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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
The New World Order: An Appraisal—I
By Gurmeet Kanwal
*
| The Twentieth Century has been one of indiscriminate violence. But when people look back at it five hundred years from now, they will remember that it marked the first exploration of space and the invention of the microchip. They will not remember Hitler, Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt. |
| Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. |
Introduction
Millions of people all over the world looked on with incredulity as the East Germans brought down the Berlin Wall brick by brick in November 1989. When the gates of Checkpoint Charlie were finally thrown open, the world Press was there in strength to record the tears of joy which flowed as East and West Berliners were reunited after over four decades of bitterness and strife. People of the world witnessed live on their television screens a defining moment in history—the Iron Curtain had fallen.
On November 21, 1990, 22 heads of state from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Warsaw Pact countries met in Paris to sign treaties which would result in the destruction of large stocks of tanks, artillery pieces and aircraft. A little later, the Soviet armies stationed in former Warsaw Pact countries withdrew to Russia, leaving behind newly independent and newly democratic East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. The unexpected collapse and break-up of the Soviet Union itself in 1991, as a large number of its 15 constituent republics demanded independence or autonomy, and its consequent loss of power and prestige, finally marked the end of the undeclared but furiously fought Cold War.
The euphoria which swept the world as the great Communist empire collapsed was understandable. For 45 years the world had been worried about war, which at times seemed imminent, as during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Hundreds of millions of people, especially in Europe and North America, had grown up in fear of a nuclear holocaust. Now the world was once again in the throes of change. President George Bush proclaimed the beginning of a new era, “Free from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace, an era in which the nations of he world can prosper and live in harmony.”
Only one superpower remained; hence, the dominant view was there could be no major conflict in the future. Suddenly, nuclear weapons were perceived as extravagantly redundant, since a major war now appeared to be out of the question. A call was raised for the dismantling of NATO. Some scholars even predicted that war itself would soon be out of date. However, so far, it has not quite turned out like that. Events which have unfolded since then have belied these hopes. In the words of James Woolsey, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “We confront a deeply troubled and conflict prone world, which is more complicated, more volatile and much less predictable.” Today, local conflagrations across the globe continue to threaten world peace and have considerably eroded the “peace dividend” which was expected to be the positive fallout of the end of the Cold War. The end of superpower rivalry appears to have made the world more unstable, not less, and more prone to violent confrontation.
The global system is caught up in revolutionary upheaval today. Mankind is witnessing the sudden eruption of a new civilisation. The concept of the nation-state, the most basic building block of the global system, is itself changing. Approximately one-third of all the present members of the United Nations, are threatened by ethnic disharmony, rebel movements and insurgencies. National borders are becoming increasingly porous; currency rates are quickly going out of control of the central banks; imports and immigrants are moving freely across the world and terrorists, guns and drugs are threatening the sovereignty of nations. Out of this chaos, a new kind of political entity, being described as the “post-national” state, is emerging. It is imperative that the intricate nuances of the various aspects of the changes taking place in the international order, and their repercussions on the political, socio-economic, cultural and ideological components of society are understood in the correct perspective, so as to formulate meaningful strategies for the future progress, development, well being and survival of mankind.
The 20th century has all along been a period of accelerating change, but the pace of change, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has left many countries confused. Consequently, responses to the unfolding circumstances have not been optimal. With the end of the Cold War, the vision of a New World Order appears to have caught the imagination of quite a few, yet there is little consensus of what it really means. Hence, there is a need to examine the recent changes to determine the contours of the New World Order and the challenges and opportunities it provides so as to formulate a suitable response to the changed environment.
This two-part article proposes to analyse and evaluate the following salient aspects impinging on the New World Order:
Recent Hypotheses on the New World Order
The End of History
Many scholars and intellectuals have proffered visions of the emerging world order. Of all these, Francis Fukayama’s book entitled The End of History and the Last Man 1 and Samuel Huntington’s article entitled “The Clash of Civilisations?” 2 (later developed into a book) have become modern day classics in the genre of international security. Fukayama has theorised that the world is witnessing the end of the ideological confict between democracy and totalitarianism and that the decisive defeat of totalitarianism will be the likely outcome. This, in turn, would bring about the end of conflict in the developed countries. However, the Third World would continue to suffer wars as it is “mired in history” and still in the process of resolving its ideological conflicts. Besides Fukuyama, economic historian Robert L. Heilbroner has also pronounced the “end of history and the victory of capitalism.” Fukayama’s argument suffers from the fallacy of a single alternative, as the end of totalitarianism and Communism does not necessarily mean the emergence of liberal democracy. Fukayama’s paradigms are limited in their applicability mainly to the Western world and tend to ignore the rest. With the emergence of many new forms of authoritarianism, ethnic nationalism and religious fundamentalism, it is extremely doubtful whether ideological and physical conflicts will end and the world will witness the “end of history.”
The Clash of Civilisations
Huntington’s hypothesis is: “The fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts in global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilisations. The clash of civilisations will dominate global politics. The (cultural) fault lines between civilisations will be the battle lines of the future.” 3 He postulates that this will be the case because differences between civilisations are not only real, they are basic; the world is becoming a smaller place; the processes of economic modernisation and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities; the growth of civilisation-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West; cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and, hence, less easily compromised than political and economic ones and economic regionalism is increasing. Thus, Huntington challenges the geo-economic school, which sees trade conflict and global competition as the main source of political rivalries.
Bernard Lewis, a respected Western scholar, writing about the interaction between the West and the rest of the world, emphasises the predominance of democracy and free markets as the core Western values that entice the rest of the world. However, the focus of public debate is now shifting towards a wider set of values and traditions that may explain Western ‘modernity’ and the West’s global dominance today versus the relatively underdeveloped, often chaotic, nature of Third World societies. In his recent writings, Lewis has stated, “The modern process of change was undoubtedly initiated by the West, but is it Western in its origins? The West was not born like Aphrodite from the seafoam, and much of it is of non-Western origin, distinct from the Greco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian roots of Western civilisation...Modern Western civilisation is the first to embrace the whole planet...(and) today the dominant civilisation is the Western, and Western standards, therefore, define modernity.” 4
Though nation-states have played a predominant role in global affairs for a few centuries, it is certainly true that the major civilisations have had a far greater part in the shaping of human history. However, it appears to be premature to downgrade the fervour of nationalism in moulding the future contours of the emerging political firmament. Major General Dipankar Banerjee, while commenting on Huntington’s hypothesis, states, “The entire concept of civilisational conflict, attactive though it may seem on the surface, does not fully address the many contradictions in the world today.” 5
While not disagreeing entirely with Huntington, Alvin and Heidi Toffler, of Future Shock and Third Wave fame, find his reliance on the traditional definition of civilisation inadequate. In their new book entitled War and Anti-war, they state, “We, too, believe civilisations will clash in the future. But not along the lines he (Huntington) suggests. An even larger potential collision lies ahead—a ‘master conflict’ within which his clash of civilisations could itself be subsumed. We might think of it as a collision of (industrial) ‘super civilisations’.” 6 The Tofflers use the word civilisation to refer to First Wave agrarianism, Second Wave industrialism and to the emerging Third Wave globalism. 7 The Tofflers argue that to introduce a new civilisation onto the planet and then expect peace and tranquility, is the height of strategic naivete. Each civilisation has its own economic, and hence political and military, requirements. 8 They predict that the historic change from a bisected to a trisected world could well trigger the deepest power struggles on the planet as each country tries to position itself in the emerging three-tiered power structure. “The resulting collisions, reflecting the sharply differing needs of two radically different civilisations, could provoke some of the worst bloodshed in the years to come.” 9
The End of Progressivism
In his essay entitled “The End of Progressivism,” Eisuke Sakakibara disagrees with the projections of both Fukayama and Huntington. 10 In his view, “The Cold War was nothing but a conflict between two extreme versions of progressivism—socialism and neo-classical capitalism.” 11 Sakakibara feels that with the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the rosy neo-classical dream of the “end of history” has been tarnished. He cites two main reasons for this: globalisation and environmental constraints. He avers, “The demise of socialism and the end of the Cold War released the world from a Western civil war over differing versions of progressivism to confront the more fundamental issues of environmental pollution and the peaceful coexistence of different civilisations.” 12 He reasons that the re-emergence of civilisation-consciousness is directly related to deep disillusionment with the ideology of progressivism. “Civilisations do indeed rise and fall and often clash with each other, but more important, they have interacted and coexisted throughout most of history.” 13 According to Sakakibara, the clash of civilisations is not the inevitable result of their coexistence but rather the result of their recent interaction with Western progressivism. He recommends that civilisations such as the West and Islam must practice tolerance and that, “the West must abandon sectarian progressivism in favour of respect for the environment and tolerance for other civilisations.” 14
Critique
The disapperance of Communism has not opened the door to a one-world system. There appears to be no justification in clinging to the belief that the “end of history”, in Francis Fukayama’s misleading phrase, is at hand. It is clear that civilisations will continue to coexist and, if at all they do clash, it will only be sometime in the distant future. However, in the foreseeable future, conflicts will be more likely to occur between nation states to correct the aberrations of history even though the real competition among nations may be in the arena of trade and commerce. Ideological confrontation is fairly unlikely to lead to large-scale wars, as the world has known them. Principles of tolerance and moderation are more likely to be practised by nations as greater political maturity results, consequent to increasing democratisation. Environmental and ecological issues will undoubtedly play a major role in the interaction between nations and environmental constraints are more likely to influence developmental activities. Non-adherence to the principles of tolerance in global politics will certainly lead to an escalation in tensions between nations and, eventually, between civilisations.
Also, if “modernity” is going to become the new prod with which the West can poke Third World cultures into neo-colonialism, this would be a divisive, diversionary and, ultimately, harmful exercise. If, on the other hand, “modernity” can be discussed in its full historical and cultural context, then a truly useful and satisfying inter-civilisational understanding can be promoted that can help to build on the strengths of shared common legacies, rather than to magnify the few differences that remain.
Contours of the Post-Cold War Emerging World Order and Strategic Trends
Ambiguity and Turbulence
It is difficult to explain in simple terms exactly what has happened since the momentous events of 1989. Although the United States (US) claimed victory at the end of the Cold War, Germany and Japan appear to be the real victors as they stand to gain the most. The bipolar, military alliance-based block system of maintaining the balance of power, has lost its relevance. With the transformation and breakup of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the East-West ideological confrontation has come to an end. In a Europe struggling for unity and further integration, unified Germany is emerging as a major power centre. The massive Japanese trade surplus continues to threaten the economies of the remaining G-15 countries. Many Cold War-linked regional conflicts are winding down. However, ethnic conflicts, such as the ongoing Bosnian Muslim-Serb-Croat imbroglio, are a destabilising influence on regional peace. Arms control, conventional weapons and nuclear disarmament, Islamic fundamentalism, human rights, anti-narcotics measures and a host of other pressing issues, are high on the international agenda. Only one thing appears certain—that turbulence lies ahead. 15 Much of it could be avoided if the world is prepared to learn from the Cold War experience and adapt itself to the post-Cold War realities. In this context, it is important to first understand the emerging contours of the New World Order.
Unipolar Present Status
In the early years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the impression that the world had become unipolar had gained currency. Renowned syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer was the first off the block to expound the concept of a unipolar world. He wrote, “The most striking feature of the post-Cold War world is its unipolarity...In perhaps another generation or so there will be great powers coequal with the United States and the world will, in structure, resemble the pre-World War I era. But we are not there yet, nor will we for decades. Now is the unipolar moment.” 16 The US exulted in its “unipolar moment” when, under its leadership, the coalition forces inflicted a crushing defeat on President Saddam Hussein’s occupation forces in Kuwait in 1991 and compelled their withdrawal. The US will was given legal sanction through its action being endorsed by a resolution of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. In subsequent years also, the US domination of the UN apparatus has continued. Interventions in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, were engineered by the US to suit its own national interests. The US-led NATO intervention in Yugoslavia has completely ignored the UN Security Council. There were fears in the Third World of a new economic Cold War between the industrialised North, under the leadership of the US, and the developing countries of the South. 17 The pressure tactics on the renewal of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in mid-1995, further incensed many countries of the Third World. However, it is clear that gradually the accent in international relations is veering towards economic ties and trade. In the decades ahead, economic power is likely to assume greater significance than purely military power and the present unchallenged domination of the world scene by the US will slowly fade away as new economic powers rise in Asia, South America and Africa.
Emerging Multipolar/Polycentric World
The likely diffusion of power of the US will ultimately result in the emergence of a multipolar or polycentric world. The Asia-Pacific region is likely to emerge as the epicentre of the evolving multi-polar world. The 21st century is being projected as the Asian century. According to K.Subrahmanyam, “There is reasonable expectation that in the next 25 years, Asia will become the centre of gravity of the globe in the economic, strategic and political fields.” 18 The growing economic clout of the Asian nations will give them a larger number of security options and increased freedom of alignment. It will also make them less dependent on the Western security umbrella and guarantees. The emerging multipolar primary centres of power will be the US, Russia, Japan, Germany (as the core of the European Union), India and China. France, Brazil, Nigeria and Korea, subject to successful reunification, are likely to be the secondary powers. Australia, South Africa, Israel, Indonesia and Malaysia are likely to be in the outer orbit of the international power equation.
Due to the diversity of power centres, the New World Order will be complex and fragile. The overall focus is likely to be on economic interdependence to a very large extent. The power equation will be mainly in trade and economic terms and in the dynamics of interaction in terms of political and diplomatic influence. Non-military threats to security and stability will overtake military threats. “The security challenges in the post-Cold War world are more complex and daunting than what any one nation can discern or manage, given the inter-linkages at play. But for any equitable and ethical consensus to emerge, there must be a comprehensive acknowledgement of reality in a balanced and consistent manner.” 19
Other commentators have proffered different interpretations of the manner in which the world may “polarise” in future. Jasjit Singh writes that polarisation could occur “between the industrialised developed states of the North and the developing countries of the South.” 20 He also states that polarisation along ideological lines cannot be ruled out. “There was certainly some indication of polarisation along ideological lines immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The OIC (Organisation of Islamic Countries) as a group of states still appears to be operating somewhat along this line, while the West views the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) with continuing suspicion. 21
Even though authoritarianism is progressively waning, the advance of democracy will be slow and marked by many interruptions. Successful new patches of pluralism will gradually take root alongside stubbornly resistant strains of the old authoritarian order, such as in China and Cuba. State structures in the developing world will take time to be consolidated. Meanwhile, there will be growing competition for regional dominance and, consequently, increase in regional tensions. The undercurrents of regional economic unification, which are gathering strength, will take concrete shape in the decades ahead. The European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) are already in various stages of implementation. These are likely to be soon joined by several other trade pacts in the South American and African continents. Fissiparous tendencies on ethnic lines will threaten the stability of a number of nations. Communal separatism in general and Islamic revivalism in particular, will endanger international security. International terrorism, including nuclear terrorism and narco-terrorism, constitute major transnational challenges. The info-tech fusion of the world into a global village is spawning rising expectations which will be increasingly difficult to fulfil and will inexorably lead to societal tensions. Such tensions may even lead to a mass uprising and class wars between the haves and the have-nots, which may spill across national boundaries.
In a strategic assessment report presented recently to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, Washington, visualised that the US might face strategic and geo-economic threats from India, China and Russia by 2008. The report termed the three states as plausible “theatre peers” and defined a theatre peer as one who “will have a trans-oceanic nuclear delivery capability and a substantial technological base to develop, exploit and deploy elements of a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA)-class military systems.” The report stated that “...as transition states they (the theatre peers) will probably both cooperate and compete with the US on a wide range of strategic and geo-economic issues. Such mixed relations will make any long-term US strategy to use international monitoring or sanctions to restrict in a substantial way the diffusion of advanced dual-use or military technology, ineffective.” The report underlined the need to maintain a “robust nuclear force” and a forward presence of forces in the Pacific to counter threats from the theatre peers. 22 Such threat assessments reveal that competition among nations is likely to continue into the new millennium and that the possibility of future conflicts can never be ruled out.
Developments Likely to Cause Major Instability
The only thing that could be predicted with some assurance of certainty is that there will be considerable asymmetries of power, capability and the willingness to exploit that capability among the emerging primary power centres, most of which will simultaneously remain embroiled in regional and even internal problems. Narrow national interests may even encourage the perpetuation of hegemonic polycentrism. Such a course of action will naturally lead to tension and instability. The following developments are likely to cause major instability in the international security environment if they occur:
Impact of European Security Environment on Stable World Order
Since the end of World War II, major international security concerns have tended to be Eurocentric. It was in Europe that a nuclear Armageddon was expected to begin and to result in the ultimate annihilation of all mankind. Though the end of the Cold War and the unification of Germany have drastically altered the situation in Europe, its place in the international security scenario remains an important one. It is, thus, necessary to analyse the European security environment and its impact on future international security.
Elimination of the Warsaw Pact Threat
From 1945 onwards, the US had guaranteed the survival of Europe against a threat from the Warsaw Pact. That threat no longer exists. Hence, from America’s point of view, the situation in Europe no longer warrants a majorAmerican presence. The US is committed to a phased reduction in the force levels deployed in Europe as part of the NATO. Some of the European nations were also never convinced that they were being treated as equal partners by the Americans. The relationship was perceived with a flavour of condescension on one side and resentment on the other. NATO has been viewed as, “a reluctant North American arm around the nervous Western shoulder of Europe.” 23 With the threat of invasion from the East having receded, the European nations are finding it difficult to convince America, the American Congress in particular, that the continued presence of American troops on European soil remains critical for the security of Europe.
In 1992, European thoughts about the future security strategy were centred around the concept of a new alliance which would overcome the weaknesses of NATO and include not only the US but also Japan. “The new alliance would be global in scope and would recognise that its members all needed each other—not necessarily in the same way and to the same degree, but enough for their interdependence to be reflected in the rules by which they agreed to operate.” 24 This view was not shared by France, in consonance with the independent line which France had adopted throughout the Cold War. At an international colloquium on the “New Strategic Debate” hosted by him at Paris from September 29 to October 1, 1992, French Defence Minister Pierre Joxe “made it clear that France could not conceive of integrating substantial elements of its defence into a wider ensemble, without the assurance in return of a Europe endowed with a political will of its own.” 25 Ruling out the return of France to the integrated military structures of NATO, the French defence minister offered increased participation in politico-military discussions of NATO. President Jacques Chirac of France also opposes the domination of the world by any one power (meaning the US) and has asserted the preference of France for a multipolar world. K. Subrahmanyam writes, “In Europe, while Britain is likely to favour continution of its special relationship with the US and a subordinate role to it internationally, Germany’s preferences on the future international system will determine the way in which the European Union will play its global role.” 26
Partnership for Peace: Restructuring of NATO to Suit New Realities
US Deputy Under Secretary of Defence (Policy) Lewis Libby, had asserted in 1992, “The US vision of the future European security architecture was not of competing structures but of interlocking institutions each with its own role to play, providing a range of options to prevent, manage or respond to crisis or aggression.” 27 He also declared, “Effective multilateral action was most likely to come about in response to US leadership and not as an alternative to it.” 28 The major differences in the US and French approach were highlighted. The prevailing German view was also in favour of converting US leadership to partnership. The French also believed in continuing the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence. “The French...are of the view that a dominant Germany can be controlled only by embedding it in a united Western European security framework and by balancing the German economic and technological dominance with the French and British nuclear capabilities.” 29
The disagreements among the leading European nations are bound to have a considerable impact on international politics and security. In spite of the Maastricht Treaty, there has been no real progress towards making the European Union an autonomous centre in international decision making. The US dominance over Europe has led to a desire on the part of insecure Eastern European states to join NATO. After the 1994 Brussels Summit, the 16 nations comprising NATO streamlined their military structures and launched a “Partnership for Peace” (PfP) Initiative to admit new members, mainly from the Eastern European states, to form an enlarged common security framework while retaining the original character of NATO. The PfP Initiative had the following aims: 30
Franco-German Rivalry
In the early years, the European Commission (EC) revolved around the Franco-German axis. German economic power was balanced by French military power. Now Germany is the dominant partner. The growing political and economic influence of Germany, and its burgeoning friendship with the US, has served to marginalise France within the European Union (EU). Sanjaya Baru states that, “The heart of EU is no longer in Brussels, the headquarters of the EU, which is symbolically halfway between Bonn and Paris, but has moved eastwards into the Rhine valley.” 31 While Germany is clearly an emerging world power in the middle of the cross-roads of change sweeping across Europe as the former Soviet bloc nations rise from behind the Iron Curtain dressed as democracies, Germany’s “security and military policy are those of a provincial government: timid, inward-looking and lacking strategic priorities...” 32 Germany’s new foreign minister’s proposal in November 1998 that NATO should renounce the “first use” of nuclear weapons, drew a sharp response from the US Administration and was rejected out of hand. Though Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder lost no time in reassuring the US that Germany had no intention of undermining US leadership in Europe, it was evident that “German resentment towards the discriminatory nuclear order runs deep.” 33
NATO’s Eastward Expansion
The PfP Initiative has dramatically altered the very character of the NATO alliance. The 38-state North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the 53-state CSCE have been instrumental in building a cohesive security and consultative apparatus in Western Europe. The Madrid NATO Summit of July 1997 was the beginning of the end of the divisions created at Yalta. Carrying the PfP Initiative further, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, all former Warsaw Pact members, were invited to join the NATO alliance.
While Russia continues to look suspiciously at NATO’s eastward expansion, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia are impatiently knocking at the doors of NATO for an early entry and the Baltic countries and Bulgaria are queuing up close behind. In order to allay Russian fears about the intentions behind NATO’s eastward roll, a joint NATO-Russian Council was created in 1997 to enable Russia to scrutinise, but not veto, NATO policy. NATO has also undertaken to desist from deploying nuclear weapons and combat units on the territory of its three new member states. “Moscow has said that a &145;red line’ would be crossed if Ukraine was to join the alliance.” 34 Fears of NATO creeping close to Russian frontiers make the Russian leaders even more apprehensive because, simultaneously, dissent continues to brew within the ranks of the 12 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—the loose grouping of the former Soviet republics. US influence over Central Asia is also growing stronger. Russian Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov suggests that the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) should replace NATO in maintaining European peace and stability. 35 This would considerably assuage Russian apprehensions. The tangible negative fallout of NATO’s eastward expansion has been that Russia has been led to reverse its “no-first use” policy on nuclear weapons and to modernise its nuclear forces. Also, the Russian Duma is now extremely reluctant to ratify the START II treaty.
Meanwhile, following the European economic union and the launch of a common currency, proposals are flying thick between Europe’s capitals to promote a security and defence identity for the EU, supported by coherent and cross-border military and defence industry policies. “Proposals to strengthen the EU’s amorphous foreign policy decision-making machinery and tie it to the defence capabilities of NATO and the Western European Union (WEU), have recently surfaced in Bonn and London.” 36 The 10-nation WEU defence organisation should “be folded into the European Union to give the latter a clear military dimension,” as per a declaration issued by the WEU Assembly on March 16, 1999. 37 The WEU is the only all-European self-defence organisation; however, it has always been dominated by the larger NATO. All the 10 members of the WEU are NATO members as well as members of the 15-nation European Union.
NATO’s New Strategic Concept
However, the US influence continues to loom large over Europe, as evidenced by the developments in Bosnia which first exposed the inability of the West European nations to act unitedly. K. Subrahmanyam has expressed the view that “the US policy in Bosnia...prevented Western European nations from succeeding in solving the Bosnian issue and led to an American sponsored solution being imposed with only minimal participation of the Western European nations in decision making.” 38 NATO’s recent US-led intervention in Serbia by way of aerial bombardment of military, industrial and civilian infrastructure targets (oil refineries, car factories, rail and road bridges, chemical and pharmaceuticals factories, railway stations, airports and television stations) without the approval of the UN Security Council, its threat to impose a naval “oil and economic blockade” and to launch a ground offensive, if necessary, is violative of several international laws and treaties and also of the NATO Charter itself. The damage inflicted by NATO includes large-scale civilian casualties. The cost of intervention is reported to have exceeded the US $100 billion mark. It has set the Serbian economy back by one to two decades, without achieving even nominal tangible progress in resolving the ethnic Albanian crisis in Kosovo province. The NATO intervention has also forced Russia to “strengthen its defences, revise its military doctrines and rethink its ties with Western countries if NATO launches a ground war against Yugoslavia.” 39 Russia has also vowed to defy the NATO oil embargo. The possibilities of a NATO-Russia standoff are inherent in these developments.
On the final day of the NATO Alliance’s 50th Anniversary Summit, held at Washington in end-April 1999, NATO leaders approved a new “strategic concept” that “embraces for the first time ‘military missions’ in ‘volatile regions’ beyond their borders...NATO Secretary General Javier Solana termed the new ‘strategic concept’ as a ‘road map to navigate the security challenges’ of the next millennium...President Bill Clinton ‘reaffirmed our readiness to address regional and ethnic conflicts beyond the territory of NATO members.’....It (the new ‘strategic concept’) also states that members can act against ‘out-of-area’ problems that threaten the security and stability of Europe.” 40 While NATO’s leaders have publicly gone along with their US host at the summit, particularly in view of the need for public solidarity in the face of the crisis in Kosovo, European diplomats, especially those from France and Germany, have for some time been expressing concern about what they a label a US tendency to push too hard for NATO to become involved in missions outside continental Europe. Many European diplomats have been “insisting (that) there be an identifiable link to NATO’s own security before any such (‘out-of-area’) missions can be launched.” 41
NATO’s newfound proclivity for “out-of-area” interventionism is not only likely to cause concern to Russia but also to India and China and is apparently a destabilising development in the emerging New World Order. Recent unilateral military actions by the US and its allies in Iraq and Yugoslavia may hasten the formation of a non-military India-China-Russia triangle, if not a “strategic triangle,” as was proposed by Russian prime minister Yevgeni Primakov during his talks with the Indian prime minister at New Delhi in December 1998. 42 Russia, in particular, feels the need for closer relations with Asian powers like India and China to counter dominance in a “unipolar” world and is vigorously pursuing its new concept of mnogopolyarnost or multi-polarity. 43 At their Beijing Summit in November 1997, the Chinese and Russian presidents had expressed their desire for a “strategic partnership” and had proclaimed their opposition to a unipolar world. At their Moscow Summit a year later, in November 1998, the two presidents noted that “the strategic partnership declared by the two countries, the world’s largest and the world’s most populous, last year is not an alliance and is not aimed against third countries.” 44 Though China had earlier been cool to Russia’s suggestion that India be included in a “strategic partnership” to counter-balance US domination of the emerging world order, during the meeting of the India-China Joint Working Group at Beijing in the last week of April 1999, China finally relented and acknowledged India’s emergence as a major pole in a future multipolar world order. This change in attitude could be attributed to India’s new status as a state with nuclear weapons with matching delivery systems as well as to the US-led NATO intervention in Serbia and the need for a common India-China-Russia “strategic partnership” to face the emerging challenge.
European security risks continue to be highly varied and all too real. Ethnic and religious tensions abound; nuclear smuggling raises the spectre of weapons of mass destruction falling into terrorists’ hands and the continuing tragedy in the Balkans underscores the reality of regional instabilities and the potential for even more serious conflict. These developments do not augur well for the further integration and consolidation of the European Union which has the potential to act as, “A countervailing factor against the overwhelming dominance of the US in international affairs.” 45
Paradigm Changes Affecting International Security
Wars of Interest
Even though most countries of the world no longer have serious differences of opinion with each other about politics and economics and ideological confrontation is no longer relevant, many of them continue to be inimical to their neighbours. “Countries have long quarreled and will continue to quarrel, about many things besides ideology.” 46 The advances of democracy will be slow, patchy and prone to interruptions. Economic pluralism does not automatically guarantee political maturity and balance. Hence, the world’s democracies will have to be vigilant and prepared to respond to threatening situations before they can develop into serious eruptions with a potential for causing major damage. Far-flung and weak members of the democratic club will need to be protected. Continuous raw material supplies will need to be ensured to keep the economies running smoothly. Threatened interruptions in vital resources like oil are likely to lead to war, such as the Gulf War in 1990-91. If rogue regimes or nations seize control of strategic areas or vital resources, it would call for a swift response through a coalition of forces to restore the situation. Conflicts of this type are being termed as “wars of interest”. Two obvious areas fall under this category. One is the Korean Peninsula where North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons could endanger world peace. The other is the Islamic crescent, running through South-West Asia and North Africa, “with its powerful combination of oil, Islam and a long history of anti-Western resentment.” 47
Wars of Conscience
In the age of heightened human rights consciousness, democracies of the world may also have to be ready to fight a different kind of war not directly related to the immediate vital interests of a participating country. Large scale human rights violations by a dictatorial regime, civil wars leading to genocide, natural or man-made calamities and the systematic extermination of minorities by fanatical despots, are likely to anger the world community enough to initially impose economic and military sanctions and, in case of failure to stem the rot, to eventually go to war to find a solution to the problem. Future conflicts of this type are being termed as “wars of conscience”. The recent interventions in Haiti, Somalia and Rwanda could be said to fall in this category, though the level of military commitment remained short of actual fighting.
Erosion of the Nation-State
The cohesive nature and autonomy of the nation-state is being progressively eroded by the changes taking place in the socio-political and socio-economic environment. The following three forces will directly influence the shape of the nation-state of the near future: 48
Though these three challenges to the survival of the nation-state are quite powerful, the nation-state is likely to have greater durability than is being imagined at present. In a perceptive essay entitled “The Shape of the World,” The Economist states, “The idea that nation-states, wishing to belong to something bigger, will gather together into big, new entities, each speaking for the culture or civilisations of its component parts, is a long way off from being realised.” 49 Only in Western Europe is there any seriously conceived plan to dissolve existing nation-states into something bigger and, “even this European experiment may now be running into the sands. The world does not, in short, seem to be heading for that fearful ‘clash of civilisations’.” 50 However, J.N. Dixit echoes a different view. Quoting Jean Marie Guehenno, a senior French diplomat, Dixit states that nation-states are becoming irrelevant. “A new imperial age is in the making where power and influence will accrue to entities and communities with advanced technologies and information capabilities. These...will transcend existing geo-political boundaries and, regardless of their size and strength, existing nation-states will have to cope with this transition.” 51
On January 1, 1999, with the introduction of the Euro as a common currency, the European nations expressed their steadfast resolve to continue the 40-year-old process of European integration. By transferring their sovereign rights over monetary policy to the European Central Bank, the nations of Europe not only added a finishing touch to the long process of creating a single market in Europe, but also moved closer to further integration endeavours in other major areas like the development of a social, environmental and, eventually, a political union. Heralding the dawn of a new era, the German ambassador in India wrote, “The emergence of Europe as one of the major global players might take time, but already now Europe in the monetary and economic area is a force to reckon with. Europe certainly will become a solid pole in a new multi-polar world...Dramatic changes are taking place at this moment, the dynamics of which are reaching far beyond European borders. The old continent is proving to be pretty young.” 52 It does not require the gift of prescience to forecast that, as Europe gets politically and economically unified, it is bound to assert itself increasingly on international issues and not be “a docile camp follower of the US as it has been in the last fifty years.” 53 Surely the world will watch this European experiment with both excitement as well as trepidation as its outcome will have widespread repercussions on the future of nation-states.
Mega-Media Revolution
A bigger blow to the concept of a nation-state comes from the “mega-media” revolution, spawned by the advances in digital communications and fanned by the unbridled power of the Internet, which has created cyber-citizens. These international net-surfers coexist in a borderless cyber-state. The “electronic liberation” of the individual is gradually creating a new power structure. The proliferation of satellite TV has also dealt a devastating blow to the concept of the nation-state, though inadvertently. It is creating what Jasjit Singh has called a “revolution of rising expectations.” 54 Powerful multinational corporations (MNCs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) transcend national borders and exercise immense power over the people whose lives they touch. It would not be far-fetched to predict that MNCs may soon raise their own armed militias to protect their commercial interests, particularly in war-ravaged regions in the Third World and such tendencies need to be guarded against. However, it is difficult to agree with Rajesh Sawhney that the end of the nation-state is close at hand. 55 The present nation-states will not easily give up their sovereignty and could reasonably be expected to struggle through at least the 21st century based on the mutual security and trade preferences provided by regional groupings, linkages and even alliances. The perceptible global trend towards cultural-economic regional groupings while retaining their essential sovereignty, is not only the most appropriate way ahead for modern nation-states, but is also inevitable.
Though there is a clear lack of agreement among scholars, diplomats and analysts regarding the shape of the nation-state in the coming millennium, what is clear is that change is inevitable. Any socio-political crystal gazing must take into account not only the post-Cold War power equations and economic globalisation, but also the challenges of economic want, terrorism, mass migration and transnational crime.
Inter-State to Intra-State Conflict
The end of the East-West ideological confrontation has brought to the fore various problems which impinge on international security, but were simmering under the surface for quite some time. The foremost among these is that the world is moving away from inter-state to intra-state conflict, often encouraged and actively abetted by external powers with vested interests. In Major General Banerjee’s words, “Force is projected through proxy wars, state terrorism or the like, often exploiting an internal weakness. It is the latter that allows an external intervention to be successful.” 56 Such conflicts undermine the cohesion of the nation-state.
The Rise of Ethnic Nationalism
Events in the last decade of the present millennium have highlighted the dangers of the re-emergence of ethnic nationalism. Due to the contradictions of history, ethnic nationalism has always been a latent force—a dormant volcano with the potential to explode without warning. According to Major General Banerjee, “Ethnic populations have always straddled international boundaries. The Cold War somehow succeeded in suppressing ethnicity and kept a lid on its separatist tendencies.” 57 The rising flames of ethnic nationalism in the Balkans, Chechnya, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Caucasus, among others, and the racial turbulence in South Africa, are threatening international security with daily doses of mindless violence. Rashid Talib writes, “Any international recognition of ethnic nationalism now would produce violent disorder and human misery on a mind-boggling scale, even assuming it was somehow possible to uproot large masses of people or transfer them from one country to another.” 58
Islamic Resurgence
The late Ayatollah Khomeini’s passionate encouragement of Islamic fundamentalism in the 1980s and the subsequent Islamic resurgence, have added a new dimension to and vitiated the already fragile international security environment. Quoting M.J. Akbar, an eminent Indian author and editor, Prof. Huntington observes, “The West’s next confrontation is definitely going to come from the Muslim world. It is in the sweep of the Islamic nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for a new world order will begin.” 59 The crescent-shaped Islamic block, from the bulge of Africa through Central Asia up to Malaysia and Indonesia, has “bloody borders.” The politicisation of Islam and its use as a tool for revolution causes universal concern. Another recent development which is a cause for anxiety is the emerging nexus between China and some of the Islamic countries. In Huntington’s words, “A Confucian-Islamic military connection has come into being, designed to promote acquisition by its members of the weapons and weapons technologies needed to counter the military power of the West.” 60
After the collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union, the West had identified Islamic fundamentalism as the most potent threat to a stable world order. Huntington theorises that the West is already at war with Islam. Virulently anti-West speeches by Islamic leaders such as Ayatollah Khomeini (“Iran is effectively at war with America”) and President Gaddafi, who proclaimed a holy Jehad against the West, did not help matters. Out of the seven countries classified as “terrorist states” by the US, five (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Sudan) are Islamic states. 61 Terrorist attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, in which more than 200 people were killed, further reinforced the view that fundamentalist Islamic forces posed the greatest post-Cold War challenge. Retaliatory US strikes on Osama Bin Laden’s terrorist training camp near the Afghan-Pakistan border and on an allegedly chemical weapons manufacturing facility in Sudan, are indicative of the emerging resolve to put in place a global anti-terrorist regime and deal firmly with the perpetrators of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism.
The vigorous Islamic revival is giving rise to fundamentalist tendencies in other religious groups too. “The historic clash between Muslim and Hindu in the (Indian) Sub-continent manifests itself now not only in the rivalry between Pakistan and India but also in intensifying religious strife within India between increasingly militant Hindu groups and India’s substantial Muslim minority.” 62 Islamic revivalism and its repercussions pose serious challenges to international security. More and more states are falling prey to the strident march of Islam. The integrity of Algeria is under substantial threat and Egypt, in spite of its long civilisation, appears to be next on the “green” hit list. A serious conflagration in any of these areas would doubtlessly invite an international multilateral intervention to restore the situation.
Emerging Factors
Other new elements likely to have an impact on the emergence of a stable world order and in the international security context, include the anticipated ecological disasters to which the world might be subjected, the likely demographic explosion, the fast-depleting hydrocarbon reserves and the possibility of a “powershift” in the manner in which the world produces wealth, hypothesised by Alvin Toffler in his book Powershift. Global warming due to a depletion in the ozone layer, caused primarily by the rapidly increasing carbon dioxide emissions, is likely to lead to a massive shortage of food and water and “water wars” are now being widely anticipated. The demographically high pressure areas of Asia are likely to gravitate towards the low pressure areas of the Americas and Australia and even the most stringent immigration laws will not be able to stem the influx, making the use of force inevitable. It can be justifiably argued that to a large extent India’s 1962 and 1971 wars were caused by the influx of Tibetan and Bangladesh refugees, as also India’s intervention in Sri Lanka in the late-1980s which could be attributed to Tamilian refugees sailing in droves across the Palk Straits. Energy security itself is assuming immense importance. While oil has been a strategic resource throughout the 20th century, its rapid depletion is likely to lead to wars of unprecedented ferocity and the use of the weapons of mass destruction cannot be ruled out in this context.
While changes in the emerging world order may not be revolutionary at least in the short haul up to about 2015-20, they will not come about without some bloodshed and violence. In this context, the conclusion drawn by Michael Lind, executive editor of The National Interest, quoted by General K. Sundarji, is relevant: 63
The world is not entering an era of harmonious global interdependence and genuinely liberal democracy. While the stakes will be lower, global competition will increase: geo-economic competition between the leading economic powers will interact in complex ways with geo-political competition involving them with less prosperous but militarily significant great powers...In the most advanced industrial nations, the new catalytic state, by its very nature, will encourage the evolution of technocratic elitism, while in the newly marketising great powers, such as Russia, China and India, authoritarian legacies along with geo-political and developmental imperatives will probably produce variants of plebiscitary or dominant party democracy with praetorian underpinnings.
Trend Towards Vigorous Interventionism
Recent History
There have been numerous undeclared wars and interventions in the post-World War II era. Most of the interventions were without sufficient cause and without the moral sanction of the international community or the UN. They were also mostly unsuccessful. America’s bitter defeat in Vietnam, the Soviet Union’s ruthless march across Hungary and Czechoslovakia and, later its long adventure in and ignominious withdrawal from Afghanistan, China’s unprovoked aggression against Vietnam, Vietnam’s justifiable but unsuccessful foray into Cambodia and India’s unfortunate excursion into Sri Lanka, are some of the major examples. However, it is no longer possible for individual nations to attempt to impose their will by force on any other nation, no matter how small. Iraq learnt this lesson about attempting to subjugate the international will at great cost to its own survival, consequent to its ill-advised sally into Kuwait in 1990.
Evolving Doctrine of Interventionism
The current doctrine of interventionism is configured around the ability of the international community, mainly the US-led Western alliance, to impose its collective will in order to restore a deteriorating situation or to prevent a nascent conflict from burgeoning into full blown war with wider ramifications. This “right to interfere” may manifest itself in many ways. It may begin with a warning through a UN Security Council Resolution. A military embargo and economic sanctions may follow. Where applicable, a naval blockade may be enforced. Failing all other means, the international community may sanction the use of military force, possibly through a UN Security Council Resolution. Invariably, a multilateral coalition force with widespread representation is likely to be assembled. Even then the emphasis will be on the minimum use of force. Maximum use will be made of surgically precise air power to achieve the desired aim. Ground forces action is likely to be limited to achieve strictly military objectives. Emphasis will be laid on preventing collateral damage, with particular reference to civilian casualties and property. The following jutifications of the right to interfere are finding increasing though reluctant and slow acceptance: 64
In addition to the above mentioned situations justifying intervention, the following happenings may warrant an international response in the future:
The latest US-led NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, which completely bypassed the UN Security Council, has added a new dimension to the ongoing debate on international intervention. The principle of “might is right” appears to be gaining currency in international affairs. This, in itself, is likely to be a new cause for polarisation and instability in the coming decades.
(To be concluded)
Endnotes
*: Senior Fellow, The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Back.
Note 1: Francis Fukayama, The End of History and the Last Man, (London: Penguin Books, 1989). Back.
Note 2: Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilisations?,” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993. Back.
Note 4: Quoted by Rami G. Khouri, “Let’s Have Dialogue, not Clash, Between Civilisations” Times of India, April 25, 1997. Back.
Note 5: Dipankar Banerjee, “An Emerging World Order,” USI Journal, January-March 1994, p. 42. Back.
Note 6: Alvin and Heidi, Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (London: Warner Books, 1994), pp. 338-339. Back.
Note 7: Ibid., pp. 339-340. Back.
Note 10: Eisuke Sakakibara, “The End of Progressivism—A Search for New Goals,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 1995, pp. 8-14. Back.
Note 15: K. Subrahmanyam writes, “A polycentric world, balanced by six major power centres—US, the European Union, China, Japan, Russia and India—will be far more dynamic and less predictable than the earlier bipolar world system,” in “NAM or Never—Proactive Agenda for a Polycentric World,” Times of India, August 26, 1998. Back.
Note 16: Charles, Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1991, pp. 23-24. Back.
Note 17: K. Subrahmanyam, “India and the World: Stability, Security and Development,” Times of India, December 27, 1995. Back.
Note 19: C. Uday Bhaskar, “Registering Reality—Selective Spin on Global Narrative,” Times of India, September 25, 1998. Back.
Note 20: Jasjit Singh, “Geostrategies and Geopolitics of India: Recent Developments, Contemporary Challenges and Future Perspectives,” in V.A. Pai Panandiker and Ashis Nandy eds., Contemporary India (New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company Limited, 1999), pp. 235-260. Back.
Note 22: T.V. Parsuram, “India, China, Russia can Pose Strategic Threat to US,” The Observer of Business and Politics, September 7, 1998. Back.
Note 23: “Security in the 21st Century-II” (from an article in The Economist, reprinted in The Economic Times, October 13, 1992). Back.
Note 25: K. Subrahmanyam, “Security in the 21st Century-III”, The Economic Times, October 14, 1992. Back.
Note 26: K. Subrahmanyam, “Chirac in Beijing,” The Economic Times, May 19, 1997. Back.
Note 29: K. Subrahmanyam, “Security in the 21st Century-IV,” The Economic Times, October 15, 1992. Back.
Note 30: Defence 95 (an annual publication of International Defence Review). Back.
Note 31: Sanjaya Baru, “Notes from Europe—German Ascendance and French Isolation,” Times of India, October 16, 1995. Back.
Note 32: “Germany’s Military Future,” Defense News, August 17-23, 1998. Back.
Note 33: Siddharth Varadarajan, “NATO & No-First Use: The Nuclear Debate in Germany,” Times of India, December 10, 1998. Back.
Note 34: “Russia Resigned to NATO Membership for Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic,” Times of India, March 12, 1999. Back.
Note 35: Krzysztof Mroziewicz, “Russia Must not Fear a Multi-polar World,” Times of India, April 28, 1997. Back.
Note 36: Luke Hill, “Europe Seeks Military Strength in a United Front,” Defense News, March 29, 1999. Back.
Note 37: Christina Mackenzie, “WEU Parliamentarians Urge EU Merger”, Defence News, March 29, 1999. Back.
Note 38: K. Subrahmanyam, “Europe in Flux: Centrifugal Forces Still at Work,” Times of India, December 21, 1995. Back.
Note 39: Fred Weir, “Nato Leaders Pledge to Intensify Air Campaign—Russia Threatens to Revise Military Doctrines,” Hindustan Times, April 27, 1999. Back.
Note 40: Ramesh Chandran, “NATO Widens Scope for Intervention,” Times of India, April 26, 1999. Back.
Note 41: Colin Clark, “As Summit Looms, Allies Grapple with Role, Spending,” Defense News, April 12, 1999. Back.
Note 42: Gurmeet Kanwal, “China’s Long March to World Power Status: Strategic Challenge for India,” Strategic Analysis, February 1999, p. 1714. Back.
Note 43: Sumitra Rajagopalan, “India is now a Power in Russia’s Vision of a Multi-polar World,” Times of India, June 12, 1998. Back.
Note 44: Anna Dolgov, “Russia, China Adopt Statement on Border Issue,” Times of India, November 24, 1998. Back.
Note 46: “The Shape of the World,” The Economist, December 23, 1995-January 5, 1996. Back.
Note 47: “Security in the 21st Century” (From The Economist, reprinted in The Economic Times, October 12, 1992). Back.
Note 51: Jean Marie Guehenno, “La Fin de la Democratie” (End of the Nation State), quoted by J.N. Dixit, in “A Year in the Doldrums,” Outlook, January 3, 1996. Back.
Note 52: Heinrich-Dietrich, Dieckmann, “Europe as Engine of Multi-polar World,” Times of India, January 14, 1999. Back.
Note 53: K. Subrahmanyam, “Fortress Europe to Rein in Uncle Sam,” The Economic Times, January 5, 1999. Back.
Note 54: Jasjit Singh, “Towards a Safer Asia: An Indian Perspective” Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, April 1999, p. 6. Back.
Note 55: Rajesh Sawhney writes, “The concept of the nation-state is in the last leg of its life-cycle. And like any other dying institution, the nation-states are trying desperately to hang on to the last vestige of physical power. Yet, they are destined to die. In the interregnum, all of us will have dual nationality: one being physical (India, US, Pakistan, Cuba and so on) and the second in cyberspace with the prefix of www,” “Net Storm Spawns a Zillion Mutinies”, Times of India, November 20, 1998. Back.
Note 56: Banerjee, n. 5, p. 45. Back.
Note 58: Rashid Talib, “Nationalism Redefined”, Hindustan Times, July 20, 1995. Back.
Note 59: Huntington, n. 2, p. 32. Back.
Note 61: Dina Nath Mishra, “The United States Strikes Back,” The Observer of Business and Politics, September 17, 1998. Back.
Note 62: Huntington, n. 2, pp. 33-34. Back.
Note 63: General K. Sundarji, “Strategy for the 21st Century,” The Hindu, August 3, 1994. Back.
Note 64: Banerjee, n. 5, p. 43. Back.