CIAO DATE: 03/04

International Affairs

July 2003

• Iraq: The Military Campaign  Timothy Garden

  This article draws together early military implications of a campaign where intensive operations lasted barely a month. The deeper insights will need much more time for the post operations reports to be written, detailed battle assessments to be made, and the key decision-makers to record their thinking. As far as is possible, the article deals with the purely military aspects of the campaign. The promise of a decade of development of high technology air power was expected by some to show a new way of fighting wars. The evidence from the campaign appears to give a more mixed message. Certainly, a higher proportion of air weapons was guided in this conflict than in any previous war. Strategic intelligence appears to have been less accurate than had been expected. The unexpected initial resistance by Iraqi forces, followed by later capitulation, required flexible coalition operations. The spectre of the use of chemical and biological weapons proved unfounded. The effectiveness of special operations will be one area for deeper study. The media strategy will need reviewing for future operations. At this stage, the article does no more than record the sequence of events, make broad judgments about the strategic and tactical approaches of both the Coalition and Iraqi forces, and highlights areas where further investigation may be useful to draw firmer conclusions.

• A Rogue is a Rogue is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis  Roland Bleiker

  Two nuclear crises recently haunted the Korean peninsula, one in 1993/4, the other in 2002/3. In each case the events were strikingly similar: North Korea made public its ambition to acquire nuclear weapons and withdrew from the Nonproliferation Treaty. Then the situation rapidly deteriorated until the peninsular was literally on the verge of war. The dangers of North Korea's actions, often interpreted as nuclear brinkmanship, are evident and much discussed, but not so the underlying patterns that have shaped the conflict in the first place. This article sheds light on some of them. It examines the role of the United States in the crisis, arguing that Washington's inability to see North Korea as anything but a threatening 'rogue state' seriously hinders both an adequate understanding and possible resolution of the conflict. Particularly significant is the current policy of pre-emptive strikes against rogue states, for it reinforces half a century of American nuclear threats towards North Korea. The problematic role of these threats has been largely obscured, not least because the highly technical discourse of security analysis has managed to present the strategic situation on the peninsula in a manner that attributes responsibility for the crisis solely to North Korea's actions, even if the situation is in reality far more complex and interactive.

• The Debate on Globalization, Poverty and Inequality: Why Measurement Matters  Martin Ravallion

  In the last year or so, markedly different claims have been heard within the development community about just how much progress is being made against poverty and inequality in the current period of 'globalization'. This article provides a non-technical overview of the conceptual and methodological issues underlying these conflicting claims. It argues that the dramatically different positions taken in this debate often stem from differences in the concepts and definitions used and differences in data sources and measurement assumptions. These differences are often hidden from view in the debate, but they need to be considered carefully if one is properly to interpret the evidence. The article argues that the best available evidence suggests that, if the rate of progress against absolute poverty in the developing world in the 1990s is maintained, then the Millennium Development Goal of halving the 1990 aggregate poverty rate by 2015 will be achieved on time in the aggregate, though not in all regions. The article concludes with some observations on the implications for policy-oriented debates on globalization and pro-poor growth.

• States, Markets and Governance for Emerging Market Economies: Private Interests, the Public Good and the Legitimacy of the Development Process  Geoffrey R. D. Underhill

  States, markets, and governance are among the pressing issues of our day. The global market exerts dynamic pressures on our societies, economic agents, and systems of government, especially in the developing world. Typically, most analysis begins with the idea that global markets have increasingly intruded upon the capacity of the institutions of government to manage the process of change. Our societies are seen as increasingly subject to the vagaries of market forces, to the delight of some and the regret of others. This article argues that much thinking about states and markets is flawed, making it highly likely that policy-makers, among others, will commit mistakes in their responses to the undoubted pressures for change. If we alter the way we think about the state and the market, we will see opportunities to change what we do about them and how they evolve over time. The article argues that we should retreat from understandings of the market and governance that involve a clear distinction between states and markets, proposing a radical reformulation wherein states and markets are no longer seen as separate entities, but as a statemarket 'ensemble of governance', or 'condominium'. Drawing on Adam Smith, this approach leads to a reinterpretation of the relationship between private interests in market processes and the wider public good. This model is used to interpret contemporary patters of global trade and finance, and the article concludes that this new way of thinking can help us to realise better our normative preferences about the sort of world in which we wish to live.

• Resolving or Exacerbating Disputes? The WTO's New Dispute Resolution System  Karen J. Alter

  In 1995 the dispute resolution system of the WTO was transformed to make it more effective in enforcing WTO rules. Ironically, the improvements in the system have contributed directly to greater conflict in the WTO. How can improving a system to resolve disputes actually exacerbate conflict? This article identifies a number of conflict-enhancing consequences of the change in the dispute resolution mechanism. Conflict is not bad per se. Indeed, if the outcome of this conflict is that governments must better justify participation in the WTO, then conflict is good. But there is a danger that international courts are more likely than not to generate conflict, while the international legal and political system is less adept at weathering controversy and addressing valid public concerns. Left unaddressed, conflicts generated by international legal bodies can erode support for the international legal system and multilateral strategies in general. This article suggests solutions designed to build into internationally legalized processes political safety valves, greater political sensitivity, and improved accountability, as well as legitimacy enhancing devices. Demonstrated here in the case of the WTO, the analysis described applies to international legal systems generally.

• Review Article: History and Globalization: Reflections on Temporality  Duncan S. A. Bell

  Globalization emerged as the buzzword of the 1990s, and, at the dawn of a new millennium, it continues to transfix academics, the media and policy-makers alike. However, one of the key gaps in the research into the process(es) of globalization has concerned its historical identity: the story (and analysis) of its origins, its development and mutation over time, and the continuities and differences between past and present. In this article the author sketches a typology of claims made about the historical identity of globlization in the current literature, and points to some unexplored and fruitful avenues of enquiry. Following this, two recent books are reviewed which attempt, in different but complementary ways, to deepen our understanding of globalization in history. The article concludes with a call for further research on this and related topics.

• Is Thabo Mbeki Africa's Saviour?  Gerrit Olivier

  Foreign relations are the main preoccupation of South African president, Thabo Mbeki. His role perception is dominated by a mission to improve the plight of Africa, and second to that, to act as the Third World's überdiplomat. Under his administration, South Africa's foreign policy has become almost an adjunct of his more holistic diplomatic pursuits. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is the magnum opus of Mbeki's foreign policy, and the success or failure of this grand design for an African renaissance will determine his legacy and make or break his leadership in South Africa and in the rest of Africa. The success of his NEPAD diplomacy is a daunting task, requiring the support of his African peers, his South African constituency, and the leadership of the developed nations of the world. Dealing with these diverse elements, Mbeki's policy-making oscillates between realism and idealism, and between ideology and interests, giving the impression of a style of a prudent bureaucrat rather than that of a single-minded reformer. In the end, his diplomacy seems to founder because it fails to satisfy the contradictory demands of any of these three constituencies. However, even if NEPAD should fail as a project, its role could be that of a harbinger of a new political and economic era in Africa and the movement away from post-colonial orthodoxy.

• Review Article: Lyndon Johnson's War? Part 1: Escalation  Geoffrey Warner

  At the beginning of 1964 there were around 20,000 US military 'advisers' in South Vietnam, working alongside the South Vietnamese army in the latter's campaign against the communist guerrillas, led and supplied by the government of North Vietnam. By the summer of 1965 there were 125,000 American troops in the country, with more pledged for future deployment. Most of these were not 'advisers', but combat forces openly engaged in fighting the communists. In addition, since March 1965, a sustained American bombing campaign had been waged against targets in North Vietnam. This transformation in the nature of the American commitment to South Vietnam had been brought about by two factors: the continued weakness of South Vietnamese governments as military and civilians struggled for control; and the growing strength and success of the communist guerrillas. South Vietnam was regarded as a vital American interest for two reasons: it was perceived as a test of US resolution throughout the rest of the world; and, following the famous 'domino theory', it was believed that the loss of South Vietnam to communism would precipitate the weakening and eventual collapse of other non-communist states in the region. Although there was opposition to the escalation of the war, both in Congress and the administration, there were also voices notably in the military, who wished to press on further and faster. The administration adopted a middle course, gradually increasing its commitment and continually planning for the next step. Although political motives undoubtedly played a part in this more measured approach-there was a presidential election in November 1964-it is clear that President Johnson was not at all convinced that any policy he chose would save South Vietnam. At the same time, he feared the consequences of withdrawal, both at home and abroad. A deeply insecure man, he allowed himself to be persuaded by his principal advisers, to whom he felt indebted for personal as well as political reasons.

• Herbert Butterfield, the English School and the Civilizing Virtues of Diplomacy  Paul Sharp

  This article seeks to establish the elements of a diplomatic theory of international relations and argues that this is implicit in the works of Herbert Butterfield on international relations, historiography, diplomatic history and Christian ethics. As a founding member of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, Butterfield shared with his colleagues the conviction that diplomacy and diplomatic systems lie at the heart of what happens, might happen and ought to happen in international relations. Like his colleagues, however, he failed to produce a work on diplomacy that attracted the sort of attention garnered by their work in other areas, for example on international systems and societies. Indeed, his own theoretical work on diplomacy is often regarded as a blind alley exhibiting nostalgia for the 'old diplomacy' of eighteenth-century Europe or a fatal attraction towards the more scientistic elements of political realism. It is argued, however, that in the broader corpus of Butterfield's work there is to be found a theory of diplomacy advocating self-restraint and charity towards others based upon recognizing both our common humanity and the impossibility of achieving a full understanding of one another. For Butterfield, this would have been a theory applied to states; but, employing one of Butterfield's own techniques for interrogating dead historians, it is argued that this holds up as a theory of how to conduct relations "between groups that regard themselves as distinctive, hold their separation from one another to be a good and, hence, value their independence."