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CIAO DATE: 01/07
July 2006
Britain's nuclear weapons debate
The future of United Kingdom nuclear weapons: shaping the debate MICHAEL QUINLAN
Britain has been a nuclear-weapon state since the 1950s, mostly in extensive cooperation with the United States in equipment procurement, though (contrary to the aims of anti-nuclear campaigners) full freedom of operational action has been kept. The current force of four nuclear-powered submarines armed with Trident D.5 missiles is not expected to be dependably sustainable beyond the early or middle 2020s in key respects, and lead times mean that initial decisions on whether and if so how to maintain capability thereafter need to be taken by about 2010. The open debate for which the government has called will have to consider international obligations and likely repercussions, strategic and ethical arguments, options for renewal (including at reduced scale), the amount and incidence of costs, and opportunity costs. The government has not yet published enough information to underpin firm conclusions about continuance other than for 'true believers' either pro or con.
Comfort blanket or weapon of war: what is Trident for? MICHAEL MccGWIRE
A hangover from the Cold War, Britain's nuclear capability has acquired a totemic quality and, in some unexplained way, is expected to shield us from unspecified dangers. There has been no serious attempt at cost?benefit analysis and such as there is ignores opportunity costs: policies or procurement foregone. The most important are political and the more significant?the things Britain could do or achieve if it did not have a nuclear capability?relate to our role in the world and, more specifically, to the NPT. This is a national issue which does not depend on international negotiations or agreement. In drawing conclusions, the article therefore ignores the larger question of whether the global elimination of nuclear weapons is both desirable and feasible. This international issue is addressed in a separate final section.
Big boats and bigger skimmers: determining Britain's role in the Long War PAUL ROGERS
While much of the focus in the Trident replacement debate in the UK is on Britain's long-term role as a nuclear power, a second decision is imminent, concerning the acquisition of two large aircraft carriers. In combination, these two projects will do much to determine the UK defence posture for several decades to come and are therefore best analysed together. The decisions are particularly significant when viewed in relation to the post 9/II US defence posture, especially in what is now being termed the 'long war'. The new aircraft carriers will make it possible for the UK military to work closely with the United States in future expeditionary warfare, with all the potential political controversies that might result.
Nuclear disarmament versus peace in the twenty-first century JULIAN LEWIS
In his analysis of the continuing necessity for Britain to retain its nuclear capability, the author argues that the purpose of the British nuclear deterrent is what it has always been—'to minimize the prospect of the United Kingdom being attacked by mass destruction weapons'. His discussion ranges from the ethical paradox surrounding the possession of nuclear weapons, the central problem of their predictability, the problem of new threat and, in his view, the Utopian non-proliferation obligations. The possession of the deterrent may be unpleasant, he concludes, but it is necessary, its purpose lying'not in its actual use but in its nature as the ultimate "stalemate weapon".'.
The economics of UK nuclear weapons policy KEITH HARTLEY
The Trident replacement decision has an economic aspect that cannot be ignored, namely, its costs. This article presents a cost-benefit framework for assessing the replacement decision and its alternatives. The replacement decision is presented against the background of the defence economics problem showing the opportunities for substitution and the need for difficult defence choices in a world of uncertainty. A framework for choices is outlined showing the range and type of information needed for sensible decision-making in this area. A range of conventional force alternatives is estimated as well as alternative civil spending. The impact of the replacement decision on the UK submarine industrial base is assessed, including the challenges of reaching a partnering agreement and negotiating an incentive contract with a UK monopoly supplier. The cost figures used for the Trident replacement are illustrative only and show how the programme can be evaluated.
Labour and the bomb: the first 80 years LEN SCOTT
The UK government's consideration of whether to replace Trident evokes past controversies about the bomb including occasions when the Labour Party advocated unilateral renunciation of British nuclear weapons. Out of office, fierce debate engulfed the party, fuelled by, and in turn fuelling, intra-party conflict. In power, while Labour governments took different decisions on key defence issues to their Conservative counterparts, they nevertheless ensured that the UK remained a nuclear weapons state. Labour also ensured the habits of secrecy in nuclear decision-making were ingrained, though these were challenged by the current government. This article examines the development of Labour's approach to nuclear weapons since 1945. Particular attention is given to the 1980s as members of the current cabinet will have clear recollections of campaigning on an anti-nuclear policy in the 1980s. The Blair government has embarked on public debate ahead of a formal decision and should the issue of Britain's nuclear status become embroiled in a political battle over the leadership succession, anti-nuclear sentiment may re-emerge. Yet if the past is guide to the future, the history of Labour governments suggests that the real debate will be about what replaces Trident not whether it is replaced.
France's new nuclear doctrine DAVID S. YOST
The new nuclear deterrence doctrine announced by President Jacques Chirac in January 2006 has rightly been recognized as a milestone, although in fact several of the key changes in policy were set forth in June 2001. While France remains determined to deter major power threats, its main new preoccupation is deterring regional powers by making clear that it has developed more employable nuclear options. The innovations announced in January 2006 include the focus on deterring state sponsors of terrorism, the threat to attach an enemy's 'capacity to act', the more discriminate and controllable employment options, the willingness to launch 'final warning' strikes, the description of 'strategic supplies' as a potential vital interest, and the presentation of nuclear deterrence as the foundation of a strategy of prevention and, when necessary, conventional military intervention. Several factors may have led Chirac to make the speech at this juncture. These include maintaining the credibility of deterrence and presidential power, sustaining the budgetary effort required for the nuclear posture, clarifying French deterrence doctrine for external and internal audiences, and sending a message of autonomy to Iran's and France's key European partners. The new doctrine's implications include its significance for deterrence and non-proliferation and for France's relations with its partners in NATO and the European Union.
Rebels without a cause: North Korea, Iran and the NPT WADE L. HUNTLEY
Unchecked nuclear weapons development in North Korea and the incipient nuclear weapons programme in Iran currently pose seminal challenges to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The disposition of these cases may determine the future of the NPT and will shape non-proliferation and disarmament efforts for the next decade or more. This article assesses these two challenges, focusing on the actions concerned European states might take to leverage and guide the inevitably central US role. The article concludes that, by smoothing the sharper edges of US nuclear and strategic policies, European states can promote political conditions more favourable to non-proliferation solutions in both critical cases and help reduce reliance on nuclear weapons threats in global security relations more broadly.
Destination unknown: Rokkasho and the international future of nuclear reprocessing WILLIAM WALKER
The much discussed expansion of investment in nuclear power in response to global warming and energy scarcity depends on solutions being found to the management and disposal of spent reactor fuels. The reprocessing route, involving the separation from radioactive waste of plutonium and uranium and their subsequent recycling, has long been advocated. However, experience shows that it suffers from chronic problems of coordination, usually resulting in mismatches of supply and demand and large stockpiles of plutonium. Just as the UK is withdrawing, Japan is embarking on large-scale reprocessing with the opening of the facility at Rokkasho which seems destined to produce large surpluses of plutonium against a background of heightened concerns over nuclear proliferation. In the meantime, the Bush administration has ended the United States'blanket opposition to reprocessing and is proposing a controversial new discrimination between'fuel-cycle'and'non-fuel-cycle'states. Confusion reigns.
At the end of the journey: the risks of Cold War thinking in a new era LEE BUTLER
This article examines the justification for the existence of nuclear weapons. For many they were the saviour that brought an implacable foe to its knees in 1945 and held another at bay for nearly a half-century. The belief that superior technology brought strategic advantage, that greater numbers meant strong security, and that the end of containment justified whatever means were necessary to achieve them prevailed. The author was an adherent to this point of view for several years. But these beliefs, Lee Butler contents, have proved dangerous. They account for the most severe risks and most extravagant costs of the US-Soviet confrontation; they intensified and prolonged an already acute ideological animosity; and they continue to entail enormous costs and expose humankind to unconscionable dangers. The author discusses how his convictions have evolved, and concludes that we have no greater responsibility than to bring the nuclear era to a close.
Nuclear deterrence MICHAEL MCCGWIRER
Written for the Canberra Commission in 1996, the analysis outlines the genesis and evolution of the underlying theories that had such a profound influence on the nuclear arms race and US policies towards the Soviet Union. With that as background, it outlines the damaging effects that deterrence dogma had on western interests and world politics; considers whether those effects were peculiar to the prevailing circumstances or are inherent to the concept; and addresses the question of 'stable deterrence'. Lastly, it dismantles the claim that nuclear weapons kept the peace and reviews the place of deterrence-based policies in the future.
Letter to the Editor Paul D. Williams
Books reviewed in this article:
International Relations theory
Human rights and ethics
International law and organization
Foreign policy
Conflict, security and armed forces
Politics, democracy and social affairs
Ethnicity and cultural politics
Energy and environment
History
Europe
Russia and Eurasia
Middle East and North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Asia and Pacific
Latin America and Caribbean