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International Affairs
July 2001
This article examines the re-emergence of ballistic missile defence (BMD) as a contentious issue in US-European security relations since 1999. It begins by outlining three phases in the recent evolution of US missile defence policy from 1995 to mid-2001. The article then examines five key factors that have dominated European views and concerns in relation to BMD: a divergence between European and American assessments of the emerging ballistic missile threat; concern over the implications for nuclear arms control stemming from Russian and Chinese opposition to BMD; the impact of missile defence on deterrence and the Atlantic alliance; scepticism about the technological feasibility of BMD; and the potential opportunity costs associated with resource allocation to missile defence. It is shown that European anxieties have been exacerbated by a perception of a growing unilateralism in American security policy in recent years. The article proceeds by arguing that the US-European debate over BMD looks set to evolve in one of two directions. The more likely and most desirable scenario would involve the US reaching an understanding with its European allies on the way forward. The less desirable scenario would involve key European countries, such as France and Germany, deciding ultimately to withhold their political support for BMD, which would have the potential of causing significant rifts in both transatlantic and intra-European security relations. In both cases, it is argued that the BMD debate will be defined by the interaction of several key variables. These include the extent to which the Bush administration engages in meaningful consultations with the Europeans; the administration's ability or otherwise to reach an agreement with Russia on the way ahead; the architecture options of a future allied or global BMD system; the related issues of technological feasibility and financial cost; and the evolving missile threat.
The Kosovo campaign of 1999 demonstrated unambiguously the weakness of European military forces. Recognition of the consequences of this lack of capability has put new vigour into the European defence debate. Yet decline in military capability is systemic in every European country. The Helsinki goals will do nothing to address this decline. National defence budgets over the past 15 years have been decreasing in real terms. Even if current aspirations to hold military spending levels were to be achieved, the decline in capabilities would continue. Military equipment and personnel costs rise faster than domestic inflation, and therefore fewer people and weapons systems can be afforded each year. There is no prospect of significant uplifts in defence budgets in Europe, despite the acknowledged need for a range of expensive enabling capabilities for post-Cold War operations. Palliative measures now on trial are unlikely to have a major impact. The only option for European nations is a progressive integration of their forces to realize the economies of scale that would allow effectiveness to be maintained. There are opportunities for initiatives that would produce short-term pay-offs. Despite the severe political difficulties of a long-term plan for integration, the alternative is worse. Trying to maintain sovereignty in defence provision will mean that the nations of Europe will eventually be unable either to meet the requirements of even their most modest security needs or to exercise any influence over US defence and security policies.
Several factors explain the high level of support for non-strategic nuclear forces(NSNF) in Russia and the correspondingly limited interest in NSNF arms control. These include Russia's conventional military weakness, NATO's conventional military superiority, political assessments that portray NATO as threatening to Russia, and the several important functions assigned to Russia's nuclear weapons and to NSNF in particular by Russian military doctrine and policy. The Russians have made it clear that they attach great importance to NSNF in a number of ways: in their preoccupations during the NATO-Russia Founding Act negotiations in 1996-7; in their recent military exercises; in their decisions regarding NSNF modernization; in their lack of transparency in implementing their 1991-2 commitments to reduce and eliminate certain types of NSNF; and in their discussions about possibly abandoning certain nuclear arms control commitments. Russian interests in using NSNF to deter powers other than NATO (such as China), to substitute for advanced non-nuclear precision-strike systems, and to 'de-escalate' regional conflicts (among other functions attributed to NSNF) would not be modified by the course of action some observers have advocated-a unilateral withdrawal of US NSNF from Europe. Such a withdrawal would, however, damage the Western alliance's security interests. NATO has adopted the most practical objective currently available: pursuing greater transparency regarding NSNF in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.
If current headlines are to be believed, the United States and Europe are not just drifting apart. The question is, how serious is the rift? There are major differences between them-including differing regional priorities, diverging issue agendas and fundamentally different approaches to meeting the challenges of the post-Cold War period. These differences suggest that the US-European relationship will continue to drift. Although continued drift has its costs (notably in the missed opportunities for cooperation on a host of international issues), the US and Europe should recognize that this change in the terms and nature of their relationship is made possible by the very success of their fifty years of partnership, which has produced a Europe that today is more peaceful, democratic, and united than at any time in history.
The Atlantic burden-sharing debate during the early part of the twenty-first century is shaping up to be very different from those of NATO's first fifty years. The resources needed for direct defence of western Europe have fallen sharply, and further cuts are possible. The gradual strengthening of European cooperation means that the EU is becoming an actor in its own right in many international regimes. Debates about which countries are pulling their weight internationally are also taking into account contributions to non-military international public goods-financing EU enlargement, aiding the Third World, reducing emissions of climate-damaging pollutants. In this new multidimensional debate, it becomes more apparent that states that contribute more to one regime often do less than most in another. Germany, for example, is concerned about its excessive contribution to the costs of EU enlargement, but it spends considerably less than France and the UK on defence. European countries contribute three times as much as the United States to Third World aid, and will soon pay almost twice as much into the UN budget. Yet they were dependent on the US to provide most of the military forces in the 1999 Kosovo conflict, and would be even more dependent in the event of a future Gulf war.
This widening of the burden-sharing debate contains both dangers and opportunities. It could lead to a fragmentation of the Atlantic dialogue, with each side talking past the other on an increasing number of issues, ranging from global warming to Balkan peacekeeping. In order to avoid such a dangerous situation, the US and European states should maintain the principle that all must make a contribution to efforts to tackle common problems, whether it be through troops in Kosovo or commitments to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Yet there should also be some flexibility in defining who does how much. The preparedness of some countries to lead, by doing more, will be essential if international cooperation is to have a chance to work.
The European Union and its member states have moved with considerable speed towards the creation of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Whether what has been achieved so far adds up to a revolution remains a moot point. The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Maastricht Treaty has not always been noted for its binding character, and too often the debate over security and defence has degenerated into an artificial, zero-sum-type game between Atlanticists and Europeanists. What is required for the success of the ESDP is not simply continued commitment to achieving the Headline Goals set out at Helsinki in 1999, but also the development of what the authors call a 'strategic culture', i.e. an institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the effective range of legitimate policy instruments of the Union. The authors argue that political commitment at the highest levels has been underpinned by the institutionalization, within the Council Secretariat, of the 'military option' in the form of the Military Committee and a Directorate General for the EU's Military Staff (DGEUMS). Even more importantly, there are already signs, especially through such concepts as 'security sector reform' and 'structural stability', that the EU, through its development and humanitarian programmes, has already recognized the necessity of military solutions.
The expansion of NATO and the enlargement of the EU will produce outside states in which perceptions and policies will be influenced by feelings of exclusion and isolation. Building on an earlier article published in International Affairs (January 2000) on Russia and Ukraine, this article analyses two countries 'inbetween' in which these feelings are particularly strong. Belarus and Moldova, two classic borderlands, are small, new states with borders not of their own choosing and little sense of identity. Their economies are in dire straits and each has a large problem that hampers European integration. For Belarus the problem is its president; for Moldova it is the separatist regime controlling 12 per cent of its territory. Based on elite interviews, opinion surveys and the analysis of focus group discussions, this article compares and contrasts the attitudes towards NATO and the EU in these two countries.
Behind the international political planning and rhetoric of future alliances and force design lie the very practical questions about who will volunteer for armed forces in the liberal democracies and whether or not they will display the expected traditional virtues. We know so little about the motivation of present servicemen and women, let alone of those we expect to join in the future. Military identity, however, has hitherto reflected national identity, which has assisted with unit cohesion, particularly among those who take the greatest personal risks. The author of this article assumes that within a generation there is a strong likelihood of mixed-nationality and multi-identity armed forces down to and within the smallest 'unit' of military power, the ten-man infantry section. There is another danger: these 'specialists' may develop the characteristics of mercenaries or militarists with extreme tendencies. The possibility of escalation from humanitarian intervention to intense military conflict is always present, even if the mission is one that starts off as benign. The credibility of military action and future effectiveness of force structures currently being planned are by no means assured. Missions that in theory should succeed may in practice fail spectacularly.
Surprisingly little has been written about the century-long relationship between Saudi Arabia and Europe, beyond snapshots of certain periods or certain aspects. Similarly, very few attempts have been made to seek long-term patterns in Saudi foreign policy. This article aims to fill this double gap. It shows that these patterns link even the earliest days with the present day, that they are inter-twined with the very building, consolidation and survival of the Saudi state and Al-Saud rule, and that they have implications for the future of Saudi-European relations.
The article also aims to draw lessons from the Saudi case for the understanding of the foreign policy of developing/small states more generally. The Saudi-European relationship provides an illustration of the extent to which small/'dependent' actors in the international system can acquire a measure of autonomy. The room for manoeuvre which adept local leaders can turn into relative autonomy at the domestic, regional and international levels emerges from the combination of particular domestic circumstances (the availability of material and political resources) with external ones (including limitations on, and competition between, great powers; and the global scattering of great-power interests, as opposed to local actors' regional concentration). Such relative autonomy for the state at all three levels has allowed the Al-Saud to pursue the survival imperative and other interests through the long-term foreign policy patterns of managed multi-dependence and pragmatism.
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