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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
Fissile Material Cut-Off
By B.M. Udgaonkar
Introduction
We will deal mainly with the question: “How useful will a fissile materials cut-off (FMC) be?”, by itself, as being proposed now, as a step along the way to a nuclear weapon-free world. The question of “linkage” with nuclear disarmament will inevitably come into the discussion. Before coming to the main topic, however, it may be useful to remind ourselves of some of the early debates over the decades, wherein some of the five nuclear-weapons states (N-5) of today, at their stage of development of nuclear-weapons arsenals at the time, had raised objections to related proposals, which were very similar to the objections now raised by states other than the N-5, to a stand-alone FMC convention, which does not address itself to their security concerns. Thereby one may get a better perspective on the stalemate that had arisen at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) over the mandate of the ad hoc committee on an FMC.
Some Reminders From History
The first proposal towards an FMC may be said to have been made by the USA as a part of the more comprehensive Baruch Plan over 50 years ago. The Baruch Plan envisaged the setting up of an authority called the International Atomic Energy Control Agency, which would be entrusted with the managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy activities in the world. In this proposal, the production of atomic weapons was to cease and existing stocks were to be destroyed after the controlling agency had started operating effectively. In other words, controls would come first, and disarmament would follow later. At this stage, the USA had a monopoly over nuclear weapons, and the USSR felt that it would be vulnerable in the asymmetric situation which would persist until the existing stocks were destroyed. As a result, the USSR made a counter-proposal (the Gromyko Plan) in which the convention on outlawing nuclear weapons and providing for their destruction was to precede the establishment of a control system. In other words, in terms of today’s debates, the sequence of a step-by-step programme and the time-frame for banning nuclear weapons, destroying existing stocks, and establishing a control mechanism, became a major stumbling block to any agreement between the two superpowers. The Baruch Plan got rejected by the USSR essentially because in the asymmetric situation prevailing between the USA and USSR, the question as to whether disarmament or non-proliferation should have precedence did not find an agreeable answer.
In 1956, when the USA, on behalf of Canada, France and the UK, proposed to the 5-member UN Disarmament Commission that all future production of fissile material be placed under international supervision and used exclusively for non-weapons purposes, the USSR rejected this on the basis that banning weapons-fissile material without also banning weapons was impractical. At this stage, the US was well in advance of the USSR with regard to the quality and the quantity of nuclear weapons. The situation was highly asymmetric. In particular, the USA had a stockpile of about 4,000 weapons, and the USSR about 400.
A similar proposal by the USA in 1964 was again rejected by the USSR on similar grounds. At this stage, the US nuclear stockpile was about 30,000 weapons and that of the USSR, about 5,000.
Meanwhile, by 1964, all the members of the Security Council had acquired nuclear weapons. “Nuclear Freeze” (in respect of fissile materials or nuclear weapons or both) was the subject of several resolutions that came before the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in the Fifties, Sixties, Seventies and Eighties. We will mention only one, the Indian-Mexican Resolution which was passed by the UNGA in November 1991 by a vote of 119 to 18 with 23 abstentions. France was one of the countries that voted against it, and two of the reasons given by France 1 , 2 for opposing the very concept of freeze are interesting in the context of today’s debate on an FMC:
(a) it would lock in existing imbalances;
(b) to the extent that it benefited a power, it would reduce that power’s interest in negotiations.
The objection (a) raised by France in 1991 can be seen to be very similar to the objection by some countries in the recent negotiations on an FMC, that a stand-alone FMC will perpetuate the existing inequitable nuclear regime, thereby threatening their security. In this context, it is worth noting the justification given by China for its two tests in June and July 1996 even while the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations were drawing to a close: that the continued existence of huge nuclear arsenals and the threat of nuclear war caused by the policy of first-use of nuclear weapons required that China conduct a “minimal number of necessary nuclear tests”. 3
How Useful Will an FMC Be?
In the context of the present workshop, the usefulness has to be discussed in relation to the objective of a nuclear weapon-free world (NWFW).
The Present Disarmament Situation and the Aim of an FMC
It is good to remember that the UNGA Resolution 48/75 L, which set in motion the recent negotiations on an FMC in December 1993, does not mention nuclear disarmament at all. On the other hand, it expresses the conviction that an FMC “would be a significant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects”. It is amazing that, in spite of this fact, it is often described 4 as one of the most important next step on the disarmament agenda. The USA and Russia have a super-abundance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium (Pu) as a legacy of the Cold War, enough for tens of thousands of fusion warheads if they decide to proliferate vertically again. The UK, France and China also have a surplus of HEU and Pu. All the N-5 have, therefore, stopped, production of HEU and Pu for weapons purposes or are in the process of doing so. 5 So the “significant contribution” that is contemplated can only be to horizontal non-proliferation_one more such measure after the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and CTBT. Is this what one wants? Is horizontal non-proliferation to be equated with nuclear disarmament? Is it even a step toward nuclear disarmament?
Measures aiming at horizontal non-proliferation lock in or freeze the existing imbalances to which France objected in 1991 in the context of the Indian-Mexican Resolution. The imbalances are to be viewed in the context of the fact that nuclear disarmament is as distant as ever. Nearly 30 years after the NPT, and nearly ten years after the end of the Cold War, some 36,000 nuclear warheads still remain in the world. 6 This is about the same number as when the NPT came into force_in spite of the expectations raised by the nuclear weapon states (NWS) from Article VI of the NPT, which was their part of the bargain with the nuclear have-nots. Even if START-II gets ratified by the Russian Duma (which is getting delayed because of NATO expansion), and sincerely implemented, the USA and Russia will still retain about 20,000 nuclear warheads in the year 2007. Further, the USA, NATO under the leadership of the USA, and, hence, Russia, reserve the possibility of a first strike with nuclear weapons. The policies of the NWS are based on an indefinite retention of nuclear weapons and of the right of first-use. A recent German proposal that NATO renounce the first use of nuclear weapons was promptly turned down by the US.
The dismal situation on the disarmament front is illustrated by the fact that Frank Blackaby, a former director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), has been led to call for what he terms a “peasants’ revolt”_a warning to be issued by a sufficient number of states party to the NPT, that given that the NWS are in violation of the NPT, they, the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) will withdraw from the NPT within two years, unless the NWS agree to start genuine negotiations designed to ultimately rid the world of nuclear weapons. He adds: “It is time to think about rejecting a US-imposed treaty unless that treaty is made to work as intended”. 7
The usefulness of any FMC proposal has to be viewed against this background. A treaty that perpetuates the present international nuclear regime cannot be useful as a step along the way to an NWFW.
Parts do not Necessarily Make the Whole
It has been argued 8 that an FMC will have to be an essential part of any comprehensive nuclear disarmament regime or an eventual Nuclear Weapons Convention. But parts do not automatically make a whole. They have to be part of a design. Giving up nuclear deterrence, acceptance of no-first-use, commitment to building up an NWFW, prohibition of nuclear weapon production, possession and use, are also essential parts of an eventual Nuclear Weapons Convention. It is significant that the N-5 are avoiding these parts. Partial measures, selected according to the priorities defined by them, serve only to tie up the NNWS and the new nuclear weapon states, without any concrete commitment on the part of the N-5 that they are heading towards an NWFW, and doing so fast enough. Such partial measures create an illusion of motion in the direction of nuclear disarmament when actually no such movement is taking place. The process can drag on indefinitely, ignoring the urgency of elimination of nuclear weapons. The danger to human civilisation would thus be allowed to persist indefinitely.
Is an FMC a Prerequisite of a Disarmament Process?
A related argument 9 is that an FMCT will put in place an essential prerequisite for the achievement of nuclear disarmament in the form of verification arrangements in respect of all enrichment and reprocessing facilities; and that “there is a range of complex verification issues that will need to be resolved before we can conclude such a Treaty”. The problem with such an argument is that it does not discuss at what stage of the nuclear disarmament process such a control should be introduced. Before a commitment to a NWFW? Before giving up the doctrine of nuclear deterrence? Before an agreement on no-first-use? These are also prerequisites which will require the resolution of a range of complex issues. The question of “linkage” is not just “a game of those who do not really want to make any progress at all”,9 as alleged.
There is no point in discussing verification arrangements for an FMC unless there is an unequivocal commitment to an NWFW on the part of the N-5, and the series of practical and realistic steps recommended by the Canberra Commission are carried out by them.
The real issue is: does one want to maintain the status quo of the inequitable nuclear regime or move towards an equitable nuclear disarmament regime?
Recommendations of the Canberra Commission
The Canberra Commission 10 has stated that the first requirement is for the N-5 to commit themselves irrevocably to the elimination of nuclear weapons, and to agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations for its achievement. The commission recommends that the commitment of the N-5 to an NWFW must be accompanied by a series of practical, realistic and mutually reinforcing steps recommended by it. The steps that can be taken immediately, according to the commission, and whose “implementation would provide clear confirmation of the intent of the NWS to further reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security postures”, include an “agreement amongst the NWS of reciprocal no-first-use undertakings, and of a non-use undertaking by them in relation to NNWS”. The commission then lists some “reinforcing steps” that “would build on the solid foundation of commitment, accomplishment and goodwill established through implementation of the steps recommended for immediate action”. These “reinforcing steps” include action to prevent further horizontal proliferation, and developing verification arrangements for an NWFW and FMC. One would like to emphasise the stage at which an FMC appears in these recommendations.
One is reminded of the French objection (b) to the Indian-Mexican Resolution of 1991_that to the extent that such a partial measure benefits a power or powers, they lose their interest in further negotiations. The NPT is a good example. The NPT was never intended to be an indefinite licence for a two-tier world of nuclear haves and have-nots, but embodied a bargain, in which, while on one side, the signatory nuclear have-nots agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons, on the other side, the NWS undertook “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” (Article VI of the NPT). Once the NPT was in place, however, the NWS showed no interest in fulfilling their part of the bargain. For 20 years after signing the NPT, they competed intensively in developing new nuclear weapon systems, carried out over 2,000 weapons tests, and their stockpile of warheads actually increased from what it was when the NPT was signed (about 38,000) and reached a staggering figure of close to 70,000 in the mid-Eighties. Though this number has come down to about 36,000, the steps taken by the USA and Russia in this regard seem to be rather in the nature of arsenal rationalisation measures.
The assurances given by the N-5 at the time of the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1996, have made no difference. Rather, as Ambassador Douglas Roche has observed recently, 11 “Despite the indefinite extension of the NPT and the signing of the CTBT, a new technology race in the quest of far more innovative and lethal nuclear weapons has broken out”.
The NWS continue to stubbornly oppose any attempts to put the issue of elimination of nuclear weapons on the agenda of the CD. Robert Bell, national security assistant to President Clinton has stated recently that “the US will continue to rely on nuclear arms as a cornerstone of its national security for the indefinite future”.
The NWS have yet to restore the confidence lost by their treatment of the commitment made by them under Article VI of NPT_including their defiance of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (1996).
Step-by-Step Approach vs Comprehensive Approach: Sequencing of Steps
One often talks of a step-by-step approach to an NWFW. In such an approach, enumeration of the steps, their sequencing, and the approximate time-scale for each step become important. The sequencing and the time-scale depend on the objective. If the objective is mere non-proliferation, there will be one sequence (going through, the NPT, CTBT, and possibly stopping at the FMCT). If the objective is an NWFW, there would be another sequence.
Douglas Roche has remarked: 12 “Relying only on Step-by-Step negotiations, with no overall plan, offers no guarantee that an end goal will ever be reached_In fact, the achievement of minor steps can actually delay progress toward the ultimate goal of elimination”, (emphasis added).
Enmeshing the FMC Into a Process Leading to an NWFW
This is where the need arises for enmeshing a treaty like the FMCT (or CTBT) explicitly into a process leading to an NWFW. A time-frame becomes important because of the lack of seriousness shown by the NWS so far, e.g. in implementing their commitment under Article VI of the NPT. Without the commitment to a time-frame, nothing prevents the NWS from refusing to take any meaningful steps towards an NWFW after the FMCT is in place.
One should stop claiming that the CTBT or FMCT are steps on the way to an NWFW, unless they are enmeshed in an agreed process leading to an NWFW. It is disingenuous to make such a claim.
Steps Must Respect Common Security
The steps and their sequencing must respect the security concerns of all the parties involved. None must feel that any step increases its vulnerability, so long as the situation continues to be asymmetric. The Canberra Commission has observed: “The process followed must ensure that no State feels at any stage, that further nuclear disarmament is a threat to its security. To this end, nuclear weapon elimination should be conducted as a series of phased verified reductions that allow states to satisfy themselves, at each stage of the process, that further movement toward elimination can be made safely and securely” (emphasis added).
Without a careful enumeration and sequencing of steps in a well-defined time-frame, an FMCT will only strengthen the present inequitable and dangerous nuclear regime, wherein the NNWS will continue to be at the mercy of the N-5. The dangerous character of the regime is easily lost sight of by even sensitive individuals in the N-5 countries or those in NATO countries and Japan which are under the nuclear umbrella of an NWS. Philip Smith 13 has recently reminded us of a statement of former Secretary of State Haig that fission and fusion explosives were tools used daily all over the world in US diplomacy. One cannot but feel greatly concerned in the face of the World Order that is sought to be created under the stewardship of the N-5 and the G-8.
Nuclear Disarmament vs Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Annette Schaper 14 has summarised the underlying conflict in the CTBT negotiations as that of nuclear disarmament vs nuclear non-proliferation, and remarked that the same conflict is now blocking the progress at the CD in the negotiations with regard to an FMC.
Some Claims and Arguments
It has been claimed that an FMC would limit the size of potential nuclear arsenals. The arsenals of the N-5, already quite large, are not going to be reduced by the FMCT. The size of potential nuclear arsenals will get limited only if the FMC is part of a Nuclear Weapons Convention in which all the unsafeguarded stocks of fissile material (and not merely those considered surplus to military needs), including those that will become available due to dismantling of warheads, are transferred to non-weapons use under international safeguards. Such a transfer is, in any case, needed in order to make the nuclear arms reductions under treaties like START irreversible; and the USA and Russia should enter into a bilateral fissile material cut-off treaty (including the fissile material available from dismantling of warheads under the START process), to solemnise their moratorium on the production of fissile material.
It has been argued that an FMC has become a symbol of the goodwill of the N5 to take seriously their commitment to nuclear disarmament. One fails to see how it can be so treated, if the N-5 continue to retain their huge stocks of HEU and Pu, and of weapons, with no commitment to a prohibition of nuclear weapons, and in fact, continue to obstinately refuse to allow nuclear disarmament to be put on the agenda of the CD. A symbolic measure of this kind is worse than useless because of its differential impact on the NWS and others. Further, even if one grants the claim, what is needed now is not a mere symbol but a purposeful action towards an NWFW. Time is running out.
It has been claimed that the FMCT would be the major policy driver to insert transparency and irreversibility in the disarmament process. Introduction of transparency and irreversibility into the START process, which is at present only a bilateral process, is certainly important in order to inspire confidence among the NWS with smaller arsenals and among the NNWS. But does this have to depend on an FMCT? If the intention of the START process is really to go down to stockpiles measured in hundreds, and smaller, and to draw in the other NWS at an appropriate stage, the process should any way become more transparent from now, with regard to both the dismantling of nuclear weapons and the disposal of all nuclear materials under international safeguards. This provision could be incorporated in START-III, IV_as a bilateral measure. As for a multilateral treaty aimed at the introduction of transparency in nuclear complexes, the importance of sequencing with other disarmament steps cannot be ignored. There is, however, nothing to prevent the N-5 from having such a transparency-and-irreversibility-promoting treaty among themselves.
Meeting Nuclear Terrorism?
In his September 1993 address to the UNGA, when President Clinton pressed for “an international agreement that would ban the production of these materials forever”, he made a special reference to “the danger of nuclear terrorism for all nations”. This danger, however, will be difficult to deal with unless the possession of nuclear material and weapons, and the production of nuclear weapons are prohibited under a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The risk of terrorist theft, either of a weapon or of fissile material, is much greater while a large nuclear industry still exists, than in a world in which that industry has been dismantled, and there are much tighter safeguards over weapons (yet to be dismantled) and materials. In the meantime, it is sad to note the rejection by the N-5 of the Indian-Egyptian proposal at the Rome Conference in June 1998 to have the use of nuclear weapons included in the list of crimes against humanity, and their threat to boycott a court whose mandate included the use of nuclear weapons.
Reduction of the Risk of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
It has been argued that partial measure like the CTBT and FMCT are useful since they reduce the risk of the spread of nuclear weapons. The question, however, is: risk as perceived by whom? The risk due to continued existence of nuclear weapoons on the face of the earth is the major risk as perceived by the NNWS. That risk is not reduced.
Such an argument is very much N-5-centric and ethno-centric. One should not forget the warning in the Pugwash Council Statement at the end of the Dagomys Conference in September 1988, namely, that “even in an arms control regime that included deep cuts in strategic forces and a CTB, the maintenance of any nuclear arsenal whatsoever, and of doctrines of nuclear deterrence, would pose dangers of nuclear weapons use as well as logical inconsistencies for non-proliferation policy.”
The Special Statement issued by the Pugwash Council on October 4, 1998 asks: “If the United States, the mightiest power in the world, resolves that it needs nuclear weapons for its security, how can one expect States that have real cause to feel insecure to forego such weapons?” 15
If the NWS are really so anxious about the reduction of the risks associated with the spread of nuclear weapons, they should agree to putting nuclear disarmament on the agenda of the CD, make an unequivocal commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons without any delay, and take other important steps recommended by the Canberra Commission, e.g. de-alerting, agreement to a no-first-use convention.
For Whom is the FMC Needed? Or Against Whom?
The N-5 have huge stocks of fissile materials, accumulated over decades, and have, therefore, either stopped production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, or are in the process of doing so. So they do not need an FMC for themselves. The FMCT is also not needed for NNWS, parties to the NPT, since they are already subject to safeguards. That leaves only India, Pakistan and Israel. So is the proposed treaty really directed against them, to cap their nuclear expansion, and put their nuclear facilities under fullscope safeguards, and possibly against China, so that it may not build a nuclear weapons stockpile comparable to those of the USA and Russia? Lewis A. Dunn, a former assistant director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has said so explicitly. 16 There is a certain sanctimonious attitude in such thinking: “It is good for us to maintain nuclear weapons, but not for them to have any, and we have the responsibility to control what they do”.
One has to ask: what are the benefits for these other countries? As far as one can see, there are none, unless the FMCT is enmeshed in a nuclear disarmament process with a definite time-frame.
If, on the other hand, the FMCT is considered as a stand-alone treaty and is not linked with a purposeful movement towards an NWFW, 17 it will imply unnecessary inconvenience to the concerned countries to open up their nuclear installations to intrusive international inspections. Moreover, it would be unproductive for the CD to waste so much time and energy on an issue which diverts attention from the central issue of a Nuclear Weapons Convention.
Concluding Remarks
A stand-alone FMCT cannot be considered as a step toward, or a prerequisite for, an NWFW, as claimed. It is merely one more non-proliferation measure, directed against the three threshold/newly nuclear weapon states, without any commitment on the part of the N-5 to move towards an NWFW_or even to allow nuclear disarmament to be placed on the agenda of the CD. John Holdren has observed: “It seems apparent that getting to zero any time soon remains anathema to a majority of the people who populate the national security establishments of the nuclear-weapon states_or at least to a majority of those whose opinions matter most.” 18
In this situation, negotiations to “achieve” an FMCT will, moreover, merely distract attention and energies from the main problem_the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and their elimination from national arsenals.
This is the reason why a stand-alone FMCT has been opposed by many NNWS, and why they have demanded an explicit linkage of the FMCT with a programme of nuclear disarmament down to zero within a reasonable time-frame.
The question of existing unsafeguarded stocks has been another point of serious disagreement at the CD. The situation with regard to existing stocks is very highly asymmetric among the two superpowers, the other three “approved” nuclear weapons powers, the remaining two new nuclear weapon powers, and the rest. Further, in the case of nuclear weapon states, “stocks” are partly those already in the weapons; partly those “required” to maintain their nuclear forces; partly those that are required to fuel the nuclear submarines; and those that are not required for any of these purposes. It is difficult to envisage the divulging the disaggregated details of their stocks, held for different purposes. The typical N-5 attitude is illustrated by the remark of Michael Weston 19 that “no NWS is going to accept [that] the size of its nuclear forces should be addressed by this backdoor means”.
Current stocks of Pu and HEU with the USA and Russia (including the stocks incorporated in warheads) are measured in hundreds of tonnes, while those in China, France and the UK are smaller; and those with India, Pakistan and Israel smaller still. Each country has its own perception of how much fissile material is required for maintaining a credible deterrence, and this perception cannot be static. Bringing the unsafeguarded stocks of fissile materials under international safeguards will affect different countries very differently and this is, therefore, not an issue that can be decoupled from the question of what is the “legitimate” size of arsenal each country would want to maintain, consistent with its perception of national security. One must not forget that even if all unsafeguarded stocks are brought under international safeguards, the number of nuclear warheads that will still be in the possession of the USA and Russia in the year 2007 (even if START II is fully implemented) will be about 20,000. These warheads will contain enough “stocks” to develop other more improved warheads, even if all unsafeguarded stocks of fissile materials outside warheads are brought under international safeguards.
A similar problem bedevils the question of tritium being brought under a cut-off regime. Here again, the situation is highly asymmetric. Even though tritium decays at the rate of about 5.5 per cent per year, the US has enough stocks of tritium to last for over 50 years. The others may not be so “fortunate”, and will, therefore, oppose tritium being brought under a cut-off regime unless the cut-off is part of a disarmament process with a reasonable time-frame.
It has been suggested that nations should be asked to provide a comprehensive record of all the fissile material they have produced outside safeguards. It is difficult to imagine the smaller nuclear powers agreeing to this proposal. As stated in the Strategic Defence Review carried out recently by the UK, in the section of nuclear transparency, “Maintaining a degree of uncertainty about_precise capabilities is a necessary element of credible deterrence.”
The question of stocks of fissile materials and of tritium will, therefore, have to be addressed directly, as a part of disarmament negotiations.
Our opposition is to the FMCT as a stand-alone measure at the present juncture. The FMCT will, however, have value as a part of a comprehensive nuclear disarmament process, at an appropriate stage. Obviously, the disarmament process will have to deal with stopping the production of nuclear warheads, destruction of existing warheads, and the stoppage of production of fissile materials so that no new warheads are manufactured and the number of warheads progressively goes down irreversibly in all countries. Care must be taken, however, to ensure that these and other steps and their sequencing respect the security concerns of all the parties involved. For this purpose, the recommendation of the Canberra Commission, mentioned above, must be followed.
The minimum one expects from the NWS is that they should demonstrate their sincerity with regard to the commitment under Article VI of the NPT by agreeing to set up an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament at the CD, with an agreed mandate, which will work in parallel with the ad hoc committee on an FMC. The Report of the Canberra Commission and the “Programme of Action for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons” proposed by some countries of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at the CD over two years ago (CD/1419 of August 7, 1996) could be the basis for negotiations in the parallel ad hoc committee.
Part of the case made for the FMCT is that it will put in place a verification machinery in respect of all reprocessing and enrichment facilities and introduce transparency and irreversibility in the nuclear disarmament process. Given the skewedness of the existing situation, one could suggest that the N-5, who have stopped, or are in the process of stopping fissile material production anyway, could make the cut-off legally binding, bilaterally or multilaterally. Others could join in later at an appropriate stage, when there is sufficient progress with regard to a Nuclear Weapons Convention.
Notes:
Note 1: The UN Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 16, 1991, p. 119. Back.
Note 2: Savita Pande, Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons, Occasional Paper Series, (New Delhi: IDSA, December 1997), p. 21. Back.
Note 3: The UN Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 21, 1996, p. 7. Back.
Note 4: See, e.g. Annette Schaper, “Problems of Future Negotiations of a Treaty on Cut-off of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapon”, Proc. of the 47th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Lillehammer, Norway, August 1997, (to be published). Back.
Note 5: The situation with regard to China is not so clear. Back.
Note 6: “Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-97”, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November-December 1997. Back.
Note 7: Frank Blackaby, “Time for a Peasants’ Revolt”, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November-December 1997. Back.
Note 8: For example, Steve Fetter and Frank Von Hippel, “A Step-by-Step Approach to a Global Fissile Materials Cut-off,” Arms Control Today, October 1995, p. 3. Back.
Note 9: For example Michael Weston, “The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: Why? What? and When?” Disarmament, vol. XX, no. 1, 1997, p. 52. Back.
Note 10: Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, 1996. Back.
Note 11: Douglas Roche, “The Vital Role of India in Nuclear Disarmament”, paper presented at the Pugwash Workshop on “Eliminating Nuclear Weapons”, New Delhi, March 1-3, 1998. Back.
Note 12: Douglas Roche, “Breaking the Disarmament Deadlock”, Proc of the 47th Pugwash Conference, Lillehammer, Norway, August 1997 (to be published). Back.
Note 13: Philip B. Smith, “The Nuclear Threat, Ethics and Pugwash”, Proc of to the 47th Pugwash Conference, Lillehammer, Norway, August 1997 (to be published). Back.
Note 14: For example, Harald Muller in “A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: Three Perspectives”, a background paper for the International Conference on “The Why and Whither of Fissile Material Cut-off”, Schlangenbad, Germany, July 1997. Back.
Note 15: “The Impasse in Nuclear Disarmament”, A Special Statement by the Pugwash Council, October 4, 1998, Pugwash Newsletter, November 1998, p. 2. Back.
Note 16: Lewis A. Dunn, “A Nuclear Weapons Materials Production Cut-off: An Idea Whose Time has Come”, in Research Paper No. 31, (Geneva: UNIDIR 1994). Back.
Note 17: As for example in the proposal made by some countries of NAM at the CD on August 7, 1996: “Programme of Action for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons”, CD/1419. Back.
Note 18: John Holdren, “Getting to Zero: Too Difficult? Too Dangerous? Too Distracting?” in Maxwell Bruce and Tom Milne eds., Force of Reason: Eliminating Nuclear Weapons and Ending War (McMillan, Spring 1999). Back.