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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
The Current Israeli–Palestinian Process: Consequences for India
By Shebonti Ray Dadwal *
On October 15, 1998, the Prime Minister of Israel and the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA) met at the instigation of the US Administration to try and salvage what is left of the process that was begun almost eight years ago to end the conflict between the Arabs and Jews. The Israeli Premier, Binyamin Netanyahu, and the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, were flown to a remote resort at Wye Plantation in Maryland to try and work out a deal which would be acceptable to both parties.
At one level, this meeting was about setting the terms for a second Israeli troop withdrawal from about 13 per cent of the occupied West Bank land as per the terms of the Oslo Accords. However, the deeper issue was trying to make what could turn out to be a last-ditch effort to save the moribund West Asian peace process.
So far, the picture most people carry of the current process to bring peace in the Middle East is of an inch-by-inch tug-of-war. Hence, when there is talk of a possible agreement, the usual response worldwide is one of scepticism. Most analysts believe that the only hopeful aspect of the meeting is that the two leaders have agreed to meet each other.
Though the meeting has evinced some hope in Washington and even West Asian quarters that there may be some movement in the peace process, there is not much optimism that the talks will result in an agreement. If there was any display of enthusiasm, it came from President Clinton, who described the meeting between Netanyahu and Arafat, after a gap of a year, as “a significant narrowing of the gaps between the two.” However, his Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, made it all too clear that she did not share the President’s optimism when she said that “some progress” had been made and rejected the term “breakthrough” which Clinton all but claimed had been made. 1
The Current Deadlock
As many had feared, the talks at Wye Plantation were acrimonious, with Netanyahu threatening at one stage to walk out over disagreements over security issues. However, he was persuaded to stay back and only said that “progress” was being made and that a deal was close. Other sticking points that still need to be sorted out are the revision of the Palestinian National Convenant to remove anti-Israel provisions as well extradition of Palestinians wanted for terrorist acts against Israel. However, the Palestinian negotiators later said that Israel was ready to soften its stand on the second aspect. But it is reported that Israel is still not happy with the security plan put forward by the Palestinians during and after the second withdrawal.
Even if an agreement can be signed to pull back Israeli troops from the stipulated territory, there is no reason to hope that this will solve the problem that has been plaguing the peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians and has caused the 19-month deadlock. As long as both sides continue to take unilateral decisions and steps which the other side considers provocative, there will be no “peace” in the current process that was started in 1991 and looked so promising after 1993 when the Oslo Accords were signed.
But after Shimon Peres was defeated in the May 1996 elections after a spate of Islamic terrorist suicide bombings left several Israelis dead, and was replaced by the hawkish Binyamin Netanyahu, who made no secret of his dislike of the Oslo process, chances of any progress on the Israeli–Palestinian process towards a settlement based on the exchange of land in return for peace were slim. Within a hundred days of the new rightist government taking over, Peres’ “new Middle East” was beginning to closely resemble the old one.
Netanyahu accused his predecessors of going too far in appeasing the Arabs, and insisted that he was serious about pursuing peace with the Arabs. He claimed that the delays in the implementation of the accords were necessary to ensure security, and pointed out that since he had taken over, there was a drastic reduction in terrorist acts. However, the Arab world seemed to be growing increasingly sceptical about his intentions. They felt that their suspicions about the new Premier were justified when he made no move to follow through on Israel’s promised withdrawal from Hebron or from large areas of the West Bank that divide Palestinian areas into islands of self-rule. Netanyahu only signed the Hebron agreement reluctantly after a crisis-like situation was created following the opening of the Hasmonean tunnel which left several riot-stricken people dead.
Neither was any progress made on other fronts such as talks on a final peace settlement or outstanding issues like disposition of water and fuel resources, release of prisoners, safe passage, etc. Stalling tactics adopted by the Israeli government based on conditions of action against terrorism by the PA, while at the same time introducing legislation allowing settlements to be constructed in East Jerusalem and parts of the West Bank, led to a growth in frustration among the Palestinians, resulting in an increasing number of protests—some violent—with Palestinian leaders even warning of the possibility of a new intifada.
It was only after Arafat threatened to use a forthcoming General Assembly meeting at the end of September 1998 as the venue for an announcement of a Palestinian state on May 4, 1999—the day the final status talks were to end—that the Clinton Administration made one final attempt to bring the two parties to the negotiating table. Netanyahu, however, threatened to annex most of the West Bank if a Palestinian state was declared, describing it as “a declaration of war” by the Palestinians and promised that “nothing will stop us (Israel) from proclaiming the land under our control and which in any case is not populated by Arabs.” He said Israel could not move forward as long as it feared “the Palestinian areas becoming a huge Hamas Islamic terrorist base—a base for fundamentalist extremism that endangers Israel.” 2
The Americans were successful in persuading Arafat not to announce plans to declare a Palestinian state, though he went ahead and called for an international conference to save the peace process. He also blamed Netanyahu for the delay in the process and assailed the US in an oblique way for vetoing 21 resolutions on the Palestinian question in the Security Council since 1973. He called on the UN to stand by his people “especially as the 5-year transitional period provided for in the Palestinian–Israeli agreements will end on May 4, 1999, and our people demand of us to shoulder our responsibilities and they await the establishment of their independent state.” 3
But after Dennis Ross, the US special official for West Asian affairs, and Madeleine Albright made yet another of their innumerable trips to the region, both sides agreed to try to come to some agreement.
Effect of the Peace Process on Israel and the Palestinians
There is no doubt that Israel has been the chief beneficiary of the peace process and the subsequent normalisation of relations with some of its neighbours. Soon after the Madrid peace conference and especially after the Oslo Accords were signed, Israel experienced a tremendous growth in its economy, and today the per capita income of Israelis stands at $17,000. Israeli leaders were welcomed by their Arab neighbours, and within months, Israeli leaders and business delegations were touring Morocco, Kuwait and Oman while officials in Jerusalem disclosed their plans for a natural gas pipeline from the Persian Gulf to Israel. The first regional conference Israel attended was also held in Morocco, and Rabat quietly opened a liaison office in Tel Aviv, requesting, however, that everything remain low-profile till there was significant progress on the Palestinian and Syrian peace tracks. Tunisia too agreed to establish an interest section in the Belgian Embassy in Tel Aviv, and plans to establish links with Oman were made. 4
The peace process also succeeded in lessening the impact of the Arab boycott, with many multinational companies and international banks, previously unrepresented in Israel, opening branches there, while many Israelis working and living abroad returned to their country. Analysts predicted that if peace could become a fixture, Israel had the potential to become a major centre and transit point.
The most obvious form of proof is the establishment of diplomatic links that have been formed or renewed with more than 50 countries since 1991, ending Israel’s isolation and opening up previously inaccessible markets. Also there has been a tremendous spurt in Israel’s defence contracts, with Israeli firms bagging many lucrative deals. Before the economic recession took its toll, Israel was chasing contracts in China, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand. Even now, Eastern Europe is a prime target and Poland, the Czech republic and Romania are concluding or negotiating defence joint ventures with Israel. Much of it is directed towards updating Soviet-made hardware. Germany, France and other Western European countries too are seeking closer cooperation in defence projects, in the hope that if peace can become a permanent reality in the Middle East, it will open up new markets after the Arab boycott is scrapped altogether.
Despite the global downturn in defence equipment sales, Israel’s technological superiority in the region has ensured that it achieved a 20 per cent increase in trade before 1996 with sales of $1.8 billion. Israel’s efforts towards peace also won military and financial rewards from the US—on top of its annual $1.8 million defence aid package, including 50 surplus F–16s, President Clinton pledged to lift barriers on transfer of supercomputer technology. 5
Israel’s greatest victory, however, was the establishment of defence links with an Islamic country. In February 1995, Israel and Turkey concluded a reciprocal military training agreement for their air and naval personnel and signed a $650 million deal according to which Turkey could refurbish F–4 Phantom jets in Israel. The next year, Ankara confirmed reports that the Israeli Air Force (IAF) was training in Turkish air space, clarifying that these were training flights and would not carry weapons or electronic surveillance equipment. Early this year, Israel, Turkey and the US with Jordan as observer, conducted naval exercises, evoking alarm and anger amongst other Islamic and Arab states. 6
However, after the right-wing government defeated the pro-peace Labour Party and took over in 1996, many analysts predicted that this would probably be the end of the peace process. As the new government announced plans to construct new settlements or enlarge existing ones, relations with Arab countries, which had been showing promising signs of moving towards normalisation, plunged.
On the security front, Israel’s neighbouring Arab countries started showing antagonism reminiscent of pre-Madrid sentiments. Syria’s President Assad showed no signs of willingness to restart stalled peace talks. In fact, tensions with Syria grew to a point that Syrian troop movements in Lebanon set off widespread speculation in Israel about the possibility of war, and Egypt warned Israel time and again of grave consequences if there was no movement in the peace process with the Palestinians. In the most recent sign of its growing strained relations with Israel, President Mubarak announced that Egypt would celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War but not the 20th anniversary of the Camp David Accords.
Even Jordan’s King Hussain, possibly Netanyahu’s strongest supporter in the Arab world, began to express doubts about the Israeli Premier’s intentions.
Further away, Qatar froze the construction of a gas pipeline to Israel and postponed the opening of its trade office in Israel. The Qatari Foreign Minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim al Thani, accused Israel of “destroying the lines we were building for peace.” Morocco’s King Hassan refused any interaction with Netanyahu, while at the same time entertaining his Labour rival, Shimon Peres, on a visit to Morocco. He said that the peace process was “in a state of crisis.”
Meanwhile, the economic condition of the Palestinians was declining rapidly. Gaza’s economy, which is fuelled by the wages earned by the 50,000 odd Palestinians who are permitted to work in Israel, was badly affected with the numerous closures imposed by Israel. Every time a terrorist act is carried out or Israel feels threatened by the possibility of one, the border points are closed, preventing the daily wage earners from crossing the Green Line. Worse still, the Palestinians are also prevented from exporting their produce. Palestinian demands that they be allowed to open a port so that they can export their produce have yet to be acceded to. Such closures affect all aspects of life in Gaza and the West Bank territories under Palestinian control, including education. 7
At the same time, in an attempt to force the PA to step up the battle against terrorism, Israel also resorted to suspension of tax reimbursements to the PA as well as other fees. Under the Oslo Accords, Israel is obligated to transfer all but a small fraction of the nearly $500 million it collects each year from the Palestinians who work or buy goods in Israel. A top Palestinian official said that Israel’s economic and security siege was costing the Palestinians $9 million a day. 8
Even within Israel there is widespread dismay at Netanyahu’s backtracking and indecision. In fact, Netanyahu’s treatment of Arafat has led to criticism within his own government with many senior security personnel saying that it was necessary to provide Arafat with public support to deal with Palestinian militants. 9
Even security officials have expressed dismay both with Netanyahu’s refusal to implement the Oslo Accords as well as his handling of relations with Israel’s neighbours. The head of the General Security Service (GSS), Israel’s internal security force, Ami Ayalon, warned that the territories were burning when he presented his biannual report to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee. He said Hamas and Islamic Jihad have the capability and willingness to carry out attacks in Israel including mass terror attacks and urged that Israel decide whether it was interested in a strong or weak Arafat. He also said that the less progress made in the diplomatic process, the more Arafat’s status would drop and the greater the standing of the rejectionists would become. 10
An alarmed US Administration, accused by friendly Arab states of using double standards in its dealings with Israel and the Palestinians, declared that it wanted a phased pullback and a “time out” on Jewish settlements construction on Arab land as a prelude to final status talks. These were to include the fate of settlements and East Jerusalem, return of more West Bank land to the Palestinians, and whether Israel would recognise an independent state.
The US then put forward a new plan whereby Israel was asked to return 13.1 per cent of West Bank land to the Palestinians. Arafat reluctantly agreed to the plan, though he was expecting upto 30 per cent of West Bank territory to be returned during the second redeployment. Netanyahu declared that he was not ready to return more than 9 per cent of land. But when Albright tried to give him an ultimatum, he ignored her and went to the US for talks with the powerful Jewish lobby. As a result, no US pressure was put on Israel.
However, it is a fact that both Netanyahu and Arafat are constrained by their constituencies in making a deal. While ultra-conservatives in Netanyahu’s coalition have threatened to walk out of the government if he conceded more land to the Palestinians, Arafat, faced with growing disillusionment by the people at Israeli actions regarding settlements and closures, is worried that if he is perceived to be cooperating with the Israeli security forces in rounding up Islamic militants, his position as a leader would be eroded. The current talks that are taking place at the Wye Plantation are, therefore, an attempt to work out a compromise solution whereby Israel would return 13 per cent of territory—out of which 3 per cent would be declared a “nature reserve” under the joint control of Israel and the PA, and where no Palestinian construction would be allowed—and, at the same time, assuage Israeli fears on security issues.
As a last minute attempt to cover his back, Netanyahu appointed his hawkish Infrastructure Minister Ariel Sharon as Foreign Minister and included him as part of the delegation to the US. Sharon has the support of the settlers and right wingers in his government and any deal which Sharon would be party to would be acceptable to them. At the same time, if an agreement could not be worked out, he could say that he had tried his best and was constrained because of the hardliners in his team.
Indo–Israeli Relations in the Aftermath of Oslo
Like many other countries which now felt free to announce official relations with Israel, New Delhi too established formal diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992. Since then, a string of joint ventures in agro-technology were established. Indian exports to Israel went up by 20 per cent within the first year, and by a phenomenal 72 per cent by the second.
Agreements to promote and protect bilateral investment, increase customs cooperation and avoid double taxation to boost economic and trade relations were also signed in January 1996 and the two governments also agreed to assist in the development of joint ventures between Israeli and Indian companies, especially in the areas of hi-tech industries, telecommunications, aviation, agriculture and agro-technology, health care, medical equipment and textiles. It was also agreed that investments from either country would be accorded most favoured nation (MFN) status.
Though Israel had set up a Consulate in Bombay in 1949, New Delhi’s support for the Palestinian cause kept it from establishing official relations with Tel Aviv until the signing of the Oslo Accords. New Delhi had to remain aloof because of its large expatriate community in the Gulf countries and friendly relations with the Arab world even though Israel often expressed pro-Indian statements despite the lack of official ties. 11
However, India and Israel are cooperating in the defence area, though not as much as the Israelis would like. Though Israel was a contender for the upgrading of the Indian Air Force’s MiG fighters, the only major defence purchases that New Delhi made were two Super Dvora MK II naval patrol boats for about $10 million, though rumours of sales of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) abound, as well as electronic equipment for all three arms of the defence establishment. However, several official as well as many unofficial visits have taken place between defence personnel of both countries with the former Indian Defence Minister, Sharad Pawar, visiting Israel in May 1995 to discuss increasing joint military cooperation between the two countries. In fact exchange of defence teams has been steadily increasing since 1992, with India quietly exploring and evaluating Israeli defence equipment, mostly electronic components and sub-systems. In 1996, Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam and Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshall S.K. Sareen separately visited Israel while the Israeli naval chief visited India. In 1995, the then Indian Defence Secretary and Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations) were among those who visited Israel, while the Israeli Air Chief visited India. Again, in early 1997 and March 1998, the Defence Secretary T.K. Banerji and the Army chief General Ved Prakash Malik, accompanied by senior Air Force and defence officers, visited Israel and inspected electronic and radar system at Israel’s defence plants. 12 There has also been a regular exchange of information and data between the intelligence networks of both countries that began some time in the late 1960s.
Relations between the two received a further boost when the Israeli President Ezer Weisman visited India in December 1996, which though aimed at promoting mainly economic cooperation, was also politically significant. According to Israeli sources who were part of the President’s entourage, India seemed interested in buying Israeli defence systems, including multi-mode maritime surveillance radars and T–72 tanks upgrades. The Israeli defence firm Elbit Advanced Technology Centre President Joseph Ackerman has declared that his company is keen to cooperate with Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) as both have expertise in modernisation and upgradation of fighter fleets. “We have more upgrade programmes than any other country, hence we are more experienced,” he said. 13
Both India and Israel have hostile neighbours, with whom they have fought wars after attaining independence. Both are also engaged in counter-terrorism, an area where it is believed that they continue to exchange information. A deteriorating domestic economic climate—thanks to a lack of progress in the peace talks—and a decline in relations with its major supporter, the US, as well as an impending loss of foreign market with the ongoing recession the Asia–Pacific region, has prompted Israel to shed its “Western” image and try to establish its presence in its own neighbourhood. With India enjoying excellent relations with most of its Arab neighbours, including Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians, it could serve as a possible peace partner.
However, though there is wide appreciation in India of Israeli achievements, given its foreign policy stance, India is opposed to any sort of strategic interaction and cooperation with the Israeli defence establishment, and defence relations are likely to be restricted to purchase of select equipment with technology transfer. But according to reports in the Indian media, the IAF has bought a sophisticated Air Combat Manoeuvring Instrumentation (ACMI) system for developing air combat tactics from Israel, along with several other electronic systems for the other wings of the armed forces.
After India conducted five nuclear tests, unlike many other Western countries, Israel did not condemn the tests, and did not buckle under alleged US pressure to curtail its defence relations with New Delhi. On the other hand, in recent strategic talks, India and Israel have agreed on a range of threat assessments, and New Delhi is reported to have quietly asked for Israeli help to stop China from selling weapons and nuclear technology throughout Asia during Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit to China a few months ago. 14
If an Israeli–Palestinian peace settlement can be made permanent, a sure sequel will be a free flow of goods between Israel and the Palestinian entity that will emerge from the settlement. If former Prime Minister Shimon Peres’ “New Middle East” can become a reality, and a common market comprising Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian entity can be set up, this would logically be the biggest growth area in the next decade. With India’s relations with both favourable, it can be beneficial, both politically and economically for India. Therefore, it is in New Delhi’s interest to promote peace between both parties and encourage them to abandon their mutual suspicions and hostilities. India should take a more active interest in the current negotiation and do what it can to push it forward.
Conclusion
Though Israel is making security and terrorism the focal point its main case for not progressing with the peace process, even many Israelis agree that there never has, and perhaps never will be, 100 per cent success in preventing terrorism. Even with thousands of troops the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) had stationed in the territories before they were handed over to the PA, Israel did not succeed in preventing terrorist attacks.
Even the Israeli security forces have said that the PA security forces have been cooperating with Israel, and statistics show that terrorism has decreased during the last two years. They cite the recent incident when two Hamas operatives—Adel Awadallah and his brother Imad Awadallah—were tracked down and killed by the Israeli forces and say it indicates that there must have been close operational cooperation between the security forces of the PA and the IDF which enabled them to be successful, though both Netanyahu and Arafat have denied it vehemently. While the former does not want the PA to be seen by Palestinians to be cooperating with Israelis on security issues during the current phase of stalemate and tension, Netanyahu’s admission would abolish his case against reaching an agreement with Palestinians, namely that they are not doing enough to curb terrorism.
However, Israel must realise that for its own security, it must agree to a balanced settlement with the Palestinians. Ideally, Israel would like an administrative self-government on less than half the West Bank, broken up by Jewish settlements into isolated Bantustans, with Arab East Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty—a surefire recipe for further strife. 15
IDF intelligence estimates have shown the possibility of war in the region after five years of estimates to the contrary. Therefore, if both parties are keen to end the current state of hostilities and return to some semblance of normal life, it is necessary for both parties to compromise on some issues and work out a deal so that their people can move ahead without harking back to a past riven with conflict and hatred.
Endotes
*: Research Officer, The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Back.
Note 1: International Herald Tribune, September 28, 1998. Back.
Note 2: Khaleej Times, September 22, 1998. Back.
Note 3: Jerusalem Post, September 29, 1998. Back.
Note 4: Khaleej Times, August 7, 1995; Jerusalem Post, March 28, 1995. Back.
Note 5: Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 19, 1994. Back.
Note 6: Jerusalem Post, April 11, 1996. Back.
Note 7: The Hindu, March 20, 1997. Back.
Note 8: International Herald Tribune, August 6, 1997. Back.
Note 9: Statesman, August 28, 1996. Back.
Note 10: Jerusalem Post, July 23, 1997. Back.
Note 11: The Hindu, January 3, 1997. Back.
Note 12: Times of India, December 27, 1996; Times of India, March 30, 1998; The Hindu, February 17, 1997. Back.
Note 13: Business Standard, January 7, 1997. Back.
Note 14: Jerusalem Post, May 24, 1998. Back.
Note 15: Jerusalem Post, September 20, 1998. Back.