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International Affairs
October 1997
The record of aid to Africa, in actual achievements in the improved well-being of its recipients, is not a good one. This article contends that this does not mean that aid should be abandoned, but that reform is necessary in the way it is given and managed. The author points out that aid programmes founded on a strong local base and pursued through local agencies have a much better success rate than those imposed from outside. He is critical of the tendency among aid donors to avoid proper engagement with the question of political power and argues for a democratization of the aid encounter which would put decisions on the use of aid in the hands of the recipients and ensure the accountability of those administering it.
The United Nations has made sustainable development one of its major objectives. But the way in which this is being pursued is likely to result in the UN system becoming increasingly marginalized in the process. This article suggests that far too much attention is given to international debates rather than to national and regional processes. The results of the UN Special Session of June 1997, called to review progress five years after the UN Earth Summit in Rio, were poor. Debate, in public at least, reverted to the traditional North-South divide. Yet in many countries the enthusiasm for the findings of the Earth summit and its follow-up is clear. What is argued is that governments need to sort out much more clearly what can and should be addressed at the international level. Many of the major environment issues, such as forest and biodiversity loss, are basically national or local concerns. The development agenda and poverty have to be addressed locally. Only when it is clear that individual countries and regions cannot cope without international intervention, as happens in the case of climate change and the international trade regime, should the matter be of concern to the UN at the centre. The UN could do more to foster this sense of subsidiarity in its affairs.
The main determinants of international conflict over the next 50 years are likely to be the global wealth/poverty divide, environmental limits to human activity and the proliferation of advanced weapons systems. Forms of conflict may increasingly invovle insurgencies, not just against local elites but also against the economic interests of wealthy states. While a traditional response to such insecurity for Britain would be a state-centred military approach working with allies, this article argues that a more fundamental approach which addresses the roots of international insecurity would be more sensible. Furthermore, Britain is particularly well suited to engage in such a process.
This article argues that the IRA ceasefire of 31 August 1994 represented a major turning-point in Irish history. However, it insists that the discussion about the ceasefire has thus far been too narrowly conceived. In particular, it suggests that the IRA decision was not just the result of factors internal to Ireland, but was also a reflection of changes in the wider international order: especially those brought about by the end of the Cold War. The article then discusses these changes in some detail and concludes from this that a political space now exists which did not exist before. However, we should be wary of false optimism. The conclusion of the Cold War may have made things possible which many once thought impossible: and that is critically important. Nonetheless, the outbreak of peace should not be mistakenly identified as a solution to the "Irish question". The future, though brighter, remains uncertain and fluid.
The decision to enlarge the North Atlantic Treaty Organization represents the most serious and complicated transformation in Europe’s security arrangements since the collapse of the Berlin Wall. The alliance tried to portray the process of enlargement as a measured operation in which the credentials of each candidate state were properly examined in an impartial way. In fact, NATO's enlargement was a haphazard affair and the semblance of unanimity which member states wished to project was shattered just when this unanimity mattered most. The enlargement failed to impart coherence to the alliance itself, or restore the credibility of the West in many former communist countires. The expansion of the alliance was inevitable. But so were many of the subsequent problems. The main questions about the purpose of NATO and its place in Europe’s security remain open, and the alliance will have to face them in the near future.
The end of the Cold War required fundamental rethinking of European order, in particular for Germany. The debate gradually developed. Between 1989 and 1991 Germany was preoccupied with stabilizing the situation and immediately binding the country into existing structures. Policies reflected knee-jerk reflexes which closed an old chapter in Germany's history rather than beginning a new one. With the conclusion of the Maastricht treaty and the collapse of the Soviet Union a more fundamental debate began between 1992 and 1994, with various schools of thought emerging. While free intellectual reflection seemed to spawn many options, pressing political demands required a clear set of goals. As the 'advocate of the whole of Europe', Germany defined a hierarchy of interests overall, aiming for interlinked layers of stability with an EMU area as its centre. Between 1994 and 1996 the debate focused on a flexible institutional order which would reflect the enormous diversity of eastern and western countries. Policies, however, concentrated on pushing EMU ahead, not as an end in itself, but as a means to the construction of a broader edifice strong enough to withstand future uncertainties.
Globalization presents similar challenges to government and to business. Both must responds positively to the opportunities offered by the liberalized international economy; both have new roles and responsiblities to fulfil in the rapidly changing world. This article analyses the mixed success of the corporate and political response to globalization. It argues that, in this 'global village' of diminished borders, internationalism and free trade, the most successful strategy for business and government is to develop global coherence while maintaining local diversity. The best response to globalization is to place increasing weight on the individual consumer and citizen.
Where stands the 'special relationship' now, at the lowering end of the century? Lost at sea, if we but knew it, according to Alex Danchev, in this companion piece to his earlier reflections, 'On specialness', International Affairs 72:4, 1996.
"Connexity: how to live in a connected world." By Geoff Mulgan, reviewed by Vernon Bogdanor.
Edited text of the 22nd Martin Wight Memorial Lecture delivered at the University of Sussex on 24 October 1996.
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