CIAO DATE: 03/03

International Affairs

October 2002

• Undoing the global constitution: UN Security Council action on the International Criminal Court  by Weller M.

  The adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) adopted in 1998, marked the culmination of the international constitutional law–making of the twentieth century. The Statute reflects a vision of an advanced universal legal order, administered through a process of multilayered international governance. In this article the author examines the key elements of this design, including the doctrine of universality of international criminal jurisdiction, the process of universal law–making and international institution–building. The author places these concepts, and the ICC itself, into the context of the emerging international constitutional order. He also considers the attempts of the United States government to undermine some of the key assumptions that underpin the concept of the ICC. In addition to analysing the objections put by the US government, the author addresses its campaign in the United Nations Security Council to exempt US service personnel and others from the reach of the court. He argues that this episode represents a very important factor in the possible development of two parallel international legal systems: one of universal application, and a special set of rules and exemptions that, it is argued, should only apply to the one remaining superpower.

• ‘One in, all in?’ NATO’s next enlargement  by Terriff T., Croft S., Krahmann E., Webber M. and Howorth J.

  In 1999 NATO heads of state invited three states to join the alliance and are set to invite yet more states to join in November 2002 at the Prague summit. At present there are ten states that have declared their interest in gaining accession to NATO councils, and the prospect is that even more states will most likely be interested in joining in the years to come. The question for NATO is no longer whether to enlarge but how to manage enlargement. This article argues that NATO should invite seven of the ten currently declared aspirant states to join the alliance, on the condition that before actual accession occurs, each state must subsequently meet political, military, economic, security and legal standards that are set forth in an annexe to the official invitation. Furthermore, NATO should determine to hold a summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council triennially, for the purpose of assessing the candidates’ membership progress in meeting the criteria, and to this end establish a mechanism, in the form of identified bodies, for the assessment of the candidate members’ progress. Such a formal process sets forth a graduated yet assured process that aspirant states must progress through that will result in guaranteed accession to NATO councils and protection. A formal process such as this will ameliorate many of the problems that will almost surely arise from proceeding in a more ad hoc, piecemeal manner, while at the same time keeping the door open to other states who may want to join in the future.

• NATO, the Baltic states and Russia: a framework for sustainable enlargement  by Kramer M.

  In this article the author discusses the projected enlargement of NATO, focusing on the candidacy of the three Baltic states. He examines the factors that have induced the Baltic governments to seek NATO membership, the steps the alliance has taken in the lead–up to the Prague summit in November 2002, the evolution of US policy with regard to the potential entry of the Baltic states into NATO, and the arguments that have sometimes been raised against Baltic membership. He argues that the admission of the Baltic states into NATO will be a step forward both for the alliance and for European security, but he believes that it should be accompanied by a restructuring of the alliance that would give much greater weight to its political dimension. One key objective of this restructuring would be to establish a closer relationship with Russia, moving beyond the NATO–Russia Council that was set up in May 2002. The way to do this is not by treating Russia as a special case, but by encouraging the Russian government to apply for NATO membership (as other countries have) and then helping Russia to carry out far–reaching political and military changes that would eventually qualify it to enter the alliance.

• The transformation and future prospects of Europe’s defence industry  by Guay T. and Callum R.

  Europe’s defence industry has evolved by transforming itself from a collection of nationally oriented firms to one dominated by two giants. Stimuli external and internal to the European Union (EU) are responsible for this development. After describing the evolution of this sector since the end of the Cold War, the authors present four factors that played key roles: developments within the United States’ defence industry; the impact of technology and defence economics; general economic restructuring within the EU together with nascent defence industrial policy; and progress towards the creation of a European Security and Defence Policy. While the evolution required all four factors, the EU played a critical and under–appreciated economic and political role in the changes that have transformed the European defence industry, and is now positioned to continue to shape this process.

• The European defence project and the Prague summit  by Clarke M. and Cornish P.

  This article reviews the state of the two security and defence institutions available to west Europeans: NATO and the EU’s common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In each case, the authors assess the political maturity and stability of the institution, and then ask what it can contribute in terms of coordinated military capability to west European’s strategic readiness. NATO’s Prague summit in November 2002 will address the thorny issue of the next tranche of post–Cold War enlargement. But beyond the predictable debate about which candidates to admit, and what should be offered to those unsuccessful in their bid, there will be a far more urgent and important agenda to be discussed at Prague—the military capabilities of the European allies. Given that ESDP is still far from achieving its capability goals, the authors argue that the time is right for European allies to begin thinking in terms of generating a composite, joint strike force which could be configured to be interoperable with US forces and which could salvage something useful from the disheartening lack of progress in developing a European military capability.

• In the shade of Locarno? Why European defence is failing  by Lindley–French J.

  European defence is failing because of the profusion and confusion of strategic concepts in Europe today. This article draws parallels with the Europe of the interwar years when strategic concepts were similarly confused. At the time a complex interplay between the traditional balance of power approach to security and the collective security, disarmament and international arbitration enshrined in the Treaty of Versailles resulted in strategic paralysis. The nadir of this failed strategic concept was the Treaty of Locarno in 1925 that, by endeavouring to keep all states happy at all times, simply prevented the creation of an effective security and defence mechanism. The rest is history. While the strategic environment of the first decade of the twenty–first century is undoubtedly different to that of the second decade of the twentieth, the need to satisfy the domestic political needs of all European powers, great and small, activist and post–neutral is producing a similar effect. Europe today has a security system that seems to bear little or no relation to the threats that are emerging. It is time, therefore, that Europe’s Great Powers, Britain, France and Germany reasserted their political authority and bring an end to the political correctness that has so undermined European defence. Given the time that such endeavours normally take, and the nature and scope of emerging threats, the time for such action is now. Europe’s Great Powers cannot again afford to be late and unprepared for the conflicts that lie ahead.

• So far, so good? Russia and the ESDP  by Rontoyanni C.

  The progression from a European Security and Defence Initiative to a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has not left Russian policy–makers indifferent. The Yeltsin administration greeted the emergence of the European Union as a new player in European security, seeing it as a potential challenge to NATO and American influence. President Putin’s emphasis on developing trust and cooperation with the West has changed the Russian perspective on the ESDP. Russian interest in dialogue and functional cooperation with the ESDP now stems primarily from a wish to add substance to the still nascent EU–Russia partnership, which Putin has chosen as Russia’s foremost external priority. In view of the imbalance between EU and Russian economic capacities, the security sphere appears as the most promising area of cooperation on which to found a meaningful long–term partnership. This article traces the evolution of Russian perceptions of the ESDP since it was first launched in June 1999 and outlines the development of EU–Russia relations in this field, which has given Russia the most advanced mechanism for interaction with the ESDP available to a non–EU country. It explores prospective areas of cooperation, as they are viewed by each side, and looks into issues of potential discord. Finally, the article considers the future of Russia–ESDP cooperation in the light of Russia’s revitalized partnership with NATO.

• Separatist states and post–Soviet conflicts  by Lynch D.

  This article examines why the conflicts in Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan in the former Soviet Union have not been resolved in the last ten years, whereas a peace agreement has been reached in Tajikistan. The analysis centres on the role of the self–declared separatist states that have emerged in the midst of the post–Soviet states: the Pridnestrovyan Moldovan Republic inside Moldovan borders, the Republic of South Ossetia and the republic of Abkhazia within Georgian borders, and the Nagorno–Karabakh Republic of Azerbaijan. The argument is divided into four parts, starting first with a brief discussion of the reasons that allowed a fragile peace to arise in Tajikistan. The article then defines the concept of a de facto state, that is, a state without international recognition but with empirical existence. The main part of the article examines the range of forces, internal to the de facto states as well as external to them, that weave together to sustain the current status quo of non–resolution.

• Between national sovereignty and international power: what external voice for the euro?  by Mcnamara K.R. and Meunier S.

  Does the creation of the euro imply that the European Union is now speaking with one voice in international monetary matters? Is the EU therefore likely to challenge the hegemony of the United States on the world stage, at least in the realm of international financial diplomacy? This article analyses the current state of external representation of the common currency and asks why the issue of the euro’s single voice has not yet been resolved. Comparing other areas of common policy–making that have an external dimension, such as trade, the authors explore the specificities of monetary and financial affairs that make the conflict between national sovereignty and international efficiency so difficult to settle. In particular, the authors focus on a set of international institutional arrangements regarding economic policy–making within the EU, and external arrangements within international fora (the IMF and the G7), which have so far impeded the ability of the EU to play a coherent role on the international monetary stage. The authors argue that the fact of the euro means there needs to exist a clear system of political representation in the area of monetary and financial governance in the EU, and they explore various options for who the external voice of the euro could be. Finally, the implications of creating the euro’s external voice for transatlantic relations, for EU enlargements, and for the debate about the ‘democratic deficit’ in Europe are analysed.

• Why the General said No  by Warner G.

  Based upon recently published volumes of French diplomatic documents, this review article examines the course of the negotiations for British entry into the European Economic Community from 1961 to 1963 and the reasons why France vetoed Britains application. It is clear that even before the British government launched its application, the French government was aware of the threat it posed to the cohesion of the Community and to French interests. It therefore pursued tactics of delay. The British, who were in a hurry to join, vainly sought to convince the French of their conversion to the Gaullist conception of a con–federal Europe that would be independent of both the Soviet Union and the United States, even dangling the prospect of nuclear cooperation before President de Gaulle. The latter’s position inside France was relatively weak until he won a referendum on the direct election of the president in October 1962 and his party triumphed in the legislative elections the following month. De Gaulle then felt secure enough to tell Prime Minister Macmillan quite bluntly at their Rambouillet meeting on 15–16 December 1962 that he did not believe that Britain was ready for EEC membership. He had thus already made up his mind to exclude Britain before the Nassau agreement between President Kennedy and Mr Macmillan in which the former agreed to supply Britain with Polaris nuclear missiles, although this agreement confirmed his belief that Britain was excessively dependent upon the United States. Although economic questions—particularly those relating to the system of agricultural support and to Britain’s request for special concessions to Australia, Canada and New Zealand—did play an important part in de Gaulle’s decision, it is clear that political factors were uppermost in his mind. He did not want either a diluted Community or one in which there was a possible rival to French leadership.

• Gorazde: the peacekeepers’ tale  by Simms B.

  This review article of a double CD–ROM focuses on the siege of the Bosnian ‘safe area’ of Gorazde during the period 1994–5. Overshadowed by the attack and massacre at Srebrenica, the defence of Gorazde has received little mention. This is rectified by Gillian Sandford and Mike Price’s CD–ROM, in which British soldiers of the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment and the Royal Welch Fusiliers discuss their personal experiences of the siege as well as the nature of their responsibilities as peacekeepers in this ‘safe area’. The soldiers discuss their support of the ‘safe area’ and how they contributed to averting a massacre by defending Gorazde until Bosnian forces were able to defend it themselves.