai Five. The agreement focused on confidence building measures (CBMs) in minute detail to ward off the possibility of any military clash. A 100-km zone on both sides of the border of member countries is repeatedly emphasised in the agreement as an area of reduced military activity. 1
During their second summit in Moscow in 1997, the Five signed the “Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas.” It aimed at reducing the number of the border forces to the level of defensive purposes, promoting transparency, mutual trust and making military activities on the border predictable and subject to supervision.
Beginning with the Almaty summit in 1998, the Shanghai Five began to take note of the threat to regional security posed by the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, the growth of drug trafficking, mounting religious extremism, separatism, aggressive nationalism and illegal immigration in the region and declared their commitment to fight these forces.
The immediate backdrop to the fourth summit at Bishkek on August 25, 1999 was provided by the increased activity of Islamic militants in the region, particularly in the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Chechnya and Dagestan in Russian Caucasus. Therefore, the accent at the summit was on reaching an agreement on appropriate joint measures against terrorism, drugs and arms trafficking. It resulted in the decision to set up an anti-terrorist centre at Bishkek.
Russia, China and the Central Asian states concerned have been extremely upbeat about the achievement of the Shanghai framework, which was projected as a ‘new type’ of constructive and practical diplomacy. The Shanghai forum has provided the big two-Russia and China-a mechanism to keep in check their nascent rivalry in the area and to co-ordinate positions on major regional and international issues.
Thus, the Dushanbe summit declaration in July 2000 endorsed Sino-Russian positions on multi-polar world, Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, opposed the US plan to build National Missile Defence (NMD) system and the deployment of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system in the Asia Pacific region. It supported China’s position of opposing the possible incorporation of Taiwan in the TMD system. The pet proposal of President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, regarding Conference of Interaction and Confidence-Building in Asia (CICA), as well as that of the Uzbek President for creating a nuclear free zone (NFZ) in Central Asia were also endorsed.
Nevertheless, there exists a certain resentment in the Central Asian circles that under Russian and Chinese influence they are called upon to express views on issues that do not directly concern them and which tend to antagonise the Western powers that happen to be their major source of aid; for instance, support for the multi-polar world and the ABM treaty and opposition to NMD, TMD, etc. 2
Within the Shanghai process, China seeks a firm commitment from the Central Asian Republics (CARs) that the Uighur national liberation movement does not get any support and encouragement from their territories. The wording of the Dushanbe declaration that “the striving of China to maintain unity in the country in accordance with ‘one China’ principle’ and for “Russia’s stand on the settlement of the situation in the Chechen Republic”, in effect, went to the advantage of China as the Chinese do not have any control over Taiwan, while the Russians have Chechnya under their effective military control, despite continued militant violence in the region.
Shanghai Five Turns into Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO)
During the Forum summit on June 14-15, 2001, Uzbekistan formally joined the grouping and it was renamed Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO). Uzbekistan has been facing increasing threat from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), an extremist Islamic group. Uzbekistan’s decision to join the SCO, though it had withdrawn from Russia-led CIS collective security treaty, is seen as a manifestation of its desire to manoeuvre between Russia and China within the SCO. 3
The highlight of the summit was the signing of the Shanghai Convention on combating terrorism, separatism and extremism.
The Member States decided to formulate a long-term programme of multilateral trade and economic co-operation. They agreed to hold annual meetings of Foreign and Defence ministers in order to co-operate “in resolving major international and regional issues, above all relating to the strengthening of security and stability in the Central Asian region.” 4
On Admitting New Members
The Shanghai June 2001 declaration refers to the possibility of admitting new members on the basis of consensus. The declaration says that those states can be considered for new membership that
“share the objectives and tasks of co-operation, the principles stated in point 6 and also other provisions of this declaration.”
Point 6 reads:
“Sanghai Organisation of Co-operation has been formed on basis of the agreements on strengthening of trust in military sphere and on mutual arms reductions signed in Shanghai and Moscow in 1996 and 1997. The principles reflected in the above-stated agreements determine the basis of relationship between the member-states of Shanghai Co-operation Organisation.” 5
A news brief given to the present author by the Kazakh Embassy in New Delhi in September 2001 makes it clear that there are no immediate plans to expand the organisation. It says,
“It is necessary to strengthen this organisation, to receive the results of activity and then to consider appeals on joining.”
Thus, the possibility of admitting new members has been kept open. New members are to be admitted by consensus among the present members. The rules are to be finalised at the St. Petersburg summit of the grouping scheduled for June 2002. At the same time, it is indicated that there is no immediate hurry to admit new members.
At times, countries as far apart as Mongolia, Iran and even the USA have been mentioned as wishing to join the SCO 6 besides India and Pakistan. In talks with Kazakh scholars in October 2001, this author was told that India’s admission to SCO would depend on the course of India-China relations, thus giving an inkling of who called the shots in the organisation. The impression therefore is that in view of lack of consensus on other members, perhaps Mongolia would be the only country that might join the group in the near future.
Significantly, the process of confidence-building measures between China and the former Soviet bordering states has been accompanied by the signing of India-China agreements on the maintenance of peace and tranquillity and confidence-building measures in the military field in the border areas along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in 1993 and 1996 respectively. It is a very positive development impacting on India’s perception of the Shanghai process.
But on the question of SCO membership, there exists an opinion in this country that India would prefer to be invited to join the organisation and with due cognisance of India’s legitimate interests rather than apply for it.
Pakistan’s Bid for Admission to the Shanghai Grouping
While India has thus been reticent, on January 3, 2001, Pakistan’s Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan submitted a formal request to the Kyrgyz Foreign Ministry for the grant of observer status for his country at the Shanghai forum. It appeared as if Pakistan was following in the footsteps of Uzbekistan which had attended the Dushanbe (July 2000) summit as an observer and was admitted as a full member in Shanghai summit in June 2001. But within two days of Pakistan’s formal application, the President of Tajikistan Mr. Emomaly Rahmanov expressed his strong opposition to admitting Pakistan in the grouping. He stressed that he was even opposed to discussing the issue. 7
But at the summit level, Beijing was reported to have strongly lobbied for Pakistan’s entry. 8 It is likely that Pakistan’s application was made with a prior understanding with China. There was no consensus as Tajikistan (and also perhaps Russia) opposed this because of Pakistan’s support to the Taliban which was exporting terrorism to Central Asia. 9
Ever since the Soviet disintegration, Pakistan has nurtured the ambition of expanding its influence in the former Soviet Central Asia. In view of difficulties in opening trade, transport routes and laying oil and gas pipelines across turbulent Afghanistan, Pakistan has been seeking to lure the Central Asian republics by offering road and rail outlets to the Arabian Sea ports across the Indus Basin corridor passing through Karakoram highway across Chinese Xinjiang linking up with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan as well as Tajikistan. 10
Russian Moves to Strengthen CIS Collective Security on the Eve of SCO Summit
While Russia is prepared to co-operate with China within the framework of the Shanghai organisation, it is also trying to consolidate its traditional influence in the region in political, security and economic spheres. Thus, on October 10, 2000, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a treaty on the creation of the Eurasian Economic Community. Moves were also made to strengthen the collective security treaty of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
On its part, China has launched its “great Western campaign” to develop its backward western regions. Thus, both Russia and China seem to be trying to consolidate their positions in their respective parts of Central Asia. 11
On the eve of the Shanghai summit (June 2001), the six member states of the CIS collective security treaty (Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstasn and Tajikistan) held a summit meeting on May 25 in the Armenian capital of Yerevan. They decided to proceed with the creation of a 3,000-man rapid reaction force, providing one battalion each. The headquarters of the rapid reaction force is to be in Bishkek. The joint statement issued on the occasion affirmed the readiness of the Member States to repel any incursions by the Islamic militants into Central Asia. Yury Yarov of Russia, the Executive Secretary of the CIS, particularly stressed the importance of Uzbek participation for making collective security more effective in the Central Asian region. 12 A unit of 2000 troops as the rapid reaction force for Central Asia to fight any potential insurgency in the area was expected to be ready by August 2001. 13
Thus, Russia-led collective security treaty members were taking measures to beef up the security of Central Asia when the events of September 11 overtook them. In fact, it was reported that the main responsibility for providing security to the region was to be shouldered by the Russia-led collective security treaty. For instance, Times of Central Asia (Bishkek) remarked that “The SCO anti-terrorist Centre, however, may do little more than co-ordinate information between the six member states”. The Chinese gain, according to the paper, was an additional summit agreement, which stipulated that at the request of one or more Central Asian Member States of the SCO, China can send troops into Central Asia. 14
The Chinese Ambition
China’s declared policy is to change with the changing times, to synthesise between contradictions and antagonisms by highlighting the common points and “reserving disagreements” in order to reach a “win-win” situation for all. China also wants to continue to amass political, economic and military power or the comprehensive national power (CNP), so that when the time of reckoning finally arrives, China is able to have its way even without firing a single shot. The Chinese are particularly sanguine about the achievements of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation and its precursor the Shanghai Five over the past five years, which, incidentally, bears the name of a Chinese city.
For the time being and for the foreseeable future, the primary Chinese objective is to maintain peace, stability and friendly dispensation in the neighbouring Central Asian states while extending economic, trade, transport and energy co-operation with the countries of the region. China has shown readiness to recognise the traditional Russian predominance in the security field in the region, although it has also been extending its military contacts and exchanges with the countries of the region. 15
It is quite likely that behind the diplomacy of mutual benefit and win-win situation for all, there exists a shrewd and long-term geopolitical design of extending Chinese influence and reach in the strategically important region of southern Eurasia comprising Central Asia, Transcaucasus and the former ‘northern tier’ countries of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. It is through this region that important trade, transport and oil and gas pipeline routes are expected to pass, including the revived silk route, TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia). 16 “The Chinese are already thinking fifty years ahead,” remarked a Central Asian diplomat, to this writer.
It is apparent that the Chinese and the Russian interests do not always coincide. For instance, the Russians are interested in promoting the Trans-Siberian railway as the main connecting link between Asia and Europe. The Chinese are believed to be rather cool to the idea. They prefer the southern route to Europe across Central Asia-Transcaucasus-Turkey to the Mediterranean coast. According to Francesco Sisci, it would provide China’s western region,
“a new geo-strategic importance. In a way, such a move would not simply expand Chinese influence from Xinjiang to the Caspian Sea . . . . It would project China into the Middle East, the Mediterranean as well as South Asia, including India. The proposed Chinese railway from Qinghai in the far west to Tibet will not only link the restive Tibetan region to the rest of China, it will also link China’s economic heart to India, through roads and railways that could one day move passengers and goods from Lhasa to New Delhi.”
Francesco Sisci believes that China is seeking to achieve its goal not by antagonising Russia, but by assuring the latter that China’s expanding economy should not be viewed as a threat. 17
The Western Perception of SCO Before September 11
The West tends to view SCO as a Chinese-Russian attempt to be the decision-makers in Central Asia to the exclusion of others. In the wake of growing Sino-Russian strategic partnership in Central Asia within the framework of the Shanghai process, concern had been felt in the USA at the rather ‘indecisive nature’ of Western influence in the region. Indeed, some Western think tanks have emphasised the desirability of the USA acquiring military bases in inner Asia even prior to the tragic events of September 11.
Prior to September 11 China was being viewed as the ‘strategic competitor’ of the USA. 18 Thus, the formation of the SCO was seen as being aimed at ‘combating American hegemony,’ promoting ‘multi-polarisation,’ and a potential counterweight to NATO. After all the Shanghai grouping comprised about 1.5 billion people or one-fourth of humanity and almost 60 percent of the landmass of Eurasia. Access to the vast oil and gas reserves of the region would help fast growing China to achieve national ambitions in both the economic and military fields.
The Western media took particular note of the fact that the defence ministers of the six Member States also met at Shanghai and discussed military co-operation, including joint exercises and research and development of weaponry. In contrast to the cautious dictum of Deng Xiaoping, “adopt a low profile and never take a lead”, President Jiang Zemin is seen making much headway in forging a regional grouping with Russia and Central Asian states and then also signing a 25 year treaty with Russia on July 16, 2001. 19
Before September 11, 2001, the SCO thus projected an image of a powerful regional organisation with increasing cohesion and purposefulness. It seemed to provide the rising China a forum whereby it could hope to expand its influence westward on the vast Eurasian land mass.
Post-September 11 Developments in the Region: US Military Presence in Central Asia
The tragic events of September 11, 2001 and subsequent developments leading to the defeat of the Taliban-Al-Quaeda forces in Afghanistan completely changed the geopolitical equation in the region. Wounded USA cobbled together an international coalition against terror being perpetrated by Taliban leaders and Osama Bin Laden from the soil of war-ravaged Afghanistan. Russia promptly offered support to the USA in the war against terrorism. In its strategic thinking the real threat to the country’s security is seen as emerging from the ‘arc of instability’ in the turbulent southern periphery of the country. Russia offered to share intelligence and the use of its air space and bases to the USA for search, rescue and humanitarian purposes. It also took the credit for influencing the Central Asian members of the CIS collective security treaty to extend facilities to the USA in the strategically important region bordering Afghanistan. Russia hopes to gain from new improved relations with the USA in multiple ways.
It is true that ever since the Soviet disintegration, the US-led West has been trying to promote ‘geopolitical pluralism’ in the former Soviet space, including Central Asia. Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region are declared areas of ‘special US interest’. The region is included in the ‘zone of responsibility’ of the US Central Command. Since September 1997 annual multinational military exercises have been held in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan under NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. However, the US presence in Central Asia in the security field was very limited before September 11. Moscow remained the main guarantor of security in the region.
The war against the Taliban provided the USA an unprecedented opportunity to register and further entrench its military presence in the inner Asian region of immense strategic importance as the borders of major powers-Russia, China, the Indian subcontinent and Iran-meet here.
Uzbekistan saw in the war an excellent opportunity to forge security ties with the most powerful country in the world in a bid to achieve multiple gains, particularly military action against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which received sanctuary and support in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. In return, Uzbekistan sought security guarantees from the USA. Knowledgeable sources said Uzbekistan offered its military bases to the USA without consulting SCO partners. It was a set- back to the grouping. More significantly, Uzbekistan did not participate in the meeting of the CIS Chiefs of General Staff held in Moscow on September 26. Neutral Turkmenistan was the other country that did not send its representative to the meeting. 20
It appears that other Central Asian states co-ordinated their stand with Moscow. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan offered air bases for US troops operating in Afghanistan. However, the US did not accept the Kazakh offer to avoid further antagonising Russia and China. Kazakhstan has a 7000- km long border with Russia and a sizeable Russian population (more than 30 per cent). It also shares a long border with China in the east. The US has so far not gone in for bases in Tajikistan as well. Russia maintains its 201 Motorised rifle division on the Afghan-Tajik border. 21
Central Asian states offered bases to the US apparently due to geopolitical as well as financial considerations. They hope to gain manoeuvring space vis-à-vis Russia and China as well as make significant monetary gains. On December 6, 2001 Uzbek press published reports of an agreement with Washington that would provide about $100 to $150 million US loans and aid for economic reforms in the country. Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan, Kurmanbek Bakiev reportedly remarked that the presence of thousands of American soldiers would be a gold mine for his impoverished country. 22 It is said that the lease of Manas air base has been co-ordinated in advance with partners in the CIS collective security treaty and the SCO, meaning thereby Russia and China. 23 In fact, there exists an opinion even in Russia that the US war against terrorism in Afghanistan and religious extremism in Central Asia also serves Russian interests.
Ostensibly, US forces are in Central Asia mainly to complete the still unfinished task of completely routing out the Taliban-Al-Quaeda net-work. It means they are going to be there for a temporary period. But the prospects of prolonged US military presence in the region, particularly Central Asia, 24 arouse deep concern in Moscow, Beijing and other capitals in the region.
Understandably, the projects of laying oil and gas pipelines from Caspian-Central Asian region to the west and south, branching away from their traditional routes across Russia, are also at the heart of the USA’s geo-strategic and geo-economic game plan.
At the same time, it appears that the USA wants to tread cautiously in the complex geopolitical game unfolding in inner Asia. It does not want to annoy and antagonise the three big powers in the region namely, India, China and Russia. Instead, the US wishes to take them on board.
Moreover, US policy in Central Asia is currently faced with a dilemma. Enhanced support to the authoritarian regimes in the region is bound to invoke criticism from human rights and democratic groups, while pressing for the latter would antagonise the local regimes.
As regards China, the impact of post-September 11 developments has been a mixed one. China gained as combating international terrorism became the number one task of US policy instead of China being projected as the emerging strategic rival of the sole super power. It supported the US war against terrorism with certain conditions. Undoubtedly, the US military presence close to its western borders is detrimental to China’s larger geopolitical goals and ambitions.
Attempts to Beef up the SCO
In the post-September 11 period, the SCO did not play any significant role. However, regular meetings of the officials of the member countries at various levels kept the show going. Moscow and Beijing remained in constant touch and kept each other informed about their foreign policy moves.
At the instance of the Chinese, an extra-ordinary meeting of the SCO foreign ministers took place in Beijing on January 7, 2002, to discuss the issues of regional security and co-operation as well as recent events in Afghanistan. The joint statement issued after the meeting made no mention of the US role in the region, but it emphasised the leading role of the United Nations in the struggle against international terrorism. It stressed that the scope of anti-terrorist struggle may not be extended arbitrarily and should not lead to interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. More particularly, the statement categorically said that the central role in the anti-terrorist struggle must be played by the countries of the region. The statement read:
“The SCO member states believe that the global system of counteraction against terrorism should be based on regional, sub-regional and national structures and firmly intend to complete the creation of a SCO anti-terrorist structure in Bishkek in the near future.” 25
India Shows Interest in SCO: India-Kazakhstan Joint Declaration
The joint declaration issued on February 12, 2002 at the end of President Nazarbayev’s visit to New Delhi made a favourable mention of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. It said Kazakhstan had expressed its support for India’s participation in the organisation. The joint declaration read:
“We have also noted the progress being made by the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) as a regional organisation. Kazakhstan expressed the belief that considering India’s geographical proximity in the neighbourhood and its active participation in regional and global matters of co-operation, India’s membership would add to the strength of that organisation”.
This is a significant development. Because, it is for the first time that India has officially taken note of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. It is also for the first time that a member of the grouping has expressed support for India’s participation. It appears that the Central Asian states and Russia may favour India’s participation in the SCO. The same can not be said with regard to the position of China. Indeed, as a Kazakh expert, Shapirbek Amirbek points out, China wants Pakistan while Russia favours India to join the SCO. As India and Pakistan have a ‘border conflict’, he opines that their joining would cause disagreements in the SCO. Yet, their joining would make three billion of the world’s six billion population, members of the organisation. It would greatly add to its economic and political weight. The Kazakh expert characterises the SCO as an organisation set against the US domination of the world. 26
It appears that Beijing-even Moscow for that matter-is pursuing a multi-pronged policy of seeking space and manoeuvrability in all directions while at the same time seeking extended engagement and co-operation-and avoiding direct confrontation-with the US. By acquiring military bases in the region, the US has sought to establish itself as the main arbiter in the region. However, being an outside power, it will, per force, have to come to terms with the powers in the region. An expert study sponsored by the International Research and Exchange Board (IREX) and the US State Department in early 2001 has opined that the USA must act in concert with the dominant regional powers – Russia and China in the Central Asian Region. 27
India has no direct access to the Central Asian-Caspian Sea region and its economic presence there is minimal. But India is situated in direct proximity to the region. The developments in Central Asia-Caspian Sea region and Afghanistan tend to have a direct bearing on its vital geopolitical and security interests. The choice before India is clear: remain a bystander in the intensifying geopolitical game in the region or astutely play cards aimed at maximising gains and minimising any adverse fall-out. The deft wording of the India-Kazakhstan joint declaration shows that India has indirectly made known that New Delhi should not be discounted as a factor in Central Asian geopolitics. At the same time, India has not prematurely thrown its hat in the ring.
By way of conclusion it may be said that the membership of SCO may provide India a locus-standi in the region and also a forum. The US may view it as an attempt on the part of the big three in the region – India, China and Russia – to join a common forum. But indications are that the US would also very much like to be a party to the processes taking place in Central Asia and surrounding region. The signals of Indian interest in the SCO through statements of support by the Central Asian states and possibly Russia would, in fact, give a message to the US and all others that India is a significant factor and player in Central Asian geopolitics.
Meanwhile, India would do well to actually enhance its presence by expanding multifarious bilateral ties with the countries in the area.
Endnotes
Note *: Dr. Jyotsna Bakshi is a Research Fellow at IDSA specialising in Russia and Central Asia. She has spent two-years at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow. She has published a book, Russia and India from Ideology to Geopolitics, 1999. Dev Publication, Delhi and many research articles. Back.
Note 1: The text of agreement at http://www.stimson.org/cbm/china/crplus.htm. Back.
Note 2: Dinara Kaliyeva, Shanghaiskaya organizatsia sotrudnichestva: perspektivy razvitiya. Analytik (Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, Almaty). 2001 (3) 40. Back.
Note 3: “Russia has Misgivings about Shanghai Co-operation Organisation”, Eurasia Insight, June 20, 2001 at www. Eurasianet.org. Back.
Note 4: The text of Communiqué of SCO heads of States, June 15, 2001 at www.missions.itu.int/~kazaks/eng/sco. Back.
Note 5: The text of the declaration of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, 15 June 2001 provided by the Embassy of Kazakhstan in New Delhi. Back.
Note 6: Interfax. June 14, 2001” at www.eurasianet.org. Back.
Note 7: Tajikistan Daily Digest, January 5, 2001 at www.eurasianet.org. Back.
Note 8: www. cnn.com, December 18, 2001. Back.
Note 9: Addressing the Chinese journalists on the eve of his visit to China in December 2001, President Musharraf thanked China for its support of Pakistan’s accession to the SCO. Hindustan Times, December 26, 2001. Back.
Note 10: Aftab Kazi. “Transit -Route Politics and Central Asia’s A’S Indus Basin Corridor” July 4, 2001” at http://www.sais-jhu.edu/cacianalyst/July_4_2001/July_4_2001_Home.htm Back.
Note 11: Jyotsna Bakshi. Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership in Central Asia: Implications for India. Strategic Analysis. May 2001, 25 (2), 174-176. Back.
Note 12: Central Asia Monitor. 2001, (4) 24-25. Back.
Note 13: Times of Central Asia Kirghyzstan, June 17, 2001. Back.
Note 15: Jyotsna Bakshi, no. 11, pp. 168-171. Back.
Note 16: Francesco Sisci., “Shanghai spirit may yet haunt Asia,” Asia Times, June 23, 2001 at www.atimes.com. Back.
Note 17: Francesco Sisci., “China Eyes Silk Road All The Way to the U.S.” Asia Times. June 18, 2001 at www. tew.org. Back.
Note 18: Dr. Yan Wenjing, The Asia-Pacific Security Situation in 2001. International Strategic Studies. Beijing. 2002, (1) 40. Back.
Note 19: Willy Wo-lap Lam, Combating American Hegemony, June 20, 2001 at www.cnn.com. Back.
Note 20: Dr. Alexandr Nemets and Dr. Thomas Torda, East-West Struggle for Central Asia Is under Way, October 30, 2001 at www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/10/29/175200.html. Back.
Note 21: Jean-Christophe Peuch, Central Asia: U.S. Military Build-up Shifts Spheres Of Influence, January 11, 2002 at www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/01/11012002091651.asp). Back.
Note 23: Krasnaya Zvezda, (no. 31) in RIA-Novosti Daily Review. February 18, 2002. Back.
Note 24: Jean-Christophe Peuch, no. 21; Paul Basken. “China, Russia Voice Concern Over U.S. Bases in Central Asia”, Bloomberg News, January 11, 2002 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/020111-attack01.htmindex.html. Back.
Note 25: “Joint Statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation,” Beijing , January 7, 2002 at http://missions.itu.int/~kazaks/eng/sco/sco06.htm Back.
Note 26: Interview by Shapirbek Amirbek on Kazakh TV on January 13, 2002 at http://www.kalaschnikow.de/kalauk/txt/2002/txt01.html Back.
Note 27: “Central Asia: Examining Regional Security”, January 31, 2001 at http://www.irex.org/publications-resources/policy-papers/central-asia.pdf. Back.