Strategic Analysis

Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA

November 1999 (Vol. XXIII No. 8)

 

US Foreign Policy: Perceptions and Priorities: Where Does South Asia Figure?
By P.R. Rajeswari *

 

International relations/politics has had swift movement in the late 1980s or rather the early 1990s–very clearly between 1989 and 1991. A series of sudden developments occurred one after the other–the fall of the Berlin Wall which had symbolised the division of the world into two blocs, the end of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the deterioration of the Soviet economy. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War had been the major breakthroughs during this period: one of the crucial players of the Cold War and which had maintained a system of bipolarity in the world politics diminished in no time and left a vacuum for the United States in its foreign policy framework.

The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union did a lot of alterations to the whole world in such a short span of time. With this change in the world arena, there has come about drastic and sweeping re–evaluation of the geo–political factors. The end of the Cold War was supposed to naturally create a unipolar world led by the United States, which would be the unchallenged hegemon in the world power system. This had been one of the major goals of the United States–to lead the nations of the world under its own guidance and principles. Certain factors could be attributed to the fast change that is coming about in the world. The number of political actors has been on an increase. The issue of nationalism and ethnicity has become a primary one and the number of independent states that have emerged in the world system is amazing. The same is the case of international organisations, at both regional and global levels. Another major factor contributing to changes comprise the fast changing technologies and their implications. With the acceleration of technology innovation, what happens in one part of the world is transferred to another part, so casually and in such a short span of time. Technology–oriented changes, particularly in the military and telecommunications sectors, have had a significant impact on international politics.

A major challenge to the unipolar world has come from the newly emerging regional economic blocs, each around one of the superpowers. The European Union (EU), Association of South–East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are examples of such groupings. Economic tripolarity is also developing in the world system: there is the emergence of United States, European Union and Japanese tripolarity. According to Fred Bergsten, the “big three economies” will be similar in their levels of gross national product (GNP) and external trade. But there is an inherent instability in a tripolar configuration of power. It is felt that this arrangement encourages each power to worry that the other two will group together against it and adopt excessive policies that could increase conflict.

Analyses of the factors that led the US and the Soviet Union to be considered as superpowers reveal that these were not their significant achievements in agriculture, science and technology, defence or space–related matters, but their capability to destroy each other and the world. Ultimately, the undue cost of this on the economy of the Soviet Union virtually crippled it in a short span of time.

Today, after the end of the Cold War, world power is not measured in terms of political power or military might, but the economic capability of nations.

Having accepted the reality of the fall of the Soviet Union, one has to see what are the US priority areas in its foreign policy framework. The Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill of June 30 clarifies the areas. Senator Mitch McConnell, chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee has pointed out that for the past few years, the Bill continued to emphasise funding in two areas–export promotion and growth in the New Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. This Bill has also expanded the support for export promotion. Second is the recovery and reconstruction in South–East Europe, which has come into the US’s priority list. The US Senate has approved $12,475 million for Fiscal Year 2000 (FY00), beginning October 1. An allocation of $785 million has been given to the Ex–Im Bank, $780 million has gone to the NIS and $535 million is for economic assistance for South–East Europe. The US priorities are quite clear and they are Central Asia, Europe, Africa and China. Recently, the US has taken significant interest in the African countries and has made huge commitments too.

The US threat perceptions in the post–Cold War have been given as:

In the past, where there was a single threat, today there are multiple threats from the above–mentioned issues. In this Commencement Address to the US Naval Academy, President Bill Clinton said:

We must remain strong and vigilant against the kind of threats we have seen already throughout the 20th century–regional aggression and competition, bloody civil wars, efforts to overthrow democracies. But also, our security is challenged increasingly by non–traditional threats, from adversaries both old and new– not only hostile regimes, but also terrorists and international criminals, who cannot defeat us in traditional theatres of battle, but search instead for new ways to attack, by exploiting new technologies and the world’s increasing openness...We must approach these new 21st century threats with the same rigor and determination we applied to the toughest security challenges of this century. 1

The Sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995 is an example of the kind of threat the US and other nations could face. India, at this point of time, has been facing many such situations from the Pakistani side. It is in this context that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) becomes a matter of great concern. Countries that do not have WMD or claim not to have them continue to be an issue of concern.

The US has also created a three–pronged approach–Containment–Prevention–Termination. William Perry and Ashton Carter, in Foreign Affairs had identified certain threats and risks to US security:

The White House document has also brought out the US national interests in very clear terms. These interests fall into three categories. The first includes vital interests–those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and vitality of the nation. To defend these interests, if necessary, even the military might be used unilaterally and decisively.

The second category includes situations in which important national interests are at stake. These interests do not affect the national survival, but do affect the national well–being and the character of the world in which one lives. In such cases, the US will use all resources to advance these interests in so far as the costs and risks are commensurate with the interests at stake.

The third category comprises humanitarian and other interests. In certain situations, the nation gets into action because certain values demand it, as for instance, responding to natural and man–made disasters or violation of human rights, supporting democratic institutions, etc.

 

American Foreign Policy: Underlying Principles

The key principles of US foreign policy have to be understood clearly in the context of the post–Cold War period.

This aspect has often been referred to by the president and the secretaries of state and defence in their statements on issues of the nuclear Non–Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and such other non–proliferation regimes.

The United States’ principal aim is to achieve total prevention of the weapons of mass destruction. It wants the nations of the world to accept an array of international nuclear agreements such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); Fissile Material Cut–Off Treaty (FMCT); Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

At this point of time, it is worth noting some of the characteristics of US interests in South Asia given that the region contains one–fifth of the world’s population, occupies a critically geo–strategic position and is surrounded by China, and the huge oil and gas reserves of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Basin. US interests center around regional stability; human rights and Islamic resurgence and fundamentalism and economic policy issues.

To further narrow down the policy objectives would translate into:

Problems crop up when there is disagreement on issues like the NPT, CTBT, etc. It is also a well–known fact that both India and Pakistan are not signatories to the NPT or CTBT. US foreign policy should not sacrifice its many interests in South Asia in order to promote unrealistic aims in the nuclear realm. In particular, a complete “roll–back” to a non–nuclear South Asia is simply not a realistic or even medium term policy option for the United States.

Neither country will eliminate its stockpile of fissionable material or declare itself ready to sign the NPT as a non–nuclear weapon state.

Another major US concern regarding Pakistan has been that a stable Pakistan in possession of nuclear weapons is enough of a worry; an unstable Pakistan would be much worse. This is really a major concern for the US as Pakistan will start selling its nuclear technology and certain dual–use materials to other Islamic countries, making it a regular income–generation programme. This becomes a cause of concern to India, keeping in mind the Sino–Pak nexus on a series of defence and nuclear–related issues.

Both India and Pakistan, at this point of time, are under a soft state system wherein a vulnerability of accidental factors can escalate a crisis point.

The US, therefore, is committed to the following measures in this region:

The Strobe Talbott–Jaswant Singh dialogue throws light on some of the US priorities towards India and Pakistan. Talbott outlined five issues that he has been raising with India and Pakistan:

  1. Adherence to the CTBT.

  2. With regard to the production of fissile material...we hope that the two governments will decide for reasons of their own that it makes sense to have a moratorium on further production of that kind of material until the negotiations on this subject in Geneva can produce a universal ban on the production of fissile material.

  3. With respect to ballistic missiles and nuclear–capable aircraft, we are hoping that the two governments will see fit as a matter of, in each case, a unilateral defence policy, to restrain and restrict the development and deployment of those delivery systems so as not to exacerbate or accelerate the ballistic missiles arms race that might otherwise prove ruinously expensive to the two countries, and also destabilising.

  4. On the issue of export controls, making sure that Indian and Pakistani laws and regulations are very much in keeping with international norms so that these two countries continue to do what I think they’ve already established a pretty good track record in doing, and that is making sure that they don’t transfer dangerous technologies to other countries.

  5. The United States is prepared to continue to use its good offices with India and Pakistan to try to foster or encourage direct dialogue between the two countries on the key issues that divide them and have been the source of such enmity and occasional conflict over the years, and that includes, of course, the issue of Kashmir. 3

On all of these issues, there has been improvement through bilateral dialogue. The most remarkable thing is that this is the first time that the US has engaged in this type of dialogue with any country on serious issues like the NPT and CTBT. This shows the US concerns in this region about nuclear issues. The two countries have made great progress in these areas. The Indian side is close to signing the treaty provided there is US support for a UN Security Council seat for India.

Regarding the NPT, the US makes certain specific reactions:

Next on the line of issues is that of Kashmir which has been the most dangerous point of contention between India and Pakistan. This is an issue with the greatest potential to trigger a conventional or even nuclear war. According to the report, the United States wants India and Pakistan to:

In addition, India should be urged to:

At the same time, Pakistan should be urged to:

Ambassador Shaffer, who was giving a brief about the Kashmir situation, said, “The US has always tried to avoid taking sides in this dispute. We have a long standing relationship” with Pakistan–important military ties in 1950s and 1960s, especially the US–Pakistan collaboration over the Afghan problem. Relations with India have had economic and scientific dimensions. “...US goal has always been to maintain good relations with both countries and not to try to choose between them.”

In regard to Kargil, the US thinking goes as follows: India should not read too much into the US support to India on Kargil. The basic problem that the US faced was the de–escalation of the conflict between India and Pakistan. The continuation of a local war in the subcontinent had the potential to escalate into a nuclear war, either accidentally or due to an over–enthusiastic supranational outburst on either side. The US desires to avert such a situation at any point of time in the subcontinent and this has been a major policy objective of the United States in South Asia.

The US interests in South Asia, and India in particular, for the future would be based on economic and commercial issues. The US has been India’s largest trade partner and the largest foreign investor too. US exports to India in 1997 were $3.6 billion, while US imports from India in the same year totalled $7.3 billion. The US aid programme for India for FY1998 includes an estimated $51.35 million in development assistance, $91.874 million in PL 480 funds, and $475,000 for International Military Education and Training (IMET). For FY 1999, the Clinton Administration has requested for $56.5 million for development assistance, $91.752 million in PL 480 funds, and $450,000 million for IMET. 4   Also the US AID (Agency for International Development) has increasingly been focussing on sustainable development programmes that support India’s efforts to restructure and privatise its economy. This does not mean that all is smooth in Indo–US economic relations. Major areas of irritation have been the issues of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), Super 301, etc.

What one could infer from the above is that US interests in South Asia have been becoming prominent in the recent years. However, there are areas of agreement and disagreement in the relations and the two countries should pursue the whole bilateral exercise by concentrating efforts on issues that bring them together like those of counter–terrorism, narco–drug trafficking, etc.

 


Endnotes

*:  Researcher, IDSA.  Back.

Note 1:  USIS, “US Security Policy in a Changing World”, US Foreign Policy Agenda, September 1998.  Back.

Note 2:  The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (The White House, October 1998), p. 7.  Back.

Note 3:  USIA, “Transcript: Talbott Worldnet ‘Dialogue’ on South Asia”, Wireless File, November 17, 1998.  Back.

Note 4:  Barbara Leith LePoer, “India–US Relations”, CRS Issue Brief, Updated June 22, 1998.  Back.