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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
START II/III:Duma Holds the Key
By Kalpana Chittaranjan *
The political and economic situation in Russia is in chaos and turmoil. As an embattled US President gets set to meet his weakened Russian counterpart at Moscow, 1 it cannot be forgotten that the height of the Cold War witnessed the USA and the Soviet Union indulging in an unprecedented vertical nuclear arms race that resulted in these two countries possessing more than 20,000 strategic nuclear weapons in their nuclear arsenals.
SALT as Forerunner to START
SALT I and II Treaties
START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) III, as the term implies, is third in a series of treaties. Though START as a process culminated in the signing of START I in 1991 and START II in 1993, its roots as arms control treaties can be traced back to the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties) process which culminated in the signing of SALT I in 1972 and SALT II in 1979 and it is useful to recall the process by which these (SALT) treaties were arrived at, for a more complete understanding of the START Treaties.
SALT I was the culmination of a long process. Three years earlier, President Richard Nixon had decided to resume the efforts initiated by President Lyndon Johnson at the Glassboro Summit (June 23–25, 1967), for formal strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviets and these commenced in November of 1969 at Helsinki. They continued for the next two-and-a-half years in Vienna and Geneva under the direction of Gerard C. Smith, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and his Soviet counterpart, Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semenov, who was assisted by Colonel General Ogarkov, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.
SALT was launched because there was a mutual need to solemnise the parity principle. The talks were started to establish an acceptance by each side of the other’s ability to inflict unacceptable retribution in response to a nuclear attack—which assumes here that neither side would initiate a first strike if the other’s retaliatory capability was strong enough to survive its impact. While SALT stood at the centre of détente, it mainly had the objectives of first making the arms race more predictable by establishing the numbers of strategic weapons for each side. It was hoped that such knowledge would reduce the anxiety of the arms race, since uncertainty and the fear that the opponent might be gaining superiority in military strength fuelled competition. The second objective, as has been mentioned earlier, was to ensure parity. The assumption was that if the two sides had approximately the same number of warheads and bombs, neither side could launch a crippling attack on the other. More specifically, parity was a condition in which no matter who struck first, the attacked side would still have the capability to retaliate and destroy the aggressor. Third, SALT aimed to reduce threats to each side’s deterrent forces. By the early 1970s, the deterrent balance was threatened not only by the continuing Soviet quantitative strategic growth but also by technological innovations that were widely believed in the USA to be undermining the stability of American-Soviet deterrence. A matter of concern was the development of a new defensive weapon (Soviet deployment of anti-ballistic missiles—ABMs—around Moscow) and the use of mulitple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Finally, SALT was necessary for détente. While a failure to arrive at an agreement or at least to continue the SALT dialogue was bound to have a deteriorating effect on their overall political relationship, only a relaxation of tensions could provide the diplomatic atmosphere that would enable the two nuclear states to arrive at an arms agreement that would leave them feeling more secure, sanctify the strategic parity between them and avoid new costly offensive and defensive arms races.
The Moscow Presidential Summit (May 22–30, 1972) saw Nixon signing SALT I on May 26, 1972, which included the ABM Treaty of 1972 as well as the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. 2 The treaty entered into force on October 3, 1972, the date of exchange of instruments of ratification for the treaty and notices of acceptance for the interim agreement. The objective of the treaty is embodied in its provisions. The parties undertook (Article I) not to deploy ABM systems for the defence of the territory of their countries or to provide the base thereof, and not to deploy ABM systems for regional defence except as specifically provided. Article III specifies in detail the missile launchers and ABM radars permitted for defence of: (a) the national capital; and (b) one ICBM field—100 missiles and launchers at each. 3 The prohibitions and limitations are further reinforced (Articles V and VI, and some agreed statements and common understandings). Sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based components are prohibited; this is essentially because mobility is inconsistent with the basic prohibition of other than limited regional defence. Verification was to be by National Technical Means (NTM), and interference with these means and concealment was banned. The treaty provided for a Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to facilitate working of the treaty, including dealing with verification and compliance questions. 4
The Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972 was essentially applicable to ICBMs and SLBMs but not to bombers, for a five-year duration while a broader and more detailed agreement could be negotiated. ICBM bombers used were frozen at the number already operational or under construction. New fixed bombers (silos) could not be started; the dimensions of silos could not be significantly increased; bombers for light or older ICBMs could not be converted into bombers for modern heavy ICBMs. Bombers for sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) could be increased beyond those operational or under construction, upto an agreed level for each party, but only if a corresponding number of older ICBM or SLBM bombers were dismantled or destroyed. Verification provisions corresponded with those of the ABM Treaty.
The key task of SALT II was to convert the interim SALT I offensive force agreements into a more permanent restriction on offensive forces. The SALT II agreement in its completed version was signed by US President Jimmy Carter and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in Vienna on June 18, 1979. Carter then had it transmitted to the US Senate on June 22, 1979, for its advice and consent to ratification. 5 The Senate resisted the treaty much more than it did the SALT I Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty. Its critics challenged both treaties’ basic provisions and also the broader relationship of the Carter Administration’s arms control policy to US foreign and defence policies. As a result of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, President Carter formally requested the US Senate to delay its consideration of the ratification of the treaty on January 3, 1980. However, in March 1980, Carter pledged that the USA would abide by SALT II terms, provided the Soviet Union did likewise. In 1981, US President Reagan formally announced that the USA did not intend to ratify SALT II but pledged not to undercut it if the Soviet Union showed equal restraint. Thereafter, US adherence to the treaty ceased to be a requirement of international law and instead became a question of political commitment. In May 1986, the Reagan Administration announced that in response to alleged Soviet violations of SALT II, the USA was terminating its commitment to the “SALT” structure. The country remained in technical compliance with SALT II until November 1986, when the ongoing conversion of B–52 aircraft to carry cruise missiles put the country over the limit on the number of MIRVed missiles and air- launched cruise missile (ALCM) carrying bombers. The Soviet Union, too, on its part, indicated that it had intended to continue to abide by the SALT II limits, and until 1989, the evidence indicated that it had remained within the sub-limits of the treaty. SALT II succeeded in converting the interim SALT I offensive force agreements into a more permanent restriction on offensive forces.
The SALT accords are historic landmarks in the sphere of strategic nuclear weaponry in that for the first time, both the USA and the Soviet Union agreed on reductions (ABM Treaty) and arms control in both offensive and defensive strategic weapons that were of state-of-the-art technology. The provision of NTM of verification was very useful for future accords which would have even more intrusive forms of verification. Finally, both the treaties laid the foundation for more comprehensive forms of future strategic nuclear accords.
The START Process
START I
During the run-up to Presidential elections in 1980, Republican candidate Ronald Reagan, had called the unratified SALT II Treaty “fatally flawed” and had promised that if elected, he would withdraw the treaty from the Senate. He opposed the treaty on the grounds that it did not limit throwweight, the true measure of destructive power and did not close what he called the “window of vulnerability” the USA faced that he felt was caused by the powerful Soviet ICBMs aimed at US ICBMs. It was only after a period of time after assumption of office that Reagan’s Administration announced that while it reviewed arms control policy, the USA would not undercut the provisions of the SALT II Treaty, so long as the Soviet Union did likewise. 6
In November 1981, Reagan announced that strategic arms talks, renamed START in place of SALT could possibly begin the following year and that the goal for negotiators would be to substantially reduce strategic nuclear arms. Meanwhile, negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) had already begun in 1981. With the introduction of nuclear freeze resolutions in the House of Representatives and the Senate, Reagan came under increasing domestic pressure in March 1981 to initiate negotiations. It was on March 31, 1982, during his first prime-time news conference that the President invited the Soviet Union to join the USA in negotiations to substantially reduce nuclear weapons.
The elements of the first START proposal were first outlined by Reagan on May 9, 1982, in an address at Eureka College where he proposed that in the first phase, the USA and Soviet Union would reduce their arsenals of nuclear warheads on land and sea-based ballistic missiles from the then-current levels of 8,000 to 5,000. The proposal went on to state that no more than half or 2,500 of those warheads would be on land-based missiles. The second phase of the proposal stated that both the countries should accept an equal ceiling on the throwweight of all nuclear missiles. Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev responded with a counter-proposal on May 18, 1982, which declared a willingness to negotiate an accord with the USA. He was of the view that the US approach would have required a unilateral reduction in the Soviet arsenal and instead proposed that the accord should ban or restrict the production of all new types of strategic armaments. He also called for a nuclear freeze “as soon as the talks began.” 7
The negotiations on START began in Geneva on June 29, 1982. By the end of 1989, many of the treaty’s basic provisions were already agreed upon. The Reykjavik Summit meeting of October 11–12, 1986, the Foreign Ministers’ meeting of September 15–17, 1987, the Washington Summit meeting of December 7–10, 1987, 8 and the Wyoming Foreign Ministers meeting of September 22–23, 1989, had important agreements on the treaty’s provisions being arrived at, after hard negotiations. 9 Important progress was made at the Wyoming Foreign Ministers’ meeting of September 22–23, 1989. The linkage issue whereby agreement on reduction of strategic offensive nuclear weapons depended on resolution of the issue of space-based defences or “Star Wars” against ballistic missiles, was called off. 10 Further, the Soviet Union agreed to dismantle, without preconditions, the phased-array Krasnoyarsk radar, which had been in violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. The USA had made it clear that a START Treaty would be signed only after destruction of this radar.
However, other issues which had previously defied solution at the negotiating table had to be addressed and these included counting rules for heavy bombers carrying ALCMs, a sub-limit on ICBM warheads, sub-limits on warheads on mobile ICBMs, modernisation of heavy ICBMs, how to address the problem of nuclear SLCMs, non-deployed missiles, telemetry encryption, cuts in Soviet missile throwweight and an effective verification regime to monitor treaty compliance. 11
Finally, START I, which had taken nine years to negotiate, saw a frenetic pace of activity in the six weeks before it was signed when the negotiators came to an agreement on the three outstanding issues of downloading; new types of missiles; and data denial. Conclusive negotiations centred on counting rules within agreed limits and sub-limits for both nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads, and the agreement, for the first time in US-Soviet arms control, provided for deep cuts in their respective nuclear arsenals but unlike the INF Treaty, it did not require elimination of an entire category of nuclear weapons. On July 17, 1991, at the Group of Seven summit meeting in London, Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev announced at their final meeting there, that START I was ready and that it would be signed at a US-Soviet summit meeting in Moscow by the end of that month. 12
By the terms of START I, the two countries undertook to reduce their strategic offensive arms to equal levels, in three phases over a seven-year period. 13 The treaty has a duration of 15 years, unless superseded by another agreement. The parties can agree to extend the treaty for successive five-year periods but each party has the right to withdraw from it at any time if it decides that extraordinary events have jeopardised its supreme interests. The Soviets stated that START I would be effective and viable only so long as there was compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty.
Follow-Up
The end of the Soviet era in December 1991 left nuclear arms deployed in some ex-Soviet republics. There were now four states with nuclear weapons based on their territories—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The three Republics and the Russian Federation undertook to make arrangements among themselves for the implementation of the treaty’s provisions, at a May 23, 1992, ministerial meeting at Lisbon, Portugal. The USA, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine signed a protocol (known as the Lisbon Protocol) to the treaty, making all five countries (including the USA) and commiting Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states.
START I was ratified by the US Senate on October 1, 1992, while the Russian Parliament ratified it on November 4, 1992. Kazakhstan ratified the treaty on July 2, 1992 14 and deposited the instruments of accession to the 1968 NPT with the USA on February 14, 1994. 15 Ukraine became the last former Soviet Republic to ratify the treaty which it did on November 18, 1993. 16 The Rada of Ukraine approved of a resolution to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state on November 16, 1994. President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine deposited the NPT instruments of ratification at a ceremony on December 5, 1994, held at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit meeting in Budapest, Hungary, thus paving the way for a second ceremony on the same day. Here, leaders of the five Lisbon Protocol signatory countries signed a protocol exchanging the START I Treaty instruments of ratification. 17
Status
The USA inspected the first Russian missile site under START I on a three-day inspection at the Kostroma site, 300 km north-east of Moscow in the first week of March 1995. 18 The inspection was to verify that missile launchers on the rail tracks at the site were no longer targetting the USA.
In April 1995, Kazakhstan had transferred to Russia all the former Soviet strategic warheads in its territory while the Ukrainian President, Leonid Kuchma, announced on June 1, that his country too had done the same. Ukraine had inherited approximately 1,900 strategic warheads and 2,500 tactical warheads from the Soviet Union—which then had constituted the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal. 19 Belarus was scheduled to transfer the final 18 strategic warheads remaining on its territory (deployed on SS-25 ICBMs) to Russia by the end of 1996. 20 Russian and Kazakh officials announced on September 20, 1996, that all SS-18 ICBM silos located in Kazakhstan had been destroyed, thus fulfilling its obligations under START I. In the Soviet era, Kazakhstan possessed 104 SS-18 ICBMs and 40 Bear-H bombers. The last of these bombers had been transferred to Russia in February 1994. 21 When Belarus returned the last of its strategic nuclear warheads to Russia on November 23, 1996, the event marked the completion of the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from the non-Russian Republics of the former Soviet Union. As part of the Soviet Republic, Belarus had more than 500 strategic and tactical warheads and 81 SS-25 ICBMs on its territory. 22 During Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma’s US visit, he announced on May 16, 1997, at Washington, that his country had decided to start eliminating its 46 SS-24 missiles, a measure that would go beyond its obligations under START I. 23
The end of 1996 marked the second year after entry into force of START I. The year saw 60 inspections in the field and conclusion of agreements and joint statements at the Joint Compliance and Implementation Council (JCIC). 24 Journalists were told on June 17, 1997, at Geneva, by a US official, that both Russia and the USA were “ahead of schedule” in implementing the treaty. 25
START II
The main shortcoming of START I had been insufficient arms reductions. Therefore, efforts were made for a more comprehensive strategic nuclear arms control treaty between the USA and Russia and the signing of START II in January 1993 was the result. After the signing of START I in July 1991, the Soviet Union was dissolved in December 1991. President Bush’s State of the Union Address on January 28, 1992, contained a proposal for a new agreement requiring far deeper cuts than those required by START I. The proposal offered a reduction in US SLBMs by “about a third” below the number (3,456) of warheads which the USA planned to deploy under START I. The Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, responded the next day with a proposal of his own. He proposed that the two sides cut their strategic nuclear warheads to 2,000–2,500 each. The months of February, March, May and June 1992 saw US Secretary of State James Baker and the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev holding ministerial meetings between them which paved the way for Presidents Bush and Yeltsin to meet at a summit meeting at Washington where they signed the “Joint Understanding on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms” (the De-Mirving Agreement). 26 The agreement became a basis for a follow-on to the START I Treaty and included numerical ceilings and a time-frame for reductions. Telephone calls exchanged between Bush and Yeltsin on December 20 and 21, 1992, produced some progress, as, after their conversations, a team of US and Russian technical specialists met in Geneva on December 22–24, to try to complete the final details. At high level meetings in Geneva on December 28 and 29, between US Secretary of State Eagleburger and Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev and Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, the last issues were finally resolved. 27
Signing and Provisions
Presidents Bush and Yeltsin signed the START II Treaty in Moscow on January 3, 1993, thus concluding the most sweeping nuclear arms reduction treaty in history. The treaty requires the USA and Russia to eliminate their MIRVed ICBMs and reduce the number of their deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000–3,500 each. These reductions were to be carried out by January 1,2003 or even earlier, i.e., by 2000 AD if the USA could help finance the elimination of strategic offensive arms in Russia. 28
The treaty consists of eight Articles and includes two Protocols and a Memorandum of Understanding. START II has set equal numerical ceilings for strategic nuclear weapons that may be deployed by either side. The agreed ceilings are to be reached in two stages. The first stage has to be completed seven years after entry into force of START I and by the end of it, each side should have reduced the total number of its deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3, 800–4,250. Of these warheads, no more than 1,200 can be deployed on MIRVed ICBMs, no more than 2,160 on deployed SLBMs and no more than 650 on deployed heavy ICBMs. The second stage has to be completed by 2003 and even earlier, i.e., by the end of 2000 AD, if the USA helps finance the elimination of strategic arms in Russia. 29 By the end of this stage, each side should have reduced the total number of its deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000–3,500. Of the retained warheads, none can be on MIRVed ICBMs, including heavy ICBMs. Only ICBMs carrying a single warhead will be allowed.
Entry into Force and Duration
START II enters into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification but not before the entry into force of START I. Since START II builds upon START I, it must remain in force throughout the duration of the latter. As in START I, each side has the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary efforts have jeopardised its supreme interests.
Ratification and Implementation
Before START II can enter into force, three steps have to be taken: (a) START I must enter into force; (b) the US Senate has to ratify the treaty; (c) the Russian Parliament has to ratify the treaty. Of these steps, the first two have been met. 30 As for the third step, the Russian Parliament, which consists of the Council of Federation (the Upper House) and the Duma (the Lower House) must approve the treaty by simple majority votes. Yeltsin had submitted START II to the Duma for ratification as early as June 22, 1995. However, due to early Russian misgivings about START II, the Duma has yet to ratify the treaty. 31
The Helsinki Summit : A Framework for START III
In order to address Russian concerns about START II, Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin met at Helsinki, Finland, on March 20–21, 1997, and in a joint statement, 32 they reached agreement on a number of arms control issues. Regarding START II, the Presidents agreed to extend by five years the deadline for the elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
As far as START III is concerned, the two Presidents agreed to immediately start negotiations for an agreement once START II enters into force. It was also agreed that START III negotiations would include four basic components: a limit of 2,000–2,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads for each side by the end of the year 2007; measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories as well as to the destruction of strategic warheads; conversion of the current START agreements to unlimited duration; and the “deactivation” by the end of 2003 of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to be eliminated under START II.
In a separate “Joint Statement Concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,” 33 Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin reaffirmed the May 1995 principles for agreement on demarcation between ABM and theatre missile defence (TMD) systems. They also reached an agreement in principle governing the status of higher-velocity TMD systems under the ABM Treaty. The USA and Russia are permitted, under this “Phase Two” Agreement to deploy high-velocity TMD systems provided they are not tested against ballistic missile targets with velocities above 5 km per second or ranges that exceed 3,500 km. The agreement does not allow either side to develop, test or deploy space-based TMD interceptors or components based on other physical principles that can substitute for such interceptors. 34
START II Implementation Delayed
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov signed a protocol on September 26, 1997, which delayed START II implementation from January 1, 2003, until December 31, 2007, when all treaty-mandated limitations and reductions were to be completed. The protocol, which implemented understandings reached by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at the March Helsinki Summit, stipulated that limitations and reductions must be completed halfway by the end of December 2004, instead of the previous date of December 2001. The date by which interim treaty limitations and reductions had to be carried out seven years after entry into force of the treaty was also extended from December 5, 2001, to December 31, 2004. The protocol also provided for a new provision which stated that the parties to the treaty could conclude an agreement on a programme of assistance for the purposes of facilitating and accelerating the implementation of START II reductions and limitations. This provision replaced the earlier one that required early implementation of START II reductions if the parties concluded an agreement on a programme of assistance within one year of START II’s entry into force. 35 Letters were also exchanged and signed by Albright and Primakov on September 26, 1997, which codified the Helsinki Summit’s commitment to deactivate by December 31, 2003, the US and Russian strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) that would be eliminated under START II. When START II enters into force, US and Russian experts will begin work on understandings on deactivation methods and on the scope of US programmes to help Russia implement SNDV deactivation. 36
Duma’s Role in START II/III
START II, which had originally been submitted to the Duma on June 21, 1995 was resubmitted by Yeltsin, alongwith additions (i.e., the protocols signed in September 1997), on April 13, 1998. 37 On May 14, 1998, the Duma voted against a proposal by its Foreign Relations Committee to form a 20–person commission to conclude the Duma’s review of the treaty. 38 The Duma voted to postpone formal hearings on START II until the autumn on June 10, 1998. 39 The Lower House of the Russian Parliament holds the key to START II implementation. Unless the treaty (which has already been ratified by the US Senate) is also ratified by the Duma, it cannot come into force and unless START II enters into force, negotiations for a START III agreement cannot take place.
Conclusion
From the aforesaid, it is clear that START II can be implemented only if the Duma ratifies it 40 and that non-ratification will mean that negotiations for START III cannot be started. As Yeltsin’s candidate, Viktor Chernomyrdin, lost the Duma vote for confirmation as Russia’s Prime Minister, 41 it is unclear how the political scenario will play out. It is unlikely that Yeltsin will withdraw Chernomyrdin as candidate for Prime Ministership and if the Duma refuses to confirm him twice more, under the present Russian Constitution, it automatically stands dissolved. What is clear is, whether the Duma stands dissolved or not, it is highly unlikely that, START II, which is a low priority issue with the Russians at the moment, will be ratified any time soon. Negotiations for START III, which are linked to START II ratification by the Duma, will also be delayed. As a result, arms control of strategic nuclear weapons between the two countries that possess the world’s largest nuclear arsenals suffers.
Endotes
*: Researcher, The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Back.
Note 1: Times of India, September 1, 1998. Back.
Note 2: For provisions, see N.J. Rengger and John Campbell, Treaties and Alliance of the World (London: Cartermill International Publishing Ltd., 1995), pp. 191–192. Back.
Note 3: A 1974 Protocol reduced the permitted deployment to one or the other of these sites. Back.
Note 4: Philip J. Farley, “Strategic Arms Control, 1967–87,” in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, Alexander Dallin eds., US-Soviet Security Cooperation, (New York: Oxford, 1988), p. 217. Back.
Note 5: For provisions of SALT II, see Rengger and Campbell, n. 2, pp. 196–201. Back.
Note 6: Nuclear Arms Control: Background and Issues (Washington DC: National Academy of Science, 1985), p. 58. Back.
Note 7: Kalpana Chittaranjan, “Prospects for START II Ratification by Russia,” Strategic Analysis, vol. XIX, no. 7, October 1996, pp. 1053–1054; and Kalpana Chittaranjan, “The START Process: Status and Challenges,” Strategic Analysis, vol. XXI, no. 11, February 1988, pp. 1703–1704. Back.
Note 8: The INF Treaty which provided for the elimination of ground-launched missiles of the USA and Soviet Union, which had ranges between 500 to 5,500 km was signed at this summit on December 8, 1987. Back.
Note 9: For a detailed and insightful account of START I negotiations, see S. Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control (New York: Knopf, 1984). Back.
Note 10: For a comprehensive account of the ABM Treaty violation issue, see R. Cowen Karp, “US-Soviet Nuclear Arms Control,” in SIPRI Yearbook 1990: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 431–432. Back.
Note 11: R. Cowen Karp, “The START Treaty and the Future of Strategic Nuclear Arms Control,” SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 21. Back.
Note 12: Times of India, July 18, 1991. Back.
Note 13: See n. 11 for excerpts of The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and related documents at Appendix 1A, pp. 38–63. Back.
Note 14: “Lisbon Protocol: START I and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Public Information, Fact Sheet, January 11, 1994, p. 1. Back.
Note 15: G. Hill, “US will Triple its Foreign Aid to Kazakhstan,” New York Times, February 15, 1994, p. A3. Back.
Note 16: SIPRI Yearbook 1994: World Armaments and Disarmament, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), appendix 16A, pp. 675–677. Back.
Note 17: SIPRI Yearbook 1995: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 638. Back.
Note 18: The Shillong Times, March 7, 1995. Back.
Note 19: “Chronology of US-Soviet-CIS Nuclear Relations,” Arms Control Today, (ACT) vol. 27, no. 4, June/July 1997, p. 29. Back.
Note 20: “Ukraine Completes Final Transfer of Nuclear Warheads to Russia,” Arms Control Today, vol. 26, no. 4, May/June 1996, p. 22. Back.
Note 21: ACT, n. 19, p. 29. Back.
Note 24: For chronology of JCIC Meetings, see The Arms Control Reporter (ACR): A Chronicle of Treaties, Negotiations, Proposals, Weapons & Policy, 1997, (Massachusetts: IDDS, 1997), pp. 614.A.4–A.5. Back.
Note 25: Ibid., p. 611.B.912. For 1998 chronology of events pertaining to START I upto conclusion of JCIC XVII on July 29, 1998, see. The Arms Control Reporter: A Chronicle of Treaties, Negotiations, Proposals, Weapons & Policy, 1998, (Massachusetts: IDDS, 1998), pp. 611.B.914–918. Back.
Note 26: This was also known as the De-Mirving Agreement as the most outstanding feature of the Joint Understanding was the elimination of all MIRVed ICBMs. Back.
Note 27: D. Lockwood, “Nuclear Arms Control,” in SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 557, 370. Back.
Note 28: For text of START II Treaty, see Appendix 11A in Ibid., pp. 574–588. Back.
Note 29: When the De-MIRVing Agreement was signed on June 27, 1992, several US-Russian agreements were also signed to assist the Russian Federation in the safe and secure transportation and storage of nuclear weapons in connection with its planned destruction of nuclear weapons. Back.
Note 30: START I entered into force on December 5, 1994, while the US Senate overwhelmingly approved a resolution of ratification of START II on January 26, 1996, by a vote of 87–4 (see START II Resolution of Ratification, Arms Control Today, vol. 26, no. 1, February 1996, p. 30). Back.
Note 31: For a concise list of major Russian concerns made by Major-General Dvorkin, chief of the Defence Ministry’s Fourth Scientific Research Establishment, see ACR, n. 25, p. 614.A.3. For a sampling of recent Russian perspectives on START II ratification, see Vladimir Maryukha, “Once Enacted, START 2 will make Russia Stronger,” Russky Telegraf, June 11, 1998; Alexei Podberezkin, “START II Treaty puts Russia at a Disadvantage,” Pravda, June 16, 1998; Viktor Litovkin, “Who Will Stand to Lose if the Duma does not Ratify START 2?,” Izvestia, June 17, 1998; Oleg Odnokolenko, “Die-Hard Russian State Duma opposes START II Treaty,” Segodnya, June 18, 1998; and Yuri Golotyuk, “Nuclear Disarmament Inevitable: Russia is Already Disarming,” Russky Telegraf, July 8, 1998. Back.
Note 32: For text of Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces, see “Joint Statements of the Helsinki Summit,” Arms Control Today, vol. 27, no. 1, March 1997, p. 19. Back.
Note 33: For text, see Ibid., p. 20. Back.
Note 34: ACT, n. 19, p. 30. Back.
Note 35: ACR, n. 24, p. 614.B.99. Back.
Note 37: ACR, n. 25, p. 614.B.107. Back.
Note 38: Ibid., p. 614.B.110. Back.
Note 39: Ibid.; for a chronology of 1998 events (up to July 7, 1998), regarding START II/III, see Ibid., pp. 614B.105–112. Back.
Note 40: For a summary of Russian parties’ positions on START II, see Ibid., pp. 614.B.108–109. Back.
Note 41: Times of India, September 1, 1998. Back.