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International Affairs
July 2000
In her introduction to the themed articles in this special Europe issue of International Affairs, Julie Smith discusses the changing nature, identity, and institutional framework of post-Cold War Europe. Focusing on the dual problem of NATO and EU enlargement and conflicting perceptions of borders and geopolitical realities, she warns of the danger of an exclusive European club at the expense of those left out.
The controversial framework of interaction between Russia and Europe is defined by some enduring parameters-geographic realities, historical experiences, religious beliefs, normative values, psychological characteristics, behavioural patterns, cultural orientations. The incongruity between cultural/civilizational and geopolitical identities further complicates Russia's perceptions of, and attitudes to, Europe. Russia's initial pro-Western enthusiasm in the early post-Cold War period was soon overshadowed by serious difficulties in its adaptation to a reduced position in Europe, as well as by numerous grievances with respect to the West. As a result, Russia's attempts to develop a 'pan-European architecture', as well as its policy with regard to multilateral structures operating in continental Europe, have been marked by deeply contradictory patterns of promoting openness towards Europe on the one hand and keeping a certain distance from it on the other. The enlargement of NATO and especially recent NATO military operations in the Balkans have been perceived in Russia not only as confrontational but also as relegating it to the sidelines of European developments. Although Russia's long-awaited transition to the post-Yeltsin era and its new European perspective have been undermined by the war in Chechnya, President Putin's unexpected pro-Westernism (its pragmatism notwithstanding) is a promising sign of rapprochement with Europe.
American backing for the process of European enlargement into central and east Europe remains strong despite differences of strategic interest, foreign policy choices and, during the past decade, a certain US ambivalence towards the trans-atlantic relationship. Drawing on a typology of 'mental maps', the author illustrates how the many and varied American ideas of what a future Europe might look like have guided US (and European) leaders in their attempts at defining this new post-Cold War Europe. Whether these maps can combine into clear policy is debatable. Yet the overall American mental map of Europe is becoming clearer. It includes Turkey, and it may include Ukraine and even Russia. However, concerns remain among US officials that this conception of a Greater Europe, equipped with its own foreign policy and military force, may prove a mixed blessing.
Both the European Union and NATO are now committed in principle to substantial enlargement. It remains doubtful, however, how far member governments are making a success of further enlargement, let alone thinking through its strategic implications. Yet the process of dual enlargement will define the future security, political and economic structures of the European region. During the past year west European governments have extended promises of eventual membership to the western Balkan states and to Turkey; while the future positions of Ukraine, Russia, the Caucasus states and the southern Mediterranean associates all raise delicate policy issues. Hard choices remain to be made about the adaptation of these organizations to eastern enlargement, and about the management of relations with the near neighbours who will remain outside.
NATO's future is again the subject of speculation and debate despite its having fought a recent and apparently successful war in Kosovo. This article proposes that there are three aspects to this challenge. First, NATO is facing a series of dilemmas in its relations with non-members: how should it manage relations with Russia, and with the applicants for membership? The authors argue that NATO should seek to develop a consolidationist posture. The second challenge is that of developing an EU-NATO partnership in the light of the Helsinki Headline Goals. This, it is proposed, can be developed through a division of labour. The third task, that of military restructuring, is overshadowed by the complexities of processing a working European military structure. In conclusion, the authors suggest that a strategy for the alliance, a key component of the Cold War, but subsequently lost, can be refashioned from the above elements.
The EU's external security concerns have caused it to encourage regional integration at all levels in central and east Europe. However, its emerging internal security policies (contained in the newly integrated Schengen Convention, and in justice and home affairs cooperation) are having contrary effects by reinforcing barriers between countries in eastern Europe. The goals of regional integration and good-neighbourly relations between applicants and non-applicants are still present in the Union's enlargement strategy, but border policies are also being developed that run counter to them. EU border policies are raising new barriers to the free movement of people and goods that inhibit trade and investment between candidates and their non-applicant neighbours. There is a risk that the EU could end up giving the central and east European (CEE) countries the benefits of westward integration with their richer neighbours at the high cost of cutting ties with their poorer neighbours in the east. This bargain is still acceptable overall to most political leaders in central Europe; however, acceptance of the EU's terms has been accompanied by great unease about its unintended consequences for intra-regional relations. Moreover, this is not just a problem for CEE countries: the overall security of Europe depends on preventing the isolation of countries left at the edges of an enlarged Union.
This article examines the threat to European liberal democratic values posed by the current asylum crisis. Drawing on a historical analysis of European asylum policies, it examines the origins of the post-Second World War refugee regime and the sources of the current challenge to its liberal universalist premises. The argument discerns two dominant forms of critique of the liberal model in twentieth-century debates on refugee policy: welfare protectionist nationalism, and ethno-centric or racist nationalism. Both of these justifications for restricting asylum have resurfaced in contemporary debates, used by--respectively--centre-left and far right parties. Having considered why these arguments have resurfaced, the article suggests three scenarios for future European responses to the asylum crisis and their implications for liberal universalist values. It argues that the liberal approach can only be sustained through more effective EU burden-sharing and the reorientation of EU external policies to incorporate refugee and migration issues.
The late Martin Wight (1917-72) made a significant contribution to the study of International Relations by developing the concept of an international 'society of states'. In such a society, he argued, states accept a number of norms and conventions governing their behaviour, which facilitate the management and resolution of interstate conflicts. The article argues that some of Wight's concepts can help to illuminate the current functioning of the European Union-seen as a body of states subject to a wide range of rules, both formal and informal-especially if these concepts are combined with the 'scientific' research methods developed more recently. In this connection, particular attention is paid to the historically based theoretical model developed by Andrew Moravcsik.
After suggesting why strong national identities arise, the author highlights the difficulties of distinguishing between Britishness and Englishness. Though this distinction is frequently elided or conflated, there are now pressures to resolve ambiguities that arise from globalization, Celtic demands for autonomy, the UK's membership of the European Union and the growth of international expressions of English identity. Can a specifically English identity be demarcated? Simply listing supposed national characteristics is futile, while looking at the connection between identity and landscape is helpful, but insufficient. Delimiting a British identity is even more difficult. Nonetheless, the author suggests that it remains important to construct an inclusive notion of British identity.
In Democracy by force, Karin von Hippel provided a useful analysis of the mistakes made and lessons learned by the United States in using military force to promote democracy during the Cold War. However, more fundamental issues with regard to the intentions and consequences of American intervention are left unexplored. US policy-makers mistakenly believe that spreading democracy will itself enhance international security. Democracy needs liberalism to produce peace; indeed, as Yugoslavia and Rwanda illustrate, illiberal democracy can bring war. This article concludes that American might could be put to better moral use in preventing massive violations of human rights, rather than in promoting democracy.
This article argues that the dominant paradigm for understanding and explaining north Korean domestic and international politics is in crisis. The dominant securitization paradigm is divided into its 'bad' and 'mad' elements and is derived from the crudest of Cold War politics and theories. The paradigm no longer provides a useful frame of reference for international policy-makers having to 'do business' with north Korea. The intervention of the humanitarian community in north Korea since 1995 has both shown the obsolescence of the securitization paradigm and provided the foundation for two alternative approaches-the 'sad' and the 'rational actor' conceptual framework. The article concludes by arguing for the utility of a historicized and contextualized rational actor model which, it is argued, offers a realistic underpinning for international policies that seriously wish to promote peace, stability and freedom from hunger on the Korean peninsula. South Korea's 'sunshine' policy is cited as one example of such an approach.